INTERVIEW

3 Training a Ready and Relevant Army at War
Interview with Brigadier General Joseph F. Fil, J r., Commanding General, National Training Center and Fort Irwin, California

ARTICLES:

1 BG David P. Valcourt Becomes 35th Chief of FA

7 3-82 FA Transformation into a Hybrid Motorized Rifle and Paladin Battalion: Training for Baghdad
By Lieutenant Colonel Timothy A. Vuono, Major Jeffrey C. Collins and Captain Evans A. Hanson

13 Flexibility and Bold Innovation for Multiple Missions in Iraq: 2-15 FAR Beyond Combat
By Major Jeffrey T. O’Neal and First Lieutenants Aaron P. Heberlein and Jonathan H. Bork

18 Post OIF: A New Mindset for MLRS Firing Battery Training
By Captain Chad M. Gibson

20 3d ID BFIST in OIF-Simultaneous Direct and Indirect Fire at the Tip of the Spear
By First Lieutenant Richard R. Aaron, Jr.

22 3-16 FA, 4th ID, Conducting Elections in Iraq
By Captain Steven L. Miller

25 A Soldier’s Story: SFC George A. Williams, Platoon Sergeant
A/2-147 FA (MLRS), SADARNG, Deploying to Iraq

26 Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan—The CJ TF-180 Method of Orchestrating Effects to Achieve Objectives
By Major Robert B. Herndon, Chief Warrant Officer Three John A. Robinson, Colonel James L. Creighton, Lieutenant Colonel Raphael Torres and Major Louis J. Bello

31 Establish an NGO Reception Center at Baghdad Airport?... What the Hell is an NGO?
By Captain Joseph C. Winkelmann

34 2-18 FA: Training the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
By Captain Julian T. Urquidez and Major Paul L. Yingling

38 1st (UK) Armoured Division in Iraq, January to April 2003
By Brigadier Andrew R. Gregory

45 A Soldier’s Story: SGT Jamie Hare, AFATDS Operator
C/2-147 FA (MLRS), SADARNG, Deploying to Iraq

Front Cover: Redlegs from A/2-319 FAF fire their M119 105-mm howitzer in Iraq on 16 August 2003. (Photo MSgt James M. Bowman, USAF)
On 9 December 2003, Major General Michael D. Maples gave up the post of Chief of Field Artillery, Commandant of the Field Artillery School and Commanding General of the Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to Brigadier General (Promotable) David P. Valcourt. General Valcourt came from Washington, DC, where he had been the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, at the Pentagon.

General Maples took command of Fort Sill on 23 August 2001 as the 43d Commandant of the FA School and 34th Chief of FA. Among other assignments, he commanded the 41st Field Artillery Brigade, V Corps, in Germany, and 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (6-27 FA), 75th Field Artillery Brigade, in Operations Desert Shield and Storm. 6-27 FA was the only unit capable of firing the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) in the Gulf War.

During his tenure as Chief of Field Artillery, the FA developed detailed “Fires and Effects” concepts for the Future Force, established requirements for the future indirect fires capabilities and the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) cannon, engaged in joint fires training and doctrine developments and supported FA units that performed magnificently in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Major General Maples is now the Vice Director of The Joint Staff at the Pentagon.

Brigadier General Valcourt originally from Chicopee and his wife, Diane, is from Aldenville, both in Massachusetts. He is a 1973 graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point. Among his first assignments, he was a Forward Observer, Fire Direction Officer and Battery Executive Officer in 1-2 FA and then Target Analyst in the Division Artillery (Div Arty), all in the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Germany.

After graduating from the FA Officer’s Advanced Course at Fort Sill, he became a Gunnery Instructor in the FA School. He credits the demands of teaching gunnery for more than two years with building his confidence and technical expertise to command his battery, B/2-37 FA, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery.

He also credits his tour as the Chief of the Advanced Fire Support Branch and, later, Chief of the Fire Support Doctrine Branch in the Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department (FSCAOD) of the FA School for preparing him to command his battalion in 1991. He was responsible for fire support instruction in the FA School and fire support lessons learned in the Combat Training Centers and determined that the Redleg’s first contribution to the fight is as a joint fire supporter, then as an artilleryman.

General Valcourt served as the S3 of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade and then as G3 of III Corps Artillery before commanding 2-17 FA, also in the 212th Field Artillery Brigade.

During his command, 2-17 FA was the first unit equipped (FUE) with the M109A6 Paladin 155-mm self-propelled howitzer. His was the first battalion to take officers off the gun line and put NCOs in charge of the new guns that could operate semi-autonomously in dispersed operations. He gives great credit to his NCOs for the initial success of Paladin. He defined his job as certifying his NCOs on their weapons system, resourcing them to keep their Paladins mission capable and standing back and letting them do their jobs.

General Valcourt has been affiliated with the 17th FA Regiment since he came into the Army. His first exposure to the guns was as a West Point Cadet at Merrill Barracks in Grafenwoehr, Germany, where he pulled the lanyard on one of 3-17 FA’s 8-inch howitzers, firing a nuclear spotting round at nearly full charge. Then as a Major, he was 2-17 FA’s Executive Officer at Camp Pelham on the demilitarized zone in Korea.

From 1994 until 1996, General Valcourt was the Chief of the FA Branch at the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) of the US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) in Alexandria, Virginia. Later, as a Brigadier General, he was the Director of OPMD.

He then commanded the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery, III Corps, at Fort Hood, Texas. General Valcourt, again, participated in another Army first—the digitization of the 4th Division. His Div Arty conducted digitized operations in the 4th Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE) at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, in November 1997.

General Valcourt next served as the the Operations Division Chief, J39, Information Operations, on The Joint Staff at the Pentagon. As a Brigadier General, he was the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea.

Field Artillery January-February 2004 1
Congratulations to three Field Artillery Soldiers from the Survey Platoon, Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, 1st Armored Division, in Iraq for being Redleg heroes and representing the “Person of the Year, The American Soldier,” on the 29 December 2003 Time magazine cover. The three All American Soldiers honored are Specialist Billie Grimes, 26, a Medic from Lebanon, Indiana; Sergeant Marquette Whiteside, 24, a Gunner from Pine Bluff, Arkansas; and Sergeant Ronald Buxton, 32, the A Team Leader, from Lake Ozark, Missouri.

According to Managing Editor James Kelly, Time chose them “to stand for all of those in a US uniform who go in harm’s way”: Soldiers, Marines, Airmen and Sailors.

At all Fort Sill ceremonies, including the 9 December change of command, it is a tradition for the historic Half Section to fly the guidon of the first command of the Commanding General. The Half Section had flown the guidon of Major General Maples’ first command, B/6-37 FA, 2d Infantry Division, for the past two years.

When the General Valcourt took command, the Half Section took down the guidon and presented it to Major General Maples, who, in turn, presented it to First Sergeant (Retired) Leon D. Parton, his First Sergeant during his battery command. Similarly, Command Sergeant Major (Retired) Cornell Gaines, who was Brigadier General Valcourt’s First Sergeant in his first command, B/2-37 FA, presented the battery’s guidon to General Valcourt to pass to the Half Section. The Half Section will display General Valcourt’s guidon at all the ceremonial events in which it participates.

In fact, on 10 December 2003, Michael Weisskopf lost his hand while on patrol with the Tomb Raiders in a high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). He had tried to throw out a grenade lobbed by an insurgent into his HMMWV when it went off. His hand cupped around the grenade and the shielding of a bench in the HMMWV probably saved lives. Jim Nachtwey was hit by shrapnel in the abdomen below his armored vest. Private Orion Jenks, 22, on B Team, from Modesto, California, suffered a broken leg while Private First Class Jim Beverly, 19, the Driver/Grenadier/Assistant Gunner, from Akron, Ohio, lost teeth and had his tongue lacerated. Specialist Grimes from the next HMMWV treated the injured immediately. (All are doing well, including Michael Weisskopf, who is at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC.)

Other Redleg heroes of the Tomb Raiders are First Lieutenant Brady Van Engelen, 24, Platoon Leader from Twin Falls, Idaho; Sergeant David Kamount, 34, Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS) Team Chief from Biloxi, Mississippi; Staff Sergeant Abe Winston, 42, Platoon Sergeant/B Team Leader from West Virginia; Specialist Sky Schermerhorn, 29, Driver/Grenadier from Fresno, California; Specialist Bernard Talimeliyor, 34, Driver/Grenadier/Assistant Gunner from Colonia, Yap, Micronesia; Private Lequine Arnold, 20, Gunner from Goldsboro, North Carolina; and Sergeant Jose Cesar Aparicio, 31, Psychological Operations NCO from Los Angeles, California.

For more information, see the article “Portrait of a Platoon” in the 29 December edition of Time online at http://www.time.com/time/personoftheyear/2003/poyplatoon.html.
Based on the impact of lessons learned in OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] on the COE [contemporary operational environment], how has the threat and battlefield changed at the NTC [National Training Center]?

The NTC embarked on an entirely new threat and operational environment in the spring of 2002. The TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] DCSINT [Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence] published a revolutionary COE, and the NTC moved from a Soviet-based threat to a capabilities-based threat. This threat—the opposing force [OPFOR]—provides a menu, if you will, of the worst, most vicious capabilities of any potential adversary that exists worldwide. The division or corps commanders of the rotational units then choose from this menu, based on the rotational units’ missions, and tailor the OPFOR to be the perfect sparring partners for their units. These “senior trainers” determine the units’ training objectives.

So the OPFOR is a very lethal, versatile, contemporary threat who doesn’t fight like any known army and exhibits the collected capabilities of the worst folks we might meet. The 11th ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment], the OPFOR, is highly trained and disciplined to be unpredictable, wily and quick at decision making; fight nonlinear, 360 degrees; and be able to exploit any weaknesses or “seams” in the rotational unit.

So the threat has changed hugely. What also has changed is the training scenario. Units have a less predictable battle rhythm. The rotations have gone from 14 to 21 days and now include realistic RSOI [reception, staging, onward movement and integration] operations.

The training scenarios are more agile. If the scenario is at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, the OPFOR can field up to five battalion-sized maneuver groups. For mission rehearsal exercises for SOSO [stability or support operations] in Iraq or Afghanistan, the OPFOR can put up to 1,800 civilians on the battlefield, who are well organized and plugged into the play so they can be Pro-US presence or anti-US presence, as required. Units now go around the clock with multiple challenges: planning and executing the mission while facing refugees, requirements for convoy escorts and heightened security, angry crowds, riots and more.

The scenarios flex for cause and effects—what a Soldier or leader does is deliberately worked in to produce an effect. So, for example, if the unit’s civil affairs and PSYOPs [psychological operations] campaigns are on target, then the unit will win the civilians over and get their cooperation or glean intelligence. If the unit does a poor job of civil-military operations, it will pay a price for it in the scenario.

Units must be able to integrate lethal and nonlethal effects in the scenarios. For example in SOSO, when events start turning sour, it can become absolutely critical that units can shift to fighting with lethal fires. The NTC has increased its emphasis on joint fires.

The NTC scenario can have a mixture of high-intensity conflict to SOSO with numerous civilians on the battlefield as a population the rotational units have to accommodate. Units must train to the human dimension on the battlefield, even at the high end of the spectrum of conflict, because that’s what they’ll face.

The NTC trains units on a harsh desert terrain with not only flat desert floors, but, increasingly, mountainous defiles and passes. We are now replicating the challenges of working through difficult urban terrain. We are building rudimentary, third-world villages, towns and cities at the NTC—we already have six of them, the largest of which has about 1,800 civilians on the battlefield, who are well organized and plugged into the play so they can be Pro-US presence or anti-US presence, as required.
400 inhabitants who live there fulltime during a rotation.

The people in these urban towns replicate whatever cultural, ethnic and political mix the division commander wants. These include insurgents, para-military and terrorists, who can take on the ideology and culture of specific groups. Eventually, we will have cities with 200 to 300 buildings, terrorist training camps, fortresses, a petroleum refinery and other complex urban terrain features on the NTC battlefield. We plan to remain as versatile as possible to train urban operations for any area of the world.

One significant change at the NTC is that observer/controllers, O/Cs, who are still the experts, have moved into more of a coaching mode and less as just observers.

All the CTCs [Combat Training Centers] have gone through a cultural change—all the things we’ve talked about—to ensure Army training is relevant and units are ready to accomplish their missions.

A You mentioned increasing joint fires at the NTC—what about JCAS [joint close air support]?

Q The Army and Air Force are solidly committed to “getting JCAS right.” The Air Force has increased the number of sorties coming in for NTC rotations, and the sorties come in continually instead of in spurts. The Air Force is providing ETACs [enlisted tactical air controllers] and ALOs [air liaison officers] with combat experience who relish the opportunity to bring aircraft in and clobber the OPFOR or create whatever effects the unit commander wants.

We strongly encourage division commanders to include the task of “Employing CAS” as one of their primary training objectives for their rotational units. The Army always will fight joint, so our joint force must train to integrate their fires—land-based, Army aviation and Air Force, Navy and Marine fixed wing.

We also coach units to keep firing artillery while they bring in CAS. But they rarely do that because it calls for complex skills and units rarely get to train on them at home station due to air restrictions and the availability of CAS aircraft. When units have the sophistication of skills to simultaneously bring in fixed-wing air, Army aviation and FA fires and synchronize those fires, they make the most of incredible joint effects and win. And when they win at the NTC, they tend to win in war.

With the emphasis on SOSO at recent NTC rotations, how does the NTC ensure units train on their core warfighting competencies?

A Our guidance from the Forces Command commander is to prepare units for their most likely next missions. Recently, the rotations have had a very strong undercurrent of SOSO mission training. After major combat operations in Iraq ended, the American Army took on an entirely new gamut of SOSO missions—our Soldiers and leaders have done an amazing job of “thinking on their feet,” a tribute to their quality and previous Army training.

So, we at the NTC, pretty much have been preparing units to deploy to the CENTCOM [Central Command] theater with the specific training objectives determined by their division or corps commanders.

In January, we will have the first rotation that mixes high-end conflict training core warfighting competencies and SOSO. The NTC will provide a very tough OPFOR who “cuts no slack.” In the near future, I think most rotations will include both.

What mechanisms do you have in place to ensure that the lessons from the real world, such as in OIF and OEF, are being incorporated into training at the National Training Center?

A It is absolutely essential that we not only capture the lessons learned from our operations in the CENTCOM theater (and any other theater, as required), but also anticipate trends as they’re emerging. We have three mechanisms to ensure NTC training is relevant to the missions the units must accomplish.

First, we are linked to TRADOC and have continuous discussions with the Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALL. We have a CALL rep here at Fort Irwin.

Next, we have folks from the NTC in theater observing current operations. Many of the NTC leaders or O/Cs have, in fact, just returned from tours in theater. If not, we get them over there to spend time with their counterparts, so they’re current.

And then third, we have strong links with the other services and other nations. We just had Jordanian officers at Fort Irwin observing and advising us on our training. I am working with the VII Carrier Battle Group out of San Diego to ensure we have joint lessons learned integrated into our training. The group is going to launch aircraft off the Stennis [USS John C. Stennis] to participate in our January NTC rotation that will be nested in the first Joint National Training Capability [JNTC] rotation. Likewise, we’re working closely with the Air Force and Marines.

What is your vision for the National Training Center?

A As if looking through a prism, there are three aspects to my vision. The first dimension to the prism is that the National Training Center remains the premier facility worldwide for training the heavy joint force; it will conduct contemporary and futuristic training, anticipating trends and events, and be well-equipped, well-instrumented, well-led and plenty big enough to train the heavy force realistically. The latter requires we expand the NTC facility.

As a first step, we are physically expanding one corridor to 90 kilometers long, which is a more realistic distance on the expanded COE battlespace. Also, as constructive and virtual capabilities become more mature, we will expand the NTC battlespace (currently 1,000 square miles) by four or five times.

“When units have the sophistication of skills to simultaneously bring in fixed-wing air, Army aviation and FA fires and synchronize those fires, they make the most of incredible joint effects and win. And when they win at the NTC, they tend to win at war.”
The second aspect of my vision is the NTC as the cornerstone of the JNTC. Here in the west, we are fortunate to have a number of highly capable and, potentially, incredibly synergistic ranges, bases and facilities. Our next-door neighbors are China Lake Naval Weather Station and Naval Air Weather Station. nellis Air Force Base that provides our air support is a little more than 120 miles away. Edwards Air Force Base is nearby. Fallon Naval Air station is just right across the border in Nevada. Twentynine Palms, the Marine’s force-on-force training center, borders on the NTC. Then, of course, San Diego with Navy ranges and Carrier Groups VII and I are not far away. VII is the “go-to-war” group and I is the training group.

Because of the NTC’s size, joint capabilities in the area with the potential for incredible synergism and the facts that we have mature instrumentation and have been running rotations for more than 20 years, the NTC is the best choice as the cornerstone of the JNTC training for all services and agencies.

I say, “agencies,” because we need a robust presence of the different agencies we will have to interface within theaters of operations, such as Special Operations Forces [SOF], DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], State Department and others. We must train to link the interfaces and synchronize our efforts.

And then, finally, we need to train multi-nationally as well. The NTC offers a huge potential for allied training, not necessarily through physical presence, but through liaison and simulations.

For example, right now from half a nation away, we can fly Apache Longbow simulators at Fort Rucker [Alabama] and “kill” OPFOR tanks moving on the desert floor of the NTC. So when the good guys cross the NTC battlefield, the pilot can see them through his windshield and must avoid fratricide. When he sees the enemy, he can pull the trigger in the simulator, have a missile launch from the Longbow and see the missile strike the OPFOR tank with simulated flames shooting up. That’s new and exciting training.

We easily can conduct the same training with the Canadian, British or Korean Army. These and other nations have expressed a desire to start to explore multi-national training at the NTC via simulations.

The final part of my vision is Fort Irwin as the best place in the Army to raise a family. We are working hard to tap into the advantages of the region and improve the facilities of Fort Irwin to make it a place that families aspire to come and where Soldiers fight to get an assignment. Duty at the NTC is tough, soldierly duty, but it is very rewarding.

Q What training at the NTC has the biggest payoff for unit effectiveness in the COE, and why?

A Leader development training. We are seeing the results of this training in the CENTCOM theater right now. The US Army is, without question, a well led, well disciplined Army with leaders who are “all over” their unique missions. The NTC has a leader development program, but its rotations also stress leaders from the brigade commander down to the corporal. That’s caused by the complexity of the scenarios and the fact that everybody is busy during the entire rotation.

