What constitutes a target? Is it a motorized rifle company repositioning as part of a combined arms reserve, whose potential effect on the battlefield places it squarely on the brigade combat team (BCT) commander’s high-payoff target list? Could it be a dug-in infantry strongpoint, positioned in such a way that it can delay a much larger unit’s movement indefinitely along an axis of advance? Perhaps it is an improvised explosive device production cell operating among an otherwise passive local populace with a notable insurgent leader at its head, coordinating an effective, widespread campaign bent on fostering unrest and instability. Is it a single 60-mm mortar, mounted in the trunk of a sedan, occasionally firing a couple of rounds into an adjacent forward operating base and then quickly melting back into an indigenous population?

If you answer yes to all of the above, you almost certainly have an appreciation for the diverse set of targets at all levels of warfare that have probably presented themselves to a targeting officer during the last few years. It is important to keep in mind that the examples listed above, in all likelihood, call for the use of lethal targeting to address them, and that there is also an equally diverse array of scenarios which lend themselves to nonlethal targeting.

In Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, a target is defined as a geographical area, complex or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. Targets also include the wide array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities and functions that an enemy commander can use to conduct operations. In JP 3-0 Joint Operations, the term “targeting” is defined as the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. While joint doctrine is not fundamentally wrong in its approach on defining targeting, it does leave the end user, the Soldier in today’s operational environment (OE), lacking a really descriptive, useful doctrinal solution.

Field Manual (FM) 3-60 The Targeting Process. The current Army and Fires Center of Excellence (CoE), Fort Sill, Oklahoma, effort to clarify this perceived targeting doctrine shortfall is FM 3-60 The Targeting Process (Initial Draft). FM 3-60 states that “successful targeting enables the commander to synchronize intelligence, maneuver, fire support systems, nonlethal systems and special operations forces by attacking the right target with the best system at the right time. Targeting is a complex and multidiscipline effort that requires coordinated interaction among many groups.”

The draft version of FM 3-60 retains Decide, Detect, Deliver and Assess (D3A) as the Army’s targeting process. This decision keeps in place a proven doctrinal methodology that has been successful for numerous years in exercises and actual combat situations, and continues to be relevant in the current OE. D3A has demonstrated its flexibility and is recognized in JP 3-60 Joint Targeting as the land component commander’s interface with the joint targeting cycle by incorporating the same fundamental functions as that process.

With that being said, the Fires CoE doctrine writers, as well as a number of knowledgeable, experienced targeting experts from a variety of specialized fields, recognized the fact that D3A can and should be improved. Giving the D3A process more flexibility and specific targeting methodology additions in FM 3-60 ensures targeting doctrine relevancy in any spectrum of conflict for the foreseeable future.

Incorporating Specialized Targeting Methodologies. In April 2008, the Department of the Army tasked Fires CoE to take the lead and examine the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate (F3EAD) targeting methodology and determine if it was valid, emerging doctrine or simply useful tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP)—perhaps
not quite worthy of being codified as Army doctrine. This tasking arose as a result of discussion held at the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, semiannual Combat Training Center (CTC) Conference.

During the next few months and after working in conjunction with Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, CAC, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the Army Capabilities Integration Center, and the Fires CoE Doctrine Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), Fires CoE determined that F3EAD is a legitimate, valuable process and moved to incorporate it into the draft FM 3-60. It also was deemed necessary to incorporate the Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess (F3EAD) process, developed to facilitate dynamic targeting at the joint level, and primarily designed to attack time-sensitive and high-payoff targets. While F3EAD is, in effect, a subset of the joint targeting cycle, it was deemed necessary for Army doctrine to echo the methodology, considering the joint nature of Army operations and the need for our targeting personnel to understand the joint interdependency prevalent in today’s OE. However, expanding upon the relationship between D3A and F3EAD is the primary goal of this article.

