

Focusing Combat Power—

The Role of the FA Brigade

by Colonel Morris J. Boyd and Major Randall A. Mitchell

**“ Wheel Horse
X-Ray, this is Red
Storm Six; execute
your on-order
mission to reinforce
the 1st Cavalry
Division. ”**



Colonel Morris J. Boyd

These are the words the Redlegs of the 42d Field Artillery (FA) Brigade heard from the VII Corps Artillery commander that launched the Wheel Horse Brigade on six weeks of around-the-clock combat operations in support of Operation Desert Storm.

During those six weeks of mobile armored desert warfare, we learned a lot about our doctrine, tactics, techniques and soldiering. Working with three great divisions during the key phases of the VII Corps fight, we also learned how each division commander focused his combat power. But most of all, we reaffirmed the importance of the FA brigade as a responsive, flexible and powerful force available to the corps and corps artillery commander to do what the artillery does best—focus and mass combat power to destroy the enemy's will to fight.

Setting the Stage

The 42d FA Brigade is a V Corps Artillery unit stationed in Germany. The brigade was notified on 8 November 1990 to deploy to Southwest Asia (SWA)

as a part of Operation Desert Shield. Before notification, the brigade was in the initial stages of a time-phased inactivation mandated by the Council for Disarmament in Europe. Once alerted for deployment, all inactivation planning stopped, and the brigade staff was reconstituted to a fully operational level. Simultaneously, the brigade underwent a complete reorganization; it was divested of its five assigned battalions (2-20 FA, 4-7 FA, 5-3 FA, 2-32 FA and 3-32 FA) and assigned three new battalions. Two of the new battalions were transferred from the 41st FA Brigade while the third came from the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, both also in Germany.

During the next six weeks, our brigade hammered out command and staff relationships and raised personnel levels in the three battalions to the required tables of organization and equipment (TOE) strengths. The final deployment configuration consisted of the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB); 3-20 FA (155-mm, self-propelled howitzers); 1-27 FA (multiple launch rocket system

or MLRS); and 2-29 FA (155-mm, self-propelled howitzers).

Throughout the reorganization, the brigade planned and conducted multi-echelon desert warfare training and executed accountability and maintenance programs. Due to the ongoing requirements in V Corps and the need to prepare for the new mission with VII Corps, the brigade staff essentially worked for both corps artillery commanders until deployment. Although initially viewed with skepticism, it was quickly apparent that you can reorganize a brigade, attach it to another headquarters and change the mission as long as you have the solid doctrine, tough training and the superb soldiers that we have in our Army today.

The brigade advance party departed for SWA on 15 December followed shortly by the rest of the brigade. After arriving at the seaports of Damman and Jubail, Saudi Arabia, all units off-loaded their equipment and prepared to move to Tactical Assembly Area Henry (TAA Henry), 570 kilometers inland and east of King Kalid Military City, which is

about 120 kilometers south of the Iraqi border.

During the weeks that followed, the brigade supported the 1st Cavalry, 1st Infantry (Mechanized) and 3d Armored Divisions in key phases of the VII Corps portion of Operation Desert Storm.

Supporting the 1st Cavalry Division

Defensive Blocking. On 13 January, the brigade began combat operations with the VII Corps Artillery order to move north out of TAA Henry to reinforce the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Div Arty). With poor visibility due to rainy weather, the Army Central Command (ARCENT) became increasingly concerned about the possibility of an Iraqi attack under the cover of poor weather down the Wadi al Batin and across Tapline Road, the latter about 45 kilometers north of TAA Henry. The Wadi al Batin is a historic avenue of approach that runs from Kuwait and Iraq into Saudi Arabia. Our mission was to be in blocking positions in the event of this preemptive Iraqi strike down the wadi. The brigade headquarters moved north about 35 kilometers at dusk in a driving rainstorm that turned the desert into quicksand. After negotiating a treacherous escarpment and several flooding wadis, the brigade closed in to its blocking position. We linked FM radio and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) with the 1st Cav Div Arty. Although the two headquarters were working on two separate secure codes, prior coordination allowed the brigade to preload the Cavalry "fill" so that the link could occur. The coordination was through liaison team contact.

