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SOME RECENT ASSIGNMENTS

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH M. SWING
The former Commandant TAS has been assigned as Commandant of the newly reconstituted Army War College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR M. HARPER
Formerly on the staff of Admiral Conley, senior US Navel commander in London, he has been assigned as CG TAC and Commandant TAS. Ft. Sill. Okla.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLISTON B. PALMER
The former Vice Chief of Staff EUCOM has been assigned as CG 82nd Airborne Division. Ft. Bragg. NC. and promoted to Major General.

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM H. COLBERN
The former CG 25th Divarty has been assigned as Assistant Commandant TAS. Ft. Sill. Okla.
The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

The Field Artillery Journal is not a medium for the dissemination of Department of the Army doctrine or administrative directives. Contributors alone are responsible for opinions expressed and conclusions reached in published articles. Consistent with the objects of our Association, however, the Field Artillery Journal seeks to provide a meeting ground for the free expression of artillery ideas in the changing present.

COLONEL BRECKINRIDGE A. DAY
Editor

MAJOR NELSON L. DRUMMOND, JR.
Associate Editor

LENNIE PEDIGO
Business Manager
NOT long ago, Sunday morning funny paper readers smiled as they watched former Sgt. George Baker's immortal Sad Sack struggling simultaneously with a perplexing correspondence course and the lure of a nearby taxi dance hall. No one who has ever used Yank to help him through the graveyard trick in a fire-direction center needs to be told which of Sack's two natures prevailed. By the end of the strip, however, virtue and extension courses had triumphed—after, it must be admitted, the visioned lovelies had proved plain, curveless, and expensive—and Sack was back at his desk making good use of his time.

Happily, most students enrolled in extension courses at The Artillery School show much the same moral fortitude as Sack, and whatever the distraction eventually get back to their lessons. Frequently, however, it is possible for the extension course instructor to determine that a lesson was started on a certain day and not finished until some months later. The early arrival of a new baby in the midst of Lesson 4, Subcourse 40-10, "Field Artillery Tactics, General," postponed the completion of the lesson by one National Guard captain until months later when the new arrival was off the 0200 feeding.

But this is not the general case. The majority of the 11,000 students now enrolled in the Department of Extension Courses at Fort Sill manage to keep their work flowing in. The school has managed to keep the preparation of the correspondence courses ahead of all but a few of the energetic students.

The task of preparing the courses has been a longer job than was originally anticipated. (See THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL, September-October, 1947.) The principal reasons for the delay have been changes and improvements in the doctrines and techniques of artillery, based on World War II experience and post-war developments and experiment. Field Artillery Gunnery is a case in point. No sooner had the courses in the range-and deflection - bracketing procedure come "on the market" (as Department slang has it) than the Chief, Army Field Forces, approved the new gunnery methods based on the use of the target grid. This forward step necessitated a complete rewrite of all the gunnery subcourses except the one on survey.

These delays, and others, such as heavy printing loads at the field printing plant at Fort Sill, have gradually been overcome. It can be foreseen that in a few months almost the entire program will be available to students. The present extension course enrollment at The Artillery School is composed of a number of clearly identifiable groups, each with its own particular reason for pursuing military education by mail.

**STUDENT MOTIVATIONS**

A large group of students are enrolled primarily to keep abreast of the advances in military techniques, especially as these advances apply to the artillery. Since the close of World War II, the combat experiences of our forces have been intensively studied and evaluated. In addition, new equipment has been developed. As a result of this study and development the whole body of artillery doctrine has been re-examined, and changed where applicable, and the remainder has been at least restated with emphasis in new places. These changes have been incorporated in new field manuals now in the process of being published and are, of course, included in the resident instruction given in the regular and associate courses of The Artillery School.

The extension courses program parallels resident instruction so far as practicable and, as the courses have been written, the latest doctrine has been included. Obviously, officers who have had no artillery experience since the war need some method of getting up to date and keeping up to date on the latest developments. Nearly every week there can be noted officers of the civilian components who do not realize that the light field artillery battery contains six howitzers. Furthermore the majority of these officers have had little contact with the new target-grid methods of observed fire and fire direction. Extension courses provide a good way to keep abreast. There are other ways, of course — summer camps, attendance at service schools, troop schools, and unit training periods. For a large group, however, summer camps are hard to fit in and attendance at service schools is impossible.

Experience has shown that the officers of the Reserve and National Guard are hungry for this information. In the spring of the year dozens of letters are received from students who plan to attend National Guard or Reserve summer camps. These students want help in the selection of courses which will prepare them for their two-weeks' work in the field. Unit commanders in the civilian components are also good "customers." Many of them find that extension courses help them attain and keep the knowledge they need to "swing" their jobs. Some of them require the officers charged with unit instruction to acquire an adequate background by taking the appropriate extension courses.

Extension courses are intended for the officers of all components of the army, not merely the civilian components. Regular officers and officers on extended active duty find them to be of value and many are enrolled. "I had a G-4 job right after the war and since then I have been in Military Government," is a typical statement in letters applying for "Conduct of Observed Fire," the new course on the target-grid method of shooting observed fires.

A number of other more immediately discernible but perhaps less important results accrue from the study of extension courses. The final grade of an extension course becomes part of the permanent record of a Reserve or National Guard officer. Obviously, this record is of considerable value to commanders when an individual is being considered for promotion, selection for service school, or call to extended active duty.

Extension courses also provide an excellent means to earn retirement credits and to keep eligible for active reserve status. Under current regulations three credit hours of extension course work are equivalent to one retirement credit.
credit point. Many officers who find it difficult to attend unit drills because of their location find extension courses their principal means of keeping eligible and of earning retirement points. The Artillery School has on its rolls any number of forest rangers, oilfield workers, foreign representatives of U. S. concerns, construction engineers, and traveling salesmen, who get little chance to earn retirement credits through unit drills. Extension courses also satisfy some reserve promotion requirements for officers unable to obtain appropriate T/O assignments.

Enrollment regulations are quite flexible, so that the educational needs of almost any individual can be met. In the usual case, a new enrollee is placed in the numbered series appropriate to his grade. For example, a captain will be enrolled in the 40 series. However, an officer with special needs may enroll in a special series appropriate to his own requirements. If an officer has applied for transfer to another branch he may take the appropriate courses in the school of the new branch. Officers on extended active duty may take any subcourse in any of the schools. Thus, an artilleryman not only can catch up on his gunnery or RSOP but can also learn infantry or tank tactics. When an officer has completed all the courses he needs at The Artillery School, he is transferred to the Command & General Staff College.

Most officers who were around before the war recall that many enlisted men, particularly those in key positions, were encouraged by their commanders to prepare themselves for greater responsibilities by pursuing military correspondence courses. When World War II came along, many of these NCO's profited materially by their preparation and won advancements ranging from second lieutenant to colonel. The records of the Department of Extension Courses, TAS, reveal that very few Regular Army enlisted men are using this method of improving their artillery knowledge at the present time, although an appreciable number are enrolled at the Army General School. Commanders might well survey their outfits and urge promising noncommissioned officers and privates to enroll in extension courses. Enlisted men may enroll in the 10 series of any school. In addition, they are authorized to take courses in a higher series when their duties or prospective duties require special training.

Many good noncommissioned leaders are going to need technical help to enable them to climb the newly devised career ladders. The examinations in firing battery and gunnery subjects are thorough and require solid understanding of the subject matter. Enlisted men preparing for these subjects will undoubtedly be helped by the study of the extension courses available on these subjects. The battery commander who has men worthy of promotion can help them by encouraging them to enroll in the subcourses appropriate to their career fields.

TECHNIQUES OF PREPARATION

Since the initiation of the program in 1946, a major effort has been made to develop techniques of teaching by mail which will impart the maximum amount of instruction per hour of student effort, and yet be such that the student retains the learned material as long as possible.

Under procedures developed by the Department of Extension Courses, TAS, the student is first given an assignment for study in the text for the course. He is then required to place himself in a realistic tactical or training situation, and finally to solve multiple-choice type, objective exercises based on the text assignment and the situation. An example follows:

**SITUATION.** You are S-3, 104th FA Group, attached to 1 Corps Artillery. Your group is composed of the 502d FA Bn (155 Gun SP), 405th FA Bn (8" How Trac), and the 893d FA Bn (240 How Trac). You are planning fires in preparation for an attack.

**EXERCISE:** You determine that for indirect fire, the 8-inch howitzer, as opposed to the 155-mm gun, is particularly suitable for:

- Interdicting a road junction.
- Attack of infantry in the open.
- Harassing a bivouac area.
- Destruction of a pillbox.

**SOLUTION:** (Sent to student after exercise is graded; includes text references not given here.)

A. Interdiction fires are of relatively light intensity laid down on lines of communication to disrupt or intermittently deny their use to the enemy. Within the range of the weapons the 155-mm gun and 8-inch howitzer are equally suitable for such missions.

b. Neither weapon is particularly suitable for neutralization of a target such as infantry in the open, because it is not considered economical to use such large projectiles when lighter projectiles will do the job equally well. In addition, neutralization requires a rapid rate of fire. Heavy artillery has a much slower rate of fire than the lighter weapons.

c. The weapons are about equally suited for harassing fire, which is fire of less intensity than fire for neutralization. Unless there is some aspect of the target location such as a deep defilade or extreme range, neither weapon could be said to be the better for this purpose.

d. The 8-inch howitzer is one of the most accurate field artillery weapons. At 18,000 yards the 155-mm gun has a range probable error of 43 yards, whereas the 8-inch howitzer has a range probable error of 19 yards. The 8-inch howitzer projectile, being twice as heavy as that of the 155-mm gun, has a considerable advantage in explosive power. Using indirect fire, the accuracy of the piece, coupled with the explosive power, excellent penetration effect and high trajectory of the projectile gives the 8-inch howitzer a definite advantage over the 155-mm gun for destruction purposes.

It can be seen that this exercise requires the student to learn the range and accuracy characteristics of both the 8-inch howitzer and the 155-mm gun, as well as the meaning and significance of the terms "interdiction," "harassing fires," "neutralization," and "destruction." Nowhere in the text will he find it stated that "destruction" is the "best" answer to the question posed by the exercise. But he can arrive at the solution by analysis of all the factors given above and applying the principles he has learned to the particular problem presented. In this way, the student learns and retains the principles it is desired to teach him.
This type of exercise, in addition to teaching the student a great deal of material, saves him a great deal of time. This is an important consideration in extension courses where students must sandwich their work in between the tasks of making a living, enjoying normal family life, pursuing other military training, following hobbies, and getting in a share of social activities. It would be quite possible to teach the same principles by asking the student to write an essay-type answer comparing the two weapons for use in the four types of fire listed in the exercise. But this is a time-consuming process which adds little to the instruction. In the essay type it is easy to straddle the fence or answer the question both ways—to hedge, in gambling terms. The multiple-choice exercise forces him to make a decision and thus trains him in a valuable aspect of military leadership. A few students have, interestingly enough, complained of this aspect of the extension course program, saying that the multiple-choice exercise does not give them enough “leeway” in their answers. Surely such a student needs the benefit of this type of training.

It is interesting to note that, while civilian experience in the multiple-choice type exercise has been largely confined to its use as a testing device, The Artillery School uses it as a teaching technique. Experiences in nearly four years of the use of this device have proved it to be of immense value in teaching military subjects and to be very popular with students, who are relieved of long hours of arduous penmanship.

INSTRUCTOR-STUDENT RELATIONSHIP

No effort is spared, in the administration of the lessons, to develop the instructor-student relationship. Despite the case of grading multiple-choice exercises, considerable time is spent by the instructors in the grading of each lesson submitted. This is especially true when the student has low marks or is not making satisfactory progress. The instructor is known by name to each student. In addition to grading the paper, the instructor adds notes and suggestions to aid the student in mastering the subject matter. Instructors are all officers especially well qualified in the subject matter of the courses in which they instruct. The majority at the present time are Regular officers of field grade. It is common practice for students to write notes and letters, asking questions and seeking help in the solving of some problem connected with their studies. These inquiries are always answered carefully and thoroughly. This personal attention is appreciated by most students, many of whom send thank-you notes at the end of the course. Last Christmas there wasn't a single instructor who didn't receive at least one Christmas card from a student.

REVISION

With the initial preparation nearly completed, a program of revision has been started. From the very beginning in 1946, careful records have been kept of student grades in each exercise of every course. When these records show that over 25 percent of the students make an improper choice or give the wrong answer, it is considered that the exercise has some flaw. The exercise is then studied and reworded or changed. Similarly, if the students’ answers are unanimously correct, or nearly so, it is considered that the exercise requires little mental effort and thus has little teaching value. As rapidly as possible all “bugs” which appear (and some do appear despite careful editing) are cured by the publication of errata or by more complete revisions. Careful records are also kept of all student comments and the average time required to complete each subcourse. These comments together with the record of student grades form the revision file kept on each subcourse. At an appropriate time each subcourse will be completely revised in view of all the information available; of course, the latest doctrine will be incorporated in each new revision.

By these procedures, The Artillery School believes that its extension courses will supply those who cannot attend its resident courses an adequate, authoritative method of acquiring, and keeping fresh, the knowledge they will need in the event of mobilization. This is a continuing effort. The initial preparation of subcourses, now nearing completion, is an important first step. Improvements will follow. Students enrolling in the program can be assured that personalized instruction by the latest proved educational techniques will reward them for the time they take from their personal lives to pursue their military education. The faint-hearted, who persuade themselves that the effort isn’t worth the gain, may take courage from the Sad Sack who stuck to his guns even in the face of the deadliest enemy of the extension course—the human female.

(For complete program, see page 77)
The article "Corps and Army Artillery" which appeared in the January-February JOURNAL gave the organization of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, and the Corps Artillery Staff as constituted at the time of writing. A new table of organization is now in effect for Corps Artillery (T/O & E 6-50-1). This new table makes obsolete certain statements and diagrams in the original article.

The block diagram, figure 1, shows the new organization of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery. Comparison of this diagram and the corresponding one which appeared in the January-February issue of the JOURNAL, shows that several changes have been made. The main changes are:

1. A light aviation section has been added. This section has four officers and six enlisted men. There are three light aircraft organic to the section. Where specifically approved by the Department of the Army, two additional field artillery lieutenants may be provided as air observers.