The O/Cs continuously hold up the mirror of reality to the unit, not only through AARs [after-action reviews] conducted down to the platoon levels, but also during operations. The O/Cs ask leaders at all levels, “How are you doing?” “Are you meeting the standard?” It’s the O/C’s job to show the standard and coach leaders, so the next day, a problem is corrected and leaders have learned something.

Q The CTCs have tended to focus on direct firefight to the detriment of the indirect firefight. We had many instances in OIF where the indirect fire saved the day. What is the NTC doing to ensure we train as we fight?

A Okay... we do appear to focus on the direct firefight, but I disagree with your assertion that we’re not emphasizing the indirect firefight.

The NTC stresses the joint and combined arms fight. Many units have not mastered synchronizing fires and movement, which equals maneuver. However, in the 15 months I’ve been at the NTC, I have seen significant improvements in the integration of fires and movement—more scenarios in which indirect fires are decisive, using mortars, Paladin and air fires.

By the way, you can’t win at the NTC unless you get fires working for you. We tell brigade commanders, “Indirect fires are yours—you own the fight and are responsible for the FA battalion just as much as for the tank battalion, infantry battalion, etc.” The brigade commander who owns it all and masters its integration will be highly successful at the NTC.

But without integrating his indirect fires, the brigade commander fights with one arm tied behind his back and a leg tied up behind him.

Q In OIF, a representative of Fort Leavenworth went to Iraq and documented that many commanders were amazed at the effects of FA fires: HE [high explosive] in urban fires, the cannon-delivered precision sensor fused munition we used, called SADARM [sense and destroy armor]—even MLRS [multiple-launch rocket systems] fired in danger-close support. What is the NTC doing (or have planned for the future) to more closely replicate the effects of indirect fires when they are accurate and timely?

A I’m not surprised that OIF commanders were impressed with FA firepower; it has awesome impact and shock effects. Live fire—real artillery, real guns, shooting real rounds, real missiles—is essential to NTC training. We need to live fire it all. HIMARS [high-mobility artillery rocket system] live fired at the NTC during the Millennium Challenge rotation last summer. After HIMARS is fielded, we certainly can train HIMARS...
operating with SOF deep as it did so effectively in OIF. We continually encourage units to bring the equipment they have, so we can incorporate it into training. The brigade commander needs to be able to bring to bear all the elements of his combat power. We also are working to replicate the effects of indirect fires more realistically. We are developing the future MILES [multiple-integrated laser engagement system] to replace SAWE [simulated area weapons effects] system in FY07, and it will include all the dimensions of indirect fires. Right now, the guy in the foxhole watching a battalion-six does not experience the effects, which are impressive...also devastating if you happen to be standing underneath them. But we never are going to be able to safely replicate all the dust kicking up, sparks flying, vehicles burning with their road wheels melting, etc., etc., etc. Of course, the NTC must have joint live fires, and our future MILES must incorporate their effects as well.

Q What message would you send Army and Marine Field Artillerymen stationed around the world?

A You are an integral part of the most professional and lethal armed force the world has ever known. Your contribution is absolutely essential, and your integration gives the land force the combat power to do the nation’s bidding.

Brigadier General Joseph F. Fil Jr., has commanded the National Training Center

The US Field Artillery Association

Army and Marine Field Artillerymen and Family Members Eligible for $1,000 Scholarships for 2004

The US Field Artillery Association (USFAA), Fort Sill, Oklahoma, will award three college or vocational school scholarships of $1,000 each in August 2004, the second annual awards. The scholarships are for worthy Association members or their immediate family members to help them attain their academic or vocational goals. Scholarships of a $1,000 each will be awarded in three categories: US Field Artillery Association member (officer or enlisted), the immediate family of an enlisted member of the Association and the immediate family of an officer member of the Association. The deadline for the scholarship applications is 1 July with the winners announced in mid-August.

Each applicant must be accepted for admission into an accredited university, college or vocational undergraduate program of study and submit a complete, signed application not later than 1 July to the US Field Artillery Association, P.O. Box 33027, Fort Sill, Oklahoma 73503-0027. The application and requirements are available online at the home page of the US Field Artillery Association www.fieldartillery.org or at the USFAA office at Building 758, McNair Road, Fort Sill. Potential applicants can call the Association at (580) 355-4677 with questions or to request an application via mail.

The applicant must include recent transcripts from the high school from which he/she graduated (or soon will graduate) or any college or technical school he/she is attending as part of the application. In addition, each must explain his/her educational goals and how the scholarship will help him/her attain those goals in several paragraphs on the space provided on the application form or on an attached page with text that is no longer than one double-spaced typed page with standard letter margins.

Among other information, the applicant will have to provide an estimate of educational expenses and an itemization of income, including earnings; savings; other loans, grants and scholarships; government benefits; family support; or other income.

The applicant also must provide statements by three character or academic references. The application includes forms for these personal references. Each applicant must submit a complete packet, including three references, or the application will not be considered.

The US Field Artillery Association scholarship committee will determine the scholarship winners. All decisions will be final.

The winners must provide proof of current enrollment in an accredited university, college or vocational institution in order to receive the scholarship checks.

US Field Artillery Association memberships are $20 per year with several benefits, including eligibility for scholarships and a subscription to the bimonthly FA Journal. Potential applicants may join online at www.fieldartillery.org.

The 2003 scholarship winners were Second Lieutenant Gary L. Helton, Rhode Island Army National Guard (ARNG) (Member category); Kristi S. Saumer, daughter of Sergeant Major Daniel M. Saumer, Minnesota ARNG (Enlisted Family Member); and Christina K. Isper, wife of Captain Eric M. Isper, Fort Sill (Officer Family Member).
The 82d Field Artillery regimental crest commemorates innovation and adaptation. Operating from horseback, the 82d FA fired its first hostile shot across the Rio Grande against the Villistas in June 1919. The unprecedented speed and mobility of those guns inspired the term “flying artillery.”

Like their predecessors, the proud Paladin artillerymen of the 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (3-82 FA), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, used innovation and adaptation to prepare for the likely combination of combat, stability, and support operations in Baghdad. Field Artillery units around the world are preparing to take on full-spectrum operations in evolving environments.

This article shares the Red Dragons’ experience in training for an ever-changing Iraqi mission. 3-82 FA applied valuable and timely lessons learned from units in Iraq to create a training program before deploying. The training plan enhanced the Red Dragons’ readiness to conduct stability or support operations (SOSO), mounted and dismounted urban operations, and civil military operations (CMO) while not compromising their ability to deliver timely, accurate and lethal fires in support of their Blackjack 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

**Receiving the Mission.** The 1st Cav’s mission to relieve the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad became public in late July 2003. Simultaneously, the extended Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) rotation plan was released. At that time, the 2d BCT, with 3-82 FA as its direct support (DS) FA battalion, was conducting training exercises at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California.

**3-82 FA Transformation into a Hybrid Motorized Rifle and Paladin Battalion:**

**Training for Baghdad**

By Lieutenant Colonel Timothy A. Vuono, Major Jeffrey C. Collins and Captain Evans A. Hanson
The Red Dragons honed their DS artillery skills at the NTC through August 2003 as they faced the contemporary operational environment (COE) opposing force (OPFOR). Although the NTC environment included some SOSO training and lessons learned from OIF after-action reviews (AARs), the Red Dragons' rotation was not significantly different than those experienced by pre-OIF rotational units.

The battalion faced an imminent deployment to a SOSO environment, yet the Red Dragons remained firm in ensuring they could execute their traditional mission-essential task list (METL) and execute it well. Keeping that focus at the NTC developed Soldiers' confidence in their warfighting readiness and made the post-NTC transition to SOSO training more meaningful.

The 2d BCT with 3-82 FA was selected to deploy in early January 2004, two-to-three months ahead of the division. After returning from the NTC, the Red Dragons had only 14 weeks to conduct their pre-deployment SOSO train-up before rail loading on 1 December. (See the training time line in Figure 1.) At the beginning of training, the division and brigade staffs were still refining the specifics of task organization and the new Iraq-specific METL.

**Overview of the SOSO Training Development Process.** The battalion operations section ordered and distributed copies of pertinent infantry manuals and referenced several mission-specific training publications (see Figure 2). The battalion commander selected priority tasks from these references to focus training on; the tasks are listed in Figure 3. The initial plan worked in three phases.

Phase I began with battery-level training during Sergeant's Time and other time available during the week, focusing on Phase I SOSO tasks. Firing battery commanders formed two infantry platoons and a headquarters element from the existing two firing platoons and support platoon. Battery fire direction specialists became automatic rifle men in squads led by former howitzer section chiefs. (The training design assumed the unit would deploy with no howitzers and receive no augmentation in personnel or equipment for the deployment.)

Putting together a SOSO training event required the battalion to identify personnel in the unit who had experience in military police, infantry, civil affairs, special operations and even civilian security and police occupational specialties. Among the first duties of the newly created 3-82 FA Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Officer (S5), he was to survey and catalog these personnel resources within the battalion. He also identified Soldiers with experience in other areas, including Arabic language and culture, carpentry and plumbing, and counseling and education. Using the database, the battalion commander could tap soldiers with specific experience or knowledge to conduct training in traffic control point (TCP) and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). This CMO database also could be useful for resourcing future operations in Iraq.

During the initial training, the organization of headquarters and service battery (HSB) remained unchanged to keep logistics and maintenance systems intact and avoid handicapping the battalion’s recovery from the recent NTC rotation.

The culmination of Phase I was a battery SOSO field training exercise (FTX) during Week Six of the pre-deployment train-up. This FTX certified squads in Phase I tasks.

During this period, the battalion commander and an assistant S3 attended 40 hours of cultural awareness training in Jordan from the Royal Jordanian Peacekeeping Officer’s Training Center. The battalion commander was then joined by the battalion executive officer (XO) on a week-long reconnaissance of their future area of operations (AO) in Baghdad.

They observed the operations of 4-1 FA, 1st Armored Division, the unit 3-82 FA was to relieve. This trip proved invaluable and led the battalion commander to adjust the training program and battalion’s organization based upon lessons learned from 4-1 FA. The focus and structure of the battalion-level SOSO training was validated, but the commander directed that planned indirect fire training only include crews from A Battery. Organizationally, the recon led to the establishment of a provisional battery composed of the battalion’s combat observation lasering team (COLT) platoon and company fire support teams.

Phase II culminated with the battalion-level SOSO FTX, incorporating all unit training. This FTX incorporated HSB and the fire support element (FSE) into the training and brought them up to speed on selected tasks from both Phases I and II.

Phase III focused on individual readiness and training, which was continuous throughout the 14 weeks of the train-up. This dovetailed into the developing training plan for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) in Kuwait.

**First FTX: Basic Squad and Battery Combat Leadership.** Artillerymen in history have proven their determination and tenacity to “stick to their guns” and are known as premier combat leaders. However, transplanting a Paladin section chief from his seat in front of the automated fire control system (AFCS) and placing him in front of a squad of light infantry troops does require adjustment. By the end of the battery SOSO FTX, former howitzer section chiefs were quite adept at the less technical, yet intensely challenging art of maneuver squad leadership. The transformation was well underway.

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**Figure 1:** 3-82 FA Pre-Deployment Stability or Support Operations (SOSO) Training and Deployment Preparation Time Line: 14 Weeks

**Figure 2:** Field Manuals (FM) and a Mission-Specific Training Circular (TC) Used as References for SOSO Training Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Training Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Redeployment from NTC (1 Sep 03), III Corps Warfighter Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Battalion Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>Battalion Services, Battery SOSO Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Battery SOSO Field Training Exercises (FTX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Battalion Reorganization, Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>Battalion Services and Deployment Preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Battalion SOSO FTX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-13</td>
<td>Deployment Preparation and Ranges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Equipment Loadout (1 Dec)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Major Peter K. Bacon, XO of 2-20 FA, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), recently wrote about his battalion’s transition to low-intensity conflict. In his article, “Whatever it Takes: Redlegs and Riflemen” in the December 2003 edition of Army magazine, Major Bacon declares, “leaders must strive to find training opportunities that encompass [SOSO] tasks and enhance leader and soldier skills.” The transformation from a mechanized artillery to a motorized infantry battalion starts with the NCO and his ability to lead and say, “Follow me, do as I do!”

In the first FTX, two platoons from each of the three firing batteries rotated through three battalion-run training sites: TCPs, Squad Situational Training Exercises (STXs) and Platoon MOUT. Battery commanders and first sergeants conducted METL assessments of their platoons during the first day of the four-day field exercise dedicated to training the platoon and battery levels. In the evenings, the battery commanders coordinated with the officers-in-charge (OICs) and NCOs-in-charge (NCOICs) of each training site to ensure the training met the needs of each platoon.

Training site OICs developed standard evaluation criteria based on Army training and evaluation program (ARTEP) standards, when available. Site OICs also reported their evaluations of each platoon nightly to the tactical operations center (TOC). The battalion commander and S3 used this information to adjust and focus training in progress to meet the commander’s intent.

The chief MOUT instructor maintained the focus on squad-level room clearing, movement through urban terrain and muzzle discipline. The temptation is great to immediately pile on other tasks, such as react to sniper and an improvised explosive device (IED), cordon and search, etc. However, each battalion trainer planned and prepared the training to ensure Soldiers were successful in certain basic tasks before progressing to more complex tasks. After a platoon achieved a prescribed level of proficiency in the basic tasks for each site, the trainer added a more complex task to the next iteration.

This technique was as an excellent way to keep battery commanders in control of their training as well as provide a quantitative method for the battalion commander to evaluate each platoon’s progress. Although the battalion only had 14 weeks to train for combat operations as a motorized rifle battalion, the trainers resisted the urge to have their Soldiers “run before they could walk” to ensure they had a solid foundation for future training and operations.

The AAR from the first FTX and the Army magazine article identified two major lessons. Although combat service support (CSS) Soldiers were busy meeting maintenance milestones to keep the battalion ready for deployment, the mechanics, supply clerks, cooks and other CSS Soldiers needed to be fully integrated into the upcoming battalion SOSO FTX (Phase II). The Soldiers from the TOC and administration and logistics operations center (ALOC) needed not only the SOSO training, but also training to provide command and control (C2) and support to a motorized infantry battalion.

Final Definition of the Mission—Training a Firing Battery for Iraq. The division and brigade mission statements and commander’s intent became crystal clear by Week Seven of the pre-deployment time line. The Red Dragons had Weeks through Nine to make several key decisions to achieve success in the newly approved METL tasks. In short, 3-82 FA had to maintain its capability to deliver artillery fires with one howitzer battery and conduct combat operations as a motorized infantry battalion.

Battery A was selected to deploy with its guns. The battery commander began a rigorous battery training plan to maintain his crews’ proficiency at the post-NTC level while preparing to execute the battalion SOSO FTX in Week 10. Immediately, the S5 became a full-time position with an assigned NCO. Personnel from the S5 section and selected task force fire support officers (FSOs) attended 40 hours of training from civil affairs officers from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center sent to Fort Hood from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Fire supporters from the task force fire support teams (FISTs) as well as the COLT platoon formed F Battery, a provisional battery with the same task and purpose as the other batteries, but it also was responsible for providing personal security for key battalion leaders.

From the forward area recon, the battalion commander and XO brought back lessons from the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad. The 3d BCT employs a “Team Village” concept, bringing together targeting, combat operations, CMO and information operations (IO) at the brigade level at a daily commander’s update brief. Each activity accomplishes tasks on one targeting matrix to meet the brigade commander’s intent.

3-82 FA will bring this concept down to the battalion level to achieve optimal information flow and coordination between the S3, FSO, S5, fire direction center (FDC) and batteries. The battalion FDC retained its traditional mission of tactical fire direction. However, the battalion commander expanded the FDC’s mission to include synchronizing targeting, combat operations, CMO and IO.

The battalion commander also identified the importance of battery bound-
aries in the AO’s matching sensibly to existing neighborhood political boundaries in Baghdad. 4-1 FA reaped the intelligence and CMO benefits from fostering close relationships between battery commanders and Iraqi civilians in their neighborhoods. With the newly formed F Battery, 3-82 FA could conduct a seamless transition of Authority within its five Baghdad neighborhoods. With its new task organization, the battalion had transformed for its new mission: new S5 staff officer, new equipment (Force XXI communications equipment and vehicles fielded in the previous 12 months), the modified FSE and battalion FDC, and F Battery. F Battery held its first formation and fielded two platoons, bringing the total number of infantry platoons in the battalion to 11.

**Battalion SOSO FTX.** After the battalion met all readiness milestones, the Red Dragons were prepared to execute the capstone battalion SOSO FTX in Week 10. The HSB commander formed three platoons of three squads each from his Soldiers. The battalion S3 developed a detailed plan to field them, squad-by-squad, rotating them through the FTX training while they continued to perform their support missions.

Week 10 was just four weeks away from railcar loading, but the Red Dragons brought all its resources to bear on the final battalion FTX. There were three keys to the FTX’s success. First, the battalion devised a simple, yet fluid execution matrix to train all 11 platoons in the five batteries over four days. Second, the trainers had to conduct rehearsals and refine the training of the five major training sites: TCP, MOUT, Paladin Table IX Live Fire (A Battery), Squad STX Lanes (HSB) and Reflexive Fire Range. Third, the trainers used realistic reporting procedures to train the TOC’s C2 and the ALOC’s support.

HSB elements participated in a convoy live-fire exercise during Week 9. That event provided valuable training on crew-served weapons to CSS Soldiers and imbued the warrior ethos in those who had not participated fully in the first FTX. In their newly formed platoons, HSB troops were integrated into the battalion SOSO training. In addition, they practiced troop-leading procedures at a special Squad STX site. This training focused on squad attack and troop-leading procedures.

A Battery validated its ability to deliver fires in a two-day, one-night live-fire exercise before bringing its howitzers to the MOUT facility on the third day. This event was highlighted by the 1st Cav’s first all-digital fire mission from a Longbow Apache to the FDC.

The remaining batteries proceeded through the TCP, MOUT, and Reflexive Fire Range training sites.

**Reflexive Fire Range.** This training challenged Soldiers in target acquisition and discrimination and built upon the urban combat techniques taught in the first FTX. The training gave Soldiers confidence in their muzzle control and weapons clearing and safety procedures.

One of the division commander’s main objectives is to eliminate casualties from negligent weapon discharge; reflexive fire training reinforced this point.

