# Integrating Targeting and Information Operations in BOSNIA

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One of the major outgrowths of the US participation in the NATO mission to enforce the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the ongoing "sea trials" for information operations (IO). A concept somewhat understood by most commanders, IO's full implementation is still well into the future.

Many articles and organizations have described various cells, processes and techniques for leveraging the vast potential of IO, but most describe ad hoc methods that rely to some extent on the operational environment, the level of command support and the amount of command involvement. For IO to be embraced fully at the tactical level, it first must become an integral part of corps and division battle rhythms and planning cycles and be compatible with doctrine. One cannot expect a division planning staff to speak in one language for conventional operations and transition to another for the sake of information operations.

In recent operations in Bosnia, a group of 1st Armored Division Task Force Eagle planners bridged the tactical IO gap. By using conventional targeting processes to merge IO into the decision-making process, the division staff was able to incorporate lethal and non-lethal attack options into a synchronized plan for the commander. The experience proved valuable because it broke down what appeared to be a wall between tactical IO and conventional military operations. In the process, planners significantly enhanced the attractiveness of information operations as another tool for tactical commanders.

This article explains how the division conducted IO in support of the peace enforcement mission Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia-Herzegovina and integrated IO into tactical operations by merging it into the targeting process. More work needs to be done to fully align the two processes, but the progress made by Task Force Eagle promises a future of IO as a responsive option for the tactical commander.

**Targeting in Bosnia.** Targeting in peace enforcement operations is fundamentally identical to that used in high-intensity operations. It is a logical process that decides what must be attacked, how and when it will be attacked, and then matches the best attack asset to the target. The tasks facing the division targeting team are no different in Bosnia, although the conditions and standards differ somewhat.

Perhaps the major difference in peace operations is the broad definition of "adversary," which can be interpreted to mean anyone, military or civilian, who can prevent the friendly force from accomplishing the mission. Although this definition generally applies to all operations, the potential for civilian "enemies" is significantly greater in peace operations. This changes the targeting objectives by expanding target sets to include non-military entities and non-destructive options and changes many "attack" effects from lethal to non-lethal.

Instead of well-defined military targets, such as multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), air defense artillery (ADA) sites and motorized rifle divisions (MRDs), the high-value targets (HVTs) and high-payoff targets (HPTs) facing the peace enforcement commander are not as well-defined. His "targets" may be the intentions of government leaders, attitudes of the local populace and influence over various social and political groups. In this environment, targeting takes on a dimension that, up to now, has been considered by many to be the singular domain of information operations. However, in recent Joint Guard operations, the unique capabilities of IO were integrated into the targeting process to expand the maneuver commander's range of attack options.

**IO in Peace Operations.** Information operations is an element of combat power that attacks adversary information and information systems while defending the friendly forces' own. In its applied form, IO synchronizes seven elements—psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC), military deception, physical destruction, civil affairs (CA) and public affairs (PA)—into offensive and defensive information operations. The mix of IO elements depends on the level of war (strategic, operational or tactical) and the range of military operations (peacetime, conflict and war) as well as the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, time and troops available (METT-T).

*FM 100-6 Information Operations* states IO in operations other than war (OOTW) may be one of the most critical and acceptable means of achieving the assigned objectives because rules of engagement (ROE) may severely restrict the use of conventional military weapons (see Figure 1). It recognizes that IO consists of both lethal and non-lethal attack options. Yet, as IO doctrine has emerged over the last several years, the use of IO at the tactical level of war, especially at the low-intensity end of the spectrum of military operation, has received relatively minor attention. During Operation Joint Guard, the need for non-lethal attack options revealed the void in existing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP).

Recent experience in Bosnia demonstrates IO activities can be integrated into the conventional targeting process and tactical operations. The principles espoused in *FM 6-20-10 Targeting* and FM 100-6 provide the commander the doctrine for using lethal and non-lethal means to achieve his mission. Conventional targeting describes both lethal and non-lethal attack options (fires, maneuver, EW and PSYOP) while IO usually describes non-lethal attack options to strike at the adversary's personnel, equipment, communications and facilities in an effort to disrupt or shape command and control. (To cover every eventuality, lethal attack options always are planned as part of military peacekeeping operations.) In contrast to lethal fires that habitually target military systems, non-lethal IO can attack attitudes, behavior and intentions.