Liaison Teams. As would become standing operating procedure (SOP), the brigade dispatched one of its two liaison teams to the 1st Cavalry Div Arty several days before the contingency operation to develop the concept of support. This early and comprehensive liaison with the reinforced unit served the brigade well throughout Desert Storm as it proved to be the critical link in the brigade's ability to move about the battlefield, reinforcing different units on short notice. Actively seeking and disseminating information, liaison teams didn't limit themselves to remaining in the Div Arty area but "touched base" regularly at the




The 1st Cavalry Division Artillery fires on Iraqi positions.

- a. Mission (METT-T)
- b. Task Organization
- c. Positioning
- d. Azimuth of Fire
- e. TACFIRE (Subscribers Tables and Matrix)
- f. Commanders Attack Criteria (TACFIRE)
- g. High-Payoff Target List
- h. Fire Support Coordination Measures
- i. Survey Control Measures
- j. Met Schedule
- k. Eyes for Fires (FIST, OH58D, etc.)
- l. Counterfire Mission
- m. Radar Employment
- n. Rendezvous/Linkup Points
- o. MLRS Employment (Technical Data, Capabilities/Limitations)
- p. Combat Service Support Coordination (May require separate meeting with XO and S4s.)
- q. Class V Considerations for Planning and Target Engagement
- r. Frequencies, Call Signs, Fills
- MSE/TASS Support
- s. TOC Locations

Figure 1: Change of Mission Coordination Checklist for LNO Teams. This included face-to-face coordination (initiated by the LNO) with the FA brigade commander, S3 fire control officer, communications and electronics officer, S1 and S4 representatives and their counterparts at the division artillery one to three days before the mission change.

division main command post (DMAIN) and division tactical command post (DTAC) as well. Additionally, the brigade commander, S3, fire control officer, communications-electronics staff officer (CESO) and a logistics representative coordinated face-to-face with their counterparts at Div Arty.

The artillery brigade is authorized two liaison teams on its TOE. In coordinating support to three divisions and simultane-



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A modified HMMWV with a shelter and VFMED mounted on the back served as a brigade liaison team vehicle.

HMMWV
2 AN/VRC-46 Radios, (one net for voice and remoted from the Div Arty TOC using a AN/GRA-39 and one for digital)
Variable Format Message Entry Device (VFMED)
Night-Vision Goggles
Trailer (for greater self sufficiency)
Global Positioning System (GPS)

Note: Battalion LNO teams had the same equipment except for having only one radio and a digital message device (DMD) instead of a VFMED.

Figure 2: Brigade LNO Team Equipment. Each team had a driver, NCO and an officer. A fourth person is recommended to allow two-man shifts for 24-hour operations.

ously conducting live-fire training, the brigade needed a minimum of three liaison teams. We took assets "out of hide" to cover the requirement, but this may not always be feasible. (See Figures 1 and 2 for a liaison officer, LNO, checklist and a LNO equipment list.)

Position Location and Navigation Devices. Other valuable tools employed during this first phase were the global positioning system (GPS) and long-range

aid to navigation system (LORAN). We used them for unit displacements and in communications and supply elements to help them keep pace with the battle tempo. These systems gave the brigade day and night, all-weather capabilities the enemy didn't have—key in mobile desert warfare.

Heavy Reinforcing Light. The 1st Cavalry Division was tasked with defense-in-zone around the city of Hafir al Batin just north of Tapline Road. During the early phase of operations, the 2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) operated with the 1st Cav Div as its "Third" brigade. This brigade was to defend the airfield at Al Quaysumah on Tapline Road. To bolster the firepower of the 2d Brigade, 1-27 FA and 3-20 FA moved into position to provide general support (GS) and reinforcing (R) fire for the 2d Brigade's direct support (DS) battalion (1-320 FA, 105-mm, towed). The 3-20 FA commander served as the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and LNO for this mission.

This reinforced the importance of the FA brigade's augmenting the fires of light forces and bolstering them with munitions and capabilities not usually found in light units. Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, the VII Corps Commander, later said the 2d Brigade "breathed a sigh of relief with the addition of the 42d FA Brigade's MLRS and 155-mm self-propelled battalions."