How F3EAD Fits into the D3A Framework. Once it was determined that F3EAD is a valid targeting process, it was immediately recognized that it should not serve as a replacement for D3A, but as a subset designed for a specific targeting requirement that refines the actions to be completed when engaging high-value individuals (HVIs). Occasionally referred to as a “personality target,” an HVI could be defined as “a person of interest (neutral, friendly, adversary or enemy), who must be identified, surveilled, tracked and influenced through the use of information or fires.”

This definition leaves the door open for a wide variety of Fires and/or effects, which are scalable from the nonlethal to lethal spectrum to affect an HVI as required. Figure 1 shows a sample cover sheet of a target information folder, which summarizes relevant information.
as it is gathered. The folder could be used for both nonlethal and lethal targeting.

One characteristic of F'EDAD is a massed, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) effort tied to a powerful and decentralized all-source intelligence apparatus, with the intent of finding an HVI possibly amidst a background of noncombatants. Precise target location combined with the quick, efficient use of either lethal or nonlethal means is the key to either influencing the target or removing the target from the OE.

F'EDAD highlights the Exploit phase and, when combined with the Analyze phase, often can constitute the main targeting effort. This exploitation and subsequent analyzing of the results can provide insight into an enemy network and might offer new lines of operations or targeting opportunities—in essence starting the cycle over again with subsequent HVIs or other targets. Figure 2 illustrates how the F'EDAD process complements the D'A process. The steps are broken down in FM 3-60 The Targeting Process.

The targeting process still begins with a Decide function in which decisions are made on priorities and the allocation of resources. The Detect function is broken into two parts, Find and Fix. During the Find step, the HVI is identified and the target’s network is mapped and analyzed. During the Fix step, a specific location and time to engage the HVI is identified, and the validity of the target is confirmed.

The Finish step mirrors the Deliver function. The action planned against the target is initiated and completed.

The Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate steps amplify the Assess function. The engaging unit gathers additional information during the Exploit step, determines the implications and relevance of the information during the Analyze step and publishes the results during the Disseminate step. Exploit and Analyze steps may occur during the latter stages of Finish and result in the immediate expansion of the operation based on material obtained. For example, a raid that captures an insurgent leader may result in additional HVIs engaged when a list of cell members is discovered in the insurgent leader’s possession.

It is important to remember that the targeting process is a continuous process. At any given time a unit may be at the Find step for some targets, the Exploit step for several other targets, and at the Fix, Finish, Analyze or Disseminate step for still other targets. Similarly, the unit may disseminate information pertaining to the location of a target before the Finish or Exploit steps. Generally, the process will follow the depicted flow, but the process itself should not restrict what needs to happen next.

**Staffing to the Field.** FM 3-60 is one of several emerging doctrinal products that the Fires CoE Doctrine Division is working on. With all draft doctrine, FM 3-60 will be subject to worldwide staffing to all Fires headquarters and staffs (typically down to Fires battalion level) and to BCT commanders. Doctrine also is staffed to all Training and Doctrine Command CoEs, as well as other specific departments and staff sections as required.

Draft FMs normally are staffed two to three times, depending on the nature of comments and need for modification of a particular draft. An excellent example of the Fires CoE staff’s diligence and understanding that the field needs to take an active part in doctrine development is evidenced by the work and staffing done on FM 3-09 Fire Support (the cornerstone of Fires doctrine, replacing FM 6-20 Fire Support in the AirLand Battle) and FM 3-09.24 The Fires Brigade. Both FMs have been staffed multiple times to the field, in light of the many changes and new TTP emerging from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world.

**The Way Ahead.** In FM 3-60, D'A is reaffirmed as the overarching methodology for targeting, with F'EDAD and F'TEAD complementing it and providing the framework for the specific needs of the force. HVI and time-sensitive targeting models help to refine targeting efforts and address gaps that may exist in current targeting doctrine. These complements to the D'A process provide for added flexibility and ensure targeting doctrine relevancy and the foreseeable future. By fully staffing this kind of emerging doctrine to the field and allowing for significant input from those who actually have to live with the doctrinal products, the Fires CoE seeks to ensure that the force has a relevant, useful doctrinal underpinning for full-spectrum operations as outlined by FM 3-0 Operations.

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