2. Five liaison sections have been added. These sections, consisting of an officer and two enlisted men each, maintain liaison with adjacent corps artilleries, division artilleries, army photo interpretation centers, or wherever the commander directs. Under the old organization, liaison officers were drawn from the S-2 and S-3 sections, usually two from S-2 and three from S-3. The addition of five liaison officers directly under the commander serves to increase the number of officers available for S-2 and S-3 duties and also makes the liaison officers more readily accessible to the entire staff.

3. An administrative section has been added. This section, comprising eight men, supplies personnel to the staff for matters pertaining to food service, ammunition supply, and personnel administration.

The changes in the battery are reflected in changes in staff organization. For example, the five liaison sections each have a liaison officer who is a staff officer directly under the commander. A comparison of figure 2, Corps Artillery Staff, with the corresponding figure in the January-February issue of the JOURNAL, shows the major changes as made by the new table. These are:

1. An Adjutant, S-1, has been added. Although indicated as S-1 on figure 2, the officer assigned to this job is in fact Adjutant, S-1. There as a warrant officer, administrative, to assist him.

2. The S-2 has full use of his assigned personnel. Since the liaison officers are now organic to the staff and separate from other staff sections, the two officers formerly drawn from the S-2 section are back where they belong. One of them has been designated the assistant counterbattery intelligence officer. The other is available for other intelligence duties. In addition to regaining these officers, the S-2 section has been given two photo interpretation teams. In all
there are seven officers in the S-2 section, making round-the-clock operation more efficient.

3. The S-3 has regained the officers formerly used as liaison officers. As indicated on figure 2, two of these officers have been given troop information and education job assignments.

4. The S-4 has some more help for ammunition and food service matters. As a matter of fact, the T/O & E is not specific as to whom the food service officer belongs, but since the S-4 is the staff officer with primary general staff interest in such matters, it appears reasonable to place the food service officer in the S-4 section.

The separation of S-1 and S-4 plus addition of personnel who are qualified in administrative matters indicates that the corps artillery will perform more administrative functions than before. Such is not the case. Corps artillery remains primarily a tactical headquarters. However, the tactical commander needs certain administrative information if he is to operate efficiently. The administrative personnel in corps artillery headquarters are there to keep the commander informed on administrative matters affecting the corps artillery. It is not considered that the administrative staff will be an operating staff in the true administrative sense.

These changes in organization of corps artillery headquarters and headquarters battery should make for smoother operation of both parts of corps artillery headquarters. It leaves the corps artillery commander more free to supervise all functions of corps artillery. The organization is still very flexible and can be modified by the corps artillery commander to meet changing requirements. Reduced to a statement of numbers alone, the corps artillery commander now has 33 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 152 enlisted men to use as he sees fit to perform the functions of corps artillery headquarters, wherever formerly he had only 22 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 89 enlisted men.

BRITAIN BREAKS A CODE!
By Jerome Kearful

A mong the spectacular and surprising successes in breaking down enemy codes, none is more remarkable than the way in which British naval officers broke the German "lightning gibberish" code in World War I. They achieved this success because they failed to wind up a phonograph! Here is the way it happened.

The German radio station at Nauen was accustomed to broadcast a regular evening summary of the developments on the fighting fronts. Following this, the station put on the air several minutes of something of which the British listening stations could make neither head nor tail. It seemed to be a secret communication of some sort, but the sounds followed one another with such speed that cryptographers could not find even a starting point from which to attempt to unravel the code, "Lightning gibberish," if seemed.

Nevertheless, British Intelligence made numerous recordings of the Nauen gibberish, and furnished copies to various units of the British armed forces with the hope that some key for unraveling the puzzle might turn up. Again the British "muddled through" in a way that was quite unexpected!

A recording of one of the baffling Nauen broadcasts had been supplied to a small British warship on duty in the Mediterranean. Officers aboard this British ship had a portable phonograph which they used to divert themselves in times of inactivity. In addition to their supply of musical transcriptions, they had played the Nauen recording more than once, but were quite as much in the dark about it as the code rooms in London.

Then came the unexpected. In the harbor of an eastern Mediterranean seaport, time was hanging heavy aboard the British warship. It was hot, and there was little to do just then. Cooling drinks and musical numbers played on the portable phonograph helped to pass the day. The small selection of records aboard had been played and replayed. Finally, there was nothing left but the Nauen recording. They might as well hear it once more.

So the British officers put on the "lightning gibberish" again. But it was so hot that nobody troubled to wind the phonograph. Halfway through the record, the machine started to slow down. At first, none of the listeners paid any attention. Then, as the sound came more and more slowly, a code officer present showed startled interest. As the record turned at a very slow speed, he had recognized understandable groups of radio code signals!

The answer was soon apparent. The Germans, using a prewar code that had been deciphered by the British long before, had recorded their secret messages at normal speed, but played them for radio broadcast several times faster! The puzzle that had baffled the best Allied intelligence officers was solved by British naval officers aboard a small ship in the Mediterranean because it was too hot to wind their phonograph!
EXTRACTS FROM THE FIRST ARMY ARTILLERY INFORMATION SERVICE (WWII)
By Brigadier General Charles E. Hart, USA

EXTRACTS FROM AIS NO. 4, PUBLISHED IN JUNE 1944
Notes on Counterbattery (MGRA 21 Army Group).

I have noticed recently on exercises a certain lack of imagination on the part of artillery commanders in dealing with the problem of counterbattery and countermortar, and a tendency to become stereotyped, based on lessons from battles which have been fought, without considering the conditions under which they were fought.

For example, the counterbattery policy at ALAMEIN, which was extremely successful, was based on an intima'e knowledge of the enemy artillery at the time the plan was put into effect. It was therefore possible to carry out the destruction and neutralization of enemy artillery in a very short space of time immediately prior to zero hour, and this plan was only acceptable to the infantry on a guarantee of a 50% neutralization of hostile guns. As it was successful this tended to become the popular method of dealing with the counterbattery problem. In a Corps attack, without good information, such a procedure is not only a waste of shells, but will also give away the front of the attack immediately before the infantry go in.

The object of all counterbattery in an offensive operation must be to neutralize as many of the enemy guns as possible before the infantry assault. Therefore, in general terms this neutralization must be complete by zero hour. If time permits, it may be carried out by the implementation of an active and destructive counterbattery policy during a comparatively long period before the battle. This method will have to be employed unless it is certain that information at the time of the attack is good enough to allow of the whole counterbattery plan being carried out in the short space of time immediately before zero.

It must again be emphasized that information is the key to successful counterbattery and the CBO must, at all times, keep in close touch with the G-2 of the Corps. The value of up-to-the-minute information from photographs appears to be fully realized and the CCRA must make certain that communication from the ACBO at the landing ground or with APIS is foolproof.

Concentrations—Not the Universal Panacea (21 Army Group—RA Bulletin)

There is little doubt that the use and power of massed artillery fire is now fully appreciated throughout the army. There is perhaps, however, a tendency to use concentrations on all occasions to the exclusion of accurate ranging and deliberate shots by batteries, troops, or even single guns.

Divisional and regimental concentrations without ranging rarely produce satisfactory results, and are only necessary when time is not available for ranging or when surprise is a dominant factor.

The success of concentrated fire by a large number of guns depends on information; this includes location of the target and knowledge of the correct meteorological conditions at the time the shoot is carried out. There may be, and often are, many other points on which information is required before effective fire can be brought to bear.

The simplest method of finding out the location of the target and meteorological conditions is by carrying out accurate ranging. This in turn presupposes good observation.

Ammunition has never been restricted, with the result that battery and troop commanders have been able to use concentrations whenever they choose, sometimes with great success, but sometimes also with considerable waste of ammunition as the result of incomplete information.

Overemphasis on either of these two aspects of artillery procedure will not produce the best results. It is necessary to keep these facts constantly before all artillery officers to ensure a right balance in both training and operations.

TAS WANTS COMBAT ARTICLES

The following is extracted from a recent letter from The Secretary, TAS.

We still need much more material here at the School if we are to have a good combat-experience book. So far, we have received about 25 combat-experience articles direct from officers. Unfortunately, many deal too much in generalities and too little in tangible facts.

We are very anxious to receive any articles that have not yet been submitted; all we ask is that officers get them in as soon as possible. We especially need factual accounts—names, dates, places, and maps or sketches—of actual happenings from battery commanders, liaison officers, and forward observers.
Operation Amphibious

By Lt. Col. R. C. Williams, Jr., Inf.

Part I: "In The Beginning . . ."

(continued)

ST. NAZAIRE

The British High Command decided that St. Nazaire had to be dealt with as soon as possible if such incidents as the successful run of the German ships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau from French Atlantic ports to the Baltic were not to be repeated. St. Nazaire, with its facilities for German submarines and its great dry-dock, capable of accommodating the huge battleship Tirpitz, was an important and dangerous German naval base. It is situated on the Loire River, six miles in from the river mouth, and over 250 miles "as the crow flies" from the nearest port in England.

The port of St. Nazaire consists of the Avant Port, which is the outer harbor, the Bassin de St. Nazaire, which is the outer dock area, and the larger Bassin de Penhouet, which is the inner dock area. The outer harbor and outer dock area are connected by the South Lock, which eliminates a change of tides at the docks. The outer dock area also has an East Lock which connects it with the Old Entrance. The submarine pens were located in the outer dock area. There were fifteen of these huge concrete pens, five still being under construction.

The drydock, called the Forme Ecluse, is at the mouth of the Old Entrance. The Old Mole to the south, twenty-five feet high, had two AA batteries perched on it. It was this portion of land, separated from the mainland by the Avant Port, Bassin de St. Nazaire, and Bassin de Penhouet, which included the power stations, bridges, control posts for the locks, and the Forme Ecluse. Therefore it was this square mile area that the High Command logically selected for the next amphibious target.

The operation was to be a combined affair with two objectives to be attained. First, the principal mission to be accomplished was the destruction of the Forme Ecluse. The second objective was to destroy the South Lock gates, the control machinery for the basins, and any U-boats or shipping found.

The plan for the destruction of the Forme Ecluse was a simple but very hazardous undertaking. One of the old destroyers received by the British from the United States was to be loaded with explosives and rammed into the lock gates of the Forme Ecluse. The Navy was to undertake this task while the Commandos carried out the demolitions required by the second mission.

H.M.S. Campbeltown was to do the ramming. Two other destroyers, a motor gunboat, a torpedo boat, and 16 motor launches to carry both torpedoes and the Military Force, completed the Naval complement. The Military Force consisted of a reinforced Commando—forty-four officers and 224 enlisted men.

The landing plans called for landings at three points. One landing was to be made on the north side of the Old Mole. A second landing from the motor launches was to be carried out at the Old Entrance. The third was to be at the Forme Ecluse lock gate, by having the assault forces clamber ashore from the Campbeltown after she had rammed the gate.

The three landing forces were divided into groups, given specific objectives to destroy, and thoroughly oriented as to how they would effect the destruction of the various installations. Each group was to have a protection party to do the fighting and a demolition party which was to concern itself only with destroying the assigned targets.

The plan for the withdrawal after the demolitions had been carried out called for the destruction of the bridges over the locks and reembarkation by all the three forces at the Old Mole. It was estimated that the Forces ashore could do their jobs and reembark within two hours after landing.

In planning the approach, the dominant consideration was the
surprise element seemed to have vanished.

All the smaller craft increased their speed, began to fire rapidly at anything resembling a target on shore, and in every way tried to distract the attention of the Germans from the Campbeltown.

Despite many hits, frequently on her bridge, the Campbeltown went ahead unswervingly and hit the lock with a resounding crash at 1:34 A.M., just four minutes late. The Commandos who were aboard scrambled off the ship and started on their missions, which were carried out without any delay.

The landing craft for the other two forces, however, encountered more difficulty in getting to the designated landing points.

The plan called for the column of craft nearest the shore, that is, on the left flank of the Campbeltown, to disembark their Commandos on the north side of the Old Mole. Actually they were forced by the intense fire of the shore batteries to land on the south side. Craft number 9 was leading the column. Despite machine gunfire all the way in, it reached the Mole, where the Germans tossed grenades into it from the Mole above, and it soon burst into flames.

Number 8 was assigned the mission to torpedo anything in sight and while searching for an enemy ship noticed Number 9 burning, so went in and rescued the survivors.

Number 7 also had a special mission. Its task was to move up and down the Loire at high speed to draw the German fire. She was so successful in this that her steering apparatus was hit, but it was soon repaired and the craft retired to rendezvous. It must be remembered that these motor launches which were used as landing craft had no armor plating, depending solely upon surprise to keep themselves afloat.

Number 12 crashed into a rock next to the Mole and thus prevented the other craft from getting close enough to disembark their men. Number 13 passed the Mole during the firing phase, then returned. Only one group of Commandos was able to get started down the Old Mole. They eliminated the antiaircraft guns and moved on to their demolition tasks.

The plan called for the right-flank, or seaward, column of landing craft to disembark their troops at the Old Entrance. Craft number 1 was leading this column, but was hit by gunfire, forced to shore, and was beached at the end of the Old Mole. Numbers 2 and 3 successfully disembarked their personnel at the Old Entrance, as did Number 6. The latter was then given orders to embark the crew of the Campbeltown, and did so. She was hit and sunk on her way out to the rendezvous.

The motor gunboat proceeded in, stopped facing the old lock in the Old Entrance, fired at the short batteries for several minutes, and then proceeded in and disembarked the Military Commander and his party. The Naval Commander personally checked the Campbeltown and assured himself that it was firmly embedded in the gate locks. He ordered the torpedo boat to go up and torpedo the gates to the submarine base, which was done successfully. On moving out of the harbor, the torpedo boat was set afire while trying to aid a burning landing craft. The motor gunboat also had a difficult time in getting away safely. Those craft remaining had to face several sharp attacks by German aircraft, and one motor launch had to be sunk by gunfire. Three out of the original 16 craft, Numbers 8, 12, and
13, eventually reached England.