Firers engaged multiple target scenarios first with blank ammunition and the next day with live ammunition. Each firer had a dedicated lane with a coach to reinforce safe and proper techniques. **TCP.** Although Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and Facilities Protective Service (FPS) personnel are taking over the TCPs in and around Baghdad, Soldiers still need to be proficient at this important task. Batteries were placed in both permissive and deadly situations to highlight the complexity of the enemy. To simulate civilian Iraqis at the checkpoint, Soldiers dressed in civilian clothing and drove three cars and vans issued from the Fort Hood Transport Motor Pool (TMP).

Pyrotechnic smoke and flares as well as dummy projectiles, mines and threat weapons were part of the training. The most valuable training aid was the “Simunition” brand M16 rifle upper receivers and ammunition. These commercial products added unique realism by turning the Soldiers’ issued rifles into paint pellet training devices.

The MOUT OIC delivered the operations order (OPORD) to the battalion commander on his arrival to the site. Concurrently, the S5 delivered cultural awareness, Arabic phrase and media relations training to the troops. Subsequently, the battery commander executed his cordon and search mission, normally given one building as an objective.

The MOUT OIC controlled every event within the mock town by handheld radio. Before each iteration, he gave the assistant OIC and the “townspeople” an initial situation, positioning and parameters for their actions. The MOUT OIC controlled the addition of variables into the scenario to meet the training objectives while the battery mission was in progress. These variables included terrorist snipers, IEDs, hidden weapons caches, mines, hostile civilian demonstrations, mass prayer in the streets at designated times and the media, just to name a few.

Battery commanders reported to the battalion TOC during MOUT mission execution. Soldiers and leaders in the TOC advised commanders on Muslim mass prayer times, delivered intelligence updates and received reports in accordance with the new tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP). The ALOC received civilians detained for questioning and processed civilian and military simulated casualties.

The training at the MOUT facility was extremely valuable at all levels. The key was realism. Soldiers gained confi-
dence that they could maintain their mission focus in a complex environment, including loud music, strange people and unfamiliar and dangerous terrain. The number of variables allowed for almost infinite combinations of situations to which batteries could be exposed. However, the scale of the training event was small enough to allow up to eight iterations per day and up to two night iterations.

**Ongoing Individual Readiness.** Units currently deployed recommend Soldiers be proficient on as many weapons as possible with an emphasis on the M249 squad automatic weapon. The last four weeks of the pre-deployment timeline included a second battalion-run live-fire Reflexive Fire Range. Soldiers continued to attend ranges administered by units throughout the brigade, including ranges for the M2 and M249 machine guns, Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher and M9 pistol.

Frequent marksmanship training, meticulous battery training records and strong command emphasis were key to the Red Dragons’ achieving 100 percent weapons qualification. Rapid fielding of M14 rifles and improved weapons optics and resourceful training from 1-5 Cav, an infantry battalion in the BCT, enabled 3-82 FA to have a trained and ready force of advanced rifle marksmen spread throughout the battalion.

The battalion physician’s assistant worked to qualify at least one combat life saver (CLS) for each vehicle in the battalion. The S5 trained key leaders and commanders on cultural awareness, the civil-military situation in Iraq and use of interpreters through a series of officer professional development (OPD) lunches. The chaplain also held an OPD concerning Islam.

The battalion trained for five days at the new engagement skills trainer (EST). The EST is a state-of-the-art computer simulation using mock vehicles, laser-projecting weapons and a projection screen. The device places Soldiers and leaders in numerous situations, testing their ability to make split-second decisions on whether “to shoot or not to shoot.”

**SOSO Design and Training Lessons Learned.** The battalion learned several training principles. Train all Soldiers, regardless of their jobs, in all SOSO tasks. Limiting the initial training to the firing batteries put the Soldiers from HSB “behind the power curve” for pre-OIF deployment training.

Decentralized operations are commonplace in Iraq. Emphasize developing small-unit leaders through traditional squad STXs.

Units should use TOCs and battery operations centers (BOCs) continuously in every training event to empower lower-echelon training systems to function, but the TOCs and BOCs must follow proper reporting procedures. A junior officer or NCO can make the right decisions on the ground if he is empowered, confident and trained to keep his commander informed.

Even with longer than 14 weeks to train up, units may feel pressure to advance through their training plan too quickly—they must resist it. The Red Dragons systematically became proficient in convoy live fire, advanced and reflexive marksmanship, MOUT and other SOSO tasks. The EST builds further confidence. Systematic planning and focus on fundamental skills made this possible. Although there is much work to be done in Kuwait and beyond, the Red Dragon Soldier is confident in his abilities as the battalion deploys.

No training event imparted greater confidence than MOUT training. With more simulated civilians, Simunition training aids and time, 3-82 FA could have added even more realism and value to this fantastic event. The MOUT OIC needs to be a star with extensive subject matter expertise, empowered with the latitude to apply variables like IEDs, sniper engagements, etc., on the spot to reach the commander’s intended training objectives.

It is not necessary to reinvent the wheel as artillery units train in tasks outside their traditional skill set. If infantrymen had to train to be Cannoneers, no one would expect them to write their own field manuals and firing tables. Units should use the experience and knowledge of the experts and look for skilled Soldiers from within their ranks.

Transformation and innovation will continue to keep artillerymen relevant for OIF and beyond.

The Red Dragons likely will learn many more lessons as they roll into Iraq in the coming weeks. Communications
with units overseas and access to existing resources can help a unit stay abreast of the latest developments in tactics, techniques and procedures. Application of these lessons in creative training events is important.

Regardless of the amount of training time available, smart planning and intra-staff synchronization can maximize the time. For Soldiers and leaders, the time is not wasted if it develops and empowers junior leaders, builds confidence in Soldiers by exposing them to unconventional and realistic situations, and adds flexibility and adaptation to their repertoire.

As of early February, 3-82 FA’s readiness had increased further while training at the Udairi Range complex in Kuwait. Contract trainers provided invaluable training with unparalleled professionalism. Key training events included close quarters marksmanship, MOUT and convoy motorized live-fire exercises.

The opportunity for all 2d BCT and 3-82 FA troops to train in these live-fire exercises served as the perfect capstone to ensure they were trained, ready and confident—prepared for success as they began their mission.

In Iraq, the Red Dragons conducted a successful transition of authority from 4-1 FA, 1st Armored Division, in mid-February.

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy A. Vuono commands the 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (3-82 FA), 1st Cavalry Division, that recently deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from Fort Hood, Texas. In his previous position, he was the Deputy Fire Support Coordinator for III Corps at Fort Hood. He served with the 1st Armored Division in Operation Desert Storm and commanded A Battery, 3-1 FA.

Major Jeffrey C. Collins is the 3-82 FA and planned pre-deployment stability or support operations (SOSO) training for the battalion, now in Iraq. He commanded A Battery, 1-5 FA, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Captain Evans A. Hanson is the Civil-Military Operations Officer (SS) for 3-82 FA in Iraq. He was the battalion’s Assistant Operations Officer during the pre-deployment SOSO train-up. Among other assignments, he was the Executive Officer for B Battery, 3-82 FA.

### Ways to Change FA Materiel and Personnel

There are many emerging insights and lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Some clearly suggest that changes may be in order for materiel and personnel in our tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). These insights are surfacing in a number of different forums, such as unit after-action reports (AARs), Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and Field Artillery articles, letters/emails to senior leaders at the Field Artillery Center, etc. While these are great forums for exchanging ideas, they normally are not enough to initiate changes.

Anyone can propose organization, manning or equipment changes to meet observed shortfalls in warfighting capacities. The complete process is described in AR 71-32 Force Development and Documentation-Consolidated Policies.

**Proposals for Minor Adjustments.** These manning and equipment proposals normally are submitted on DA Form 2028 Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. The form is sent through command channels to the FA Center as the proponent for FA units. Email is also acceptable as long as it contains all the required information: modified TOE (MTOE) or TOE number and paragraph; details of the proposed change; bill payer, if required; and a detailed statement of justification.

DA policy is that proposals to increase personnel normally are not approved without offsets (reductions from another part of the organization). It is advantageous for a unit to get consensus from other affected or like units before submitting the proposal.

Combat Developers at the FA Center review the proposed change for compliance with doctrine, regulations and Army policy and coordinate with other proponents, when necessary. Sometimes DA already has looked at the issue from a larger perspective, such as funding across the Army for like type units, and decided not to make the change.

If the FA combat developers nonconcur, they provide a memorandum to the command explaining the reasons. If the proposal is approved at the FA Center, it is forwarded through the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to the Department of the Army (DA) G3 for final review and an approval decision. A copy of the TRADOC package is returned through command channels to whoever submitted the proposal. This process usually takes about six months.

**Proposals for Significant Changes.** These changes to an organization’s design, manning or equipment must go through the force design update (FDU) process. FDU issues are organizational solutions to accommodate capability shortfalls in which current doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel or soldier (DTLOMS) solutions are insufficient.

The first step is for the commander to begin an informal dialog (telephone, email, discussion at a conference) with FA Center combat developers to determine the operational merit of the proposal. This information is forwarded to Headquarters, TRADOC, where action officers staff the proposal worldwide to gain Army-wide consensus. From there the issue is forwarded to DA for approval by the Chief or Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

Approved FDU issues that do not carry a personnel or major equipment bill (increase in quantity) normally are implemented immediately. Issues that do have a bill may be approved as a requirement in the TOE but must compete for MTOE resources in the total Army analysis (TAA) process. From the time the FDU is announced until final approval by the Vice Chief is about 10 months.

**Major Redesign and Restructuring Initiatives.** These follow a process similar to the FDU but are larger in scale, affecting all organizations within a specific proponent or echelon (e.g., Force XXI Division design). Such proposals usually are initiated by a proponent or by the Army leadership.

If you have questions, contact the authors at emails KleinC@sill.army.mil or CarlsonD@sill.army.mil.
The battalion headquarters of 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment (2-15 FAR) from the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Fort Drum, New York, deployed to Iraq in March 2003 with its Q-36 Firefinder radar and the battalion’s combat observation lasing team (COLT). The headquarters coordinated, integrated and synchronized lethal fires for the 173d Airborne Brigade in support of the brigade’s campaign on the Northern Front in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Although the battalion headquarters performed typical FA tasks, the most significant impact 2-15 FAR had in OIF fell outside the traditional Redleg spectrum of missions. 2-15 FAR accomplished tasks that included conducting dismounted presence patrols; securing oil facilities; establishing and overseeing a detention facility; guarding a major bank; conducting command, control and communications (C3) for a 150-by-100-kilometer maneuver area of operations (AO); and establishing the a provincial government for the city of Kirkuk that governs 800,000 Iraqis.

The leaders and Soldiers of the 2-15 FAR headquarters tackled these varied and unique challenges by relying on improvisation, flexibility and lessons learned from past training experiences, such as rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, and a recent division Warfighter exercise. Soldiers, NCOs and officers performed duties for which they had not been trained at home station, often accomplishing them without the authorized equipment and personnel.

**Task Organizing and Deploying.** The 173d Airborne Brigade stood-up as a brigade in June 2000. It was formed around the former Southern European Task Force (SETAF) Airborne Battalion Combat Team (ABCT). The brigade has one organic artillery battery: D Battery, 319th Airborne FAR (D/319 AFAR). To accomplish its OIF requirements, the 173d Airborne Brigade requested a force FA headquarters (2-15 FAR), a Q-36 radar and an additional firing battery. 2-15 FAR also decided to deploy its COLT to augment the brigade’s observation capability.

2-15 FAR received its warning order to deploy during the 10th Mountain Division’s Warfighter exercise in early March 2003. The battalion commander sent the brigade fire support officer (FSO) to the 173d Brigade in Vicenza, Italy, to integrate the FA battalion into planning for movement and help formulate the brigade’s fire support plan. The battalion continued to participate in the division’s Warfighter exercise while the tactical operations center (TOC) (minus), Q-36, COLT and firing battery prepared to deploy.

The battalion headquarters package departed Fort Drum on 23 March and completed movement to Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, on 25 March. During the next two days, the battalion headquarters integrated into the final stages of the brigade’s air movement and tactical plan.
The members of the battalion worked with their brigade counterparts to quickly adapt to the new unit’s standing operating procedures (SOP) and develop relationships with key leaders. 2-15 FAR also exchanged SOPs and conducted rehearsals with D Battery.

As the load plans for the airborne assault into northern Iraq were being finalized, aircraft restrictions forced the brigade to reprioritize its equipment for transport into theater. The reprioritization caused a significant decrease in the number of vehicles and personnel that 2-15 FAR could bring into country. As a result, only the vehicles absolutely necessary to provide command and control (C2) were air landed into theater. The battalion’s combat service support (CSS) assets remained in Italy to redeploy to Fort Drum. The 105-mm battery made it to Germany, prepared to deploy to Iraq, but later was redeployed to Fort Drum.

**Inserting by Air into Iraq.** The 173d Brigade conducted its airborne insertion into Bashur Airfield in northeastern Iraq on 26 March. On 27 March, headquarters, headquarters and services battery (HHS) (minus) and 2-15 FAR deployed forward on C-17s with 41 personnel for the TOC, a Q-36 radar section and COLT platoon with a total of eight vehicles, one ISU90 storage container and two pallets of equipment and medical supplies.

The 173d Brigade’s mission was to secure the Bashur Airfield, build combat power and prepare the airfield for use as a logistics hub in the Northern Front. The brigade jumped onto the airfield and secured it with the help of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N) along with soldiers from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP fighters, known by US forces as the Peshmerga (those who face death), are a Kurdish resistance group in northern Iraq.

Under light rain and in darkness, the 2-15 FAR headquarters air landed at Bashur Airfield. The Q-36 occupied a position near the airfield and began observing. The TOC established operations in a former Iraqi Army fort that once was used as a prison. Due to the lack of organic vehicles’ being flown in, 2-15 FAR’s leaders arranged to transport the TOC personnel and equipment on borrowed Peshmerga trucks for the 20-mile trip through mountainous terrain. The 2-15 FAR TOC quickly learned the necessity of working with local forces and using the talents of contracted linguists to interpret and coordinate activities. The Peshmerga also helped provide security for the TOC as it set-up and immediately began the military decision-making process (MDMP) for upcoming missions.

The six howitzers of D/319 AFAR arrived in Iraq on 28 March and quickly established a firing capability near the airfield, soon integrating the Q-36 into its battery perimeter. The battalion fire direction center (FDC) incorporated D Battery and the Q-36 in fire mission and counterfire acquisition rehearsals.

The FDC established SOPs with its non-habitual subordinate battery and worked through the challenges posed by the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS)-equipped battalion FDC communicating with the non-AFATDS, battery computer system (BCS)-equipped firing battery. Needing to meet the five requirements for accurate, predicted fire, the TOC provided C2 for a live-fire exercise for D/319 AFAR to calibrate its howitzers. Based on procedures outlined in a January-February 2003 article, the TOC applied Air Force meteorological data from the secure Internet protocol net (SIPRNET). (The article was “Afghanistan: Firing Artillery Accurately with Air Force Met Support,” by First Lieutenant Joshua D. Mitchell.)

**Fighting in Iraq.** The training soon paid off when D Battery and 2-15 FAR TOC elements conducted two, two-gun raids near enemy lines with 60 confirmed kills and two bunker complexes destroyed in support of US Special Forces operations.

To conduct the raids, maintain security operations near Bashur Airfield and conduct the MDMP for future operations, 2-15 FAR TOC personnel contributed to the brigade’s efforts. The TOC provided an officer to act as D Battery’s executive officer (XO) for the artillery raid element, one NCO for the brigade’s tactical command post (TAC) to facilitate coordination for air support and surface fires as part of the brigade fire support element (FSE) and a 131A warrant officer in the brigade TOC FSE to help in operations and planning. In addition, 2-15 FAR’s brigade FSO acted as the FA battalion S3 and supervised the battalion’s MDMP and production of the FA support plan (FASP). 2-15 FAR developed the fire support plan for the brigade’s seizure of the city of Kirkuk.

On 9 April, the 173d Brigade attacked to seize Kirkuk. The 2-15 FAR battalion TAC, Q-36 radar and four guns from D Battery moved 120 kilometers south to Kirkuk. The TAC reached the outskirts of Kirkuk and linked up with the remaining two guns and FDC from D Battery.

The artillery elements moved forward immediately behind the lead infantry battalion to provide close supporting fires. Enemy resistance was light as the Peshmerga and US Special Forces had conducted an attack earlier in the day that had diminished the enemy threat. The battalion and brigade TACs occupied a position at an Iraqi military helicopter airfield base outside Kirkuk, and D Battery established a firing capability and integrated the Q-36 into its firing position.

On 10 April, the brigade and battalion TACs moved to an Iraqi air force base directly west of Kirkuk. There they established permanent C2 centers for the brigade and city. The Q-36 and D Battery occupied a position within the perimeter of the airbase and were prepared to provide indirect fire support.
The remainder of the 2-15 FAR TOC arrived early the next morning, once again on borrowed Peshmerga cargo trucks.

High-intensity combat operations were over for the 173d Airborne Brigade and stability or support operations (SOSO) began with a series of nontraditional missions.

Securing Iraqi Oil Facilities. To protect Iraq’s vital infrastructure, the brigade tasked 2-15 FAR to secure the key oil processing plant in northern Iraq. Kirkuk’s oil fields produce 40 percent of Iraq’s oil and six percent of the world’s oil. D Battery secured the oil stabilization plant five kilometers northwest of Kirkuk while maintaining two guns in position ready-to-fire.

2-15 FAR also was responsible for an AO that included the oil stabilization plant, oil storage facilities and industrial equipment storage sites. To facilitate the security of the oil stabilization site and prevent looting and espionage to oil production structures, Soldiers from the 2-15 FAR TOC conducted many presence patrols at those sites and in surrounding villages. These patrols were conducted by FA officers and NCOs and Soldiers from Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) 13D Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Specialist, 13B Cannon Crewmember, 96B Intelligence Analyst and 31U Signal Support System Specialist.

Instrumental to the success of these presence patrols was their training, focused on battle drills and rehearsals. The training was on mounted and dismounted patrolling techniques, reacting to ambushes, apprehension of looters and evacuating casualties. Leaders also had to integrate their linguists into training and operations.

2-15 FAR’s TOC Soldiers never had been exposed to this type of training but were eager and quick to learn. These Soldiers were placed in the Iraqi population to provide security and build trust with the locals. One patrol with eight personnel and three vehicles captured 36 looters, some armed with AK-47s, who were stealing oil production equipment. Another patrol captured a 60-mm mortar that had fired at the air base.

