

In 1998, 1st Armored Division planners discovered that the process described in *FM 6-20-10 Tactics Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process* could be used to integrate information operations (IO) into tactical operations. (See the article “Integrating Targeting and Information Operations in Bosnia” by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Curtis, Captain Robert A. B. Curris and Major Romanych, July-August 1998.) With continuous refinement, the targeting process has progressed to another plateau three years later.

During operations in Kosovo, field support teams from the US Army Land Information Activity (LIWA) in conjunction with the fire support element (FSE) from the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, refined the process. The team

expanded targeting to merge IO not only to synchronize lethal and IO engagement assets, but also to focus all the command’s nonlethal engagement assets into a single, integrated operation.

This article explains how Task Force (TF) Falcon (1st Armored Division) employed the targeting process during Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo from April to December 2000 to plan and execute nonlethal maneuver, civil-military operations (CMO) and IO engagements. These engagements shaped the environment for future TF operations.

Operational Framework. TF Falcon’s primary mission was to maintain a safe, secure environment for the local populous, international community and TF Falcon soldiers. To do this, the TF

planned and executed tactical operations within an operational framework of maneuver, CMO and IO. Within these three elements of “combat” power are various nonlethal operations, such as troop presence activities, FA illumination missions, humanitarian assistance, medical civilian assistance program (MEDCAP), psychological operations (PSYOP) and public affairs.

The major challenge of targeting for peace support operations is to shape the operational environment using nonlethal assets and means. In conventional conflict, enemy formations and functions are targeted and the battlefield is cleanly divided into deep, close and rear operations; in peace support operations, “adversary” target sets are the populace’s societal institutions and the “battlefield” is a nonlinear maneuver space defined in terms of time and events rather than geographic locations.

To shape this ambiguous environment, TF Falcon employed PSYOP teams, a public affairs detachment, civil affairs tactical support teams, combat camera teams, medical treatment teams, unit commanders and unit patrols. These dissimilar nonlethal assets used equally disparate means, such as PSYOP loud-speaker operations and handbills, radio broadcasts, press releases and media events, medical assistance programs, reconstruction and short-term employment projects, face-to-face meetings and force presence.

Nonlethal Targeting Revisited

The Kosovo Experience

By Chief Warrant Officer Two Richard L. Gonzales and Major (Retired) Marc J. Romanych, AD



Military Police wait for the order to deploy in response to a civil disturbance in Kosovo.




Figure 1: TF Falcon Targeting Cycle

The key to integrating nonlethal assets is a concept of “fires” (called “engagement”) that focuses available means on those selected leaders and populace groups that influence the attitudes and behavior of the general populace. Procedurally, the development of a nonlethal concept of engagement is the same as traditional targeting methodology. The difference is in the desired targeting effects (e.g., influence, warn, co-opt rather than destroy, damage, etc.) and the types of targets, whose most important characteristic is their ability to influence the populace.

TF Falcon’s analysis and control element (ACE) produced two products for nonlethal targeting: a 30-day intelligence estimate and a high-value target list (HVTL). These products were used to develop the concept of engagement and the high-payoff target list (HPTL).

The 30-day intelligence estimate described TF Falcon’s future operating environment. The ACE accomplished this by identifying changes in the environment that could affect friendly operations and predicting courses of action (COAs), or at least the intentions, of individuals, organizations and populace groups that could negatively impact the TF’s mission.

Threats to the mission included ethnic and political violence, obstructionist

interference or insurgent and criminal activities. The HVTL listed those individuals and groups in the area of responsibility (AOR) that controlled or influenced the populace who had been identified as threats to the TF mission. Typical HVTs were political, civil and religious leaders and discrete populace groups, such as internally displaced persons, residents of specific villages or criminal groups.

The Targeting Cycle. The targeting cycle drove the *decide*, *detect*, *deliver* and *assess* (D³A) targeting functions (see Figure 1). TF Falcon adopted a three-week targeting cycle divided into one-week segments. In each week, a D³A function(s) was performed. Thus, the *decide* function was accomplished in the first week, *detect* in the second, and *deliver* and *assess* functions concurrently during the third week.

The *decide* function began each Wednesday with the development of a concept of engagement and culminated on Sunday with the publication of a targeting fragmentary order (FRAGO). The engagement concept consisted of TF-level nonlethal engagements, maneuver collection requirements, MEDCAPs, directed CMO and supporting battalion IO tasks. The concept of engagement was planned for a one-week targeting period, two weeks in advance

of current operations. Planned activities and engagements were reviewed and adjusted the week before their execution to reflect changes in the AOR.

After the FRAGO was issued, the *detect* function provided TF-level assets (e.g., PSYOP, civil affair and public affairs) and subordinate battalions time to plan assigned engagements and targeting tasks. Units had one week to develop a plan to execute the engagements assigned by the targeting FRAGO.