The mission assigned the Force was carried out. The Camphelltown had embedded itself over twenty feet into the lock gates of the drydock and blew up the morning following the raid. The pump house, control posts, buildings on the quays, gun positions, and some shipping, were all destroyed. Delayed action torpedos blew up the East Locks of the Bassin de St. Nazaire.

The Navy lost thirty-four officers out of sixty-two and 151 enlisted men out of 291. Only ten out of forty-four officers and 46 out of 224 men returned in Number Two Commando, the Military Force.

But, aside from achieving its purpose, the St. Nazaire Raid provided some interesting lessons. It showed how a small raid could accomplish a difficult task if the Army, Navy, and Air were used jointly. It proved to the world that a small force, utilizing darkness in order to obtain surprise, could attack and throw into confusion the defenders of a well-fortified port. The effect on German morale, exemplified by their reaction in the radio and the press and their direct approach to the French, showed how profitable such a joint operation could be if planned thoroughly and carried through with resolve.

As far as the amphibious phase was concerned, both the Military and Naval participants who returned had some concrete ideas. Motor launches were not adequate for use as landing craft, and all felt that a definite attempt must be made to construct landing craft designed for this type of work. Then, too, a column formation, when near the landing areas, was thought to be too vulnerable and a wave formation was advocated. More care must be taken in selecting landing areas. The obstruction which one motor launch at the Old Mole presented to the rest, preventing their disembarking, was felt to be a weak portion of the plan. The problem of the evacuation of the wounded was obviously not solved, because of the lack of personnel from the medical service and lack of craft.

The British Imperial Staff, however, felt that the St. Nazaire results improved the position of the Allies immeasurably in their efforts to win the Battle of the Atlantic, and, looking ahead, decided to make a thorough investigation of the German defenses against a large invading force. They were also interested in discovering any defects in the equipment, tactics, and technique developed by their own forces. With this in mind, less than three weeks after the St. Nazaire raid they ordered plans prepared for a large-scale amphibious reconnaissance in force, and selected as the target the French coastal village of Dieppe.

**Dieppe**

Although the Dieppe raid was carried out in August of 1942 it still remains one of the most controversial operations of World War II.

There were numerous objectives in the minds of the British Imperial Staff when they selected Dieppe as the next target. Some forty German barges which, it was thought, were to be used in the invasion of England were in the Port and had to be destroyed. The German Headquarters for the coastal area was located there and undoubtedly had some secret documents, as well as personnel, which could furnish much valuable intelligence. The Casino was being used as an ammunition dump, many of the houses contained food supply dumps for the German Army, the pharmaceutical factory was providing much-needed medical supplies to Germany, and, therefore, all of these installations had to be destroyed. In addition, the German barracks, coast guard station, railway yards and tunnels, gas works, power station, gas tanks and dumps, the bridges and locks in and around Dieppe harbor, the radar station, and the telephone exchange were all ear-marked for elimination. If at all possible, the installations at the St. Aubin airfield were to be included in this wholesale wrecking program.

As Dieppe was considered a typical point of the German defensive wall, it was hoped that an accurate picture would be obtained as to how they intended to repel any invasion threat. It was determined to test the landing of tanks from amphibious craft, to test the changes made in joint communications, to obtain information concerning the results of naval gunfire and air support, and finally, to keep the German nerves in a jittery state along the coast.

In outline, the plan for the raid consisted of four flank attacks to be followed thirty minutes later by a main assault on Dieppe itself. The eight landing beaches running from east to west were designated by colors, as shown on the accompanying sketch.

The purpose of the two outer flank attacks at the Yellow and Orange Beaches was to destroy two heavy batteries near Berneval and Varengeville, so that the Naval Force could approach the coast without undue loss. The attack on Blue Beach was to be made for the purpose of silencing another heavy battery. The attack on Green Beach was to capture a fortified position. Other troops were to pass through the initial assault troops at Green Beach and capture the St. Aubin Airfield and the headquarters of the German division in that area. The troops landing at the main beaches opposite Dieppe itself (Red and White) were to capture the town and hold the harbor long enough to enable a naval detachment, accompanied by detachments from several French ships, to remove any barges and other craft found in the harbor. The troops were to be assisted by tanks, which were to land on these beaches. In all cases the assault landings were to be masked by smoke screens laid down by air or naval craft, or both, and covered by aerial and naval bombardment. Here, then, was the main plan of attack. It was realized that its success depended upon perfect synchronization and timing of the successive phases.

The Force Commanders had at their disposal 252 ships and landing craft to carry out the raid.

The difficulties encountered in executing the plan were many. The coastal region around Dieppe consists of high cliffs, accessible only in a few places, which are fronted by very narrow stony beaches. At the foot of the coastal cliffs is a narrow strip of stones and boulders bordered by fringes of rocks. Because of the tide, minimum sea swell, and the wind, it was found that only two days out of each month would be suitable to execute the landing.

While still seven miles from the French coast a group of enemy ships discovered the Force and so eliminated any chance of their obtaining complete surprise. Communication from the shore to the ships during the operation was
Coastline in Vicinity of Dieppe

out because the Beachmaster and his Beach Signal Party had never been landed. The German wire on the beach was more difficult to negotiate than the British had anticipated. In addition to long coils of wire, there was a wire of a heavier gauge with long spikes laid in a double-apron pattern behind the concertina coiled type. German 88's and French 75's opened fire from concealed positions in caves carved out of the cliff face as soon as the smoke screen lifted. This enfilade fire made the capture and retention of the beaches an impossibility and was the main cause of the failure to press on through Dieppe and attain the objectives assigned in the plan. The floating reserve arrived at the wrong beach because of the heavy smoke screen, was immediately pinned down, and accomplished nothing. The fire of the destroyers was to be controlled by means of forward observers who were to land with the troops, but most of them soon became casualties.

Owing to an error in navigation, the first wave of tanks in six LCT's was five minutes behind schedule. The plan called for the tanks to engage the enemy pillboxes for ten minutes immediately after landing, by which time the engineers and working parties would have arrived on shore. One LCT beached, landed her three Churchill tanks, was then hit by heavy gunfire, drifted 60 yards, and, after an unsuccessful attempt had been made to tow her back, was sunk. Another LCT sustained heavy damage but managed to land her tanks. The chains of her ramp were severed by gun fire, causing the ramp to fold back under her hull. She was also hit in the engine room, the ammunition magazine was set afire, and most of her crew were killed or wounded. The third LCT was hit while going in and her ramp chains cut, and she beached with the ramp half down. She remained beached. The fourth was also hit before landing, set on fire, and sunk in deep water some distance from shore. Another LCT went aground near the western headland. A sixth LCT was hit in the engine room going in and attempted to turn; after 3 helmsmen were killed, the fourth brought her in, debarked the tanks, and returned to the boat pool, after trying unsuccessfully to tow away the grounded LCT. Of the 18 tanks carried by the first wave of LCT's, 14 were landed successfully. Five tanks crossed the Esplanade Wall and a sixth managed to climb the steps up the wall near the Casino. At the moment of landing, three of them stalled on the ramp of one of the LCT's because their engines were cold, and fifteen vital minutes were used up trying to get them into action. Thus, only six tanks from the first wave managed to get over the Esplanade Wall within twenty minutes of landing. These tanks successfully engaged pillboxes and fortified positions until they were out of ammunition, then returned to the beaches. Their exact movements while over the wall, however, are obscure.
The second wave of tanks fared even worse. Four LCT’s arrived at the departure point at 6:05 A.M. according to plan and attempted to land despite the heavy fire. One LCT was sunk after landing her tanks. Another had landed only one tank when all her naval officers and crew were either killed or wounded by fire, and she was eventually towed back to England by a motor launch. All the tanks used in the operation were water-proofed so as to operate in water six feet deep. The four LCT’s of the second wave landed eleven tanks, one of which submerged and was out of action. One tank and one scout car climbed the Esplanade Wall and disappeared, but the remainder were either fouled or hit by German fire and were all left stranded on the beach.

Of the 24 LCT’s which sailed from England, 10 landed their tanks, which meant that 28 were put ashore. Of these 28, twelve became casualties, nine were unaccounted for, and seven crossed the Esplanade. Of a total of 11 officers and 314 enlisted men, 9 officers and 180 enlisted men were either killed, wounded, missing, or taken prisoner. Most of these casualties occurred during the first few minutes before and after the landing. The wall itself was no more than 3 feet in height and did not constitute an unsurmountable obstacle to these tanks.

The Dieppe Raid is, the British say, the perfect historical example of timing, coordination, cooperation, courage, and the determined, “never give up” spirit. It serves as a good example of perfect military discipline, loyalty, and leadership.

The losses in men and materiel in the Dieppe Operation were great. The total in killed, wounded, missing, or prisoner was 4388. Losses in materiel included a destroyer, 28 tanks, 7 scout cars, 88 fighter planes, 10 reconnaissance planes, 8 bomber and smoke-laying planes, and many landing craft.

What lessons were learned in return for this stiff price? The first thing realized was the necessity for overwhelming fire support. Much more had to be done in joint training before all three Services would be able to successfully participate in an invasion of Europe. It was seen that the planning of a raid had to be independent of weather conditions. The planning and execution of the military plan must be characterized by a great deal more flexibility. An accurate and comprehensive system of control and communication is a paramount necessity in a joint amphibious operation. Every officer and enlisted man must not only be thoroughly familiar with his own task but must be familiar with the plans as a whole if unforeseen situations which inevitably come up during such an operation are to be successfully dealt with. Special training, particularly in night amphibious operations, is of inestimable value. Complete rehearsals should be a definite part of the planning.

Assaults must be carefully timed and the landings executed on time if naval and air support is to be used to the best advantage by the landing forces. In order to land tanks with the leading waves, it is necessary to have first neutralized or destroyed a major portion of the enemy’s anti-tank beach defenses. The briefing of the troops should be as late as possible for the actual operation, so that they will not forget what was told them. The Imperial Staff saw that, unless means for the provision of overwhelming close support was available, assaults should be planned to develop the flanks of a strongly developed locality rather than frontally against it. Communications fell down within the various units because the beach signal detachments had been landed complete with the first wave rather than later when the beaches had been secured. The importance and necessity of the use of smoke in amphibious operations was well demonstrated at Dieppe. The Military Force saw that some form of light or self-propelled artillery had to be provided, once an assault has passed the beach area and is progressing inland.

These lessons are some of those learned by the British. Another was added by our own people who saw the action at Dieppe. It is that an attempt to land on a hostile shore, fronted by cliffs 100 feet high which are known to be defended, when the only avenues of approach inland are the mouths of a few rivers and a few gullies which are choked with barbed wire entanglements and gun emplacements, is very apt to result in failure.

The intelligence used by the force attacking Dieppe was based, for the most part, on aerial photos which were ten days old. During this ten-day period the Germans had brought in additional guns. The Canadians did not find out about the heavy guns, mortars, and machine-gun nests covering the beaches at Dieppe itself until they tried to land. They had to try to move through the Casino and the tobacco factory to learn that these were small forts in themselves. The point to remember is that air photos never can and never will tell every detail about a defensive area.

Whether the information brought back more than offset the loss of 4,338 men out of 6,068 is not a question easily
Field Artillery Missions

By Lt. Col. S. L. Nichols, FA

The Artillery School teaches that the field artillery battalion may be assigned one of four missions. They are:
1. Direct Support.
2. General Support.
3. Reinforcing.

Since "General Support-Reinforcing" is really a combination of missions and since other combinations are possible under certain circumstances, a statement that "Field artillery battalions are assigned direct-support, general-support, or reinforcing missions, or a combination of these" appears to be more accurate.

* * * * *

On 9 January 1945, D-day for the amphibious attack against Luzon, the Division Artillery, 43rd Infantry Division, consisted of the following battalions:
- 103rd Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzer).
- 152nd Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzer).
- 169th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzer).
- 192nd Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm howitzer).
- 181st Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm howitzer) (attached).

All organic battalions landed on D-day. The 181st landed on D+1. Initial missions, assigned prior to embarkation, were as follows:
- 103rd F.A. Bn: Direct support of 172nd Infantry.
- 152nd F.A. Bn: Direct support of the 103rd Infantry.
- 169th F.A. Bn: Direct support of the 169th Infantry.
- 192nd F.A. Bn: General support; reinforce the fires of the 169th Field Artillery Battalion; counterbattery and distant interdiction until relieved by corps artillery.

181st FA Bn: General support; counterbattery and distant interdiction until relieved by corps artillery. (No information available as to reinforcing mission, if any.)

The situation on D+2 was approximately as shown on the next page.

As the attacking troops moved inland, expansion of the beachhead, with the resultant long communication lines, made general support of the entire division zone more difficult. The 181st displaced forward to reinforce the fires of the 152nd Field Artillery Battalion on a full-time basis. By D+3 this battalion was reinforcing both the 152nd and the 169th battalions.

The strongest enemy resistance developed on the left flank. The 192nd, while reinforcing the 103rd, established liaison with the 147th Field Artillery Battalion, primarily to get information.

So far as the general support mission was concerned this situation had the effect of dividing the zone of action of the division between the two medium battalions—the 181st on the right and the 192nd on the left. (At a later date the division front was so wide and communications so difficult that the division artillery actually was organized in two groups.) The fires of both medium battalions could have been massed within their range limits, but communication lines were getting longer all the time, and in addition trail shifting on the 155-mm howitzer in a rice paddy can be difficult and time consuming.

On D+3 the 63rd Infantry (less one battalion) was attached to the 43rd Division. (The report of Sixth Army covering this operation states that "The 63rd RCT was attached to the 43rd Division." The researcher wonders what comprised the 63rd RCT. Actually it was two battalions of infantry with no supporting troops. The term "RCT" should be discontinued.) It was assigned the mission of driving north to secure the Damortis-Rosario road in its zone of action. The 192nd Field Artillery Battalion was placed in direct support.

The missions of the 192nd Field Artillery...
Battalion now covered the entire field of missions. "Direct support (63rd Infantry), general support, reinforcing (103rd FA Bn), or a combination of these." The battalion operated that way successfully until the supported unit took its objective and was relieved of the attachment.