Running a Detention Center. During this period, a new detainee collection point needed to be established. Presence patrols conducted by brigade maneuver units throughout the AO were detaining large numbers of looters and anti-Coalition personnel. Local jails in the city were not yet established, and the existing collection point was overflowing.

The brigade assigned 2-15 FAR the task of establishing a brigade detention facility. The battalion determined the location and developed the plan for its construction and security. “Camp Bayonet Collection Point” was soon established.

A mortar platoon initially provided security for the facility while 2-15 FAR provided the hearing officers and the magistrate. Two FA captains, one FA lieutenant and the radar warrant officer became responsible for hearing cases and dispensing justice to detainees who soon numbered in the thousands. The hearing officers provided recommendations to 2-15 FAR’s S3, who was the magistrate.

Artillerymen were asked to perform duties primarily associated with judges and military policemen. These officers and Soldiers relied on common sense and practical judgment to accomplish these tasks for which they had never trained.

Due to mission requirements and Department of the Army needs, 10 personnel of the original 41 with 2-15 AFAR, the Q-36 and COLT returned to Fort Drum. 2-15 FAR (-) was led by the battalion S3, and a sergeant first class (promotable) became the senior NCO.

The young officers and NCOs throughout the TOC stepped up to the increased responsibilities. The assistant S3 became the operations officer and the senior NCOs became the S1 and S4. Others filled unfamiliar roles, such as a 13D
T he former regime. TF Government competing for scarce resources and all Turkomen, Kurds and Assyrians all
nically charged area with Arabs, million people. The city also is an eth-
and its governate has more than 1.2

The 173d Brigade then re-allo-
weeks.

The main focus in these towns was to

Artillery soldiers applied hard work,
ningenuity and attention to detail while operating a facility that was recognized as the best in the 4th Infantry Division.

Securing the Bank of Kirkuk. 2-15 FAR also was assigned to provide secu-

establish the government's budget and

Democracy.

2-15 FAR maintained the equivalent of two command posts, one in the Kirkuk
government building and the traditional command post in the TOC. The battal-
ion faced the challenge of not only performing the traditional C² duties of a battalion
TOC, but also surging manpower and resources daily in the Kirkuk
government building, as necessary, to accomplish the tough tasks of building the
government and making it function. The former battalion assistant S3 per-

2-15 FAR’s Captain Matthew Murray briefly the Kirkuk city council on leadership in a democracy.
formed the duties of the S3, maintained a presence in the TOC and synchronized the efforts of the battalion’s four maneuver elements within the brigade.

The TOC also had to overcome the challenges of commanding and controlling elements in a large battlespace. The battalion’s signal officer obtained enough tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios and satellite phones for the battalion TOC to maintain digital and voice communications using the TACSAT’s data burst capability and voice nets. The TOC also used the brigade’s retrans as an alternate communications means to distant stations.

With training, units were able to send reports and updates digitally with follow up on satellite phone. The battalion TOC could respond quickly to hostile contacts and other potentially dangerous situations for units 70 kilometers away.

Each of the areas of emphasis for TF Government had unique challenges. The FA captain in charge of budgets and salaries was responsible for dispensing more than five million dollars in the 2003 budget and paying the salaries of more than 40,000 government employees. He also submitted budgets for the 2004 fiscal year. He used email to contact similar-sized cities in the United States and used examples of these American city budgets to establish Kirkuk’s budget while also adhering to the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA’s) requirements.

The Government Design Cell was responsible for everything from government structure to the buildings the government would occupy. Led by the battalion’s FDO and communications NCO, the Government Design Cell completed estimates on the government buildings in Kirkuk. This allowed non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to renovate these buildings at a later date.

The team also organized and opened the Kirkuk Employment Office. The purpose of the employment office is to find jobs for the many unemployed people of Kirkuk. The battalion FDO completed the estimates, helped hire personnel to man the employment office, coordinated with international organizations to provide funding and ensured the personnel had the equipment they needed to run the office. As of 30 September, the employment office had found jobs for more than 1,500 personnel.

The De-Ba’athification Department was to eliminate the influence that Saddam Hussein’s former ruling Ba’ath Party had on the government in Kirkuk. The battalion S2 established a system for screening the 40,000 government employees in the Kirkuk province. The battalion S2 used not only guidance from the CPA, but also familiarized himself with the de-Nazification process the Allies undertook after World War II.

He hired and trained an Iraqi staff to carry out the process. His NCOIC helped by acquiring the staff’s equipment. Currently the De-Ba’ath program in Kirkuk has screened more than 4,500 government employees and operates with minimum Coalition oversight.

TF Government also established the initial processes for the contentious issue of resettlement. The LRSD XO took charge of this area, and eventually, D Battery’s XO took over this task. With little guidance from CPA and without help from international organizations, the resettlement office, with D Battery’s XO spearheading the effort, mediated terms between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen groups who were in conflict over land and housing. These agreements have averted bloodshed in this ethnically charged area of Kirkuk.

As part of the brigade’s TF Government, 2-15 FAR has not only established the processes and systems to get the government of Kirkuk and its surrounding towns operating, but it also hired local Iraqi staffs and trained them to accomplish the same tasks in the areas of budgeting and city planning. 2-15 FAR began the process of returning local control to trained Iraqis.

Flexibility and bold innovation have been the cornerstones of success for the Soldiers, NCOs and officers of 2-15 FAR and D Battery. They employed ingenious methods to accomplish a variety of standard and non-standard missions with less than 60 percent of their personnel and 40 percent of their equipment.

2-15 FAR and D/319 AFAR, like other units in Iraq, have performed combat operations, civil affairs operations, and functions usually associated with NGOs. Leaders of 2-15 FAR and D Battery quickly adapted new methods to accomplish their unique tasks, conducted research and refused to take “That is outside of my MOS” as a reason for not accomplishing missions.

Training that places units in unexpected conditions, that requires quick problem-solving and that rewards innovative leadership will prepare our units for future missions, such as those accomplished by 2-15 FAR and D/319 AFAR after OIF.

Major Jeffrey T. O’Neal became the S3 of 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment (2-15 FA), 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), when the battalion landed in Iraq in March 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He assumed the duties of the Commander of 2-15 FAR in Iraq in May 2003.

Before deploying in OIF, he was the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 2d Brigade, 10th Division. 2-15 FAR is due to deploy back to Fort Drum, New York, this spring.

First Lieutenant Aaron P. Bork is deployed to Iraq with 2-15 FAR and has been the battalion’s Signal Officer for 18 months. He also serves as the Battalion Historian and Public Affairs Officer.

First Lieutenant Jonathan H. Bork is deployed to Iraq and has been 2-15 FAR’s S2 for seven months. He also served in the battalion as a Company FSO, Battery Fire Direction Officer and Battery Executive Officer.
One of the credos that the Army preaches is “train as you fight.” While we probably do that relatively well as an organization, there are exceptions. Unfortunately, combat is not like the pre-OIF rotations at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, with intensive emphasis on the military decision-making process (MDMP) and training constraints.

From an MLRS perspective, training at the NTC for a firing battery was nonexistent, relative to the maneuver unit company team and its direct support (DS) brethren. Traditionally, the MLRS batteries are icons on a computer screen, not vehicles and people on the ground.

Accordingly, the MLRS battalion must train its batteries for combat. To change the dynamic in the training environment, we first have to change how we view ourselves as MLRS artillery officers and NCOs.

The intent of this article is not to criticize the NTC, which has already updated its training considerably, but rather to put the onus on MLRS battalions to train their firing batteries more realistically, ultimately preparing them for the fluidity of combat operations.

My observations are based on having served in every position as a lieutenant in a firing battery, my experience as a liaison officer to a DS battalion at the NTC and, most importantly, as a battery operations officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the 3d Infantry Division’s MLRS battalion: 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery (1-39 FA).

No Force Protection in OIF. I’ve overheard several battery commanders talking about battery security say something about “having maneuver all around us” in combat or “We’re going with notional security because our guys will get burnt out rotating between the FDC/BOC [fire direction center/battery operations center] and LP/OPs [listening post/observation post].” As a lieutenant without any combat experience up to that point, I routinely “took those answers to the bank,” often using them myself.

The battery commanders thought they were correct in anticipating maneuver forces protecting their flanks; they had never experienced combat either. Furthermore, the field grades usually concurred with the battery leadership, trusting their judgment as battery commanders and first sergeants.

The assumptions made about battery security stem from years of complacency in the MLRS community about being in close contact with the enemy. The notion that we provide deep fires by delivering rockets and missiles translates for many into a false idea that we will never get close enough to the enemy to need any type of force protection or even to call on the maneuver units that supposedly are to our left, right, front and rear.

After fighting a swift and offensive war in Iraq, the MLRS mindset now has to change so firing batteries are better prepared, especially psychologically, for providing real-life force protection — engraining it in their minds that the M2 .50 caliber machine gun is not a paper-weight.

Digging fighting positions and improving them with every passing hour is a start along with using Class IV to reinforce vulnerable areas. Due to training area constraints, especially at Fort Sill, many units hide behind the range control regulation that requires prior approval before digging in. Rather than taking the time to go through the proper channels to get permission to dig, units fail to accomplish this essential force protection objective. How can a battery commander train for combat without accounting for all variables (like the time and resources) he will have to consider in a time of war?

Operations officers and BOC chiefs have to understand that their fire direc-
troops and others from the battery headquarters will man the firing positions and other security points. Accordingly, they will have to manage shifts to maximize force protection during critical times, staff a competent FDC and provide their troops a basic amount of rest.

The concept of nodal security for the BOC and battery headquarters should be scrapped immediately. The only way to prepare a soldier for the mental and physical exhaustion of armed combat (with real bullets) is to test his mettle in peacetime training, so he is not surprised after he finds himself digging a foxhole.

**Occupation in OIF.** Oftentimes in OIF the maneuver forces to our front drove through an area unopposed and called it “cleared.” Yes, doctrinally, it was cleared—in the sense that they observed no enemy forces. However, when follow-on forces, such as MLRS batteries, occupied these areas, lingering combatants armed with rifles, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and mortars were hiding in bunkers and trenches.

The tankers and infantrymen were in a race to Baghdad and, therefore, did not eliminate all opposition. They achieved their objectives and continued on. Meanwhile, the MLRS platoon leaders had the task of conducting security sweeps for which they were neither trained nor equipped.

Reconnaissance and surveillance is in the job description of the platoon leader, and most of the skills required for these tasks are basic soldiering proficiencies. However, MLRS platoon leaders are not trained to conduct more complex tasks, such as clearing a building or an enemy weapons cache four kilometers square.

One of two things has to happen: either we train MLRS platoon leaders to do more advanced infantry-related tasks, or we have maneuver troops work for MLRS units—the latter will never happen. The Field Artillery School should consider revising reconnaissance and force protection training for an MLRS firing platoon leader, which could mean splitting the MLRS and cannon officer basic course lieutenants earlier in the cannon-heavy curriculum. In the short term, units must be innovative in adopting ways to train their platoon leaders.

Additionally, launcher chiefs must be flexible enough to operate in terrain and surroundings that are novel and not covered in Field Manual 6-60 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). The small villages that are not visible on maps and the irrigation ditches and arable land in central Iraq are challenging occupation platforms.

There was a definite preconception that OIF was going to be fought in the open desert. From a training perspective, very few of us were prepared for operating in some of the areas we did—open desert with spraying wedge formations it was not.

**Maintenance and Logistics.** Remarkably and to the credit of operators and our exceptional maintenance team, my battery enjoyed a stellar combat maintenance posture in the harsh and unforgiving desert climate. The lesson to take from this is to exercise our vehicles consistently when we are not actively training in a field environment. The launchers and heavy expanded-mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) ammunition haulers require attention, but they are extremely reliable when put to use. Allowing equipment to sit in the motor pool for weeks at a time is inexcusable, but it happens all too often in the garrison setting.

A comprehensive and coherent maintenance program spearheaded by battery maintenance experts and battalion executive officers not only can keep vehicles better postured, but also benefit the Army economically by reducing the dollars spent on repair parts needed due to neglect and inactivity.

This is especially true of the HEMTT fleets. Taking care of vehicles extends past a before-operations preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) with “no faults found” and requires the operator to dispatch the vehicle, drive it, critique it and identify potential shortcomings.

“Command Maintenance Monday” is an admirable concept, but the same emphasis on maintenance is lacking from Tuesday through Friday. Commanders at all levels should scrutinize how they do business in the motor pool outside of the parameters of Command Maintenance Monday to be responsive to the needs of our aging equipment.

For maintenance and training, why not acquire more “load test pods” to keep the cranes and launchers operating under the same stress of handling live pods in combat? Annual load tests do just that—test a cable and crane only once a year.

Critics of increasing the load test frequency to exercise cable and pulley systems may say the equipment will fail more often when put under the stress and strain of combat conditions. In OIF, we found the equipment to be remarkably reliable. Second, I would rather test and know the limits of my equipment before reaching a combat theater rather than learn the hard way in combat when supply lines are nonexistent.

Realistic maintenance and logistical training at home station is essential to provide battery and battalion commanders a glimpse of the variables and planning considerations they could encounter on the battlefield. Actually running a logistics personnel and administration center (LOGPAC) during training rather than making a quick trip to the motor pool to grab a part from the prescribed load list (PLL) cage may be painful, but there is no motor pool to run to when sitting in the middle of a combat zone.

Shooting rockets and training on the command and control piece of our profession are not items that go neglected by the majority of units. The time-consuming and important tasks, such as force protection, are what we do not train on enough; in combat they become critical. Some additional tasks to consider for training are realistic combat vehicle loads, driver’s training with a full supply of live pods and others.

When combat comes, there is no way to turn back the hands of time, our most important training resource. We can, however, use the training time allotted to better prepare ourselves for the realities of war, which include internalizing more of a warrior ethos, rather than seeing ourselves at a distance from the close fighting.

Regardless of where the next fight takes us after Iraq, force protection, occupation and maintenance/logistics will be extremely important. MLRS battalions must execute realistic, demanding training for their batteries to fight the War on Terrorism.

Captain Chad M. Gibson served as the Operations Officer for 1-39 FA (MLRS) (3-13 FA) while attached to 1-39 FA (MLRS) from the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Currently, he is the Adjutant for 3-13 FA. He has served in every lieutenant position at the MLRS battery level. He is also a 2002 graduate of the University of Oklahoma, holding a Master of Education with an emphasis in Educational Psychology.
3d ID BFIST in OIF
Simultaneous Direct and Indirect Fire at the Tip of the Spear

By First Lieutenant Richard R. Aaron, Jr.

“On target! On target! They flattened the damn thing!”

These were the first words I spoke across my internal intercom sitting in the turret of my M7 Bradley fire support vehicle (BSFV) as 36 rounds of 155-mm high explosive (HE) fired by 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA), our direct support (DS) artillery battalion, destroyed an Iraqi outpost 900 meters from the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Within minutes, our supported infantry company (B/3-15 IN) crossed the border into Iraq and began clearing the passage lanes for the remainder of our 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized).

Passing through the destroyed outpost, we observed the devastating effects of the artillery up close. In an area where two buildings and an observation tower once stood, a smoldering pile of rubble remained. Within an hour of the assault into Iraq, our Bradley fire support team (BFIST) had initiated the first indirect fire mission from Iraqi sand, destroying a BMP (Russian-made armored personnel carrier).

From those first few moments across the border until the day we occupied one of the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s palaces in Baghdad, our BSFV traveled more than 1,200 kilometers as our team experienced 23 days of sustained combat operations.

The BSFV in Formation. The BSFV proved to be a lethal, reliable platform for the FIST to operate from and transmit quick accurate indirect fire missions. Its maneuverability, armored protection and direct fire system enhanced our ability to provide our company indirect fires throughout the conflict.

The BSFVs weapon systems and armor protection allowed the BFIST to aggressively maneuver on the battlefield to initiate and observe indirect fires. During all movements, we positioned the BFSVs near the company commander and behind the lead platoon of the company for the best tactical advantage.

In column formation, this allowed the BFIST to quickly move to the front of the company to observe any targets that appeared. During column movement, alternate observer responsibilities went to the lead platoon. This was because the BFIST could acquire any targets almost simultaneously due to its ability to rapidly maneuver to the front of the company and get “eyes on” the target without assuming any more risk than that assumed by the maneuver Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) in the lead platoon. When moving in a wedge, the BFIST, again, could move quickly in any direction to support any element in contact needing indirect fire support.

The most important factor is the BFIST’s freedom of maneuver on the battlefield. My company commander considered his fire support officer (FSO) his wingman. Although the BFIST traveled in proximity to the company commander’s Bradley, the FSO had the authority to quickly reposition in the moving formation to assess the need for indirect fire when an enemy threat appeared or was likely.

The commander considered the assault toward Baghdad as one long movement-to-contact. The rapid assault toward Baghdad consisted of the maneuver formation reaching speeds of more than 30 kilometers per hour sustained for hours at a time while maneuvering through treacherous desert terrain. The BSFV allowed the BFIST to maneuver within the company BFV formation and never have to “catch up,” a feat the old fire support team vehicle (FISTV) would not have been able to accomplish.

Hasty Occupation. We established hasty defenses after many long movements in our attack toward Baghdad. We occupied these defensive positions for no longer than 24 hours, most less than 12 hours.

Once the company established its perimeter, the BFIST positioned inside where it could observe any pre-planned targets (and registered with mortars) during the hasty indirect fire planning process. If there were no pre-planned targets, the BFIST positioned to observe the enemy’s most likely avenue of approach (AA).

Although we were part of the company’s perimeter, we were not included in the company direct fire plan. The team needed the freedom to maneuver within the company perimeter to observe for targets of opportunity.

On 30 March, our maneuver company received a mission to establish several blocking positions along Highway 9, just south of Karbala and approximately 80 kilometers south of Baghdad. As the northernmost element of the brigade, the company’s task was to block any enemy attack along Highway 9 and several other high-speed AAs to facilitate the brigade’s rapid assault north.

The company quickly established a defense consisting of several key blocking positions spread out over three kilo-
meters. Just after positioning the BFSV along a high-speed AA to observe a pre-planned target, a platoon 400 meters away came in contact with snipers from a building. Due to limited visibility, the BFIST quickly moved to the platoon in contact and, after positioning within its perimeter, acquired the target and destroyed the threat with an immediate suppression artillery mission.