The *deliver* and *assess* functions occurred concurrently as assigned engagements and targeting tasks were executed, reported and assessed. Generally, unless otherwise required, tasked units reported the status of engagements and targeting tasks to TF Falcon once each week.

Meetings and Work Groups. The *decide* function was composed of three meetings and three special working groups. The meetings (an initial Targeting Meeting, Executive Targeting Meeting and the Commander’s Decision Briefing) were the mechanisms by which the concept of engagement was developed, coordinated, integrated and approved. Three working groups provided analytical information to support the development of the concept of engagement: the IO, civil affairs and assessment working groups.

The targeting cycle started with an initial Targeting Meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to produce a concept of engagement for the planned targeting period. The concept was developed by defining the operational environment, reviewing the mission statement and commander's guidance, and outlining planned TF operations for the proposed targeting period. This information then served as the basis for developing targeting objectives, tasks, targets and priorities for TF-level and subordinate battalion engagements. The targeting team then developed CMO and MEDCAP activities.

In the Executive Targeting Meeting, the TF chief of staff reviewed the proposed concept of engagement and supporting maneuver, CMO and IO with the primary staff. The purpose of the meeting was to ensure staff integration and unity of effort commensurate with the commander's guidance.

The meeting's analytical summary included the status of the previous week's intelligence, maneuver, CMO and IO; reviewed the upcoming week's targeting plan; and discussed the proposed concept of engagement. The TF chief of staff directed changes to the proposed concept of engagement before the concept was briefed to the commander.

The Commanding General's Decision Briefing was the forum for the TF commander to approve or revise the concept of engagement and provide guidance for future targeting. At the end of the meeting, the targeting team wrote and issued the weekly targeting FRAGO.

The Assessment Working Group assessed the effectiveness of the previous week's engagements. The group determined targeting effectiveness by assessing information and intelligence from unit operations and intelligence reports as well as input from the IO Working Group (IOWG) and Civil Affairs Working Group (CAWG). The assessment group developed measures of effectiveness to quantify the extent to which the targets were serviced. This information then was checked against the current targeting objectives to determine whether the desired targeting effects were being achieved.

The IOWG was the IO section's forum to coordinate TF IO, including IO targeting tasks. The CAWG was the G5's forum for coordinating CMO with other TF operations.

The Targeting Team. The targeting team planned, coordinated, integrated and directed the TF's targeting effort. The core targeting team consisted of the FSE targeting officer; IO analyst; and G2, G3, and G5 representatives. These members represented TF Falcon's three elements of combat power (maneuver, CMO and IO) and linked targeting meetings and working groups with other staff functions that interfaced with the targeting process. Other staff representatives, such as from PSYOP, public affairs and medical planners, helped the targeting team, as needed.

The FSE targeting officer headed the targeting team and orchestrated the targeting cycle. The targeting officer also chaired the Targeting Meeting and produced the weekly targeting FRAGO.

The IO analyst developed and provided IO input to the targeting process. Because IO is a major component of nonlethal engagements, the IO analyst led the development of the nonlethal concept of engagement and produced the target synchronization matrix (TSM) and the IO execution matrix for the weekly targeting FRAGO.

The G2 representative produced and updated the 30-day assessment and HVTL for the planned targeting period

and interfaced with the ACE to develop and assess the collection effort. The G3 representative established targeting priorities and synchronized the targeting effort with maneuver operations. The G3 representative also planned, coordinated and assessed the maneuver component of the nonlethal concept of engagement.

The civil affairs rep planned and assessed the CMO component of the nonlethal concept of engagement. The PSYOP rep planned supporting PSYOP activities and assessed populace attitudes. The medical rep planned and coordinated MEDCAPs and other medical activities to support the targeting objectives.

Targeting Products. The targeting team used standard fire support products (e.g., the HPTL and TSM) to develop, coordinate and integrate the concept of engagement for TF assets and subordinate maneuver battalions.

HPTL. TF Falcon used a modified HPTL (see Figure 2). HPTs were selected from the G2's HVTL, based on whether or not engaging the target would produce the desired effect (i.e., payoff in support of planned operations). HPTs were selected if critical to both the adversary's needs and the friendly concept of the operation as expressed by the targeting objectives.