Typical non-lethal IO targets are civil, political and military leaders who control or influence the local population or assets these leaders use to achieve their objectives. For example, if adversary leaders seek to turn a legal civilian political rally into a violent, hostile demonstration, the target set may be those capabilities and personnel needed to form or transform a crowd into a mob (inflammatory radio broadcasts, loudspeaker vans, handheld communication systems or crowd leaders). Critical information nodes—for example, a radio station broadcasting messages instructing hostile crowds to assemble—are




Figure 1: Targeting Emphasis. Information operations (non-lethal fires) may be the most effective means of achieving objectives because the rules of engagement (ROE) may severely restrict the use of conventional military weapons.

| Attack Effects | Traditional Operations | Information Operations |
|---|---|---|
| Limit | Reduce available options or courses of action (COAs). | Minimize influence. |
| Disrupt | Preclude effective combat system cohesion. | Reduce ability or effectiveness. |
| Delay | Alter time of arrival. | Hinder decision making. |
| Divert | Tie up critical resources. | Gain cooperation or assistance. |
| Destroy | Ruin the target's structure. | Destroy something physically. |
| Damage | Undefined/Subjective | Undefined/Subjective |

Figure 2: Targeting Objectives. This figure compares the description of effects desired against traditional military as compared to information operation targets.

candidates for non-lethal attack target by EW assets. In some cases, complementary systems may work to attack an IO target, as often is done with conventional attack options against military targets. Thus, if buses are needed to transport people to the demonstration, the owner of the bus company could be targeted to discourage his vehicular support of the demonstration. Also, traffic control points could be placed on likely avenues of approach to delay or stop buses carrying passengers to the demonstration.

**IO and Targeting.** The targeting process—*decide*, *detect*, *deliver*, *assess* ($D^3A$)—can be used without modification to conduct offensive IO. Integrating lethal and non-lethal IO into the targeting process starts by acknowledging the compatibility of conventional and IO targeting objectives.

*FM 6-20-10* describes targeting objectives that "limit, disrupt, delay, divert, destroy or damage" the enemy. These same terms are applicable to IO targeting, although the descriptions must be refined from both the conventional and IO perspectives to reflect the focus of IO targeting (e.g., adversary decision-makers, information structures and decision-making processes). (See Figure 2.)

Because targeting and IO share the same end state (enemy capabilities altered to a level specified by the commander and friendly capabilities protected), it logically follows that the processes to achieve that outcome should be similar. Using parallel, non-integrated planning processes is an inefficient use of limited planning time and produces sub-optimal results.

*Decide*. The decide function begins with the HVT list (HVTL) developed by the G2 during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The HVTL identifies the people or things (capabilities) critical to the enemy's success as shown in Figure 3. (The example HVTL and other matrices referred to in this article are found in Annex C, of *FM 6-20-10* and can




Figure 3: Information Operations (IO) High-Value Target List (HVTL). This matrix shows the HVTs- targets that are critical to the enemy's operations. Non-lethal and lethal targeting use the same HVTL.



If adversary leaders seek to turn a legal civilian political rally into a violent, hostile demonstration, the target set may be those capabilities and personnel needed to form or transform a crowd into a mob

be applied to both traditional and IO targeting without modification.)

The HVTL includes all targets, by target category (i.e., government leaders, media, weapons storage sites, etc.) that are critical to the adversary's successful completion of its mission paired against the targeting objectives (limit, disrupt, delay, etc.). Note that in the example HVTL shown in Figure 3, traditional targeting terms are applied to non-traditional targets, such as buses and government officials.

Targeting objectives are derived from the commander's guidance. These objectives focus all division systems (maneuver, fires, IO) on a few key tasks. To reflect the focus of IO, it is necessary to include both lethal and non-lethal attack in the targeting objectives.

Traditionally, targeting decisions have focused on the "what" (physical targets), while IO focuses on the "who" (leaders and decision makers). In most military operations, the commander's intent will include both target sets. By expanding the attack options to include non-lethal means, planners develop a truly integrated and comprehensive target set for the operation that will fulfill the commander's intent.