The BFIST maintained that position for several hours until it moved 800 meters to another platoon’s blocking position when the platoon came into contact. We had assigned a pre-planned target to protect the position.

We continued to occupy the position for the next 12 hours. It was in this position that our BFSV had its first direct fire engagement with enemy vehicles and soldiers attempting to penetrate the platoon perimeter. Although we engaged several targets with direct fire, BFVs in the platoon always overlapped our direct fire sector.

In every perimeter, the maneuver unit clearly understood our BFIST could reposition on a moment’s notice and didn’t count on us to cover a specific sector with direct fire. The urban environment we often fought from did not allow us to remain static and observe from one location. Our priority to engage and destroy the enemy with indirect fires never changed.

**Indirect and Direct Fire Simultaneously.** The BFSV’s direct fire capabilities and armored protection became extremely evident during the company’s most intense battle at a four-way cloverleaf overpass in southern Baghdad along Highway 8, known as Objective Curly. On 7 April, the company received the mission to establish a blocking position to protect the brigade lines of communication (LOC) from enemy counterattack. As the two armor-heavy task forces (TF 1-64 and TF 4-64) from the brigade were making the violent push into downtown Baghdad, we came under a fierce attack as the enemy fought to overrun our position in an attempt to cut the brigade’s LOC along Highway 8.

Although dangerously exposed to rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms fire, our BFIST positioned on top of the overpass in the center of Objective Curly while the company fought below. This position afforded excellent observation of most of the surrounding area in all directions.

Our BFIST maintained this position for more than four hours, engaging enemy vehicles with the 25-mm main gun while simultaneously initiating artillery and mortar fire missions. These missions included two danger-close artillery missions at less than 400 meters away from armored friendly forces.

The BFIST occupied this exposed position because it was the most advantageous terrain from which to execute the fire support mission. RPG shrapnel and small arms fire hit the BFSV, but its armor allowed us to maintain our position.

Throughout the 2d BCT, BFSVs sustained direct hits from RPG and small arms fire on many occasions and continued to execute their fire support mission. The armored protection and direct fire weapons on the BFSV allowed the FIST to aggressively maneuver itself where it could tactically occupy and defend an observation post while looking into the teeth of the enemy.

**BFSV Battle Drill.** Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the gunner and FSO simultaneously engaged enemy threats with both direct and indirect fires when it was critical to accomplishing the mission. Both need to train extensively in the operation and troubleshooting of the BFSV weapons. The gunner needs to be able to scan and engage close enemy threats with the 25-mm main gun and coax machine gun quickly. He must be able to switch back and forth from FIST mode to direct fire mode rapidly.

During OIF, we initiated danger-close fire missions and engaged approaching suicide bombers in vehicles with direct fire while waiting for the command of “Shot” from the battalion fire direction center (FDC). This simultaneous execution required extensive coordination between the BFSV commander, gunner, and driver. By equipping the driver with binoculars, he served as an additional target acquisition asset.

The FSO’s ability to scan from the commander’s hatch with binoculars while the gunner scanned from within the turret paid huge dividends during combat operations when engaging with direct fires and requesting fire missions. This allowed the FSO to guide the gunner onto indirect targets, laso the grid with the Bradley eye-safe laser range finder (BELRF), obtain the target location data via the target station control panel (TSCP) and return to scanning for other threats. The FSO then could keep eyes on the target and observe the indirect fire mission.

Our BFIST developed this crew drill during Bradley gunnery tables and live-fire exercises conducted in Kuwait before combat operations.

On Objective Curly, there was a fire mission that, after initiation using the BELRF and TSCP, the FSO observed and adjusted without the help of the BFSV’s sights as the gunner continued to scan for other indirect targets and engage the enemy with direct fire when appropriate. However, while under enemy fire, the FSO cannot always provide a second set of eyes, and the BFSV’s sight system becomes the team’s only acquisition capability.

For combat conditions when fighting buttoned up, the FSO’s visibility is severely restricted and the use of binoculars is difficult with such a limited field of vision. The BFIST’s proficiency in using the integrated sight unit (ISU) and TSCP is critical in maintaining the ability to acquire indirect fire targets and defend itself. The TSCP proved to be a very user-friendly device that allows the BFIST to retrieve all necessary data quickly to process a fire mission.

The ability to scan and engage targets with both direct and indirect fires simultaneously while under fire was the ultimate proof of the BFSV’s combat survivability.

The team must resist the temptation to pursue direct fire targets and abandon its primary mission to provide fire support. With fire support as its focus, the BFSV gives the team the ability to provide its own defense while accurately acquiring indirect fire targets.

The numerous fire missions executed by 2d BCT fire supporters on the offensive assault toward Baghdad were a result of the aggressive positioning of the BFISTs at the tip of the spear.
Fires and fire supporters have played a key role in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). But in many cases, the task force fire support officer (FSO) has filled other roles in the task force in addition to that of fire support. As replacement units arrive in theater, the role of fires will likely be reduced even further and FSOs at all levels will be filling positions such as information operations (IO) officer (S7) and civil-military operations (CMO) officer (S5). These jobs can be both challenging and rewarding.

In Task Force 3d Battalion, 67th Armor (TF 3-67 AR), the TF FSO was also the S5. Part of his duties involved overseeing elections at several levels of the Iraqi government.

This article provides an overview of some of the challenges associated with those elections and the ways that they were resolved. FSOs who will be deploying in support of OIF or another theater where democracy is to be established likely will have to deal with similar issues.

The process of establishing democracy in Iraq has been rather problematic. The issues of fairness and legitimacy have been a concern for the Iraqi people in every election conducted by TF 3-67 AR. In an area where a census has not been completed for about 35 years, it is difficult to determine how the voting process should work.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has been working with various groups and agencies to determine the best way to handle the election process. Meanwhile, people across Iraq were clamoring for elections of any kind for Coalition Forces to oversee. The result has been a hybrid of election techniques and procedures that the CPA will have to sort through and incoming Coalition units will have to repair.

The discussion must begin with a clarification of election terms. The words “election” and “selection” both have been used to describe the process of choosing government officials in Iraq. The process was neither a general election like we are familiar with in the United States (not everyone over the age of 18 voted) nor a process where a group of people appointed or selected by a leader are then imposed on the people against their will.

The process was a group of people voting by writing on a secret ballot the names of the people they thought were right for the positions. The people who voted were the respected leaders of the
communities whose decisions were trusted by the people in the villages and tribes. The word “election” appears to do more justice to the process than the word “selection.”

Three factors made the election process in Iraq difficult: a lack of understanding of the existing governmental structure and its connection to geographic boundaries, a lack of clear guidance from civilian and military authorities who were establishing the new Iraqi government and pressure on unit commanders from the local population to hold elections.

**Government Structure.** Each local village, town and city has a governing body of some sort, usually the local tribal sheik or other senior leader. Larger than the local municipalities are *nahiahs*, which are several villages and towns in relatively close proximity—similar to a county in the US. *Nahiahs* are subordinate to the *kada’a*, which is made up of several *nahiahs*. Likewise, several *kada’a* make up a province.

Due to the lack of modern mapping and proper governmental survey or communications, it is not always clear exactly what villages and towns make up a *nahiah*. It is easier to determine boundaries higher up in the government structure, but it still can be unclear. It appears that most Iraqi leaders at the *nahiah* level do not know all the little villages that make up their *nahiah*. A village that would appear to belong to a particular *nahiah*, for some reason doesn’t, and it is not clear which *nahiah* it belongs to.

To add to the confusion, the Coalition area of responsibility (AOR) boundaries did not coincide with the existing governmental boundaries. The TF 3-67 AR AOR has parts of three *kada’a* in it. Of those, only one has the seat of the *kada’a* government in the TF 3-67 AR AOR. The TF has four *nahiahs* in its AOR. Only two of those *nahiahs* fall under the jurisdiction of the *kada’a* seat of government in the AOR. The other two *nahiahs* under TF 3-67 AR’s control each belong to two other *kada’a*. It is difficult to conduct elections in such a confusing environment.

**Lack of Guidance.** For the elections to be legitimate, the results of the elections had to be reported to the next higher level of government. Because other *nahiahs* within a *kada’a* were under the control of other US units, their elections were handled differently.

While elections were going on across the country, many commanders knew nothing of *nahiah* or *kada’a* levels of government while others thought those were the most important levels at which to establish governing bodies initially. This created confusion within the brigade combat teams (BCTs) because there were no standardized instructions on these different levels of government and issues and no clear guidance on how to proceed with the elections.

**Pressure from Iraqis for Elections.** While the CPA was working on establishing the higher government, the people of Iraq were clamoring for local elections in their towns and villages. Commanders worked out local election rules as best they could by applying the little guidance received from the CPA. This led to non-standardized elections across the country.

While the CPA was drafting a constitution and working to establish the national levels of government, some commanders thought it best to follow the CPA model in holding elections “top down.” They thought that because the Iraqi national and provincial governments were being emplaced by the CPA, brigades and battalions should be working on *kada’a* and *nahiah* elections and then work on local village/town elections later.

Other commanders thought the “bottom up” process best. This created a pool of candidates for elections at higher levels of government that were trusted by the population because the people had elected them.

Elections were held both ways, resulting in a lack of consistency. All the election models had merit, but there was no authority telling commanders which model to use or providing instructions on how to use it.

Despite these issues, commanders were under pressure from the Iraqi people to hold elections in their AORs. Elections were one of the main topics at every town meeting attended by Coalition Forces. Iraqis wanted democracy, and they wanted it now. The goal of Coalition Forces is to transfer authority and responsibility back to the Iraqi people and what better way to do that than to allow the people to choose their own leaders who would help resolve the many issues of the cities.

This pressure to transfer that authority created some hasty decisions that later led to questions of fairness and legitimacy in some areas.

Ultimately, elections in the TF 3-67 AR’s AOR were a hybrid of the top-down and bottom-up processes. The first election was held in the city of Khalis for the *kada’a* council. A 20-member council was chosen to govern the entire Khalis *Kada’a*.

All of the known leaders (tribal, religious, community—several dozen in all) came together at a designated time. Of the larger group, a smaller number, about 40, agreed to serve on the council if chosen. The names of those individuals were written on a blackboard, and ballots were passed out to all present. Each person voted for 20 individuals. The 20 with the most votes were the new Khalis *Kada’a* council. Of those, one was selected to be the mayor. The mayor’s role is much larger than that of mayor of a city. He is responsible for the city of Khalis itself as well as the several *nahiahs* that make up the Khalis
Executive Branch for an Iraqi Province

Kada’a. The mayor can be compared to the position of county commissioner in the US.

This went well, and there were relatively few issues or problems with the process. After that was complete, the focus shifted to the nahiah level of governing council.

The citizens were much more interested in elections at the nahiah level than the kada’a level. Tribal and community leaders had traditionally taken their city’s issues and problems to the muhktar or single nahiah leader, which was being replaced by elected nahiah councils. (See the figure.) This was a dramatic change and brought a fair amount of anxiety. The largest obstacle was reassuring the local leaders that the voting process would be as fair as possible.

During the course of three months, TF 3-67 AR oversaw elections in three nahiahs. Each was handled slightly differently, but the result was the same for all: a council of 20 chosen to represent all the people of the nahiah equally. The process was all similar to the kada’a election in that a group of several dozen leaders came together, a smaller number agreed to serve if selected and the entire group voted by secret ballot with the top 20 vote-getters chosen as the new council. Of that council, one was chosen, again by secret ballot, to be the mayor of that nahiah. The process was a learning experience for TF 3-67 AR, with subsequent elections better than the ones before.

In the last nahiah election, the company commander and CMO officer overseeing that area got involved in the process in the local villages and towns. Applications for the council positions were taken in advance (several hundred of them, in fact). This allowed the S2 to screen the candidates for backgrounds of non-compliance with Coalition Forces directives before they were selected, and it allowed the Iraqi provincial leadership to see the applications and verify that they fairly represented the separate factions of that nahiah.

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The citizens were much more interested in elections at the nahiah level than the kada’a level. Tribal and community leaders had traditionally taken their city’s issues and problems to the muhktar or single nahiah leader, which was being replaced by elected nahiah councils. (See the figure.) This was a dramatic change and brought a fair amount of anxiety. The largest obstacle was reassuring the local leaders that the voting process would be as fair as possible.

During the course of three months, TF 3-67 AR oversaw elections in three nahiahs. Each was handled slightly differently, but the result was the same for all: a council of 20 chosen to represent all the people of the nahiah equally. The process was all similar to the kada’a election in that a group of several dozen leaders came together, a smaller number agreed to serve if selected and the entire group voted by secret ballot with the top 20 vote-getters chosen as the new council. Of that council, one was chosen, again by secret ballot, to be the mayor of that nahiah. The process was a learning experience for TF 3-67 AR, with subsequent elections better than the ones before.

In the last nahiah election, the company commander and CMO officer overseeing that area got involved in the process in the local villages and towns. Applications for the council positions were taken in advance (several hundred of them, in fact). This allowed the S2 to screen the candidates for backgrounds of non-compliance with Coalition Forces directives before they were selected, and it allowed the Iraqi provincial leadership to see the applications and verify that they fairly represented the separate factions of that nahiah. Each town of that nahiah was allotted a number of seats on the 20-member council, based on its population. Because there had not been a census in many years, ration cards were used to determine approximate populations.

Despite the challenges, each nahiah that has had elections now has a functional governing council that is holding regular meetings and working to improve the conditions of the area.

Recommendations. Units need a comprehensive document that explains the former Iraqi form of government at the town and nahiah level and how it relates to the kada’a and provinces. This will help commanders and CMO personnel understand the Iraqi citizens’ feelings about the importance of local government and how it nests with the higher levels of government. This also will help commanders and CMO personnel explain to the Iraqi people how the new democratic process is different from what they are used to. Units coming to Iraq now are already adopting valuable lessons learned by aligning their boundaries along the existing geopolitical boundaries. This will help them understand the old system of government while establishing a new one.

In addition to background information, the CPA needs to issue a clear set of directives and guidance about the election process. These directives need to be prepared with input from the Coalition leadership but with primary contributions from the Iraqi people. The new Iraqi constitution will be the document that outlines these processes.

The specific details of how to handle elections needs to be very clearly articulated to the commanders and CMO personnel, military or civilian, who provide oversight of and help with the elections. Consistency is critical for the process to be efficient and have legitimacy.

By understanding the Iraqi governmental structure and following clear guidance for a consistent election process, there will be less pressure from the Iraqi people on commanders. Commanders will have a clear vision of the end state and be better able to talk to local leaders about the election process and the dramatic changes associated with bringing democracy to a country that has only heard of it.

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Captain Steven L. Miller is the Fire Support Officer (FSO) and S5 for Task Force 3d Battalion, 67th Armor (TF 3-67 AR), 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), currently stationed in Baquba, Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. At Fort Hood, he has been a Company FSO, Battalion S1, Paladin Platoon Leader and Battery Fire Direction Officer in 3d Battalion, 16th Field Artillery (3-16 FA), also in the 4th Division.
A Soldier’s Story

SFC George Williams, MLRS Platoon Sergeant
A/2-147 FA, SDARNG, Deploying to Iraq

Sergeant First Class (SFC) George A. Williams from Pierre, South Dakota, is a 13M Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Platoon Sergeant in A Battery, 2d Battalion, 147th Field Artillery (2-147 FA), part of the South Dakota Army National Guard (SDARNG). In his civilian job, he is the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture for the State of South Dakota. His battalion will deploy to Iraq for one year on 28 January 2004 and will be under the 197th FA Brigade, New Hampshire ARNG. Its mission is to capture enemy ammunition/equipment and conduct security operations. This is his story.

Being in the Army is a family tradition. My father was a 11B Infantryman in the 82d Airborne Division. He jumped out of perfectly good airplanes; I admired him a great deal. Unfortunately, he died when I was young. Most of my family—my uncles, my father, my grandfather—were in the military.

When I graduated from high school, I knew I wanted to go to college, but I wanted to join the military as well. Joining 2-147 FA and the Army National Guard in 1986 was the perfect way to follow in the steps of my family while completing my education and doing the other things I wanted to do.

I began in 1986 as a 13B Cannoneer on the 8-inch howitzer, an archaic beast. Then we moved up to the 155-mm M109A4 howitzer, and about four years ago, we converted to the multiple-launch rocket system, MLRS. It’s nice to have that change and work with more and more advanced weapons systems. That certainly increases the battalion’s chances for activation, but if we’re going to have to deploy, we want to contribute the most we can to whatever our mission is.

The war in Iraq is necessary. We are proud to help bring about justice and help free the Iraqi people. Iraq has such divergent populations with lots of conflict and had a dictator who used weapons of mass destruction, not only on others but also his own populous. We have an important mission.

The Secretary of Agriculture Larry Gabriel and my entire office have been very supportive of this deployment. The tough part of being Army National Guard and deploying is leaving your employer, your family. This is my first deployment, but I signed up with full knowledge that there was the potential for activation at any time.

One of the most difficult things I’ve had to do…may be will ever have to do… is saying, “Goodbye” to my family. Fortunately, my wife, Lisa, is very strong. She’s taking care of our kids, Hannah, age six, and Alyssa, age 10, and, as such things will happen, she has had to replace the hot water heater in December and the furnace in January. It is cold in the winter in South Dakota. Deployments are difficult on families, whether or not Soldiers are Active Army or National Guard.

I am excited about deploying with 2-147 FA. Its strength is in its diverse cast of individuals with a lot of knowledge and experience—we have business owners, plumbers, carpenters, attorneys—I would say about 50 percent of the battalion has college degrees, some with advanced degrees—I have a master’s degree, and several have PhDs. These folks are independent thinkers who are used to running their own operations and thinking “outside the box.”

We have some more mature individuals in the battery than you might typically see in Active Army units (I am 34). I think that maturity is an advantage. Also, several of our Soldiers deployed to the Gulf for Operation Desert Storm.

All this talent and experience are real assets to the battalion and will help us deal with the diverse culture and unique missions in Iraq.

We have had a variety of training here at Fort Sill for about a month. We have learned Operation Iraqi Freedom lessons from leaders who already have been over there, including things they wish they had trained on better. We have drilled on individual and collective skills, culminating in a live-fire lane that put them all together. In the live-fire lane, we had to fire a weapon out of a moving vehicle, react to a blocked ambush in a convoy situation, extract ourselves from a minefield and more—plus we had to utilize litter teams and combat lifesavers. It was really great training.