It is true that the general-support missions were few and far between. Throughout this phase of the operation the battalion was never called upon to mass its fires with those of the other medium battalion (author’s memory). Reinforcement of the 103rd Field Artillery Battalion did not place an undue burden on the 192nd, nor did it interfere with the accomplishment of the direct-support mission. It should be noted that the battalion had displaced on D+4 to a position from which it could support the 63rd Infantry all the way to its final objective, and which also shortened the lines to the reinforced unit.

The division artillery commander could not foresee the number of general-support or reinforcing missions that would be required. His reasons for the unusual organization for combat were probably as follows (author’s deduction only):

1. Owing to the excellent defensive positions which the rugged terrain offered the enemy, and to the ferocity of that enemy’s defense, the 63rd Infantry (less one battalion, remember), must have artillery in direct support. To take one or two batteries from one of the light battalions would be to deprive other infantry of the needed support and would still not provide adequate fire power for the 63rd.

2. The 172nd Infantry was fighting over the same type of ground. Much of its action was against strong cave positions, the destruction of which might well require something heavier than 105-mm. Medium artillery should be available if required.

3. While the heaviest action was on the flanks, the rest of the division zone of action could not be ignored. The Japanese 2nd Armored Division had not been destroyed at that time, and was quite capable of an attack at any one of several points on the division front.

A question might be asked as to which mission had priority. No instructions regarding the priority of missions were ever given, nor were such instructions needed. There was never any question in the battalion commander's mind but that the direct-support mission took precedence over all others, subject to orders of the higher headquarters.

The division artillery commander was faced with the problem of providing direct support for an additional regiment for which he did not possess the means. Because, in his judgment, one light battalion (103rd) needed medium artillery reinforcement, he declined to deprive it of that reinforcement. The medium battalion was placed where it could accomplish all three missions, and it did accomplish them for as long as was necessary.

It is useless to speculate as to what action the division artillery commander would have taken had he been bound by a four-mission doctrine as taught at The Artillery School. He might have arrived at a different solution, or he might have risen above dogma and made the same decision. Certainly the decision which he actually made would not have presented itself immediately. Perhaps another solution would have worked equally as well. No other solution would have accomplished the same result with as little disruption of command and communications.

If it is argued that this was an unusual situation, reference is made to the trite saying that in war the normal is the unexpected.
Let's Simplify FDC Communication
By Major C. H. Wohlfeil, FA

Almost everyone who ever served in a direct-support artillery battalion, peace or war, between the grade of yard-bird and lieutenant colonel—and a sizable portion of the artillery population outside of that category—has had a brain storm about FDC communication. Most of the ideas were hatched into a working model or system, and employed in the unit with varying degrees of success. But owing to the paper shortage, lack of ambition, the re-civilization program, or any of a number of reasons, very few of these ideas ever found their way into print for distribution to other interested artillerymen.

In the interest of humanity (which includes all yard-birds and some lieutenant colonels), and to incite comment and contributions from others who have been awaiting an opportunity to express their ideas on the subject, the following treatise is submitted for criticism, adoption, or castigation. The field is wide open!

Any such project as this, it must be remembered, naturally must be adaptable to more than one situation, application, or employment if it is to be worthy of consideration at all. Otherwise it becomes nothing more than a special-purpose gadget and has no appeal except for a special minority. With little or no variation in design, this homemade attachment can be used by an FDC computer, a Div Arty S-3, a Corps Arty S-2, an infantry company commander, or any of a number of different people. But for the sake of brevity and simplicity, let's confine the example to the computer in the fire-direction center of a direct-support artillery battalion.

First, let's take a look at a diagram of the wire network of a direct-support battalion, with emphasis on the FDC communication.

Note the congestion of personnel and equipment in the FDC—each computer has two phones, and in addition a radio remote-control operator must be in constant attendance. When the activity along the front picks up, all of this tends to degenerate into something akin to Grand Central Station during the Christmas holidays, with sound effects.

Simply discharging the pre-Pearl Harbor fathers from the group or disconnecting the simplex phones isn't going to help the situation a great deal, because the efficiency and flexibility of the system will suffer accordingly. The answer to the problem must necessarily preclude any deterioration of the desired reliability and flexibility of the system and, at the same time, reduce the equipment and operating personnel to reasonable limits. Moreover, whatever can be done to eliminate excessive traffic within the FDC and the necessity for swapping equipment between operators will also improve the quiet, efficient conduct of fire.

Here is one solution. With the exception of the panel and the metal clip, which can be made from scrap material, all the equipment is available on T/O & E.

There are several features to this arrangement, in addition to reducing equipment and operating personnel, which are worth while to point out:

A. It permits selection of either two-party or party-line operation.
B. It permits full use of the operator's hand in performing computations, making entries on maps, or in journals.
C. It permits a considerable reduction of the noise level in the FDC, but allows one man to monitor all stations, during slack periods, without confusion as to which of a large number of phones is being rung.
D. By furnishing a circuit through an FDC switchboard, the computer, the forward observer, and the executive at the guns can all be tied in on a party...
also has one plug connected to his phone and is thereby able to contact any of his subscribers or to form a party line with as many as he chooses. The switchboard SB 18/GT is a T/O & E item for all artillery units—batteries and battalions—except the Corps Artillery Headquarters Battery. At that level the plugs U4/GT may be obtained as separate items from the Signal Battalion.

The question may arise — why not just use the switchboard SB 18/GT? That is a good question, but small though SB 18/GT is, it is still too large and somewhat unwieldy for efficient operation. Furthermore, there are many times when the plugs from one or two boards will have to be divided among three or more phones to meet the requirements. This is not unusual even with the present distribution of switchboards. Finally, the arrangement recommended here is much less bulky and fits snugly to the phone, where it is readily accessible and permits rapid installation of the circuits.

No doubt some alterations in design could be made to improve the form factor, as, for instance, sloping the top of the panel to allow the cover of the phone to be closed when not in use. Or the board might be fastened directly to the case of the phone, thus eliminating the broad spring clip. In any case, if the opportunity presents itself and you feel so inclined, give it a whirl and see how many phones you can save in the process.

General Burnside vs The Press
By Capt. J. S. Douglas, GSC

Freedom of the press, which was written into our Constitution shortly after the Revolution, has been a mainstay of our democracy for over one hundred and fifty years. In that time there have been many treatises written defending this action and that action, all of which indicates that in spite of the law many problems have arisen out of interpretation of "freedom of the press." What is it? How far can one go in print? Can license be revoked by
any person for serious enough cause? All these and many more moot questions stand waiting for answer.

During the Civil War, our government exercised almost no restraint over the press. This failure to do so, although a noble effort to uphold our Constitution to the letter, may have caused untold injury in both prestige and loss of life, chiefly by permitting promiscuous publication of military information.

There was, however, another and possibly more dangerous form of newspaper activity which the government also did little to restrain. Many persons in the North were justifiably upset to think of their husbands and sons fighting a war, while certain newspaper editors were unmolested in espousing the cause of the Southern Confederacy. Popular resentment, rather than government interference, resulted in attacks on these editors by mobs which were often chiefly composed of soldiers. There are at least fifty cases on record in which Northern newspapers were subjected to these attacks or suppressions by military personnel.

To mention only a few of these incidents, this list will show the nature of most frequent types:

In July, 1862, General McNeil forbade the circulation of the Quincy Herald throughout the State of Missouri. In January, 1863, General Schenck, in command of the Middle Department, ordered the arrest of the editor of the Philadelphia Evening Journal, and caused the paper to be suspended because of "anti-war sentiments." The editor was later released and permitted to resume publication. Near the same time, Lt. Col. Newbold, a recruiting officer, found that the Jonesboro (Ill.) Gazette was so hampering his operations that he closed the paper's office by military order, and supported his order with troops. In February, 1863, Generals Hamilton and Hurlbut issued orders prohibiting the circulation of the Chicago Times in their military areas. General Grant, then their superior, "suggested" that those orders be withdrawn because such action would only serve to increase notoriety and sales of the paper. Last in the list, but perhaps most important, in June of 1863 General Burnside suppressed by military order the Chicago Times. This incident stirred up the entire country.

Before discussing Burnside's actions, it must be stated that it was not only the military who disapproved of the Times. In June, 1862, Governor Morton of Indiana wrote an appeal to Secretary of War Stanton, pleading for immediate action by the government to suppress several newspapers, among them the Times. He wrote, "They are doing incalculable injury to the Union cause . . . by vituperative attacks, by apologies for the crimes committed by the leaders of the rebellion . . . and I deem it of vital importance to the Government that immediate steps be taken to break up these unlawful combinations."

In July of the same year, Governor Yates of Illinois wrote to Stanton, "There is an urgent and almost unanimous demand . . . that the Chicago Times should be immediately suppressed for giving aid and comfort to the enemy." These two letters indicate the sentiments of the States' highest civil authorities.

There was certain apparent justification for these letters, and a few inside glances are necessary to understand the reason. A short paragraph or two is hardly sufficient, but it is possible therein to point toward the full story.

When the President issued his Emancipation Proclamation, the Times at once raised the cry, "Africanization of Illinois." Although it had heretofore referred its derogatory remarks to the offices of the President and his Cabinet, it henceforth made personal accusations against the individuals. For example, of Secretary Stanton it said: "The recent fright at Washington illustrates the quality of the genius who presides over the War Department. Dabbling in matters entirely beyond his comprehension . . . he becomes so much more frightened than his generals as to suggest a question of his lunacy. . . . The public apprehension is now, however, subsiding to discover that it had been awakened by the ridiculous fears of a ridiculous quack."

Shortly after this editorial appeared, the Chicago Board of Trade and the Y.M.C.A. passed resolutions forbidding the paper in their libraries, and ordering back copies burned publicly.

But the Times continued to get more severe and sarcastic. In April, 1863, it made reference to "His Excellency President Davis." In May it published an editorial calling all those in the war effort murderers: "So long as the war is continued as a political war . . . every life lost is an abominable sacrifice and a murder. The man who does not wash his hands of all participation in such a war shares the guilt of those by whom it is prosecuted."

And so it went, with the Times taking issue on every point of the administration's policy. So far, it had left General Burnside, senior military officer of the Department, out of its editorial gun sights. In May, however, when Burnside caused the arrest of a politician named Vallandigham, the lid was off. The Times became an ardent screaming fan for its hero, Vallandigham, and a most caustic critic of the "villain" Burnside.

Major General Ambrose E. Burnside took command of the Department of the Ohio on March 25, 1863. He made numerous speeches declaring his intention to do his utmost for the cause of the Union. His threats against anyone not of similar sentiments were lightly veiled.

On April 13, 1863, Burnside issued General Order No. 38, in which he listed and defined all acts which he construed as cause for arrest and trial as spying or being a traitor. The list was long and comprehensive, and included a paragraph which made it treason to declare sympathies for the enemy, either in print or orally. There was much ado over the order, and several persons enjoined the General to revoke it. It was not revoked, however, and was to lead to two serious incidents.

In the latter part of April, the minority leader in the House of Representatives, Clement L. Vallandigham, returned to Ohio to make speeches against the administration policies. His talks were by and large in the nature of campaign propaganda, but on May 1, 1863, in a speech at Mt. Vernon (O.), he referred to the President as a tyrant, adding that "resistance to tyrants is obedience to God." Burnside felt that this speech was more than political talk, and he had Vallandigham jailed under his General Order, pending trial by a military commission.

There was rioting in Vallandigham's
home town of Dayton, and the press of both parties carried the news with bold headlines. The politician, from jail, told the world that he had been jailed without due process of law, and demanded release. His lawyers, however, found that District Judge Leavitt believed Burnside had the power of arrest as an agent of the President. The requested writ of Habeas Corpus not being granted, Vallandigham stood trial and was found guilty. His sentence of imprisonment was commuted by the President to sending the prisoner across the lines into Confederate hands. Vallandigham later crossed back into Canada, but until the war's end never returned to his home. So great was the feeling in Ohio that he came within a very few votes of being elected Governor while he was serving sentence.

The Chicago Times carried long reviews of the case and trial, pleading that a grave injustice had been done. In the days which followed, it printed editorials severely criticizing both the Administration and General Burnside. This, for example, is the first sentence of a full-column editorial: "We do not credit that the Administration are gone stark mad, and therefore we do not believe that they are bent on provoking civil disturbances in the North, but they must be made to know, if they do not know, that the high-handed measures of provoking civil disturbances in the North, and they are bent on provoking civil disturbances in the North, and they must be made to know, if they do not know, that the high-handed measures which Gen. Burnside has inaugurated in his military department, respecting freedom of speech and press, cannot be pursued as a policy without the greatest danger of provoking civil disturbances."

Again, in an item reprinted from the New York Herald, the Times said: "The arrest of Vallandigham was evidently illegal. Gen. Burnside is now rashly dashing himself against the law, as he did against the rebel fortifications at Fredericksburg." (Burnside lost over 10,000 men in one day, 13 December, 1862.)

It was evident that Burnside could not tolerate this comment for long, and on June 1, 1863, he issued his General Order No. 84, which suppressed the Times.

Between June 1 and June 4, a tremendous flurry of letters, orders, and telegrams, along with mob scenes, broke the semi-quiet status of the Department of the Ohio, with a large majority of the activity centering in Chicago.

Paragraph III of the order read as follows: "On account of repeated expression of disloyal and incendiary sentiments, the publication of the newspaper known as the Chicago Times is hereby suppressed."

Burnside wasted no time in setting up means of enforcing this order. He sent a telegram to the Times' editor, Wilbur Storey, advising him of the order and telling him to comply. At the same time he sent a telegraphic order to Brigadier General Ammen at Camp Douglas in Chicago, charging him with enforcement. Ammen in turn ordered a Captain James Putnam to carry out the order, using force if necessary.

Captain Putnam went to the offices of the Times on the evening of the 2d and officially warned the night editor against publishing a paper the next morning, under threat of military seizure of the entire establishment.

However, Storey, having been forewarned by Burnside's telegram, was ready with his lawyers. He had no intention of obeying the order, and about midnight of the 2d, after Putnam's visit, Storey roused United States Judge Thomas Drummond from his bed to secure a restraining order against the military forces.

