Fire Support Just Got Harder:
Adding Nonlethal Fires as a Core Competency

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"Fire Support is hard, especially if you are stupid." A "Sands of Iwo Jima" movie poster, with that humorous caption and John Wayne's grim face staring back at you as US Marine Corps Sgt. John Stryker, once hung in several offices of Fire Supporters at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The saying bears a serious truth in today's fight.

Fire support *is* hard, and Soldiers and Marines in the field depend upon fire supporters to deliver fires when and where they need them. The changes in *Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations* make the challenge harder—or at least more complex. The publication of *FM 3-0* now has established that the fires warfighting function includes both lethal and nonlethal fires.

Recently at the 2008 Fires Seminar, the Combined Arms Center (CAC) commander, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, told the gathered leaders of the fires community that nonlethal fires are now a *required core competency* for the Field Artillery (FA). This core competency requirement of nonlethal fires was reinforced by Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Chief of FA, in his future vision of the Branch as well as by multiple other presenters at the seminar.

So what does this mean for the Branch both institutionally and operationally? For FA, it means that we immediately have to redesign the training and education of our fire supporters to bring a balanced approached to understanding both lethal and nonlethal fires and to give them with the necessary skill set to be integrators of lethal and nonlethal fires. It also means we have to educate our maneuver commanders on this change, the implications, consequences and the new role in the integration of these capabilities we are bringing to their operations.

SFC Carlos A. Rosales, 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 1st Brigade Combat Team (1 BCT), 101st Airborne Division (101st Abn Div) (Air Assault), hands a young boy a soccer ball during a combat security patrol near Dor Al Sinah, Iraq. Although the unit is involved in a full-spectrum combat operation, Soldiers from the battalion still make time during their combat patrols to offer humanitarian assistance to the local populace. (Photo by 1LT Jonathan Springer, 1 BCT, 101st Abn Div Public Affairs)

While almost all Field Artillerymen are comfortable integrating and employing cannon, rocket and missile fires, close air support and mortars as forms of lethal fires, the integration of nonlethal fires appears to be a paradigm shift for us. At first glance, the recent doctrinal changes may cause some fire supporters to see nonlethal fires as "just another rock in the fire support rucksack." It is not really a change. After thoughtful review, the new doctrine really only expands and formalizes the fire supporter's role as the integrator of *both* lethal and nonlethal fires. Since operations in the Balkans began in the early 1990s, commanders routinely have turned to their fire supporters to integrate nonlethal fires in an informal role. The change is that now it is a defined *doctrinal* role for our Branch.

Ultimately, the integration of nonlethal fires is a logical extension of our traditional roles in the integration of fires assets to meet the maneuver commander's intent, through the targeting process, to gain a desired effect on a target. As Artillerymen, we are used to seeing a target and directing lethal means on it. Now with a newly defined doctrinal role, the FA must change our mindset—our thought process—to look at a target and determine, "OK, I can kill it; but if I do, what do we stir up? Do I undo some progress with a certain group? Can I deny or disrupt their command and control (C^2) another way, or can I even destroy it without killing it?" That is the kind of thought process that has to become second nature for fire supporters now.

The Paradigm Shift. In close examination of *FM 3-0*, specifically Chapter 4, we find the addition of C^2 warfare (C^2W) and nonlethal fires integration to the fires

warfighting function. Chapter 7, Information Superiority, further defines C^2W and in dissecting the Army information tasks, directs the integration of C^2W to occur in the fires cell (see Figure 1). The result of these two chapters establishes nonlethal fires and C^2W integration as fires warfighting function core competency.



Integrating nonlethal fires with lethal fires adds complexity to the mission and requires a new mind set in the targeting process in a world where the *King of Battle* has had a lethal focus in the past. This shift to balancing lethal and nonlethal fires requires the integrator to look at achieving commander's intent with expanded capabilities and an eye toward second and third-order effects, especially across the spectrum of conflict. In counterinsurgency or stability operations particularly, this extension of effects capabilities permits the fires integrator performing the targeting process to employ a range of options, while considering the likelihood that tactical actions often have strategic consequences.

In recent operations during the last few years, we in the FA have had a variety of non-fires related in-lieu-of missions. We all are aware that these missions have been executed superbly by Field Artillerymen. Now the Army has added a new task to our resume that is *very* relevant to integrating fires.

The emergence of these tasks of nonlethal fires integration and C^2W into the fires warfighting function *doctrinally* confirms the fires responsibilities for nonlethal fires. It includes tasks associated with integrating and synchronizing the effects of these types of fires and C^2W with the effects of other warfighting functions. In terms of traditional FA roles, it requires us to deny, disrupt and destroy enemy C^2 by more familiar lethal physical means—and now adds nonlethal means to the "quiver" of options we can apply.

The Challenge. In the current fight, fire supporters have been integrating information operations, electronic warfare (EW) and psychological operations into the targeting process for a long time. Now, added to our traditional mission sets of the delivery of lethal fires, counterfire operations and fire planning, fire supporters have documented performance of their nonlethal fires integration work.

Institutionally, the Fires Center of Excellence (CoE), Fort Sill, Oklahoma, now must train and equip leaders with skills to integrate joint, lethal and nonlethal fires. This change is a significant shift for Field Artillerymen who now must become the experts to integrate both lethal and nonlethal fires into operational planning, including both Army and joint capabilities.

An immediate concern is that we have to define nonlethal fires. For many, nonlethal fires may equate to the familiar idea of, "I can't define it, but I'll know it when I see it." Officially, *FM 1-02 Operational Terms and Graphics*, dated September 2004, defines nonlethal fires "as any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions, and facilities. Psychological operations, [EW] (jamming), and other [C^2] countermeasures are all nonlethal fire options."