When we get to Iraq, we will continue to train. The more we train, the better we will be able to react and do the right thing without having to think about it.

I am proud of the men I am serving with in this battalion. We are self-sufficient. We are independent—at times maybe a fault. But certainly we are much stronger because of that independence and our maturity and diversity.

I have learned a lot from this battalion. In 2-147 FA, I had the opportunity to be a leader, which has helped me in my civilian job. Joining the National Guard and 2-147 FA has helped me more than I could have imagined or could repay—it’s probably the smartest move I ever made.
Many in our Army, particularly fire supporters, are talking about synchronizing effects in support of the maneuver commander. While this is not a new concept, truly integrating lethal and nonlethal fires and effects to achieve the commander’s intent can be a daunting task.

The Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) in Afghanistan is executing a method for synchronizing joint fires and effects, which not only meets the CJTF commander’s intent, but also has served as a model for lethal and nonlethal integration throughout Central Command (CENTCOM). Within the CJTF-180 staff, the joint fires element (JFE) uses fused intelligence to identify opportunities to conduct integrated operations along three lines: Enable Afghan institutions to thrive, Help remove the causes of instability and counter terrorism.

This article describes the process and organizational structure for CJTF-180’s effects-based operations (EBO), the impact EBO is having on meeting the commander’s intent and the future of fire supporters moving forward as enthusiastic proponents of EBO.

**EBO Defined.** US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) defines an effect as “the physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that results from specific military or nonmilitary actions.” EBO is “A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or ‘effect’ on the enemy through the synergistic, multiplicative and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.”

In his paper for the Army War College, Lieutenant Colonel Allen W. Batschelet submits that EBO includes the “identification and engagement of an enemy’s vulnerabilities and strengths in a unified, focused manner and uses all available assets to produce specific effects consistent with the commander’s intent.” He further states that EBO is about “producing desired futures.” In a sense, that is exactly why fire supporters must continue to talk about synchronizing all effects in support of the maneuver commander.

These definitions provide the foundation for CJTF-180’s EBO in Afghanistan.

**The CJTF-180 Operational Environment.** As we begin to explain how the commander’s intent is translated into full-spectrum effects, it is important to understand the framework, or operational environment, of the Afghanistan Combined/Joint Area of Operations (CJOA).

We are waging continuous, decisive combat operations within about one-third of southern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border (see the map in Figure 1).
These combat operations comprise both lethal and nonlethal effects to help shape an environment that enables the reconstruction of the country as a whole.

The 10th Mountain Division’s Combined Task Force Warrior (CTF Warrior), which is the 1st Brigade Combat Team; the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), which is the 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne); and the 354th Expeditionary A-10 Fighter Squadron are the task forces with the primary lethal delivery systems in theater. The main objective of these combat operations is to deny terrorist operatives sanctuary and eliminate all foreign-sponsored Taliban, Al Qaeda and Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) anti-Coalition Forces. (See Figure 2 for more details about the threats in Afghanistan.)

The larger part of Afghanistan circled on the map is relatively peaceful and stable. To ensure continued success and peace throughout Afghanistan, ongoing nonlethal efforts are spearheaded by the Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) with the 321st Civil Affairs Brigade as the lead command element.

CJCMOTF efforts are accomplished through a civil-military coordinator who is based in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, near the seat of central government. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are deployed to help more than 30 provinces that are beginning to rebuild their infrastructure and to help a bureaucracy ravaged after more than 20 years of continuous war.

The “United States Policy Objective” is a government of Afghanistan committed to and capable of preventing the re-emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil.” This is the measurable end state that the CJTF-180 commander must achieve. Of the five threats to the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) outlined in Figure 2, the two most powerful the CJTF-180 must counter are the anti-Coalition militants of the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces and the internal threats, including warlordism and poor governance. CTF Warrior and CJSOTF maintain focus on the former, while CJCMOTF, in concert with international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), focuses on the latter.

EBO Organization and Process. To understand EBO in this environment, you must understand who plans and executes EBO, who the staff proponent for synchronization of effects in the CJTF is and what assets are available for producing the full spectrum of lethal and nonlethal effects.

Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB). The JECB synchronizes the lethal and nonlethal execution of the commander’s intent for effects and is chaired by the Director of the Combined/Joint Staff (DCJS). The JECB is a targeting board that approves and synchronizes the targets and manages and allocates resources to achieve targeted effects throughout the CJOA.
Similar to standard targeting boards, the JECB includes the CJ3 and CJ2, USAF Air Component Coordination Element Director, CJ3 Information Operations (IO) Planner and representatives from the Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE), including the Collection Management and Dissemination (CM&D) section. Additionally, targeted kinetic action directed against anti-Coalition militants’ command, control and communications (C3) nodes is achieved through the Joint Intelligence Support to Targeting (J2T), in which the FA Intelligence Officer (FAIO) is embedded. The JECB also includes representatives from CJJSOTF, CTF Warrior, Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA).

Being a vital and ongoing part of the Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A) targeting process, assessment is accomplished by all staff sections in the JECB. The JISE, IO and CMO elements provide key tactical assessments as a foundation for the “way ahead.” Assessments are provided in relation to the desired effects for each discipline and are captured either quantitatively (JISE reporting) or qualitatively (IO or CMO reporting).

The JECB is organized and facilitated by the CJTF-180 Chief of Fires, the 10th Mountain Division Deputy Fire Support Coordinator (DFSCOORD). His mission is to synchronize effects using both lethal and nonlethal fires across the spectrum of operations. (See Figure 3.) The Chief of Fires and his JFE supervise the process, from developing the commander’s effects guidance through collecting intelligence, nominating targets, allocating resources and executing and assessing the effects. Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG).

Weekly staff coordination is achieved through a JEWG, which essentially is a targeting working group. The recommendations of the JEWG are briefed to the JECB.

The JEWG, or targeting team, starts with the National Command Authority’s (NCA’s) stated “United States Policy Objective” for the CJOA. Using the standard military decision-making process (MDMP), the Operations Planning Group (OPG) develops the commander’s intent. The CJTF-180 commander’s intent is defined along the three lines of operations: Enable Afghan institutions; Assist in removing the causes of instability, and Deny the enemy sanctuary and counter terrorism.

The JEWG staff develops the supporting effects that will accomplish each line of operation. The unique challenges in the process are not necessarily determining what actions might accomplish the effects, but determining the indicators to trigger actions as well as managing the limited assets or combination of assets that are best suited to facilitate the process.

Targeting Battle Rhythm. After publishing the operations order (OPORD), the OPG/JEWG begin a three-week battle rhythm resulting in a weekly fragmentary order (FRAGO) that refines or redirects EBO guidance. This guidance is for lethal and nonlethal targeting, collection requirements and priorities, IO synchronization priorities and CMO targeting recommendations.

A battle rhythm example is shown in Figure 4. Changes to operational guidance, as interpreted from CENTCOM and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) planning orders (PLANORDs), are incorporated into the operational MDMP process on Monday (20 October), focusing on operations three weeks in advance (in this example, Week 24). The refined opera-
The operational guidance also is passed to the JEWG and Information Operations Working Group (IOWG) on Tuesday (21 October), which affects operations two weeks out. The JEWG integrates the operational and tactical priorities of CJTF-180 into the normal battle rhythm. On Monday, 11 August, the JEWG fell into its sanctuary and counter terrorism.

After the Mountain Viper OPORD was published, the JEWG fell into its normal battle rhythm. On Monday, 11 August, the JEWG identified a requirement for and recommended an increase in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in the Sami Ghar region. This recommendation is forwarded to the OPG on the next Monday, 18 August, and to the JEWG on Tuesday, 02 September. The DCJS approved the recommendation at the Thursday, 04 September, JECB.

As part of the synchronization process, the JEWG set assets in motion at its meeting on 2 September to prepare the area for lethal execution of the target. Host nation AM broadcasts were transmitted on radios distributed by CMO teams, instructing friendly civilians to avoid activities in the area. Distribution of posters and the conduct of face-to-face encounters by CMO teams as well as the deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other US government agencies (OGAs) were additional actions to protect friendly host nation civilians. Pre-drafted PA releases were on standby for release to national and international audiences, pending the outcome of follow-on phases.

During the JEWG on Tuesday, 9 September, the group reasonably discerned an opportunity to attack the Sami Ghar target. DCJS approved the target for attack at the 11 September JECB, and the target was placed on the CJTF-180 joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). The transitory nature of the target required that, once the target was detected, the appropriate platform for attack was an AC-130U gunship.

On the night of 16 September, intelligence sources detected the target outside a remote village in the Sami Ghar Mountains. The JFE conducted a clearance-of-fires drill and used national imagery assets to perform a collateral damage assessment of the target area according to CENTCOM collateral damage requirements. The AC-130 identified the target and was cleared to engage it. This attack resulted in battle damage assessment (BDA) of eight enemy personnel killed.

### Figure 4: CJTF-180’s Three-Week Battle Rhythm for EBO
This example shows the EBO process resulting in lethal and nonlethal actions to take in Week 24 that will lead to the effects to achieve the commander’s intent.

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Legend:  
CCB = Component Commander’s Backbrief  
FRAGO = Fragmentary Order  
JECB = Joint Effects Coordination Board  
IOWG = Information Operations Working Group  
MDMP = Military Decision-Making Process

### Figure 5: Typical Products Integrated into Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) to Execute Lethal and Nonlethal Effects

- **Targeting Priorities and High-Payoff Targets (HPTs) by Category**
- **Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)**
- **Collection Requirements and Priorities**
- **IO Synchronization Priorities**
- **Psychological Operations (PSYOP)**
- **Public Affairs (PA) Targeting Recommendations**
- **Civil-Military Operations (CMO) Targeting Recommendations**
- **Specific Rules of Engagement (ROE)**
That same evening, a scheduled unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) identified approximately 25 Taliban fighters egressing down a narrow valley after the engagement. The JFE used this intelligence to plan further attacks in the objective area and clear it of insurgent activities.

On the heels of this lethal attack, CMO teams and PRTs were postured to enter the area to help local civilians. These teams were prepared to distribute aid packages, provide medical assistance and help rebuild infrastructure. The desired effect of these teams was to win the support of the populace in the CJOA.

This particular target was assessed as destroyed, based on this attack combined with a follow-on analysis of the target system in the weeks after the engagement. According to HUMINT sources and information from CMO teams dispatched to the area, recent Taliban activity in this area shows that fires had a significant disruptive effect.

Intelligence indicated that fighters in the area were instructed to break into two- to five-man teams to prevent presenting a large target to Coalition Forces. This intelligence and subsequent CMO operations in the region validated the effectiveness of the 16 September attack in the Sami Ghar region, helping to provide the desired effect of “Deny sanctuary and counter terrorism.”

The technique for EBO discussed in this article is just that—a technique. The Institute for Defense Analyses study “New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations” identifies seven attributes of EBO as outlined in Figure 6. CJTF-180 has interwoven these seven attributes into its EBO process, most prominently adapting to the operational environment and constantly evolving enemy (Number 5), and gaining the support of the Afghan National Army to secure the Afghan domestic situation (Number 6).

The key to CJTF-180’s successfully executing EBO was the focus on effects achieved by the process—not the process itself. At times, CJTF-180 planners got mired in the process and ignored the effects being generated, thus they failed to adapt to the ever-changing enemy and take advantage of the effects they could have created.

Fire Supporters as Effects Supporters. Lieutenant Colonel Batschelet wrote of producing “desired futures.” The desired future we, as fire supporters, collectively embrace is the continued prominence of our position in the profession of arms. As Artillers, we must continue to provide accurate, timely indirect fires; it is our heritage and the hallmark of our branch. But we must move forward from fires coordinators to effects coordinators.

Who better to derive the maneuver commander’s intent for “effects support?” Is it not a logical evolution? Fire supporters historically have coordinated and synchronized mortar, artillery and aerial fires to delay, disrupt and destroy the enemy; now we must embrace the nonlethal and non-military agencies, the likes of which are managed by CJTF-180.

We must begin developing the “Effects Supporters” who will accompany the maneuver commanders of the future. An FA lieutenant, as an “Effects Support Team” (EST) leader, must understand how to employ lethal and nonlethal assets to realize the maneuver company commander’s vision of future operations. He must be able to work with civil affairs teams, special operations, coalition and host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and OGA’s.

In CJTF-180, the Chief of Joint Fires synthesizes and facilitates EBO. He and his JFE supervise the process from developing the commander’s effects guidance all the way through assessing the results. As the CJTF-180 Effects Coordinator, the Chief of Joint Fires is the proponent of EBO and, along with a dedicated group of professionals from across the lethal and nonlethal spectrum, has turned this concept into reality. CJTF-180 is executing EBO today, meeting the commander’s intent and having a tremendous impact in the global War on Terrorism.

Much talk has been generated and much ink spilled regarding Army transformation. As the Army’s synchronizers, fire supporters must become the lead proponent for the effects coordination process. Previously, Redlegs massed walls of hot steel to ensure our maneuver brethren were successful. Today and in the near future, we will continue to “mass” effects in a more complex operating environment. This may require hot steel, but also, and perhaps more importantly, it may require an array of cascading effects that wins friends, destroys enemies and produces desired futures for the 21st century maneuver commander.

Endnotes:

2 Ibid.
4 Ibid.

Major Robert B. (Brad) Herndon is the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) Artillery S3, Fort Drum, New York. He recently served as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJ TF) Mountain Fires Chief in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and, previously, as the Fire Support Officer for 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, in Afghanistan for Operation Anaconda, also in OEF.

Chief Warrant Officer Three John A. Robinson is the 10th Mountain Division Targeting Officer and has served as the CJ TF-180 Targeting Officer since May 2003. He also served as the Targeting Officer for CJ TF-Mountain in Afghanistan in OEF.

Colonel James L. Creighton commands the 10th Mountain Division Artillery. He served as the Assistant Operations Officer for 4th Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, part of the 2d Armored Division (Forward) attached to the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operations Desert Shield and Storm in the Gulf.

Lieutenant Colonel Raphael Torres is the 10th Mountain Division Deputy Fire Support Coordinator and has served as the CJ TF-180 Chief of Joint Fires in Afghanistan since August 2003.

Major Louis J. Bello is the 10th Mountain Division Artillery Executive Officer. He served as the CJ TF-Mountain Fires Chief in OEF and Deputy Fires Chief during Operation Anaconda, both in Afghanistan.
By mid-April 2003, the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) had fought a fast-paced conventional battle sweeping from the Kuwaiti border all the way to Baghdad, and the capital city of Iraq had fallen. Shortly after, on 1 May, the President of the United States declared an end to major combat operations, and Coalition Forces transitioned to stability or support operations (SOSO).

Establishing Operations. The division tasked the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to provide a detachment of one platoon of armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) for security and the 123d Signal Battalion to provide six family of multipurpose tactical vehicles (FMTVs) to transport NGO personnel and supplies into Baghdad. The 94th Engineer Battalion provided 40 cots for billeting and 60 cases of meals ready-to-eat (MREs) for humanitarian workers.

We established the NGO Reception Center in the former Iraqi Airways Cargo Terminal. This terminal, like much of Baghdad International Airport, was in disrepair due to years of neglect. Electrical power was sporadic, bathroom facilities were not functional and offices designated as soldier and NGO personnel living space were looted and extremely dirty. After days of clearing debris and cleaning, the building was almost ready to receive visitors.

While clean, the reception area was austere. A storage warehouse within the Republican Guard compound on...
the airport provided the final touches. We repositioned furniture, decorative pieces and oriental rugs destined for Ba‘ath Party members and Saddam’s palaces to furnish the NGO Reception Center. This turned the former cargo terminal into a comfortable lobby.

Communications consisted of an AN/VRC 92 single-channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) set on the Div Arty force protection net and a mobile subscriber radio terminal (MSRT) phone to coordinate with outside units and agencies.

Manning consisted of an officer-in-charge (OIC), a captain; assistant OIC, a first lieutenant; NCOIC, a sergeant first class; assistant NCOIC, a sergeant; and two Soldiers. The remote access unit (RAU) team providing communications support consisted of two NCOs and four Soldiers. The communications team took on the same responsibilities as other personnel. Operations were 24 hours a day.

**Operations Begin.** Operations began slowly. The non-military and government organizations operating the airport were neither prepared for, nor had guidelines to allow humanitarian assistance flights into the airport. The first week we received four flights from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and two flights from AirServ (US State Department-approved air transport for US humanitarian organizations). These flights carried previously evacuated humanitarian workers returning to evaluate the situation in Baghdad and reestablish support operations.

This small number of flights allowed us to refine our mission requirements, develop a contact list and phone roster, and establish an in-processing procedure for arriving personnel. We became known as the Baghdad International Non-Governmental Organization Center (BINGO). The name stuck.

We initially operated under the assumption that the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), currently referred to as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), would establish control of arriving and departing personnel into and out of Iraq. To our surprise, ORHA did not establish control. It relied on us to track and screen all civilian and foreign military personnel arriving into and departing from the “civilian” side of the Baghdad International Airport.

Our tracking procedures consisted of recording each person’s name and taking a digital photo of him/her; requiring a passport/military identification; recording the ID number and the country of origin; determining the agency, position and occupation; and, finally, recording the flight number and date of arrival. Adhering to these screening and tracking procedures became very important to security as the operation increased in volume and scope.

Everyday BINGO had to accomplish additional tasks, usually without prior notification by or coordination with a higher authority. On a daily basis, we reacted and adapted operations to changing coordination requirements and an increasing influx of new humanitarian agencies and equipment. (See the figure.)

BINGO personnel performed a myriad of duties. One day we loaded tons of humanitarian supplies onto trucks or coordinated for special machinery to download equipment and humanitarian aid. Another day we helped load injured personnel onto hospital aircraft.

Because Baghdad Airport was under maximum force protection and security, we had to escort NGO vehicles and personnel to and from the gates of the airport. We also became an information and transport support center for personnel who mistakenly came to the reception center. We coordinated for and helped transport all those intended for the military operations side of the airport. The NGO Reception Center became the NGO “Reaction Center.”

Coordination became a large part of our daily operations. Working in an environment with limited and, sometimes, unreliable communications, we conducted all types of coordination between many facets of military and government organizations.

Coordination with ORHA was a puzzle that seemed to have many disconnected pieces. We spent many frustrating hours getting humanitarian organizations, commercial civilian business representatives and civil aviation representatives to the correct ORHA office of control. This coordination also included pinpointing the responsible CA office by jurisdiction or identifying the engineer unit with the assets available to accomplish a variety of missions.