Judge Drummond issued the writ, his reason being stated therein that the military order was issued at too late an hour for a public hearing. The writ was duly served on Captain Putnam about 1:30 a.m. on the 3d. This time it was Putnam's turn to disobey an order. He left town to return to Camp Douglas, intent upon bringing soldiers back to seize the newspaper.

Storey, who suspected something of the sort, sent a rider to follow Putnam and report back as soon as he saw any troops leaving the camp. Meanwhile the editorial staff set about to make ready the morning paper. They expected Putnam to return at once, and they had to race against time. Within the hour the rider returned with a warning.

About 3:30 a.m., a small group of soldiers appeared at the Times building and took possession without any necessary use of force. However, they had not arrived in time to prevent about eight thousand copies of the newspaper from reaching the streets. With the remainder of the issue confiscated, the soldiers left the press rooms, but warned Storey once again not to make any further attempts to issue his paper. Obviously the editors had partially won their race, and their success added greatly to the incendiary tendency of a Chicago mob that was soon to gather.

At 8:30 on the morning of the 3rd, the Circuit Court opened hearings on Storey's application for an injunction. Judge Drummond, presiding, made a statement showing his preconceived attitude in the case. After telling the court that he would give every possible aid to the Government, he stated he would not support a government of mere physical force. It appeared as if he would support Storey, but at the request of Storey's lawyers the case was postponed until General Ammen could be called. No military personnel had appeared in court when it opened.

By 9:30, a mob had begun to gather in the streets outside the Times building. Handbills were passed out at Storey's instigation, calling for a mass meeting that evening in the Courthouse square. The day grew on, and the group grew with it, until by nightfall it looked as if there might be serious trouble.

During the afternoon an interesting rumor spread. Word was passed around that a "Colonel" Jennison, famed desperado lieutenant of John Brown's organization, was prepared with armed men to protect the offices of an anti-Times newspaper, the Tribune. Men had been smuggled into all vantage points around the building, the rumor said, ready at a signal from Jennison to "strew the streets with Copperhead corpses." Although nothing materialized from this, the mob was electrified and did not stray even close to the Tribune. A mere rumor probably saved that newspaper from total destruction.

By 8:00 p.m. an estimated twenty thousand persons had gathered in two factions at the square. The anti-administration group far outnumbered the pro-administration group, but the former was held partly in check by the knowledge that the entire militia had been placed under arms to meet any trouble. Also, Camp Douglas was not far away, and troops could be called out at any time.

Leaders and friends of both groups...
made speeches, most of them temperate and counseling moderation. One particularly fiery speech by a retired Army general nearly caused a riot, but another speaker quieted the crowd.

While this was taking place, leaders of both parties were meeting inside the courthouse in an attempt to settle the impending danger. A resolution was drafted to President Lincoln, requesting either suppression or rescission of the General Order. The wording was calm and orderly, belying the general apprehension of the hour. It reduced the entire matter to greatest simplicity, stating frankly what conditions were and what should be done. Whether a more passionate note would have made a different impression on the President is a matter for conjecture, but it is believed that the sobriety of this one had much to do with its acceptance. At any rate, the resolution was promptly telegraphed to the White House, signed by the Mayor of Chicago.

At the same time a separate petition was drawn up for the benefit of the crowd outside. In general, it was a long statement to the effect that civil liberties had been infringed upon by Burnside's action, and that the citizens of Chicago would not abide by violations of their Constitutional rights. After this petition had been signed by members of both sides, the mob began slowly to disperse and await the President's decision. The moderation which had been preached and practiced during those few hours was overwhelming. To control a crowd of twenty thousand persons is a major task in any field, even in an organized army, yet research yields nothing which refutes the contention that there was no major disorder. Everybody was willing to relax and wait. It was now the 4th of June.

The telegraphed petition and resolution, sent at 2:30 a.m., reached the White House early in the morning, and Lincoln took immediate action. He sent a short note to Secretary Stanton, and the latter sent a telegraphic order to General Burnside stating simply, "In conformity with the views of the President, you will revoke the order suspending the publication of the Chicago Times."

At Burnside's headquarters no time was lost in obeying. General Order No. 91 was immediately issued, and copies transmitted by mail to Chicago. Paragraph I of this order revoked General Order No. 84.

Burnside telegraphed a personal note to Storey to give him the gist of his new order, but he did not apologize in any respect for his suppression. He was in Lexington, Kentucky, at the time, and had conducted the entire proceedings via telegraph with his headquarters. That fact makes even more astounding the speed with which the day's work had been done. Within approximately sixteen hours after the resolution had been telegraphed, the order causing all the trouble had been revoked. It came too late for the Times to publish on the 4th, but the paper resumed full operation on the next morning.

When all the excitement of the immediate issue had subsided, it seemed as if the Democrats had won at least a moral victory. Subscriptions to the Times leapt forward, and the party gained more propaganda for its cause. Storey continued to play up his own view of the incident, but it appears that after two or three weeks the entire country was ready to forget. Although in the long run little was gained by either side, it cannot be forgotten that the action stirred up a veritable hornets' nest of comment in every corner of the Union.

The central figures of this story, Burnside and Storey, were both strong in will, each convinced he was right. There was, however, far more than a clash of personalities involved. Two civilian governors, both staunch supporters of the Administration, had pleaded for the suppression of the Times a year before Burnside took his ill-fated action. When he did move, he charged the newspaper with treason, probably under the Treason Act of 1862. This act was very broad in scope, but by its very breadth it lacked teeth.

The Times never specifically advocated disobedience to laws, resistance to conscription laws, or desertion from the armed services, but its editorial attitude was such that it accused as murderers those who supported the war. The Times at no time intentionally printed any military information of benefit to the enemy. On the other hand, it did advocate immediate cessation of hostilities and the negotiation of a peaceful settlement. None of this is treason.

In a few of its editorials the Times showed a positive sympathy for the Southern Confederacy. That, in a fratricidal war such as the Civil War, can be far more damaging to morale than out and out treasonable activity. There is nothing more bitter than a war between brothers, and for a newspaper which is allegedly on one side to support the other side is at best hypocritical. Dependent largely upon an individual's interpretation of "treason," such activity as was carried on by this paper might well have been called treason. The recent cases of Axis Sally and Tokyo Rose parallel this story in many respects.

It is presumably upon some such reasoning that General Burnside suppressed the Times, for no correspondence is available in which he expresses any reason for his action. He may have been unwise in not permitting prosecution in civil court, but in time of war there are actions which must be taken at once before further damage can be done. Already "Copperhead" influence, partially through papers such as the Times, had caused the desertion of nearly 13,000 men recruited from the State of Illinois. In January, 1863, for example, the 109th Regiment, largely recruited from Illinois, was being deserted so rapidly that it appeared to be mutiny. It had to be totally disarmed, arrested, and jailed under heavy guard. Such conditions cannot prevail in an army which is fighting a war. Taking civil action in this case might have meant months of waiting. Burnside thought that something had to be done at once if the Union Army was to be saved, and he acted accordingly.

General Burnside was a soldier, and the pattern of his life shows he was sincere in all his decisions, even if a little stubborn. He was, in his own mind, certain of his grounds. His responsibilities in time of war were tremendous, and for him to take an action such as this must have required courage. He might easily have guessed at the repercussions. The fact that he was not relieved of his command is an indication that others in the Administration, including the President, believed he had at least partial justification for creating such a disturbing scene in the history of journalism.
EIGHT months and nearly 1500 miles out of their starting point at Fort Leavenworth, Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan and the First Missouri Mounted Volunteers were approaching Chihuahua, the principal city of northern Mexico. It was the end of February, 1847, and the capture of Chihuahua City was one of the main objectives of Doniphan's force of farmers and frontiersmen turned soldier, enlisted to fight one year of the war with Mexico.

If there were some skeptics back East who spoke contemptuously of "Mr. Polk's War," and derided Manifest Destiny as a figment of a fevered expansionist imagination, there were none among Doniphan's First Missouri. Only a boundless enthusiasm for the course on which they were embarked and an easy and complete confidence in themselves and their leader could have carried them through the terrible trials of the long trail from Leavenworth.

It all began May 13, 1846. On that day President James K. Polk not only signed a proclamation of war, but directed the governor of Missouri to supply 1000 mounted volunteers, to report to Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny at Fort Leavenworth. Kearny already had his own regiment, the First Dragoons, a crack outfit experienced in Indian fighting and the rough life of the frontier. It was Kearny's job to whip the volunteers from Missouri into shape in short order, and see that they elected their own officers.

The call to arms and adventure found a ready response among young Missourians who found little interest in planting corn or carrying on the prosaic operations of trade while an Empire was being made. Colonel Kearny soon had his quota of enthusiastic young individualists. Soon an election of officers came up, and they wisely chose Alexander W. Doniphan of Liberty, Missouri, to be colonel and leader of the First Missouri Volunteers.

Doniphan was a gangling, slow-talking man, kindly and indulgent, but hard as nails when the circumstances demanded it. He understood his Missourians perfectly, and they respected him in their equalitarian way. He had been a lawyer in Missouri, and an officer of the state militia. At Polk's call to arms, he had volunteered as a private; but now, by election, he was Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan, leader of the "Doniphesias."

The First Missouri Volunteers formed a part of Kearny's Army of the West that left Fort Leavenworth for Santa Fe in June, 1846. Besides Kearny's First Dragoons and Doniphan's Missourians, the Army of the West included a battalion of infantry, two companies of field artillery, a spare cavalry troop, staff troops, and engineers. The two artillery companies, Weightman's and Fischer's, comprised altogether about a dozen light field pieces and two hundred and fifty men. Fischer's company remained in Santa Fe when the Doniphesias went on into Mexico.

In 1846, the Santa Fe trail had a long history of violence, Indian raids, and death from starvation and thirst. The bitter jornadas across alkaline deserts under burning suns took their toll from Kearny's Army of the West. Some men collapsed and were sent back to Leavenworth. Others went mad. Some found their graves along the Santa Fe trail. The toll among the horses was even heavier.

Nevertheless, Kearny and Doniphan marched into Santa Fe and raised the flag of the United Sates on August 18, 1846. Rumors that Mexican forces were gathering to oppose the expedition at different points on the march had turned out to be just rumors. As yet, Polk's grand strategic design to occupy New Mexico and the northern states of Mexico had not been resisted by the firing of a single shot.

After organizing New Mexico as a territory of the United States with Doniphan's help, Kearny and the First Dragoons continued on the dry and torrid route to San Diego. To Doniphan was entrusted the task of pacifying the Indian tribes of New Mexico and making treaties with them by which they would recognize the sovereignty of the United States. On their way from Fort Leavenworth were the Second Missouri Volunteers under the command of Sterling Price. When they should arrive in Santa Fe to relieve the First Missouri, there would be other tasks for the Doniphesias.

On September 26, the day after Kearny set out for California, leaving Doniphan in Santa Fe, a sizeable American force under General Wool left San Antonio, Texas, under instructions to occupy Chihuahua, Mexico. The fact that difficulties of terrain and supply would eventually force the termination of the project was an eventuality that could not be foreseen. Kearny ordered Doniphan, on the arrival of Price, to march southward and rendezvous with Wool. President Polk and his advisors were aware that the occupation of Chihuahua would guarantee a firm hold upon New Mexico, and that New Mexico meant the conquest not only of the Southwest but of California as well.

Price and the Second Missouri Volunteers arrived in Santa Fe in due time, and Doniphan prepared to set out on his march to Chihuahua. The artillery. Price insisted, should be left with him in Santa Fe for a time, until his situation there should become more secure. It could be dispatched later to catch up with Doniphan. Doniphan reluctantly agreed.

So, in December, the gangling Missouri lawyer and 856 men set out for Chihuahua. A complete uniform was a rarity; the formalities and much of the discipline of a trained army were completely lacking. Yet, as a British officer who happened to see them at this time observed, "they were as full of fight as a gamecock." Cursing, unwashed, and unshaven, they were a wild-looking lot. But they made history.

Doniphan's route to Chihuahua would take him through El Paso del Norte, near the present El Paso, Texas. Here, if anywhere on the trail to Chihuahua, the Mexicans would offer resistance to the Missourians. As the
Americans approached, more and more rumors began to drift in that a Mexican army would fight here. The American camp was watched by might, and living hoofprints in the sand were visible. One or two spies were captured. Yet even this threat was not enough to make the Doniphesias observe a military order in their march. They straggled for miles.

On Christmas Day, 1846, the First Missouri encamped early, in observance of the holiday. They did eighteen miles that day before Doniphan called a halt at El Brabito, thirty miles short of El Paso. Doniphan and some of his officers began a card game, the prize a particularly attractive horse that had been brought in. Their game was interrupted by the appearance of a splendidly uniformed Mexican officer who demanded Doniphan's surrender.

Even while the Missouri colonel was declining in vigorous language, a force of a thousand or more Mexicans appeared in line of battle. More than half of Doniphan's force were still scattered over the country, or were gathering wood and watering horses. The Missourians assembled only four hundred as the Mexicans opened fire with a two-pound cannon. When they charged, Doniphan's men gave them two volleys at short range, and they broke and fled. A second charge by Mexican lancers against the wagons failed, and the battle was over. The Americans had seven wounded; the Mexican losses were heavier.

Doniphan's Missourians were now the masters of El Paso del Norte, a town of 10,000 inhabitants. Jubilant over their first success under fire, they relaxed with good food and drink. The native Mexicans were eager to please their conquerors, and the Missourians were eager to improve their rudimentary Spanish. Yet it was here that distressing news came. Doniphan learned that Wool's expedition from San Antonio against Chihuahua had run into difficulties and had been abandoned.

Less than nine hundred men, a thousand miles from home, and deep in enemy territory! The First Missouri was completely on its own. There was uncertainty in the ranks, and some of the officers advised turning back. Then Doniphan decided the issue. The First Missouri Volunteers would go ahead and take Chihuahua without General Wool. And Doniphan sent urgently for his artillery that had been left back in Santa Fe with Price.