In addition to the defense mission, the 1st Cavalry Division was to deceive the Iraqis into believing the main attack of the Multinational Coalition Forces (MCF) would come up the Wadi al Batin. Part of this deception operation was a series of artillery raids and division and corps attack helicopter feints. The role of the Div Arty and 42d Brigade was to suppress or destroy enemy air defense (SEAD or DEAD) assets.

"Mix and Match Missions." After the air war began on 17 January, the 1st Cavalry Division moved north along the Iraqi, Kuwait and Saudi tri-border areas. The division conducted its defense-in-zone with a cavalry screen (1-7 Cavalry) in front and two brigades abreast. The 42d Brigade's 3-20 FA was the DS to the 1-7 Cav, with the 2-29 FA general support reinforcing (GSR) to the 1st Cav's 1-82 FA and the 1-27 FA GS. In this manner, the brigade accomplished both centralized

control of FA fires (immediately responsive to the corps artillery commander, i.e., GS and GSR) and decentralized control with brigade fires immediately responsive to a particular maneuver force (DS and R). This flexibility to continually mix and match missions, depending on the situation, was another doctrinal "reaffirmation" of the FA brigade in Desert Storm.


Retrans Teams. With the lines of communications (LOCs) stretched, we sent a retransmission team out to ensure that the brigade could communicate with its units south at the VII Corps training area a few kilometers from TAA Henry in the event we had to recall them rapidly. The retransmission team did an outstanding job of establishing a double retransmission station (by combining their assets with 2-29 FA's retransmission team), thus allowing the brigade to maintain FM communications some 90 kilometers. This valuable asset proved itself again and again during Desert Storm.

MLRS Raids Forward. On 13 February, the brigade fired its first shots in anger. The 2-29 FA (Pathfinders) fired the first mission (also the first of a Germany-based element of VII Corps) against an Iraqi truck convoy.

Additionally, the 1-27 FA (MLRS) conducted a raid against three artillery

targets acquired using corps and division intelligence and targeting assets. The targets were passed through the Div Arty to the brigade for execution. This was an intensely managed operation that called for pushing the MLRS launchers well forward into the screen area to allow them to range the Iraqi targets. With few exceptions, Iraqi artillery was deployed so far to the rear that their maximum range only allowed them to reach their forward line of own troops (FLOT). With guidance from the 1st Cav Div Arty commander, the commander of 1-27 worked out the game plan with his battery commanders in what he called a "Thinkex."

The raid mission was to marshal the launchers and command and control vehicles in an assembly area and move them forward under maneuver escort to a survey control point. (This allowed the launchers to update their on-board fire control systems.) The 1st Cav's MLRS battery was "chopped" to 1-27 FA for this mission. From there, the launchers proceeded to their firing points where two of the three batteries engaged targets while the third remained silent, tied to a Q37 Firefinder radar to provide quick counterfire. If counterfire was unnecessary, the third battery was to fire on preassigned targets. After completing these missions, the launchers immediately displaced back to the update area (ser-



1-27 FA (MLRS), 42d FA Bde, participates in an artillery raid.


ving as a rally point), conducted personnel and equipment accountability and then proceeded back to their original positions.

One aspect of the raids that was to prove crucial was the importance of rehearsals. In the words of the British 1st Armored Div Arty commander (who also worked with the corps artillery), "What you don't practice, you can't do." This operation was rehearsed many times to "work out the bugs." The first rehearsal went almost too smoothly; subsequent ones proved that "Murphy" was alive and well but could be beaten.

The close coordination between the Div Arty and brigade commanders and S3s greatly facilitated this operation. As additional raids were fired and units became accustomed to the requirements, the time needed to plan and execute them dropped off markedly.

But the raids highlighted another problem, one that would continue throughout Desert Storm: the lack of timely and accurate battle damage assessment (BDA). We couldn't determine the effects of our raids. This highlights the urgent and chronic need for a system that will allow for effective, timely BDA (i.e., an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV).

On the night of 15 February and early on the 16th, both 3-20 and 1-27 FA participated in an AH64 helicopter raids and



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The 42d FA Bde's TOC in Southwest Asia.

feints, while 2-29 FA provided counter-battery coverage. This mission called for the units to conduct SEAD to allow elements of the corps 11th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) to attack preplanned targets and targets of opportunity in zone. This mission also called for strict adherence to a firing schedule to keep from endangering friendly aircraft.