Passport control, customs, immigration, civil affairs and ORHA representation was absent at this single air-entry point for all of Baghdad. Humanitarian agencies, representatives for commercial businesses and foreign military personnel (under the humanitarian aid umbrella) from all over the world started flooding into Baghdad Airport through the NGO Reception Center. The volume of traffic processed during our peak was 12 flights and 300 NGO personnel in a 24-hour period.

Div Arty personnel had to control an area referred to as the “Wild West.” The potential for terrorists, Saddam loyalists and Ba‘ath party members to enter or depart the country existed.

For example, some days we processed United Nations personnel, ICRC personnel, hundreds of Saudi Arabian armed forces personnel working at a hospital in Baghdad, civilian and military United Arab Emirates embassy and hospital workers, and British Airways representatives attempting to initiate flights into Baghdad International Airport.

Requests for additional support and control measures went to the 3d Infan-
try Division Headquarters, V Corps and ORHA. The verbal responses were favorable, and they recognized our legitimate concerns; however, reaction and execution were not. This was due to a changing and confusing bureaucracy resulting from the problem of establishing government control after the war.

Eventually, working through ORHA, we received a CA representative to help in operations. The problem of support for BINGO originated from a jurisdiction issue between CA units in Baghdad and from the push by ORHA to turn the Baghdad International Airport operations over to the Iraqis.

Showtime—The Media, Etc. BINGO soon became a hotbed for media activity. Humanitarian flights from all over the world brought their own television news teams and print reporters to record humanitarian operations in Iraq. CNN, AFN and Fox News as well as other major US media frequented the NGO Reception Center and humanitarian ramp.

Representing the United States Army and 3d Infantry Division in Iraq to the world became our added mission. We were the first US Soldiers that many of these civilians and news personnel had ever seen up close. It was important for all personnel working there to portray a high degree of professionalism, good conduct, personal appearance and cooperation while maintaining control and making it clear that the US military was in charge.

Media events included the return of Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs) from the Iraq-Iran War more than 25 years ago, evacuation of hospitalized Iraqi citizens out of Iraq for advanced medical treatment and the arrival of thousands of tons of humanitarian aid. The most covered event was the NGO Reception Center meeting of Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay Garner, the Director of ORHA; Paul Nielson, the President of the ICRC; and Jakob Kellenburger, the Commissioner for Humanitarian Assistance of the European Union. BINGO processed many international dignitaries.

The coordination, assistance and procedures established while the 3d Div Arty operated BINGO sent a positive message of support to the international community. We maintained security and quickly coordinated to facilitate humanitarian aid and medical assistance to help reconstruct Iraq.

After months of preparing for war and then fighting across Iraq, this change in mission gave our Soldiers a feeling of accomplishment on behalf of the Iraqi people. The flexibility and resourcefulness of our FA soldiers were evident in their instantaneous transformation from executing victorious combat to effective support operations.

Captain Joseph C. Winkelmann is the Assistant S3 for the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery and served as Battle Captain during major combat operations and then Officer-in-Charge of the Non-Governmental Organizations Reception Center at Baghdad International Airport during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Also in the 3d Division, he has served as a Troop Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3-7 Cav); Targeting Officer and Executive Officer for A/39 FA (Target Acquisition Battery); and Multiple-Launch Rocket System Platoon Leader for A/13 FA. He also was a Brigade FSO for the 6th Cavalry Brigade in Korea. He served 10 years as an enlisted soldier, attaining the rank of Staff Sergeant.
When the Iraqi man saw the uniform, his eyes widened in shock. “Oh, no. I cannot wear that uniform. That is the uniform of Saddam,” the man said through an interpreter.

A Field Artillery captain approached the man quietly and respectfully. “This uniform is no longer the uniform of Saddam. It is the uniform of the new Iraq and of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). By wearing it, you will be serving your country.”

The man reluctantly agreed, completed his training and today is helping to safeguard the new Iraq as part of the ICDC.

The ICDC was one of several security agencies established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to help Iraqis assume a greater role in providing for their own security. (See the figure.) The ICDC operates alongside Coalition Forces to provide a secure and stable environment for the Iraqi people.

The Soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery (2-18 FA), part of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade, from Fort Sill, Oklahoma, had the privilege of training a battalion of ICDC soldiers who now serve in the Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) area of operations (AO). This article passes along some insights gained by the battalion in operating an ICDC training academy.

Training host nation security forces is certainly a non-standard mission for a multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion. Nonetheless, Army doctrine provided a useful foundation for operating an ICDC training academy. The eight-step training model, first developed by the US Army Europe (USAREUR) Regulation 350-1 Training, 15 May 2003, was ideally suited to plan and execute the training. Furthermore, the six tactical logistics functions from Field Manual (FM) 10-1, Quartermaster Principles, 11 August 1994, were useful for organizing our sustainment efforts.

The Eight-Step Training Model. The steps in this model are 1. Plan the training, 2. Train the trainers, 3. Reconnoiter the site, 4. Issue the order, 5. Rehearse the training, 6. Execute the training, 7. Evaluate the training and 8. Retrain, as necessary.

• Plan the Training. We began planning the training by adopting an established ICDC program started by the 1st Armored Division. Moreover, the Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) Commanding General had identified a specific program of instruction (POI) for each six-day training cycle. The cycle includes classes on Basic Soldier Skills, Traffic Control Points (TCPs), Squad Tactics, First Aid, Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM), Drill and Ceremony, as well as Rules of Engagement (ROE), Laws of Land Warfare, Civics, Cultural Awareness and Human Rights.

The newly trained ICDC cadets would help provide a safe and secure environment for the people of Iraq and perform important tasks, such as serving as linguists for translator support and as vehicle drivers, conducting security missions, providing natural disaster assistance and providing security for humanitarian aid operations and for routes and convoys.

The battalion established the six-day training schedule to ensure the training was completed efficiently and to standard. The cadets were organized into two 50-man platoons and initially had a battalion drill instructor per platoon and a Coalition NCO per squad. The drill instructors were the primary instructors.
at all stations, except for the Staff Judge Advocate and G5 classes. The platoons rotated BRM, drill and classes from Saturday through Wednesday with graduation on Thursday. Tuesday was devoted to BRM retraining.

- **Train the Trainers.** We then trained and certified a cadre to train this new Iraqi paramilitary force. We faced two challenges in this process. First, we had to train our own senior NCOs to serve as drill instructors for the academy. Second, we had to develop techniques for integrating the Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian and Bulgarian squad leaders from the MND-CS into our training plan. These squad leaders would lead ICDC recruits through their training and then take them back to the MND-CS AO for operational employment.

- **Recon the Site.** While the battalion’s senior NCOs were planning the training and certifying the trainers, the battalion staff began reconning the ICDC Academy. The staff’s focus was to ensure that all the resources to train the ICDC

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects</th>
<th>Iraqi Police Service (IPS)</th>
<th>Iraqi Border and Customs Police</th>
<th>Iraqi Correctional Service</th>
<th>New Iraqi Army (NIA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Interior (Department of Border Enforcement)</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>National Security Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duties</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Enforce Customs and Immigration Laws</td>
<td>Prison Security, Welfare and Security of Prisoners and Detainees</td>
<td>Collective Military Tasks to Protect the Territorial Integrity of Iraq under Iraqi Military Leadership, Serving Side-by-Side With Coalition Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>Light Blue Shirts</td>
<td>Khaki Shirts</td>
<td>White Shirts</td>
<td>Desert Camouflage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>Various, Modified</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Prisoner Escort Vehicles</td>
<td>Wheeled Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>Pistols, Shotguns, AKs</td>
<td>Pistols, AKs</td>
<td>Pistols, AKs</td>
<td>AKs, RPK Light Machine Gun, Mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>Civil Pay Scale</td>
<td>Civil Pay Scale</td>
<td>Civil Pay Scale</td>
<td>Special Pay Scale Approved by the Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Final Figure: 65,000 Nationwide</td>
<td>Final Figure: 10,000</td>
<td>Final Figure: 10,000 by 2005</td>
<td>27 Light Infantry Battalions by September 2004: Three Divisions of Nine Battalions Each with Combat Support and Support Elements to Follow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects</th>
<th>Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)</th>
<th>Facilities Protection Service (FPS)</th>
<th>New Iraqi Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>National Security Defense</td>
<td>Work For All Ministries/Governmental Agencies or Privately Hired; Ministry of Interior Sets/Enforces Standards, Includes Security for Oil, Electricity, Police and Port Facilities</td>
<td>National Security Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>Solid Brown</td>
<td>Grey Shirts</td>
<td>To Be Determined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>Two Jeeps, 12 Trucks per Battalion</td>
<td>Provided by Ministries</td>
<td>Various, Including Impounded Patrol Boats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>AKs</td>
<td>AKs</td>
<td>AKs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>NIA Pay Scale</td>
<td>Civil Pay Scale (Lower Than Police/NIA) or Contract</td>
<td>NIA Pay Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Initially 18 x 846-Man Battalions (One Per Governate) = 15,228 Total</td>
<td>Roughly 6,050 in Baghdad and 14,500 Nationwide</td>
<td>Patrol Boat Squadron (1 x 550-Man Marine Battalion)</td>
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**Iraqi Forces Trained by the Coalition**

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*Photo by CPT Urquidez*
were available: computers, printers, identification tag equipment, bedding, beds, wall lockers, sundry packs, military vans, uniforms and individual weapons.

The staff paid special attention to the security of the training site. Former regime loyalists and other anti-Coalition forces often targeted Iraqis who cooperated with Coalition Forces.

- **Issue the Order.** Next, the battalion staff issued the order and produced all products to support the ICDC staff. The order essentially tasked subordinate units for the support to establish and operate the ICDC Academy.

- **Rehearse the Training.** The battalion rehearsed the training using both right-seat-rides with the 1st Armored Division and back briefs to the battalion commanders. The right-seat-rides proved to be extremely worthwhile as the cadre members learned how to handle situations their prior military training had not prepared them for.

For example, the cadre learned that what motivates American Soldiers does not always motivate former Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqi cadets were motivated by calm explanations and reasoning rather than an up-tempo, fast-paced training atmosphere.

Additionally, the right-seat-rides allowed the cadre members to develop their own training tactics and procedures. Back briefs to the battalion commander and CSM confirmed that each instructor understood the commander’s intent for the training. Rehearsals, whether executing a fire mission or a non-standard mission, were keys to success.

- **Execute the Training.** After completing all rehearsals, the battalion executed this six-day training schedule.

- **Evaluate the Training/Retrain, as Necessary.** All training was evaluated and validated on the fifth day of training. The commandant along with the cadre performed their final inspections and ensured that all trainees had met the standards. For those who did not meet the standard, retraining, reevaluation and validation immediately began.

**Sustain the Training.** The tactical logistics functions (man, arm, fuel, fix, move and sustain soldiers and their systems) helped us organize our sustainment efforts to ensure we had the resources to conduct the training to standard. The nature of the training provided few challenges in the “fuel” and “fix” categories but more than enough challenges in areas of manning, arming, moving and sustaining soldiers and their systems.

**Manning.** Recruiting was the most significant manning challenge in operating the ICDC Academy. ICDC recruits had to be motivated to serve their country, be in reasonably good health and pose no security risk to Coalition Forces. Our Coalition partners in MND-CS, aided by US civil affairs (CA) Soldiers, were primarily responsible for recruiting.

CA Soldiers evaluated the motivation of recruits to ensure they genuinely wanted to serve. They also screened potential recruits to ensure they were not associated with former regime loyalists or other anti-Coalition elements. Medical doctors from MND-CS gave recruits physical exams to ensure they were medically fit for training.

In addition to recruiting ICDC soldiers, we also recruited translators. This difficult challenge was complicated by the fact that the Polish and Bulgarian units in MND-CS would employ these ICDC soldiers.

The number of Iraqis who speak English, Arabic and Bulgarian can be counted on “one hand.” The services of such skilled translators were in high demand, and we had to compensate them accordingly. However, many of the translators were motivated far more by patriotism than by simple financial gains—Iraqis such as Abbas Khudhair Abbas, who is the lead ICDC translator.

Translator Basim Hezma Mehod stands with SFC Roger Cadle, Senior Drill Sergeant for the ICDC Academy. Saddam had imprisoned the translator for seven years. (Photo by CPT Unkadez)

**Moving.** Transporting recruits from their homes to the training site and back involved important security considerations to guard against attacks by Anti-Coalition elements. The attacks not only posed a danger to the individuals targeted, but also had an adverse effect on others interested in cooperating with the Coalition. To prevent attacks on ICDC recruits, we coordinated convoy security for them as they moved to and from the training facility.

- **Arming.** The primary weapon of ICDC soldiers was the AK-47 assault rifle. These weapons and the ammunition they fire are in plentiful supply in Iraq. The challenges were ensuring they were serviceable and repairing them.

- **Sustaining Soldiers and Their Systems.** This logistical function was by far the most important one to sustain the ICDC Academy. Taking care of ICDC soldiers’ health, personnel and field services requirements ensured they remained focused on training.

The most important personnel action was pay. After graduating from training, each ICDC soldier received $50 in cash. To ensure accountability of funds, each platoon sergeant paid his platoon and witnessed his ICDC soldiers as they signed for their pay. Another senior NCO was also present to provide a double check for financial accountability.

Pay was a significant motivation for ICDC soldiers. Offering recruits a graduation bonus proved very effective in retaining recruits who might not otherwise have completed their training.

Despite the medical screening during recruiting, many ICDC soldiers had minor health problems during training. Foot conditions were by far the most common cause of missed training. Many ICDC recruits had never worn boots before. In rural areas of Iraq, sandals are the most common footwear. Many recruits experienced foot pain when standing or marching for long periods. Having one medic per platoon to treat these conditions minimized the amount of training recruits missed due to injury.

Among field services, the one that proved the greatest cause of concern was clothing. Poorly made boots contributed to the foot problems. When we could get a higher quality of boot, foot injuries dropped off significantly.

The uniforms themselves were a source of unexpected controversy. There are several uniforms that evoke a surprisingly emotional reaction among Iraqis. Giving the recruits a patient respectful
hearing and focusing on the importance of the ICDC mission enabled our cadre to defuse these potentially explosive situations.

At the writing of this article, the training described was the initial training for the Iraqi ICDC to get corpsmen into service rapidly. Obviously, the training plan will evolve as other units take up the mission.

Operating an ICDC battalion was certainly a challenging mission, especially for an MLRS battalion—2-18 FA. But relying on proven Army training and logistics doctrine helped organize the efforts. This Army doctrine, when employed by intelligent and resourceful leaders, allowed the Redlegs of 2-18 FA to excel in a mission none ever imagined he’d be performing.

Captain Julian T. Urquidez is the Assistant Operations Officer in the 2d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery (2-18 FA) (Multiple-Launch Rocket System, MLRS) part of the 212th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In this position, he was deployed with the battalion to Iraq from March 2003 until November 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He also has served as an MLRS Platoon Leader and a Support Platoon Leader, both in the 1-12 FA, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery.

Major Paul L. Yingling is the Executive Officer of 2-18 FA. He joined the battalion in July, 2003, and redeployed with the unit in November, 2003. In his previous assignment, he was the Chief of Plans for the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. He commanded A Battery, 25th Field Artillery (Target Acquisition), 1st Armored Division, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and served as a Platoon Fire Direction Officer with the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) during Operation Desert Storm. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Science from the University of Chicago and is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

For the first time since President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq on 1 May 2003, Paladin M109A6 155-mm howitzers were live fired in Baghdad. 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery (4-1 FA), in direct support of the 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 1st Armored Division (1 AD), certified its howitzers in semianual Gunnery Table VIII in Baghdad from 6 to 20 December 2003.

A unique feature of this training is that while the rest of Task Force 1 AD’s (TF 1 AD’s) assets conducted gunnery at Butler Range—approximately 50 kilometers away from the 3d BCT’s operations area—4-1 FA fired within the city’s borders. The advantage of the certification within the city limits is twofold: it not only certified the unit, but also served as a “show-of-force” for would-be “bad actors.” After Operation Iron Hammer, the big guns’ firing keeps the enemy confused and demonstrates TF 1 AD’s ability to react with counterfire—should the enemy decide to shoot mortars or rockets into any areas controlled by the Coalition Forces.

An open field six miles from the firing site was quarantined to serve as the impact zone for the training. Signs are posted around the perimeter of the impact zone, warning residents to stay out of the area. Also, psychological operations teams inform residents of the “incoming steel.” TF 1 AD’s aviation brigade along with the division and brigade fire support elements (FSEs) clear the airspace for the live rounds, including coordinating with the neighboring 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), whose aircraft might need to fly through TF 1 AD’s airspace.

The King of Battle is on his throne in the skies of Baghdad.

Story and Photo by SGT Christopher S. Stanis
TF 1 AD Public Affairs Office, Baghdad
Operation Iraqi Freedom
A good deal of military planning had been undertaken by the United Kingdom (UK) in conjunction with the US Armed Forces during the latter part of 2002 for possible operations to remove both the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the regime of Saddam Hussein. However, it wasn’t until early in January 2003 that the decision was taken to deploy a British armored division to Kuwait under the tactical command of the United States Marine Corps’ 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). This article chronicles some of the key activities during the operations that occurred in the first half of 2003, looking at matters particularly from an artillery perspective, and considers some of the main lessons identified for future deployments.

Organization and Deployment. The Secretary of State for Defence announced that the 3d Commando Brigade would operate under command of I MEF in December 2002. On 20 January 2003, he announced that the UK land contribution to possible operations would be a divisional headquarters: 1st (UK) Armoured Division with 3d Commando Brigade, 7th Armoured Brigade and 16th Air Assault Brigade, with appropriate supporting troops, including the 102d Logistics Brigade.

The structure within these formations was significantly curtailed by other com-

The US name chosen was “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” a title that is relatively easy for most soldiers to identify with. The British name was “Operation Telic.” The dictionary definition of “telic” is “purposeful” or “moving or directed toward a goal.” This laudable but slightly esoteric term passed most of our troops by. To them, Telic stood for only one thing: “Tell Everybody Leave Is Cancelled!”
mitments faced by Britain’s armed forces at that time, particularly the 19,000 service personnel providing cover in the United Kingdom for striking firemen. The result was a number of highly desirable capabilities were omitted from the task organization. These included provisions for rear area security or area air defense (although a limited close air defense capability was retained), long-range surveillance and target acquisition patrols and, most critically from an FA perspective, any multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS). The latter was omitted both as a result of an agreement that 1 MEF would provide all the deep fires for the British division and after an analysis of the terrain showed the extensive spread of oil infrastructure in our likely area of operations AO would significantly curtail the firing of weapons systems with a large beaten zone.