FM 3-0 Chapter 7, Information Superiority, defines C^2W as "the integrated use of physical attack, [EW], and computer network operations, supported by intelligence, to degrade, destroy, and exploit the adversary's [C^2] system or to deny information to it. It includes operations intended to degrade, destroy, and exploit an adversary's ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum and computer and telecommunications networks. These networks affect the adversary's [C^2] or ability to communicate with an external audience. [C^2W] combines lethal and nonlethal actions. These actions degrade or destroy enemy information and the enemy's ability to collect and use that information. The fires cell synchronizes physical attack, [EW], and computer network operations against enemy and adversary [C^2]."

As we look forward and develop our fires doctrine nested within *FM 3-0*, we have developed some proposals for the new *FM 3-09 Fire Support* to try to define nonlethal fires clearly and how it then fits in to our fire support doctrine. While *FM 3-09* is still a draft and currently being staffed, the Fires CoE doctrine division received some guidance from the commandant and has developed the following.

Task	Information Engagement	Command and Control Warfare	Information Protection	Operations Security	Military Deception
Intended Effects	• Inform and educate internal and external publics. • Influence the behavior of target audiences.	• Degrade, disrupt, destroy and exploit enemy command and control.	• Protect friendly computer networks and communication means.	• Deny vital intelligence on friendly forces to hostile collection .	• Confuse enemy decision-makers .
Capabilities	• Leader and Soldier Engagement • Public Affairs • Psychological Operations • Combat Camera • Strategic Communication and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy	• Physical Attack • Electronic Attack • Electronic Warfare Support • Computer Network Attack • Computer Network Exploitation	• Information Assurance • Computer Network Defense • Electronic Protection	• Operations Security • Physical Security • Counterintelligence	• Military Deception

Figure 1: Army Information Tasks (*Field Manual 3.0 Operations*)

FM 3-09, paragraph 2-137, states, "Nonlethal fires are any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions, and facilities, or to alter the behavior of an adversary or enemy. Nonlethal fires options include elements of both information engagement and [C^2W]. Examples include artillery and air delivered leaflets, electronic attack, computer network attack, obscuration fires, and illumination fires."

We have tried to nest this into both *FM 3-0* and joint doctrine, while defining this in terms of fires and to provide a sound basis for the fires community to work as the integrator for these capabilities.

The Fix. So now we must fix this institutionally and train our leaders to equip them with the required skill sets. There are different requirements for training today—new requirements for building new core competencies. The fires warfighting function must incorporate the related tasks and systems that provide the coordinated use of Army indirect fires, joint fires and C^2W—including nonlethal fires—in the targeting process. This requires the changes listed in Figure 2.

The Army has identified FA as the bridging strategy for Army EW integration. To support C^2W integration, one immediate change must be the incorporation of nonlethal tasks into the core mission essential task list and into the collective tasks. Currently we are relying on sister services—Navy and Air Force—to provide EW officers (EWOs) to the ground forces in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

- Establish nonlethal fires expertise and command and control warfare (C^2W) integration as a fires warfighting function core competency.
- Train nonlethal fires and C^2W capabilities.
- Train integration of nonlethal Fires and C^2W.
- Incorporate C^2W into the targeting process.
- Integrate operational functions of C^2W and nonlethal fires into operational planning.
- Incorporate organizational structure of C^2W and nonlethal fires into the fires cells.

Figure 2: Requirements for Building New Core Competencies

To provide our own institutional expertise and to "grow the bench," FA has assumed the EW integrator role with the Operational EW Course resulting in the awarding of the additional skill identifier (ASI) 1J. This ASI is being applied to second generation modified tables of organization and equipment for the nonlethal fires cell 13A FA Officer, 131A FA Targeting Technician and 13F Fire Support Specialist with skill level 3.

This six-week course is required for deploying units, brigade and higher, and prepares the EWO to plan, integrate and synchronize EW for the operational commander. This bridging strategy will put EW integration capability in the fires cell until the Army creates the enduring solution of an EW enlisted military occupational specialty, warrant officer and/or officer functional area.

Functional courses at the Fires CoE also integrate nonlethal fires to equip leaders going to operational missions. We currently teach the Tactical Information Operations Course (TIOC), the Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) Course and the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC). TIOC is nonlethal focused and provides leaders from staff sergeant through lieutenant colonel with training on basic information operations requirements to include EW, operational security and cultural awareness. The FSCOORD and JOFEC courses specifically are designed to train leaders at the brigade combat teams, divisions, corps and joint task forces on the planning, synchronization and integration of joint, lethal and nonlethal fires.

The Fires CoE also is adding nonlethal training to our officer, warrant officer and NCO Education Systems (OES, WOES and NCOES). Each of our professional military education courses now has nonlethal fires integration embedded into the courses so that all fires support leaders at all levels, from battalion through corps, have a working knowledge and basic understanding of the requisite skills they need to be the fires integrator for the commander. Lethal and nonlethal skills are core competencies for these leaders.

The Future of Fires. Today and in the foreseeable future, operations across the full spectrum require the commander and staff to rely on fires integrators to employ lethal fires and nonlethal fires in operations. As current operations dictate in stability and counterinsurgency operations, we find a greater need for integration of nonlethal capabilities to achieve campaign objectives. This requires that integration of lethal and nonlethal fires be an essential skill for Field Artillerymen.

Fire supporters must be educated in the application and integration of both lethal and nonlethal fires, through the targeting process, to gain desired target effects, while simultaneously understanding the second- and third-order magnitude of effects—all to achieve the commander's intent. It is our new doctrinal core competency as fire supporters, and the Fires CoE is moving now to equip our leaders and Soldiers with the skills necessary to accomplish the mission.

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