But Price would part with only six small pieces, under the command of Major Meriwether Lewis Clark and Captain Weightman. The battery of Clark and Weightman joined Doniphan in El Paso del Norte on February 1st, and within a week the First Missouri was off on its fateful mission.

So it was that Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan and the First Missouri Mounted Volunteers, supported by a single battery of artillery, were approaching Chihuahua City at the end of February, 1847. This time there would be no easy victory, the Americans were aware. Chihuahua was a city of considerable importance to the Mexicans, and its defenses were under the direction of General Conde, an able military engineer. Under Conde's supervision, the Mexicans had constructed a strong fortification about fifteen miles north of Chihuahua City, at a point on the approach where the trail narrows as it passes between two imposing hills and crosses a small stream called the Sacramento. Conde had employed all of his skill in the construction of Chihuahua's defense, and he was certain that the Americans would never pass it.

Conde's confidence had so pervaded the Mexican city that, at a safe distance, a large grandstand had been built for spectators who wished to observe the battle and the defeat of the Americans. A thousand ropes, of the right strength and length, were on hand with which to truss up the Americans and march them into Chihuahua as prisoners. All that was necessary was for the Americans to walk into the trap.

Doniphan and the Missourians began the attack February 28, almost eight months to the day after leaving Fort Leavenworth. Doniphan arranged his forces frontier style, his wagon train moving in four parallel columns, with the cavalry, infantry, and artillery in between columns. As the Americans approached the front of the fortifications, they turned to the flank. The Mexicans opened fire as the wagons had difficulty crossing a ravine.

Doniphan ordered the troops to the front of the wagons as Mexican lancers gathered for a charge. Their backs against the hills, there was no retreat for the Missourians. Then Doniphan's artillery opened up! Before the well-aimed fire, the Mexican lancers broke up in disorder. Conde's artillery then started banging away itself, causing little damage save to a few horses and some of the wagons. Clark and Weightman were scoring hits in the Mexican fortifications.

After something more than an hour of firing, Doniphan ordered three companies of cavalry and two artillery pieces to charge the Mexican position. At a hundred yards, Captain Weightman's battery set up and began firing, raking the Mexican position with deadly effectiveness. Two of the cavalry companies had inexplicably halted halfway between the American and Mexican lines. Weightman's battery only worked the harder. Their shells crashed into General Conde's redoubts, crumbling the fortifications, destroying masses of infantry, and routing the lancers.

The halted cavalry and the rest of the Missourians took up the charge. The Mexicans resisted bravely for a time, but their confidence had been shattered by the destruction wrought by Doniphan's artillery. After a bloody hand-to-hand struggle, the defenders of Chihuahua fled in disorder. The First Missouri collected more military supplies and equipment than they had ever had of their own; they got the Mexican paymaster's box, complete with cash; ornate carriages and Conde's field desk were a part of the booty.

Several months later, back in Washington, President Polk called Doniphan's capture of Chihuahua "One of the most decisive and brilliant achievements of the war." By this time, the First Missouri was well on its way on the long trail home through Reynosa on the Rio Grande, New Orleans, and up the Mississippi to St. Louis.
At the Gates of the Manchus
By Major John B. B. Trussell, Jr., CAC

One of the stranger and least publicized campaigns of the United States Army is its participation in the relief of the Pekin legations in the summer of 1900. Side by side in the relief column marched the troops of Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Russia, Germany, and the United States. Apart from any other aspect, there is drama in this association if only because these forces, twice in the next two generations, were to be facing each other in far greater and more deadly conflicts.

It is understandable that this expedition would be overshadowed in American military history by the more spectacular events of the war with Spain and the conquest of the Philippines. Usually the American share in the suppression of the "Boxer Rebellion" is written off in a sentence as a minor manifestation of the United States' suddenly discovered taste for imperialism. And yet, as a small-scale version of the problem of military alliances this campaign is not without significance. As it provides examples of gallantry and devotion to duty on the part of the artillerymen, it is a justifiable source of pride to artillerymen of today.

China was then, as now, in a state of considerable confusion. During the late 1890's there had developed a movement for the Westernization of the country, a reform which would bring modern educational, sanitation, administrative, and technological methods to China and which, if carried through, might have had an effect comparable to that of the Westernization of Japan some thirty years before. One of the chief proponents of this reform was the young Emperor, but it would appear that he was more enthusiastic socially than shrewd politically, for the movement was bound to meet with opposition, and from any other aspect, there is drama in this association if only because these forces, twice in the next two generations, were to be facing each other in far greater and more deadly conflicts.

The situation was rapidly becoming desperate. All foreigners in Pekin took refuge in the British Legation, and a mixed force of sailors and marines from foreign ships in Chinese ports was hastily gathered—they numbered eighteen officers and 369 enlisted men—and rushed to the capital to defend the Legation compound in the siege which was obviously imminent. They had barely arrived when the Boxers tore up the rails and burned the stations of the railway connecting Pekin with Tientsin.

A larger body, 2000 troops under Admiral Seymour of the Royal Navy, started from Tientsin for Pekin on 10 June, but after marching only a few miles was attacked so heavily that it could proceed no farther. Reluctantly deciding to retreat, the British admiral found the return route cut off; and only by bitter fighting was he able to make his way back to Tientsin. At that, he lost 62 killed and 218 wounded.

The Chinese followed up immediately with an attack on Tientsin's foreign settlement, using modern rifles and artillery. The allied forces in Tientsin fought off this assault, and the threat to their communications with the mouth of the Pei-ho River. The commanders on the ground, however, were convinced that large reinforcements were needed if the legations in Pekin were to be relieved. It was agreed that "the situation had gone beyond the power of mere landing parties from the fleets." A detachment of United States Marines was already on the scene, but American authorities planned to increase the force to a strength of 15,000. As a beginning, the Commanding General in Manila was directed to send a regiment to Tientsin. He designated the 9th Infantry which, although delayed in embarking by a violent typhoon in Manila Bay, reached Tientsin on 11 July, well in advance of the forces which had been dispatched from Stateside stations.

Disembarking, the American troops were immediately assigned a sector in the attack on the native city, to commence at 5 AM, 13 July. The entire assault was under the command of the British general, A. R. F. Dorward. Of parenthetical interest is the item that the artillery support included guns used by the British in defending Ladysmith during its siege in the Boer War the year before. Mounted on boiler-plate wheels, these pieces were anything but easily mobile, but their heavy projectiles did yeoman service in blasting through the city's stone wall.

The ground over which the 9th Infantry attacked was extremely difficult. Wading through rice paddies, the men moved slowly and, under the blistering
rifle fire of the Boxers, their casualties were heavy, amounting to thirty per cent of their engaged strength. One of the first to be killed was the regimental commander, Colonel Emerson H. Liscom, who was hit while talking to a wounded man. "The soldiers went almost wild when they knew their wounded man. "The soldiers went Liscom, who was hit while talking to a commander, Colonel Emerson H. 3000. The 9th Infantry's part in the battle was handsomely acknowledged by General Dorward in his formal report, part of which reads: "They were fighting about twelve hours, almost alone, and never giving back a foot of ground, until directed to retire under cover of night and the fire of the naval guns."

There was a more tangible reward, too, for when the city was taken, the Americans captured the Mint, with enough silver to pay all the costs of the expedition.

By 19 July the United States contingent was strengthened by the arrival of Battery F ("Reilly's Battery"), 5th Artillery, with six guns; the 14th Infantry; and a battalion of Marines. Within the next few days Major General Adna R. Chaffee, who had been ordered to the command of the force from occupation duty in Cuba, landed with the 6th Cavalry and more Marines. The 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry was at sea, en route from the United States.

No word had been received from Pekin since 14 June, and it had been generally accepted that the Chinese must long since have overrun the legations and butchered the foreigners who had taken refuge there. There was new hope, however, when a message was smuggled through the Boxer lines by a Chinese Christian. All question of its authenticity was removed by the fact that it was written in United States State Department code. Although it showed that the defenders were still holding out, it also stated that they could continue to do so for only a few more days unless help arrived. Instead of awaiting further reinforcements, therefore, it was decided to start at once, leaving a mixed force to guard Tientsin. The column which took

up the march on 5 August was made up of approximately 10,000 Japanese, with 24 guns; 4000 Russians, with 16 guns; 3000 British, with 12 guns; 2000 Americans, with 6 guns; 800 French, with 12 guns; and 300 Germans and Italians. It was under the over-all command of General Sir Alfred Gaselee.

Pekin was approximately seventy miles away, but blocking the approach were thousands of fanatical and surprisingly well trained and well equipped Chinese. Although the first day's march was hampered by the fact that the Boxers had cut the banks of the river, thus flooding the land on each side, the Japanese built pontoon bridges and the column advanced without serious opposition. On the following day, however, more troublesome resistance was met at the town of Yangtsun, where four hours of hard fighting were required to clear the way. A co-ordinated attack was made, with the British in the center, the Americans on the right, and the Russians on the left. The American right flank was covered by a squadron of British cavalry (the American force was not to have its own cavalry until 10 August, as the 6th Cavalry's mounts were late in arriving).

The Chinese defense of Yangtsun included cavalry, infantry, and artillery, the latter armed with Krupp guns. Boxer riflemen sniped at Reilly's Battery from the concealment of a cornfield, and their cavalry tried to cut the guns off from the rest of the force. But shrapnel from the guns and rifle fire from the Marines supporting them soon silenced the enemy. Meanwhile, the main attack was being made by the 14th Infantry. Hardly had the Americans and some of the British reached the village, however, when the Russian artillery, ignorant that the position had been taken, opened fire on them. Accidents like this are probably inevitable in such a force until it has had time to develop smooth co-ordination. Certainly such an eventuality would not be foreseen by troops with no previous experience in this type of combined operation. Nevertheless, considerable and understandable bitterness was caused by this incident. General Chaffee estimated that at least half of the 14th's losses (seven killed and fifty-seven wounded) were caused by the Russian fire.

The physical conditions under which the men fought throughout the campaign were very difficult. The temperature on this day was 102 in the shade, and many men were overcome by the hot, muggy atmosphere; two men died of sunstroke, and all suffered from thirst. Although the historians make no mention of the stench, anyone who has ever smelled an Oriental rice paddy will realize that this must have added considerably to the general discomfort.

There was little opposition from the Boxers after Yang-tsun until the force reached a point some seven miles from Pekin. Here Lieutenant General Linivitch, the Russian commander, demanded that the column halt for one day so that the troops might rest, but in view of the danger to the legations the other commanders objected. Since the Russian remained adamant, a compromise was finally reached: the column would halt, but faster progress would be insured for the following day by using the day of rest to make a reconnaissance up to Pekin. The entire force was to be readied for a jump-off early on August 14.

Pekin was a walled city divided into four parts. The southern part (the Chinese City) had attached to it, but divided from it by an interior wall, the Tartar (or Manchu) City. Inside the Tartar City was the Imperial City, also walled; and inside that, within more walls, was the Forbidden City. The circumference of the outer walls was twenty-five miles, with the walls varying in thickness and height; the least of these (that of the Chinese City) was thirty feet high and twenty feet thick, made of enormous, solid bricks. Gateways pierced the walls at intervals, but they were closed by immensely thick wooden doors, strengthened and studded with iron belts and bars. Above each gateway rose a tall, battlemented brick tower of several stories.

During the night of 13-14 August, either through an excess of zeal or from pique at the Allies' refusal to accept General Linivitch's proposal, the Russians unilaterally moved on the city, attacking the Tung-pien gate, at the point where the walls of the Tartar City join on the east. According to plan, the other Allies were waiting for the time agreed on for the advance. But General
Chaffee learned of the Russians' movements and threw forward a cavalry reconnaissance; as soon as it established contact with the Boxers, he ordered one battalion of the 14th Infantry to its support.

Although General Linivitch's men had forced their way through the Tung-pien gate during the night, the Chinese descended upon them in an attack from all directions, cutting them off from the forces on the outside.

The 14th Infantry's two leading companies scaled the wall of the Chinese City before noon, the first Allied troops to raise their colors on the battlements. The remainder of the regiment, supported by Reilly's Battery and under General Chaffee's personal direction, moved to the aid of the Russians. Tearing down a section of wall south of the Tung-pien gate, they were able to enfilade with shrapnel and small-arms fire the Chinese who were hemming in the Russians, and to clear out all the enemy as far to the west as the Hata-men gate. At the same time, however, they were for lack of suitable cover subjected to a galling fire from Chinese riflemen posted on the wall of the Tartar City, ten feet higher than the wall of the Chinese City. Pinned down though they were, they created an invaluable diversion, for the British were able to move in without opposition. Reaching the so-called Water Gate (a tunnel in the wall through which a canal ran from the Tartar to the Chinese City), Indian troops waded through to the legations. The objective had been attained, the missionaries and legation staffs were saved, but Chinese resistance was by no means crushed.

While the 14th Infantry and Reilly's Battery were answering the fire of the Boxers on the wall of the Tartar City, the 9th Infantry, which had been held in reserve, was ordered to move ahead, making its way to the west as far as the Ch'ien-men gate. On the next morning the assault of the Tartar City was to begin.

About 6:30 AM on 15 August, four of Reilly's six guns were unlimbered on one of the platforms of the tower rising about the Ch'ien-men gate. They blasted away at a Chinese battery located at the next gate to the west. As the thick smoke from their black powder billowed out, blinding the gunners, they alternated their targets, shifting to fire on the Forbidden City, covering the advance of Marines and of doughboys of the 9th and 14th regiments through the Ch'ien-men gate and across the wide square which lay between it and the first gate of the Imperial City. In the same tower as the battery, on the next story up, was a company of Marines under Lieutenant Smedley Butler.