Target Category	Target Set	Municipality X	Municipality Y	Municipality Z	High-Payoff Targets
Political Parties	Party A	X	X	X	Party A President
		X			Party A Vice President
	Party B	X	X		Party B President
		X	X		Party B Executive Secretary
			X		Party B Vice President
	Party C	X	X		Party C Leader
Civil Government	Municipality X	X			Municipal President
					Municipal Vice President
					Council President
					Council Member
	Municipality Y	X			Municipal President
		X	X		Council President
		X			Council Member
	Municipality Z		X		Council President
			X		Village Mayor
			X		Council Member
Religious Organizations	Church Council	X	X	X	Council Leader
		X	X		Religious Leader
				X	Council Member

Figure 2: High-Payoff Target List (HPTL)

Targeting Objectives: 1. Reduce obstructionist leaders' influence on the local populace. 2. Reduce populace acceptance of ethnically motivated violence.						
Decide		Detect & Deliver				Assess
Target Set	Target(s)	Asset	How	When	Effects	Purpose/Assessment
Political Leaders	Party A President	TF 1-1 IN	Messages 1-6	NLT 02 Nov	Warn	Purpose: Reduce interference. Assessment: Response to messages.
	Party A Vice President	TF 1-1 IN	Messages 1-6	NLT 02 Nov	Warn	Purpose: Reduce interference. Assessment: Response to messages.
	Party C President	TF 2-3 AR	Messages 1-6	NLT 02 Nov	Influence	Purpose: Increase cooperation. Assessment: Response to messages.
Civil Leaders	Municipal Council Leader	TF 1-1 IN 211 CA	Messages 7-9	06 Nov	Inform	Purpose: Maintain support. Assessment: None.
	City Mayor	TF 2-3 AR	Messages 10-12	06 Nov	Warn	Purpose: Reduce interference. Response: Response to messages.
Populous Groups	Populace Town X	TF 1-1IN 405 PSYOP	Messages 13-16	NLT 06 Nov	Influence	Response: Reduce violent behavior. Response: Attitudes toward other ethnic group.
	Populace Town Y	TF 1-1 IN 405 PSYOP	Messages 13-16	NLT 06 Nov	Influence	Purpose: Reduce violent behavior. Response: Attitudes toward other ethnic group.
Effects: Inform —Provide information (to counter misinformation). Influence —Curtail or cause a specific action. Warn —Provide notice of intent (to prevent a specific action). Co-Opt —Gain cooperation. Disorganize —Reduce effectiveness or ability. Isolate —Minimize power or influence. Deny —Render ineffective by physically denying (e.g., confiscate equipment, detain personnel, occupy terrain, etc.).						

Figure 3: Target Synchronization Matrix (TSM) for Information Operations Targets. Task Force Falcon messages in the “How” column were “Do not interfere in KFOR [Kosovo Force] operations,” “Cooperate with the KFOR,” “Violence does not solve anything,” and others.

Targeting objectives focused TF assets on leaders and population groups to produce a desired effect that contributed to accomplishing the mission. Unlike a conventional HPTL that contains only adversary targets, the HPTL for a peace support operation also includes “friendly” leaders and populace groups that support TF operations.

Target sets and individual targets were rank-ordered on the HPTL by their relative importance to the populace and their geographic area of influence. The rank-order, or priority, sometimes changed, depending on the TF’s focus and concentration of effort.

On the TF Falcon HPTL, the influence of a person or group was recorded in columns that indicated areas within the AOR where the leaders were influential, typically in unit sectors. This distinction significantly helped the targeting team select HPTs, develop engagement criteria and assign delivery assets.

Once constructed, the HPTL was reviewed and adjusted each week during the Targeting Meeting. The nature of the targets and nonlethal engagements made dynamic revisions to the HPTL unnecessary. Unlike combat operations where targets are attacked according to

the priorities of the HPTL, in peace support operations, HPTs are engaged by priority, but nonlethal targets rarely are removed from the HPTL. In TF Falcon, targets remained on the HPTL but were re-prioritized and re-engaged, as needed.

TSM. The TSM is a tool used to establish the targeting objectives and synchronize the D³A engagements for the targeting period. The targeting team produced the TSM for the TF staff and units to use to plan and execute engagements and was included in the weekly targeting FRAGO. (See the modified TSM in Figure 3.)

The targeting team used targeting objectives—for example, the two shown at the top of Figure 3—to translate the commander’s intent, concept of the operation and planning guidance into nonlethal targeting of the populace and their societal institutions. Because traditional targeting objective terms (i.e., limit, disrupt, delay, divert, destroy and damage) did not always describe the desired effects, the targeting team had to use other terms. TF Falcon used the terms “reduce,” “minimize” and “increase” in the targeting objectives to describe the desired nonlethal effects.

Like other TSMs, the modified matrix used in TF Falcon assigned specific *decide*, *detect*, *deliver* and *assess* responsibilities for every planned HPT. However, there were differences in the information entered into the matrix, most notably engagement means, and the use of non-standard terms to describe nonlethal attack effects.