Development of the HPTL is the primary objective of the decide function of targeting. Built during the military decision-making process (MDMP) course-of-action (COA) development, the HPTL identifies those targets critical to the success of the friendly mission (see Figure 4). Targets are selected from the HVTL and re-grouped into target categories on the HPTL. The target categories are adversary capabilities and functions. Within each category, individual targets are rank-ordered by sequence of appearance, importance or other criteria that satisfy the targeting objectives. In this way, the targeting process ensures the selected targets support the commander's intent.

Targets on the HPTL are confirmed and refined in the war-gaming process. Prioritization of the high-priority targets may differ between phases of an operation, but the target list should remain the same and include all critical targets—from people to tanks. Once the entire target list is finalized, the assignment of delivery means follows the traditional targeting process.

*Detect.* The detect function begins with the intelligence collection plan. Although collectors for traditional and IO targets are frequently the same, the number and type of collection assets are expanded beyond those normally used for traditional targeting in order to identify IO targets for non-lethal attack.

Additionally, descriptive target selection standards (TSS) frequently are required to identify IO targets. Unlike traditional target selection where the enemy is known to possess specific types of equipment (e.g., T-54 tanks,

**Target Categories are adversary functions.**

**Listed in sequence, these targets are the elements needed to form a crowd.**

| Priority | Category | Target |
|---|---|---|
| Phases 1 & 2: 1 | Entity A Crowd Formation | Town Mayor<br>Radio Stations R & S<br>Sirens (3 Locations)<br>Loudspeaker Vehicles<br>Populace |
| Phases 1 & 2: 2 | Entity B Crowd Formation | Area Mayors X & Z<br>Community Ldrs A & B<br>Buses<br>Populace |
| Phase 1 & 2: 3<br>Phase 3: 1 | Military Mobilization | ADA Site<br>WSS 1<br>WSS 2<br>WSS 3<br>Corps Cdrs |
| All Phases: 4 | Other Targets | Blockade Vehicles<br>Barrier Material |

Figure 4: High-Payoff Target List (HPTL). These targets are critical to the friendly force's course of action (COA) success. Non-lethal and lethal targeting use the same HPTL.

| Category | HPTL | When | How | Effect | Rmks* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Traditional Attack** | | | | | |
| Military Mobilization | ADA Site | P3 | FA, Atk Avn | S | |
| | WSS 1 | P3 | FA, Atk Avn | N | |
| | WSS 2 | P3 | FA, Atk Avn | N | |
| | WSS 2 | P3 | FA, CAS | N | |
| **IO Attack** | | | | | |
| Crowd | Mayor | P1, 2 | BILAT - Unit, CA | I | ERG |
| | | | MSG: CA, CB** | C | |
| | Radio Station | P1 | BILAT - PSYOP | W | |
| | Loudspeaker Veh | P2 | Unit Patrol FPT | H | |
| | Populace | P1, 2 | PSYOP Radio | I | |
| Military Mobilization | Corps Cdrs | P1, 2 | BILAT - JMC | D | |
| | | | MSG: MA, MB** | H | |
| Other | Blockade Veh | P2 | Unit Patrol | | |

*Rmks (Remarks) column is the space for additional guidance. For IO targets, the remarks clarify the desired effect.
**MSG (message) is two-letter designator that refers to a specific IO message.

***Effects:***
**Traditional Attacks- S = Suppress and N= Neutralize**
**IO Attacks- I = Influence, C = Co-Opt, W = Warn and H = Hinder**

***Legend:***
**ADA =** Air Defense Artillery
**Atk Avn =** Attack Aviation
**BILAT =** Bilateral
**CAS =** Close Air Support
**CA =** Combined Arms
**ERG =** Emergency Reaction Team
**FPT =** Force Protection Team
**HPTL =** High-Payoff Target List
**JMC =** Joint Military Commission
**PSYOP =** Psychological Operations
**WSS =** Weapons Storage Site

Figure 5: Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM). This matrix combines the HPTL and AGM and is used for lethal and non-lethal targeting. Note the "Effects" for the "Traditional Attack" are different than those for the "IO Attack." (Matrix is in accordance with Appendix C of *FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process*.)