A section made up of the battery's remaining two guns, under First Lieutenant Charles P. Summerall, accompanied the infantry. Lieutenant Summerall had already made a name for himself in combat. For his part in an action against Filipino insurgents a few months before he had been awarded a brevet, recommended by Colonel Robert L. Bullard (then commanding the 39th Infantry) in these words: "Too high praise cannot be given Lieutenant Summerall and his battery. His judgment was ever sound; he was full of vigor and activity and as cool and brave as anyone I ever saw." Now, while infantrymen ran through a hail of bullets to surrounding houses, ripping off timbers to use as battering rams to try to break in the gate of the Imperial City, Summerall turned the fire of his two pieces on the massive wooden door. One round, two rounds each gun fired; splinters flew in all directions, but though the gates shook under the impact, they stood firm, as solid as ever. The trouble was that the cannoneers, sweating under the fierce heat and the fiercer Chinese fire, were aiming merely at the gate, not at the same point on it. Seeing this, Summerall ordered them to suspend fire. Heedless of the rifles of the Boxers, he walked forward. Sudden puffs of dust from Boxer bullets spurted about his feet. He marked a large cross on the door. Then, stepping out of the line of fire of his guns but in full view—and range—of the enemy, he directed his section's firing by hand signals until the gate was jolted enough ajar for an infantryman to slip through
and unbolt it. A moment later the barrier was flung open and the Americans poured through to the next courtyard.

Meanwhile, fire from the rest of the battery was continuing. Lieutenant Butler's company of Marines was firing so fast that many of their rifles grew hot and jammed. After a time the company was relieved and Butler went to the floor below, where General Chaffee stood beside Captain Reilly, directing the battle from this point of vantage. Butler had hardly joined these two when a Chinese bullet struck Captain Reilly in the mouth and killed him. "He was a great soldier." Major General Butler said of him many years later. "No one in the army had so many friends." He must indeed have been a man of great charm and character, for all the accounts of his death are in the same vein as Smedley Butler's. One observer calls him "one of the finest officers in the American Army," going on to say that his gunners wept when the word was passed that his wound was a mortal one. An Englishman who accompanied the column wrote, "He was a brave officer, who was loved by his men ...; 'Reilly's Battery' was the pride of the force."

Almost at this same time the Chinese staged an attack from both east and west on the square just north of the Ch'ien-men gate, trying to cut off the Americans who, having penetrated into the Imperial City, were being scourged with the fire of hundreds of Boxers concealed in the buildings which lined the courtyard where they were penned. The attack on the square was driven off by the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry, aided by the artillery in the tower. Then two more guns were brought down to join Summerall's section, blasting into the houses which hid the Boxers inside the Imperial City. Under the heavy, accurate fire of American riflemen and cannoniers, the Chinese resistance began to crumble, and by the end of the day the fight was over. Just as the troops were about to enter the Forbidden City itself, orders came to halt. "Reasons of State" demanded that the attack be stopped.

That was, substantially, the end of the military operations. There were a few punitive expeditions into the countryside, but the "Boxer Rebellion" was finished. The implications and political consequences of American participation in intervention in a foreign country are beyond the scope of this article. They are, moreover, beside the point: American lives and property were threatened and the responsible government not only refused to take any action to discharge its obligations, but in fact supported those who committed outrages. American participation with the other Allies was a sign of America's coming-of-age as a world power.

Until the decade just before the turn of the century, field artillery had seen little change in technical capabilities and tactical employment since as far back as the time of Napoleon. The wars which took place around 1900, however, saw a change in materiel and the beginning of a change in tactics which, as usual, followed a little behind the potentialities of the weapons. The artilleryman of 1900 was, tactically, not yet halfway between his Civil War father and his World War I son or younger brother. Breech-loading cannon were no longer novelties, but atop the tubes were open sights, for all the world like those on the Krags the infantry carried.

In a sense, the dramatic contrast inherent in this transitional period is pointed up by the physical setting—the mechanical efficiency of the young Twentieth Century clashing with the Middle Ages against the back-drop of a walled and battlemented city. Too, the members of the relief column, marching in suspicious, loose, and uneasy alliance, were in a few short years to be uniting on different lines, dividing against each other, playing their parts on an immensely larger military stage, for far higher stakes at a much bloodier cost.

That is not to say, however, that the China Relief Expedition was a picnic. We have a tendency to look at campaigns of the past with an attitude combining condescension, because of our more efficient deadliness, with a slight twinge of nostalgia for those bygone days of Case I fire and a long-lost code of leisurely and gentlemanly warfare. Yet, insofar as casualties are a valid criterion of hardship, this was a hard campaign, for the Americans alone lost 177 officers and men killed of their roughly 2,000 participants, or more than eight per cent. They did their duty, they fought hard, and they died gallantly. We can be justly proud of all of them, but the sacrifice of Captain Reilly, the heroism of Lieutenant Summerall, and the devotion of the artillery that was "the pride of the force" add specifically to the honor of the artillery.

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**The Artillery School Enlisted Courses**

**Prepared at the Artillery School**

It isn't enough to tell a recruit that if he keeps his ears open, his mouth shut, and learns his "connoneer's hop," some day he may get to be a first sergeant. Such a future will appeal to some men but to many others an original enlistment filled with routine drill appears as a mere exploratory venture. Frequently possessing a good education, many of these men are still too young or have been unable to decide what they want to do in life. These are the men the Army wants to interest in the more technical aspects of the Army.

The Army is putting a tremendous effort behind the career program to interest the best possible type of young men in an Army career. In order to assist that program it is essential that eligible young men, particularly those who have just started an Army career, are fully informed of the opportunities for a solid future which their Army offers. To that end, the officers and non-commissioned officers who immediately advise them and guide their destinies must be aware of the available channels which an Army career may take.

Training in the specialist courses at The Artillery School is ideally suited to appeal to young and ambitious soldiers. Theory and practice, including
work in the classroom, laboratory, and field, are carefully balanced to give the soldier a well-rounded education in his chosen field.

**COMMUNICATION**

For the young soldier who wants to learn radio, five Radio Repair classes, each of approximately 21 weeks duration, are scheduled at The Artillery School. These courses will begin on 12 July, 23 August, 6 December 1950, and 31 January and 23 May 1951.

The knowledge and abilities needed for attendance are not severe nor is the course unduly difficult. The objective is simply to qualify selected enlisted men as radio repairmen (SSN 0648), capable of repairing and maintaining all radio sets and allied communication equipment used by artillery units. The following brief outline of the entrance qualifications and scope of the course will bear this out.

First, a man must have Aptitude Area IX Score of 110 or better. Area IX is a test covering basic electricity and radio fundamentals. An AGCT score of 110 may be used in lieu of the aptitude area score. Second, he must have normal color vision in order to be able to trace colored coded circuits in schematic diagrams.

The course is designed to permit the student to progress from basic mathematics and fundamentals of electricity to the more intricate problems of circuit tracing, trouble shooting, and repair. It includes practical shop work, beginning with proper use of hand tools and developing into actual repair of radio sets and other communication equipment. Installation, operation, maintenance, test and repair of AM and FM radio equipment, telephones, switchboards, and power equipment are thoroughly covered, with the emphasis placed on practical application on well-organized lines.

Four Artillery Communication courses are similarly planned, commencing 12 July, 6 September 1950, 10 January and 14 February 1951.

The requirements for attendance at the communication courses require that the applicant have an Aptitude Area IX Score of 100 or better (or an AGCT score of 100 in lieu of the aptitude area score). In addition he must be a non-commissioned officer with prior experience in a military or civilian occupational specialty directly related to telephone or radio communication. For both Radio Repair and Communication courses the applicant must have a desire to attend the course. A high school education or equivalent is desirable.

The Communication course covers the entire field of artillery communication and entitles the student to an SSN of 0542 upon graduation. Its purpose is to train enlisted men in the installation, operation, and maintenance of artillery communication equipment, and in its tactical employment.

Detailed instruction is given in basic electricity and radio theory. All items of electronic equipment with which the artillery is concerned are studied in detail. Students are thoroughly grounded in the techniques and procedures employed in operating with both wire and radio equipment. In addition, the organization and tactical employment of artillery units and allied arms are taught as a basis for instruction in the communication systems of all artillery units.

As in the Radio Repair course, much of the time is devoted to practical work, both in the shop and in the field on actual communication problems and exercises.

Both courses are designed to train students for duty in Field Artillery and Antiaircraft Artillery units. Graduates are returned to their units with a wide background of knowledge pertaining to their specialty and with a detailed knowledge of the equipment, procedures, and systems of their particular organization.

**OBSERVATION**

Still in the fascinating field of electronics, but pointed in a different direction, is the Artillery Countermortar Radar Course. Here qualified enlisted men are taught to operate and maintain radar devices which can track mortar projectiles automatically and from the data thus obtained locate enemy mortars.

This course is conducted in four classes. Those for infantry and armored division personnel start on 2 August 1950, 17 January 1951, and 18 April 1951. The class for airborne division personnel will start on 11 October 1950.

The basic requirement is an Area IX Aptitude score of 110 or better. An understanding of elementary algebra is an asset, but is not essential.

The Sound and Flash Ranging course has been developed to the point where it is interesting, but difficult enough to constitute a challenge to the soldier. It is really two courses in one, with about 170 of the 480 hours allotted to sound ranging, 85 hours to flash ranging, 105 hours to survey, and the remainder to such general subjects as mathematics, slide rule, and drafting.

The prerequisites for attendance at this course are rather high. The candidate for the course must have a score of 100 or more in Aptitude Area I, and in addition must have had the equivalent of high school algebra, plane geometry, and plane trigonometry. Waivers will be considered for men who have shown ability in mathematics during their military careers.

Like the majority of the courses at The Artillery School, this one is conducted in four yearly courses, each of 12 weeks duration. Classes start in August, November, February, and May.

**METEOROLOGY**

Another attractive but highly technical course is the Artillery Ballistic Meteorology Course. Because of the new types of materiel and advanced techniques developed in recent years, qualification in this course opens up a practically unlimited field of endeavor for the enlisted man.

While the basic requirements for this course are not quite as high as for the Sound and Flash Ranging course, the applicant must have a good educational background. He must have a score of 100 or more in Aptitude Area II, with some high school work in algebra and geometry. A knowledge of trigonometry, physics, and radio is desirable but not essential.

The four classes, each of 16 weeks duration, start in August, November, January, and May.

This course covers the entire field of
THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL ENLISTED COURSES

Extension Course Program of the Artillery School 1949-1950, 1950-1951

For completion of a series, different requirements have been established for FA and AA (CAC) enrollees. The subcourse required for each branch are indicated in the columns "Credit Hours" by numerical entries (value of the subcourse) under headings of "FA" or "AA". Those subcourses which are optional are indicated under the column "Opt."

*Indicates subcourse is not now available. Estimated date of availability, if known with reasonable certainty, is shown in parentheses following title.

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*Indicates subcourse is not now available. Estimated date of availability, if known with reasonable certainty, is shown in parentheses following title.
When the student has completed the subcourses listed above, which are currently available, the School will transfer him to the Command and General Staff College where he will pursue subcourses as follows:

### 60 SERIES

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Some 50 series and all 60 series subcourses are administered by the Command and General Staff College. However, applications for enrollment of artillery students in courses administered by other schools must be forwarded to "The Artillery School." When applying for specific subcourses, state the title as well as the number. Enlisted men enrolling in 10 series must apply to the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas.
PERIMETERS in PARAGRAPHS

By Col. Conrad H. Lanza, Ret.

NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Prepared by a widely-known military scholar and writer, PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS is a recurring feature dealing with the military, political and economic realities in world affairs. Whereas an understanding of these realities is deemed essential to the American soldier, it is emphasized that PERIMETERS IN PARAGRAPHS reflects the opinions of the author, alone. This installment covers the period 1 January - 28 February 1950.

The Situation in West Europe. This is the critical area in the Cold War between the Western Powers and the Communist states. It contains the largest and most civilized populations, and the greatest industrial developments. If time permits of development, it might arrange to defend itself against all hostile forces. Temporarily it is but lightly armed and generally unorganized. It needs the help of its Anglo-Saxon allies.

At the beginning of 1950, General Lattre de Tassigny, Allied Ground C-in-C, had available the equivalent of 12 divisions, viz:

| British | 3 |
| French | 5 |
| American | 2 |
| Small Powers | 2 |
| **Total** | **12** |

Three Dutch divisions, including one armored, may be returned from Indonesia during the year. There is little chance that three French divisions in Indo-China can be brought back during 1950, nor three other divisions in North Africa. It is expected that two French armored divisions will be organized soon. How many other divisions may become available depends on appropriations yet uncertain. In all, maybe 20 divisions will be on hand to defend West Europe north of the Alps by the end of the year.

Against this relatively small force, present estimates show over 90 Russian divisions opposite Germany and Austria, exclusive of satellite divisions. This disparity of forces places Allied military forces in West Europe in a precarious position.

A major factor is that communist forces, less Yugoslavia, are under a single command. They obey orders, and do so promptly. West Europe defenders, less Scandinavia, consist of five continental independent nations, supported by three English-speaking allies—8 nations in all, each having its own ideas, desires, and command. This means consultations and delays before anything can be done.

Plan of Defense. The drafting of such a plan was completed at Paris on 1 December, 1949. It was approved at Washington on 6 January, 1950, by the Defense Committee represented by the respective Allied diplomatic chiefs. On 27 January, President Truman proclaimed the North Atlantic Defense Plan in effect. He thereby released $1 billion of American funds for rearming Allies, of which three—Canada, Iceland, and Portugal—have asked for nothing. The other Allies held a meeting in London on 11 January to decide which of each of them will get what, mostly at American expense.

The Defense Plan is secret. Nevertheless the following information regarding its provisions has leaked out. It defines a Defense Concept, which covers the pooling of resources, and the developing by each Ally separately of its own forces. Strategical and tactical deployments are believed to have been omitted. As there are insufficient forces for effective defense, omitting to provide for it is at this time not so important.

Notes on West Europe. France will manufacture part of the artillery and planes required for its own army. It expects to receive from the United States this year material for equipping 2 armored divisions to be organized, 90 AAA batteries, and materiel to defend and extend air bases. Belgium has issued orders for reorganization of its army. These are secret. They include organization of a special division for rear areas to operate against saboteurs and enemy drops. The importance of defense against hostile air drops in rear areas can not be overestimated. Failure promptly to contain and then overcome air invasions may lead to paralyzing developments. As far as known, Belgium is the first nation to organize special troops in time of peace for this purpose.