Shortly before 0100 on the 16th, the night calm exploded with cannon and rocket fires. At precisely 0100, the weapons fell silent as the Apaches from the 11th CAB moved forward to do their work. In concert with the Div Arty, some

322 rockets and 219 rounds were fired. Once again, one of the MLRS batteries stayed silent to provide immediate counterfire or engage preplanned targets if no counterfire was necessary. The result was the successful suppression of the air defense network and an open corridor in the Iraqi lines that allowed the CAB's Apaches to attack their targets at will. The mission was complete at 0230 hours on the 16th.

Later that morning after only a few hours sleep and with the tubes and launchers still warm from the SEAD and feint, the 42d Brigade departed the 1st



A 42d FA Bde M109 howitzer battalion moves in column back to Saudi Arabia after the cease fire.

Cav zone to move to support the 1st Infantry Division (Big Red One) in a series of raids and a preparation for the breach operation.

Supporting the 1st Infantry Division

“Jump TOC.” By 1300 on 16 February, the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) traveled 78 kilometers to the Big Red One’s area just south of the Iraqi border and was mission ready within 12 hours of departing the 1st Cav zone. Here again, the brigade communications element established a long (75 kilometers) retransmission to allow the 42d Brigade to maintain crucial FM communications with VII Corps Artillery.

The remainder of the 16th was used to update the battalions on the current situation, perform maintenance and prepare to conduct future operations. This was facilitated by the brigade Jump TOC moving in advance of the brigade on 14 February into the Big Red One’s sector to prepare the location for the brigade’s arrival. The Jump TOC closed in its new position on 15 February, reporting that there was enemy mortar fire in the area of operations that was being engaged with friendly counterfire. A raid and feint communications exercise (COMMEX) took place in the evening.

FA Brigade as Div Arty Headquarters. As with the 1st Cavalry Division, the 42d Brigade participated in

several artillery raids with 1st Infantry Division. In these raids we fired a mix of cannon and MLRS assets. In addition to attacking high-payoff targets and attriting Iraqi artillery in zone, these raids also were training for fire planning and to allow crews to gain additional confidence in their equipment.

A prime example of this was the attachment of A/40 FA (MLRS), the 3d Armored Division’s MLRS battery, to the 42d Brigade for one raid. Due to operations security (OPSEC) considerations (the massing of the 1st Armored and 3d Armored Divisions to the west), the battery was precluded from firing from the 3d Armored Division zone. But by moving to the 1st Infantry Division zone, they could hone their skills and return to their division more proficient.

Also, the 1st Infantry Div Arty commander tasked the 42d Brigade to be the planning and controlling headquarters for two of these raids that included the attachment of divisional battalions and battalions of other artillery brigades. Our ability to act as the Div Arty controlling headquarters was critical in upcoming operations. Our ability to rapidly receive and shed units was well-tested.


Also of prime importance was the brigade tactical fire direction system’s (TACFIRE’s) ability to provide mutual support for the Div Arty. Our support was put to the test when, during the course of one raid, the Div Arty computer encountered a radio problem that prevented it from communicating with its

units. In 15 minutes, the Div Arty system completely transferred the data to the brigade shelter, allowing us to assume control of the operations without a break in the raid sequence.

Submunition Duds. The massive use of dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) for the first time in combat provided another valuable insight. In the intense, movement-oriented combat that took place in the following days, DPICM showed itself to be a “two-edged sword.” While this munition was very effective against enemy targets, at times a number of unexploded “bomblets” were left littering the area that maneuver (and subsequently support units) had to cross.

Air Coordination. Finally, the raids required close coordination between Air Force “fast movers” and the artillery. This coordination was essential for the safety of friendly aircraft. However, the coordination wasn’t always timely and, in at least one case, delayed the firing of a raid. A similar incident occurred with the 1st Cav. This is definitely a subject that requires additional emphasis during training exercises.

In addition to timely clearance, there was a problem with the definition of fire support coordination line (FSCL) and airspace coordination areas (ACAs) throughout Desert Storm. VII Corps used the FSCL as a restrictive fire control measure (i.e., any fires past the FSCL have to be coordinated with the Air



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An M109 battalion passes a herd of sheep while redeploying to Saudi Arabia.