BMPs, etc.), in peacekeeping IO, target identification is often unclear. For example, not everyone carrying a cellular telephone in a hostile crowd is an agitator and not all buses in the area of responsibility (AOR) are transporting reinforcements to a demonstration. Thus, descriptive criteria are required to help the attacking systems (e.g., patrols and traffic control points) determine valid targets.

*Deliver*. Once detection assets are assigned against the HPTs and appropriate named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs) are established, delivery assets are determined for each target. A prioritized list of this information is developed by building an attack guidance matrix (AGM), the primary tool for executing all attacks, both lethal and non-lethal. (See Figure 5.) The AGM provides the target (who/what) and when and how to attack it with the effect desired for each target.

Descriptive criteria are required to help the attacking systems- in this case, a traffic control point- determine valid targets.

If employed creatively, virtually all lethal attack systems can have a non-lethal role. For example, positioning howitzers (lethal delivery means) in range of selected weapons storage sites could influence disgruntled faction leaders (the targets) whose weapons are stored at that site to agree to comply with the provisions of the peace accord (desired effect). In Operation Joint Guard, non-lethal delivery systems include Task Force Eagle commanders and staff conducting face-to-face bilateral discussions with entity leaders and target groups; PSYOP print, radio and television media products; CA contacts with the local populace; and PA press releases and conferences.

| Traditional Attack (Quantifiable) | | IO Attack (Descriptive) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Effect** | **Criteria** | **Effect** | **Explanation** |
| Harass | Disturb, Curtail | Inform | Provide information to counter misinformation. |
| | | Warn | Provide notice of intent in order to prevent a specific action. |
| | | Influence | Curtail or cause a specific action. |
| Suppress | Degrade Performance (For Specified Time) | Disorganize | Reduce effectiveness/abilities. |
| | | Isolate | Minimize power/influence. |
| Neutralize | Render Ineffective (10-29% Destruction) | Co-Opt | Gain cooperation. |
| Destroy | Physically Render Combat Ineffective (30% or Greater Destruction) | Deceive | Mislead to induce a reaction. |

Figure 6: Targeting Effects (Non-Doctrinal). The different types of attacks call for different effects.

*Assess.* Targeting assessment is a continuous process to determine if targeting objectives have been achieved and if re-attack is required. The assessment process for traditional and IO targeting is the same, except that while the traditional assessment is objective, IO assessment is often subjective. Overcoming this difference requires a clear understanding of the desired end state as well as the capability to interpretively measure the effectiveness of the attack.

In traditional targeting, desired effects are precisely and quantifiably measured in terms of "harass, suppress, neutralize and destroy." Because *FM 100-6* does not include such definable effects for IO attack, Task Force Eagle planners developed equivalent targeting effects with descriptive assessment criteria for IO (see Figure 6).

IO is another vital tool available to the tactical commander. Clearly, offensive IO can be integrated into the maneuver commander's operation using the targeting process.

**Lessons Learned.** In the process of integrating IO into the targeting process, we have learned a number of lessons—three of the most important of which we discuss here.

1. IO is another vital tool available to the tactical commander. Clearly, offensive IO can be integrated into the maneuver commander's operation using the targeting process.

2. IO is not a stovepipe process. Few divisions and corps can afford another two- to three-hour meeting injected into an already tight battle rhythm. Integrating IO into the existing targeting process is a sensible and efficient way to bring IO "under the tent."

3. IO brings additional and unique capabilities to the maneuver commander. In peace operations where lethal fire support and maneuver options are often limited by restrictive ROE, IO has proven to be an effective and efficient method for executing the commander's intent.

The next challenge is to apply these lessons learned to a traditional warfighting operation.

This is an exciting time for the development of IO. Field Support Teams (FSTs) from the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) out of Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and the 1st Armored Division staff have made significant advances in employing IO at the tactical level.

Incorporating IO into $D^3A$ methodology allows planners to use simple processes executed by existing organizations within the military decision-making process. The way ahead for incorporating IO into tactical operations is clearly marked. The same process for IO must be applied to high-intensity conflict. We must identify those significant aspects of the IPB that should be fined-tuned to answer specific information operations requirements.

The efforts of Task Force Eagle planners to integrate IO into the targeting process portends a bright future for the full adoption of IO in tactical operations for peace missions, conflict and war.

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