The final task organization for the British land contribution to the liberation of Iraq is shown in Figure 1. Royal Regiment of Artillery (RRA) personnel

![Diagram of 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division in Operation Telic in Iraq](image-url)
numbered just under 2,500, 11 percent of the total force of about 22,000. (See Figure 2.)

The full augmentation needed to bring units up to war establishment was not possible due to manpower pressures elsewhere. In the event, most units coped with a thin establishment, although this might not have been the case had we taken significant numbers of casualties or had combat operations lasted more than 17 days.

The only significant augmentation was to the 3d Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) that doubled in size to field 32 AS90 155-mm self-propelled howitzers and provide the tactical groups for the four battlegroups within the 7th Armoured Brigade; at about 1,000, all ranks, the 3d RHA became one of the largest and, certainly, the most powerful British artillery units ever fielded.

The deployment of the entire British force into Kuwait was completed in 11 weeks, a remarkable achievement considering the deployment of a similar sized force for the 1991 Gulf War took double that time. Inevitably, there were some difficulties. For example, asset tracking was a particular problem. The container park near the Kuwaiti ports was likened to a Christmas morning where the children had gone downstairs first and removed all the labels from the presents so nobody knew either what was inside or who they were from until they’d been opened.

Our ammunition arrived much later in the shipping order than I would have liked; it would have been embarrassing to have had guns with no bullets.

Training and integration were not as thorough or comprehensive as I would have wished, both internal to the British force and with I MEF units. This issue will grow in emphasis as US forces, our most likely allies, move toward “Deploy, Employ.” Nevertheless, by mid-March, we had enough combat power in Kuwait for operations.

**Training and Integration.** The British force had not trained as an entity, and the division had not operated under command of I MEF, an interesting situation with conflict looming ever closer during February. However, three crucial training activities proved vital to the subsequent success of the operation.

In 2001, the division conducted an expeditionary exercise in Oman. A whole host of lessons at all levels came out of this two-month activity that proved to be invaluable, especially concerning the use of our equipment in the Middle East.

Secondly, the 7th Armoured Brigade had just completed a brigade training year. Although the final field training exercise had been cancelled, all the battlegroups had completed live firing and force-on-force combined arms exercises at the British Army’s training center in Canada.

And finally, I had run a major artillery concentration in November 2002. This ensured the battery tactical parties (forward observers and battery commanders) that would deploy with the maneuver units and gun groups were as well trained as resources would allow.

All the artillery units on the final order of battle completed further special-to-arm (artillery) training in England or Germany in January 2003 before their equipment was loaded onto ships. As it turned out, the space and time in Kuwait were too limited for any coherent training before crossing the border. Indeed, my final battery group only arrived 48 hours before operations and just had time to bomb up the guns in a sandstorm before deploying onto their platforms at their first gun position.

The integration with I MEF proved to be much easier than I thought, despite the fact we had never trained with them. From top to bottom, we all found I MEF an outstanding organization. We turned up for “the party” at the 11th hour when months of planning had already been conducted by US forces, yet we were welcomed and our systems aligned with those of the Marine Corps in an exemplary manner.
We did not take this for granted for we know how difficult it can be. Major General Robin Brims, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) the 1st Armoured Division, in his first directive to the division dated 3 February 2003, wrote: “Being an ally is a two-way street. When you find someone or something odd, reflect with certainty that someone finds you and your people very odd, too.” I MEF simply made it work, probably accepting that “the Brits are always slightly odd.”

Nevertheless, there were challenges to be overcome. Procedures and battle rhythms were not identical, and it took time to fully understand how we should best operate in our new higher headquarters.

Our communications systems were not interoperable, mainly because I MEF, although not yet a digitized headquarters, has many more digitized systems than our formations have. We overcame this in part by allocating appropriate terminals to each other’s headquarters.

However, the overall key to success was very significant numbers of high-quality liaison officers (LNOs) being deployed in both directions. For example, I eventually placed three lieutenant colonels and 10 majors in both I MEF and the 3d Marine Air Wing (3d MAW) to coordinate fires, some LNOs embedded and some in a pure liaison role. They had to be extracted from other posts, but they were critical to the operation.

A weakness in most of our formations is our integration of air into the land battle. The British Armed Forces have insufficient people or equipment, particularly communications equipment, and too little training to undertake this important technique. This has been recognized and is in the process of being rectified, although the solution will not be instantaneous.

However, given that I MEF’s deep fires are provided solely by the 3d MAW rather than by ground-based systems, the integration of air, especially close air support (CAS), needed to be a part of our battle. The situation was saved by the provision of both a 70-person USMC air support element (ASE) into the divisional headquarters and also the USMC 1st and 3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICOs). The latter came with ground-to-air communications and were attached to joint fires cells at all levels from division down to company or squadron.

We could not have operated without these critical and most professional additions to our task organization. Indeed, we are looking to replicate their capabilities in our own order of battle.

Finally, we developed extremely close linkages with the 11th Marine Artillery Regiment and trained and fired together, which paid dividends in the early hours of the campaign. It proved to be a happy and rewarding relationship with a highly professional unit.

The 7th RHA and elements of the 3d RHA were grouped (attached) to the 11th Marines for initial border crossing operations. Rounds fell together in unity of mission and purpose despite the incompatibility of our communications systems (liaison parties again proved to be the solution).

Scheme of Manoeuvre. I do not intend to go through the warfighting phase of Telic that occurred between 20 March and 9 April blow-by-blow, for you will be familiar with much of it. Rather I wish to give you a feel for the nature of the British operation.

The mission of the 1st UK Armoured Division was to attack to defeat enemy forces, secure key oil infrastructure and seize the Umm Qasr port to prevent or mitigate environmental disaster and enable humanitarian operations. Subsequently, the division was to relieve the 1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV) to support its rapid movement north. (See the map in Figure 3.)

The key to success was to attack with 1 MARDIV and together gain control of the oil infrastructure, control the AO and then enable I MEF to continue the advance north alongside V Corps without interference.

Our part in the plan was to seize the Al Faw oil infrastructure, a task undertaken by the 3d Commando Brigade working with US Naval Special Warfare (NSW) sea/air/land (SEAL) teams; to secure Umm Qasr, a task for the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15 MEU) under the tactical control (TACON) of the 3d Commando Brigade; and then relieve the 1 MARDIV. For this phase of the operation, I had my three close support regiments and the 15 MEU’s S Battery.

My resources for the opening phases of the operation are in Figure 4 on Page 42. The plan proved robust, and there was no need to deviate from it. The business of allocating resources at the highest level and then delegating their control to the lowest levels worked superbly, another timeless principle.

By 22 March, the 1 MARDIV had been relieved in place and was moving west to cross the Euphrates River at An Nasariyah. The 7th Armoured Brigade

Figure 3: 1st (UK) Armoured Division’s Scheme of Manoeuvre for 20–22 March—secure key oil infrastructure, seize the Umm Qasr port and, later, relieve the 1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV) to support its rapid movement north.
Intent. The OSG will co-ord and provide fires throughout the 1(UK) Armd Div AO. I MEF will provide all div deep fires, principally using the MAW. Priority will initially be with 3 Cdo Bde seizure of the AL FAW peninsular and the securing of UMM QASR. It then switches to the RIP of 1 MARDIV. The OSG will remain balanced to support all formations. Subsequent regrouping likely. All OSG assets should then be prep for subsequent Ops as ordered.

Scheme of Manoeuvre. MAW will take control of the airspace over the peninsular 72 hrs prior to A Day. I MEF (incl MAW) will conduct deep fires to support MEF Ops. 29 Cdo Regt RA, sp by 3 Btys 3 RHA (1 x Rft, 2 x GSR) and 5 Bty, 15 MEU (Umm Qasr Btys at Option 3, Bubiyan Island Bty at Option 2) will support the 3 Cdo Bde seizure of AL FAW peninsular and UMM QASR. 7 RHA and 3 RHA (6 Bty) move ahead of Bdes to sp (GSR & TACON) 11 Marines (7 RHA TO 2/11 Mar and 3 RHA to 3/11 Mar) as they adv N. Once 3 Cdo Bde are secure, 3 RHA regroup GSR CO 3/11 Mar, OOM TBC. 7 RHA Rft 16 AA Bde and 3 RHA Rft to the RIP of 1 MARDIV. The OSG will remain balanced to support all formations. Subsequent regrouping likely. All OSG assets should then be prep for subsequent Ops as ordered.

ME. Initially sp to seizure and securing of AL FAW and UMM QASR, respectively. Subsequently, sp to security of oilfields, particularly through the prevention of movement southwest.

Figure 4: Resource Allocation of 1st (UK) Armoured Division’s Royal Artillery Assets for Operation Telic (Iraqi Freedom)
Phoenix is rail-launched and operates from within the divisional area. The British Phoenix unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) being employed in Operation Telic. The “Chemical Ali,” the regime leader in Basrah and against Ali Hassan Al Majid, gathered or regime personnel loosen the regime’s grip. Much of this activity was cued by human intelligence (HUMINT) grouped down at the lowest levels of command. Timely, air-delivered munitions along with the highly accurate fire of ground artillery were critical during this phase. Strikes on the Ba’ath Party headquarters against regime meetings in both Az Zubayr and Basrah and against Ali Hassan Al Majid, “Chemical Ali,” the regime leader in southern Iraq, combined with powerful armored raids into the city swelled the courage of the local population and, eventually, proved to the Saddam sympathizers their cause was lost.

Basrah fell on 7 April and attention then turned to exploitation up the Tigris River valley into the Maysan Province, particularly to liberate Al Amarah, its capital. However, by this time Baghdad had fallen and the regime had gone underground or been eradicated by the locals. Combat operations had ended in southern Iraq.

In 17 days of warfighting, the British artillery fired 22,193 rounds, give or take about 100 rounds, as ammunition accounting on gun positions is notoriously inaccurate. The 9,500 155-mm rounds included 2,000 extended-range bomblet shells (ERBS) used for the first time and whose target effects and maximum range of 30 kilometers proved invaluable; 200 smoke rounds, mainly in support of the early border crossing operation; 700 illuminating rounds; and just under 6,000 conventional high-explosive (HE) rounds. The illumination was used extensively over Basrah along with airborne surveillance systems (helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs) to psychologically reduce the freedom of movement of the regime personnel in the urban areas. Feedback suggested that this proved to be highly effective.

Of just under 13,000 105-mm rounds fired, all were HE, except about 200 each of smoke and illumination. The S Battery also fired 350 rocket-assisted projectiles (RAPs) while TACON to the 1st Armoured Division. Finally, a gun line of four ships that fired about 600 salvos provided the first naval gunfire support (NGS) to British operations since the Falklands War in 1982.

CAS, fixed and rotary wing, from the 3d MAW was a crucial factor in the success of the operation. Despite our not being in the I MEF main effort, the division used significant numbers of sorties most effectively in our AO.

**Targeting and Rules of Engagement (ROE).** The importance and complexity of targeting and of understanding ROE are areas that only real operations bring to the fore. British ROE at the tactical level were based on three principles: positive identification of Iraqi combatants, an identified military necessity to engage them, and the proportionality of the attack or expected damage within the engagement. The issue is exacerbated when enemy positions are in complex urban terrain or close to one of the 11,000 or so restricted or no-fire targets where collateral damage or civilian casualties could result—mosques, hospitals, schools and the like.

The question became, “Could the junior officer in a command post order the guns to fire when the check map showed the engagement would be in such an area?” The division’s senior lawyer and I devised a series of scenarios presented to relevant commanders, observation officers, command post officers and their superiors. He provided the legal factors, and I educated him about combat and gunnery. It proved to be a highly effective process and, as a result, I had confidence that before conflict was joined, all necessary personnel understood whether or not they could engage a target.

We finished our presentations with a one-liner: “If the enemy are engaging Coalition Forces, the only issue is the proportionality of the response, given possible noncombatant casualties or collateral damage; but if the enemy has yet to engage friendly forces, the military necessity of the fire also must be proven.”

The deliberate targeting process using both lethal and nonlethal means against enemy forces and nonlethal means (information operations, for example) against noncombatants is understood in principle but rarely practiced to the detail real operations demand. The procedures are easy to comprehend: what effect does one wish to have in what time scale against what target audience? Having gotten reasonable intelligence on enemy dispositions, the major diffi-
culp was receiving reliable feedback on the consequences of an initial strike in order to trigger subsequent actions. This proved a challenge when the strike was kinetic. Battlefield damage assessment (BDA), at best, was tardy and imprecise and too often nonexistent. But measuring the effectiveness of a leaflet drop or series of radio broadcasts proved to be nigh onto impossible. It was hoped many Iraqi formations would indicate a desire to surrender, avoiding combat and potentially allowing them to form a nucleus of a new Iraqi army. However, a lack of feedback forced us to revert to kinetic targeting of assessed positions. The only alternative to kinetic targeting would have been to expose Coalition Forces to potential danger, something that was clearly unacceptable. This issue, in part, resulted in the significant expenditure of artillery ammunition.

**Technology and Doctrine.** A range of technological developments proved their worth for the first time in combat. New weapons locating radars (WLRs), when integrated into a proper surveillance system, were remarkably effective. This linkage to the shooters is something that needs to be tightened. Advanced sound ranging also detected enemy artillery fire to an accuracy of about 100 meters at a range of 60 kilometers. While clearly suited to the less mobile operations of the British division when compared to those of V Corps or the 1 MARDIV, sound ranging remains a capable system, particularly with its recent upgrading.

UAVs were a vital component of the target acquisition (TA) capability. The British Phoenix UAV is rail-launched and operates from within the divisional area, an important factor in guaranteeing the essential requirement that UAVs at this level remain under the full command of the land commander. Crucial to the success of our TA equipment was that they produced a broad, layered surveillance and TA (STA) system. Cross-sensor cueing was particularly effective.

The AS90 howitzer proved to be robust, versatile and provided the range, accuracy and, when required, significant weight of fire to degrade almost all enemy actions. The variety in its munitions has already been mentioned. Having toyed with withdrawing the illuminating shell from service some years ago, Operation Telic has shown the British Army must retain a full suite of munitions.

The L118 light gun also proved its worth, particularly when it was lifted along with sufficient ammunition onto the Al Faw peninsula early in the operation, freeing AS90s to commence tasks elsewhere. A proper balance of towed (both 105-mm and 155-mm) and self-propelled artillery would appear to be an essential future prerequisite. Most of our doctrine proved robust although we need to refine the coordination of lethal and nonlethal effects within a timely STA framework. It remains unclear in British doctrine exactly where the command of lethal and nonlethal effects should most logically lie. There is much merit in placing this command in a joint effects cell (JEC) where the necessary synergy can be developed against appropriate time lines. Of course, there would be feeds to other parts of the headquarters throughout any operation. This was how the 1st Armoured Division headquarters operated throughout Telic, and it proved remarkably effective.

**Conclusion.** Deploying a British division into Iraq as part of the liberating force provided a unique opportunity to practice procedures and techniques in high-intensity combat. It proved, again, something that too often gets ignored in combined arms training: the critical importance of Field Artillery and the dependence of combat troops upon it.

It reconfirmed the need to conduct robust, challenging and realistic training. The fact that many soldiers commented during the fighting that it was “just like being on an exercise” is a testament to the training they had been given. It demonstrated that, as close friends and allies, US and UK Armed Forces need to conduct more frequent training, both intellectually and in field integration, especially given the move toward Deploy, Employ.

Operation Telic reaffirmed the necessity of having a full range of high-technology equipment. Outmatching the enemy both by day and night provided a confidence that bred success. Although we faced some weaknesses already discussed, the operation proved, again, the robustness of the British and American Soldier and Marine. Any success was their success and theirs alone.

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I like the Army. I like being a Soldier. I like the people I work with and serving my country. It’s a lot different than my normal life of being an attorney. I think that’s the main reason I’m in the Army National Guard: it’s something different.

Although I’ve never actually deployed before, this is the second time I’ve been mobilized. The first time was in March 2003 and my battery was assigned to 1-181 FA of the Tennessee Army National Guard at Fort Campbell [Kentucky], training to deploy to Iraq. But after two months, they demobilized us…I guess major combat operations were over before we could get there. So this is our second mobilization in a year.

Our first mobilization was a big deal. This mobilization started in December and is a lot easier because we’ve already gone through the mobilization process.

The biggest challenge for me is family separation. Somehow, it was harder to leave this time than the last, which surprised me. It was bad enough the first time around, so I didn’t think the second time would be worse. One of my children is in college and the other is almost 17—it would be even harder to leave if they were toddlers, like some Soldiers have.

I not really nervous about going to Iraq—it is just part of what you do as a Soldier in the National Guard. I just hope we all come back—that’s my main concern, that we all come back. But the odds are pretty good. The rough areas of some our big US cities are more dangerous than Iraq. We had many more casualties in Vietnam and World War II. The casualty hype is just the media conducting its business.

I have a good job with a good section chief and platoon sergeant. I think we have the best section in the battery, a real team, which makes my job even better. I like going to the field—even though I’m not actually one of the gun crewmen, I get to go to the field.

I’m 40 years old, one of the oldest in the battery, and a lawyer, so the younger Soldiers come to me for advice and counseling, which is a good opportunity to do some team building. People always seem to come to me with their problems. I think my maturity reassures a lot of the young Soldiers.

The question I’m asked most frequently is why I’m not a JAG [Judge Advocate General] officer. But I don’t want to do in the Army what I do in my civilian job. That would be boring. I want to go to the field with the younger Soldiers because they make me feel young. I don’t want to work with a bunch of stuffy lawyers.

We’ve been training at Fort Sill for about one month now, mainly training on small arms and qualifying on different weapons. We’ve trained convoy operations over and over and over and over and over…first aid over and over and over. So we feel pretty confident we’ll be able to accomplish the mission when we get to Iraq.

I’ve “been around the block” a lot in my life, but some members of the battalion are paranoid. They don’t want to miss any training they might need or forget anything so there are no problems when we get to Iraq. But I think once we get in country, a lot of the tension will go away. We are just dealing with the unknown and getting ready to do a mission we normally wouldn’t do.

I don’t mind going to Iraq. We’re well trained, and I trust everyone I’m going over with, so that solves most of my problems.