Force). The Air Force also heavily used "informal" ACAs as opposed to formal ones. While the informal ACAs were much easier to establish, they presented numerous problems and areas of conflict between indirect fire systems and the aircraft.

Pre-Link-up Coordination. On 22 February, while continuing with raids and intense planning for the breach operation with 1st Infantry Division, the brigade also coordinated with the 3d Armored Division fire support element (FSE) for eventual link-up. For this change of mission and link-up, the 1-27 FA went to the 3d Armored Division immediately after our artillery preparation, fire with the 1st Infantry Division. The rest of the brigade followed within 12 to 18 hours. The 1-27 FA linked with the division between Phase Line (PL) Minnesota and PL Apple just across the Saudi Arabian-Iraqi border. Once again, early and constant coordination with the gaining unit was critical to success.

Flexible Planning. With the completion of the last raid on 23 February, the brigade turned its full attention to the breaching operation with the 1st Infantry Division. An integral part of this operation was an artillery preparation planned and continually modified to adapt to a changing tactical situation. The initial plan was for ARCENT, minus VII Corps, to attack on 24 February (Ground Day or G-Day) and the 1st Infantry Division to fire the prep and conduct breaching operations (along with the rest of the VII Corps attack) on G+1. Soon after the start of the ground assault on 24 February, it became obvious the advance would go swifter than expected. Thus the planned two-and-one-half hour prep became a one-half hour prep and was fired at 1430 on G-Day.

This quick change and repositioning of artillery not only demonstrated, again, the artillery's ability to respond, but also showed the criticality of having a solid fire plan. Also, with the basic plan set, modifications were much easier. This short but intense "firestorm" set the pace for the remainder of the conflict; close air support (CAS) stunned and attrited the Iraqi forces, artillery hammered them to the ground and maneuver forces "drove the nails in the coffin."

After the preparation, the brigade moved forward in the late afternoon and crossed the border into Iraq. That night

the 2-29 FA was the first element of the Wheel Horse across the breach, followed the next morning by the rest of the brigade. Continuing north, the brigade departed the 1st Infantry Division sector at 1200 to begin operations with the 3d Armored Division for the final phase of the operation: the destruction of Saddam Hussein's highly touted Republican Guards Forces Command (RGFC).

Supporting the 3d Armored Division

Link-Up Facilitation. 25 February was breach breakthrough and link-up day. The brigade moved north through the breach and, after snaking its way through areas literally covered with minefields, improved conventional munitions (ICM) bomblets and other unexploded ordnance, linked up with elements of the 3d Armored Division cavalry squadron at noon, some 40 kilometers into Iraq. Again due to prior planning and rehearsal, the link-up came off without a hitch. Once in the 3d Armored Division sector, it was "pedal to the metal" to catch up to the front lines of "Spearhead."

Facilitating this was a Division movement-to-contact schematic the division commander and his staff developed especially for this operation. A few days before the link-up, the 3d Armored Div Arty commander, realizing that one picture was worth a thousand words, alerted the brigade commander to view a sketch of an entire division in movement-to-contact wedge formation, consisting of about 6,000 vehicles. Also, the use of "waypoints," checkpoints and GPS allowed the brigade to orient on the division and smoothly link-up. By 1730, the link-up was complete, and the division stopped for the night to rearm and refuel between PL Saigon and PL Smash in preparation for the anticipated swing east toward Kuwait in a meeting engagement with the Republican Guards.

The Division Wedge Formation. The division advance continued before dawn on the 26th with all elements again traveling in the wedge. The battalion and battery wedge worked well for movement during all phases of the battle. Our division wedge moved rapidly with maneuver forces leading and the artillery close behind. The logistical elements of the units followed the wedge in column along

several paths, providing excellent fuel and maintenance support. This provided the logistic assets added security. The close proximity of support drastically reduced the amount of coordination required to recover disabled vehicles.

This formation, as well as the wide open terrain and the rapid advance, negated the need for the artillery's traditional advance party. By the nature of the formation, the batteries quickly were able to establish a firing capability.