The primary means of engaging key leaders was verbal messages delivered during face-to-face meetings. The messages were a set of five to seven talking points used by the person conducting the meeting to guide the conversation. Specific messages were developed for each target set and, on occasion, for individual targets. Messages were matched to targets in the TSM’s deliver column and attached to the TSM.

TF Falcon used non-standard attack (engagement) effects for nonlethal engagements. To avoid confusion, the effects were explained in detail at the bottom of the TSM (Figure 3).

Targeting FRAGO. The targeting FRAGO directed the execution of the targeting concept of engagement. The FRAGO was issued each week on Sunday night for execution by subordinate elements one week later. In addition to



US troops from the 1st Infantry Division in Kosovo conduct cordon and search operations. Timely, specific intelligence is required to engage the correct target.

the TSM, the FRAGO included the commander's guidance, priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), maneuver collection tasks, an IO execution matrix, TF-level directed civil affairs activities and MEDCAPs, and engagement re-tasking.

Maneuver collection tasks included increased or re-directed presence patrols in a specific area, mobile tactical checkpoints or increased monitoring and reporting of certain activities. These tasks were in named areas of interest (NAIs) and assigned to the maneuver battalions for execution. Maneuver intelligence collection tasks were linked to collection requirements (e.g., PIRs), but also to specific tasks from the IO execution matrix.

Engagement re-tasking involved adjusting the previous week's targeting FRAGO and directing re-engagements of previously engaged targets. The FRAGO also addressed re-tasking for maneuver and (or) IO resulting from changes in the operational environment.

Assessment. Lacking quantifiable physical evidence, nonlethal targeting effects are necessarily subtle. Engagement effects may be a target's response or non-response or changes in efforts and techniques. Targeting effects may be manifested as trends, activities and patterns in the operational environment. Effects also can be as simple as the absence of activity.

To assess the status of the targeting effort, the TF Falcon targeting team reviewed unit intelligence and operations reports for information that indi-

cated whether the targeting effort was achieving its objectives. Two types of information were gathered.

The first was incident data, which was a record of key incidents that occurred during a targeting period. These incidents were evaluated and categorized as being either negative (counter to a safe, secure environment) or positive (inter-ethnic cooperation or observance of the rule of law) in relation to the TF's mission. Examples of negative incidents tracked by TF Falcon included acts of ethnic violence, civil disobedience and anti-Kosovo Force (KFOR) rhetoric. Positive incidents included peaceful demonstrations and refugee returns.

The tracked incidents must be defined in sufficient detail to ensure continuity of categorization from one targeting period to the next. The recorded incidents then can be analyzed to determine trends over time (weekly and monthly) and across the AOR by unit sector.


The second type of collected information was an indicator. These were significant events that provided an indication of change in the operational environment. TF Falcon examples of such events included an attack on an important political faction leader, anti-KFOR graffiti in several villages within the same municipality or a series of violent demonstrations. To properly assess and analyze this type of information, the targeting team had to have knowledge of the AOR, operational environment, populace culture and other factors to determine the relevance of the event to targeting effectiveness.

Conclusion. The greatest value of employing the targeting process for peace support operations is its ability to direct disparate assets and means into a single, focused operation. First Brigade's experience in Kosovo not only reaffirmed the use of the D³A process as an integration tool for IO, but also proved the process can synchronize nonlethal maneuver, CMO and IO engagements.

But work still remains. Peace support operation planners must define targeting objectives and attack effects to reflect the focus of their nonlethal targeting plus develop a methodology to assess the effects of nonlethal engagements.

D³A has been proven as an effective methodology to synchronize maneuver, CMO and IO both in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Kosovo, nonlethal engagements were credited with successfully shaping the environment for day-to-day operations and diffusing several potentially volatile situations, as well as setting the conditions for significant events, such as the Kosovo municipal elections.

Further innovations are required if the targeting process is to realize its full potential in peace support operations.



Chief Warrant Officer Two Richard L. Gonzales, until recently, was the Targeting Officer for the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, Germany. Currently, he is the Counterfire Officer for the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He also served as the Targeting Officer of Task Force Falcon in Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo. Past assignments include serving as a Fire Support NCO (FSNCO) for the 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers, participating in Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf; as an FSNCO for the 2d Battalion 75th Rangers, participating in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti; and as a Q-36 Radar Technician with C Battery, 25th Field Artillery of the 1st Armored Division, participating in Operations Joint Forge/Guard in Bosnia. He can be reached at montygonzales@hotmail.com.

Major Marc J. Romanych is a retired Air Defense Artillery Officer. He works for JBM, Inc., which is under contract with the Army Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA). Since 1998, he has deployed with LIWA Information Operations Field Support Teams to Bosnia and Kosovo and on many Army and joint exercises. He can be reached at mjroman@vulcan.belvoir.army.mil or mjromanych@cs.com.