Digital versus Voice Commo and the Demand for MLRS Fires. The advance continued at a brisk pace throughout the day, meeting only scattered, generally uncoordinated resistance. As dusk came, the situation changed dramatically. The 3d Armored Division (with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and 1st Infantry Division in the south and the 1st Armored Division in the north) smashed headlong into elements of three Iraqi armored units: the Tawakalna Republican Guards Mechanized Division, the 17th Armored Division, and the 52d Armored Division in the vicinity of PL Bullet, at this point only 40 kilometers from the Kuwaiti border to our east.

In the furious night battle that followed, the brigade was heavily committed. The 3-20 FA and 2-29 FA fired continuously with their reinforced battalions. The 1-27 FA, in general support, constantly fired rockets on the Iraqi formations. The Iraqis referred to these devastating rocket barrages as "Iron Rain." By dawn, the triple punch of CAS, accurate and timely artillery fire and aggressive maneuver had "broken the backs" of the Iraqi divisions attempting a desperate defense.

This night action brought out several key points. First, the brigade found that both technical and tactical fire direction with TACFIRE worked best when using a combination of digital and voice methods. The best approach was to plan fires digitally and execute them by voice. Attempts to execute digitally were slow and didn't provide the fire direction of-ficers (FDOs) enough information to attack targets properly. Also, while TACFIRE's centralized control was immensely helpful in controlling possible fratricide, it tended to slow down mission processing time dramatically.

Second and common throughout Desert Storm, the demand for MLRS fires was tremendous, with the expecta-

tion for it to do more, faster. MLRS provides a massive, quick surge of firepower, but both maneuver and, at times, fire support personnel didn't fully understand the peculiarities of the system. Response times, launcher status and the current single munition capability were continually assessed as we employed the system.

The FA Brigade As Div Arty Headquarters, Again. On 27 February, the brigade initially stayed in position to allow the 3d Armored Div Arty to displace. Again the FA brigade's ability to function as the artillery headquarters for the division was proven. The 3d Armored Division continued its advance into the night with the Div Arty and brigade providing numerous supporting fires. By now it was obvious the Iraqi Army was rapidly losing its will and ability to fight. We encountered large groups of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and destroyed massive amounts of abandoned equipment.

From Offense Back to Defense. Up to the last minute before the cease-fire, the brigade's guns and launchers punished the now routed Iraqi units. At 0800 on 28 February, our guns fell silent, and the cease-fire went into effect. With the 3-20 and 2-29 FA already across the border in Kuwait, the brigade headquarters and the 1-27 FA followed. In a defensive "set," the brigade conducted accountability,

maintenance, rearm and refit operations to be able to continue the attack and provide force protection.

Lessons Learned. Throughout Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, our FA team adapted well to operations in the desert, mastering new tactics, techniques and technology "on the fly." We had the speed and agility to stay up with the M1 tank and Bradley equipped maneuver units, even during exploitation and pursuit. The GPS emerged as a critical piece of the land navigation and position location challenge. TACFIRE, light TACFIRE (LTACFIRE) and manual gunnery had worked in harmony due to the superb efforts of the fire direction centers (FDCs) at all levels. We also learned the "desert wedge," battery (vice platoon) and similar tactics should be incorporated into our training tasks. We reaffirmed the need for a UAV to keep a timely, accurate "eye on the battlefield."

In the final analysis, it was the spirit of our Redlegs that brought us through it all. Well-trained soldiers led by competent leaders made the difference.

As we entered the cease-fire and thought about our experiences in mobile armored combat, we kept coming back to the words Lieutenant General Franks spoke after our initial move in support of 1st Cavalry Division: "You were all I had. You were the only combat power I could generate at that time. Your posi-

tioning and responsiveness made the difference in establishing the initial defense." That's the role of the FA brigade—to focus combat power when and where most needed.



Colonel (P) Morris J. Boyd commanded the 42d Field Artillery Brigade (Wheel Horse), Germany, and deployed his unit to Southwest Asia in Operation Desert Storm. Currently, he's the Executive Officer for the Commanding General of the Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe Virginia. His previous commands include the 6th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery (M101A1 and M198 howitzers), a direct support battalion in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) Fort Ord, California, a battery in the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam, and a battery in the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood.

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Special thanks to Captains Eric R. Romero and Robert B. Gilpin, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 42d FA Brigade, for the LNO checklist and equipment list.



SGT Taylor directs traffic as HHB 42d FA Bde moves to reinforce the 3d Armored Division Artillery in Iraq.