Norway, having started to use British naval vessels and planes, and supplies for same, will continue to do so. It looks to the United States for armor, artillery, motor vehicles, radar, and ammunition.

Communist Reaction. Following the approval of the Defense Plan on 6 January, Russia took the following steps:

1. On 10 January, through the Cominform, issued secret instructions to its 5th Columns in West Europe to organize strikes among longshoremen and marine crews handling arms, munitions, and supplies arriving by sea for rearming West Europe. Disturbances and agitation against belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance were also ordered. The communists in France and Belgium have complied with this order. In France the resulting riots were so serious as to necessitate the employment of troops.

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2. On 14 January, the Cominform issued a secret directive relating to publication of material alleging that the North Atlantic Alliance and the Marshall Plan were steps undertaken by the United States towards conquering the World. This continues earlier instructions to the same effect.

3. On 29 January, Russia recognized the insurgent communists in Indo-China, while China threatened to supply these with arms and supplies. This is intended to prevent the 3 French divisions in Indo-China from being withdrawn to West Europe. Present indications are that this move will succeed.

COMMENTS

It is dangerous to defend territory with insufficient forces. Weapons and munitions accumulated in West Europe before the defense is organized to protect them are a temptation to an enemy — to be had for the taking. It is an invitation to war with a view to making big gains at little risk. As military supplies grow, promise of military booty increases, at the expense of greater resistance. The problem is to determine at what date an attack should be launched to secure the maximum returns, while remaining sufficiently superior in strength to avoid a too serious resistance. That date may not be too far away.

As these facts are well known throughout West Europe, there is considerable distrust as to whether it is worth while to go ahead with rearming as presently in progress. It may lead straight to a futile resistance, devastation, and great suffering.

An obvious solution to this problem would be to rearm Germany if time permits. Previous experience indicates that an armed Germany supported by the North Atlantic Allies would have an excellent chance of winning a war against the united communist states. Objection to this solution is that France is unalterably opposed to rearming Germany. For if that should happen, Germany, with its greater population, better industrial development, and more extensive resources, and not France, would be the leading Power in West Europe. Rather than see this occur, France prefers to take a chance of complete conquest by Russia. The danger of this position is evident, but as French assistance is, as long as Germany is disarmed, absolutely necessary for the defense of West Europe, none of the Allies opposes France. The United States has officially announced that it will not agree to rearming Germany.

A second solution is to organize southwest Europe—in rear of the Pyrenees—as a fortified area, or redoubt, to which defense forces, if too weak to oppose an enemy, could retreat in time. The Pyrenees Mountains present a first-class obstacle and an excellent defensive position. Behind them is ample space for large forces, good sites for air bases, good ports for maintaining lines of communication to the Americas. Spain could contribute 20 divisions to the North Atlantic Alliance without delay, and Portugal another four—probably sufficient to defend the Pyrenees temporarily. These troops do not have complete modern equipment, but they are a disciplined force.

Objection to this solution is that Spain is in the international dog-house, with the North Atlantic Allies refusing to deal with her, on the ground that the government is not entirely democratic. That is a correct statement of the facts, but there is lack of evidence that the Spaniards are dissatisfied with their government, which is strongly anti-communist.

An effort has started in Europe to remove the objections to excluding Germany and Spain from the North Atlantic Alliance. If this were to occur, West Europe within a few years—which might indeed be dangerous ones—should thereafter be in excellent shape to protect itself. This would lighten the great burden of taxation undertaken by the United States to protect the large populations, exceeding its own, in West Europe, and permit the use of funds so released for defense of the Pacific Theater, which is vital to the United States but is of secondary consideration to Europe.

At the present time, either or both of the foregoing solutions are impracticable for political reasons. It is consequently necessary to seek another solution which would avoid the risk of losing everything, including all of West Europe, if war comes while rearming is in progress but still substantially incomplete.

Such a solution would be to organize new divisions outside of West Europe. Only a minimum number of divisions, and no stocks of arms and munitions, would be maintained in Europe. An apparently suitable area for organizing, training, and equipping new divisions is French North Africa. The North Atlantic Alliance expressly includes this area within its limits. It is of course much nearer to Europe than the United States or Canada, less exposed to enemy air attacks than the British Isles. Not until a sufficient number of divisions, with services, were ready, would they be transported to West Europe, and then only as far inland as a line which they would have a reasonable chance to defend.

Various lines can be envisaged, and the particular one to be selected can only be determined at the time from a consideration of the then existing situation. As an illustrative example, the first line, if peace prevails, might be along the Loire River from the sea to the Alps, and thence down to the Mediterranean. Whether Italy would be included would depend on whether there were enough reliable divisions to defend north Italy from invasion. As more divisions become available, the line held can be advanced to the Rhine, the Elbe, or wherever desired. If war comes before necessary divisions are available, this solution offers the least risk of losing all through a sudden attack by overwhelming forces. Regardless of the situation on the mainland, the islands of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica are essential for the protection of North Africa and to assure the ability to make forced landings, if required, at an hour and place which the enemy should be unable to judge.

This solution does envisage the possibility of an enemy occupying all of West Europe without much opposition. For at least a few years, he can do that anyway. If he does, the Occupying Power would be forced, as Germany was during World War II, to garrison extensive areas amidst hostile peoples.
He should never know where or when an invasion by sea and air would come. The problem presented should not be too difficult to solve.

Regardless of the Allied Plan, control of the sea and air is absolutely necessary to the North Atlantic Allies. A Plan to maintain that is the first major requirement.

**GERMANY**

_U. S. Policy._ On 17 November, 1949, the United States issued a detailed directive as to its policy concerning Germany, which declared:

"It is essential that Germany should not again be permitted to develop political conditions or a military potential which might threaten the independence of other nations or the peace of the world."

To accomplish this it was ordered that measures be taken to:

- a. Deprieve Germany of means to wage war.
- b. Integrate Germany into the common structure of a free Europe.
- c. Prohibit military units, other than bona fide police forces.
- d. Prohibit manufacture, import, or operation of any aircraft. Servicing planes is permitted, but only foreign planes may be flown.
- e. In the American Zone, authority was to be turned over to Germany as it demonstrated its ability to operate a safe and responsible government.
- f. Berlin was entitled to participate in the government of West Germany.

On 6 February, U. S. High Commissioner John J. McCloy announced that the United States would use all its power to fight a revival of Nazism. He warned the West German Government to concentrate on "unification of all Germany" by upbuilding democracy. In his view this was not going ahead as fast or as completely as desired. He stated "there will be no German army or air force."

**German General Staff.** An unofficial and unauthorized, but nevertheless more or less efficient, General Staff has appeared. It serves without pay and advises the West German Government on military matters. It is headed by a group of former generals and general staff officers supposed to have been relieved from active duty. First recommendation, submitted before the foregoing U. S. Policy had been promulgated, was that Germany should raise a small but highly trained ground force, to be armed and equipped by the United States and to operate with the American Occupation Forces.

**The Saar.** On 15 January, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman visited Bonn and conferred with German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer regarding the Saar. France would like to annex that small country on account of its valuable coal mines and extensive industrial plants. It would round out French economic resources. Germany naturally would like to retain the Saar, whose million inhabitants are all German. No agreement was reached between France and West Germany.

France has unilaterally erected the Saar into a separate state, allegedly independent, less military and foreign affairs, which are to be French. It has free trade with France, but a customs barrier has been erected against Germany. This action has provoked the Germans. They are helpless and cannot do anything about it at this time. Yet it is a dispute which may have unfortunate effects.

**Union of East and West Germany.** The Allies favor the union of East Germany to West Germany. Russia favors union of West Germany to East Germany. Germans just want Germany to themselves. East and West Germany are holding conversations directly, and secretly. Being unarmed and under Occupying Powers, their best card is to play Russia against the Western Powers and vice versa. They want neither, but to secure their independence will consider conditions which either side proposes.

The possibility should not be overlooked that Russia may return to Germany territories seized by Poland, in return for an alliance. Germany would be a more valuable ally than Poland. Russia has previously engaged four times in partitions of Poland. With that record it may happen again.

**East German Notes.** Russian persecution of religions has been extended to East Germany.

The new communist German Army is now estimated as 45,000. They are a nucleus for 3 divisions, to be organized this year with supporting troops. Personnel is composed largely of ex-German soldiers selected for their toughness. It is not known whether the High Command is Russian, German, or mixed.

A Hate America campaign is in progress. Example: 13 February was designated as Hate America Day for Saxony, because of its being the anniversary of the bombing of Dresden by American planes in 1945. No reference of course was made to the fact that at that time Russia was attacking the east German front, that Dresden was then an important center of communications, and that the bombing was primarily to aid the Russian offensive.

During January and February, Russia has maintained partial land blockades about West Berlin, apparently purely for harassing purposes. This has had a nuisance value, but did not seriously interfere with either the Allies or the citizens of West Berlin.

**RUSSIA**

**POLITICAL**

21 January is Memorial Day in Russia. It is customary on this day to make important announcements regarding Russian policy. This is done before a distinguished audience of the highest officials. This year, 1950, was no exception. The keynote speech was delivered by Mr. P. N. Pospelov, editor of the authoritative Pravda. It centered about the Far East. China, whose President Mao Tze-tung and
staff were present, was congratulated upon establishing a Communist Government. It had thereby proved that the Imperialistic Powers were incapable of suppressing The People. The speaker denounced the United States, which he claimed had spent $6 billions in a vain effort to establish bases in China for an attack on Russia. He continued:

"In the camp of imperialism and warmongers there is frenzy, as it feels its internal weakness and its historic [impending?] doom. Each month, the sea of poverty, and of tears, and of suffering toiling masses, increases in that country. Capitalism is ripe and overripe. It has lived its age and has become the most reactionary handicap to human development." He concluded that at best the United States could only postpone the ensuing victory of Communism.

On 14 February, a treaty was signed establishing an Alliance with China. In the section on China in this article, pertinent quotations are given indicating that the main mission was action against Japan and the United States. That this is the intention is shown by an editorial in Pravda which interprets the treaty, also published on 14 February. It stated that the Alliance was needed because of the behavior of the United States in Japan. It alleged that the United States was making enormous efforts to transform Japan into a base for launching attacks against China and Siberia. It charged that the United States was intentionally dragging out the conclusion of a peace treaty for the express purpose of continuing its occupation indefinitely. It went on to say:

"There is hardly any necessity of proving how real is this problem at this very time when, under protection of American Occupation authorities, Japanese reactionaries are openly declaring their intentions of revenge."*

On 14 January, the Cominform issued a directive to all satellite states, including China, to direct their press to emphasize strongly the importance of,

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*No record has been found to substantiate the charge that Japanese reactionaries openly seek revenge, nor any record that they are even thinking of attacking the Asiatic mainland.

and the Russian success in, the Far East, as contrasted with the unimportance of, and lack of American success in, Europe under the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Alliance.

**Comment.** Present indications are that Russia proposes to pursue a vigorous policy in Asia, while temporarily going slow in Europe. Russian Communism is gaining in Asia, but it is not yet consolidated. Much work to accomplish this is needed. Top priority has apparently been assigned to this project.

**THE RUSSIAN SATELLITES IN EUROPE**

Finland. Russia's controlled press, commencing on 18 January and continuing to 28 February, has published menacing "warnings" toward Finland. That country is charged with willfully violating the peace treaty. Specifications are that it has failed and neglected to deliver to Russia war criminals as per list furnished. Finland's explanation is that these alleged war criminals have either escaped to Sweden, from where they cannot be extradited, or that they can't be found. Russia charges that the "escapes" to Finland were connived at, and that a serious situation has thereby arisen. Public opinion in Finland is that the persons demanded by Russia are completely innocent of any crimes, according to careful investigations made in each case.

Poland. The religious campaign is being pressed. All Catholic charitable organizations have been confiscated. Clergymen are gradually, but slowly, disappearing as they are arrested on various charges, or no charge at all. Espionage trials are increasing, and in regard to foreigners have been concentrated against French personnel.

Czechoslovakia. All American missionaries, mostly Mormons but including a few Methodists, have been ordered out of the country. It is alleged that they constitute a danger to the state. Trials of foreigners for spying are concentrated against the Dutch.

Hungary. On 28 January, the Dictator Matyas Rakosi returned to duty after an unexplained absence. He then advised the U. S. Minister, Mr. Nathaniel P. Davis, that Mr. Robert A. Vogeler, an American citizen in confinement for three months awaiting trial, would be found guilty, would confess to spying, and would implicate members of the U. S. Legation, whose expulsion would then be demanded.

It happened just as predicted. Mr. Vogeler's *confession* alleged that he had been ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington to spy within Hungary, and particularly to secure information as to uranium, military forces, etc. He had been doing this, he said, since 1942. He was convicted and sentenced to 15 years confinement. Mr. Vogeler was an official of the International Telephone & Telegraph Company and had made visits to Hungary for that company since the war. He was not in Hungary during the war years, in spite of his *confession*. American offers to have personnel whose names had been mentioned in the *confession* testify as to their alleged aid to Mr. Vogeler were denied. As usual, no proof of espionage, documentary or from witnesses, was produced.

On 24 February Hungary, by letters to the United States and Great Britain, suggested that in regard to their Legations in Budapest, they "urgently consider reducing their staffs," whose size constituted "an intolerable situation." Both the United States and Great Britain have declined to comply with this request, on the ground that the size of diplomatic staffs is the sole business of the country employing them.

Bulgaria. As explained in the preceding installment of PERIMETERS, Bulgaria on 8 December, 1949, had intimated to the United States that its minister at Sofia, Mr. D. R. Heath, should be recalled on the ground that *confessions* of Bulgars at espionage trials had proved that the U. S. Legation was the responsible employing agent of spies. On 19 January a formal demand for Mr. Heath's recall was made.

It appears that for over a year Bulgaria has been harassing the American Legation by unfounded accusations, refusing to reply to correspondence, and arresting Bulgarian employees at the Legation (translators, telephone girls, etc.) who had been appointed only on the recommendation of Bulgaria. After a 30-days' warning, the United States,
fee

... by refusing passports. This latter action had previously been taken against Hungary on 20 December, 1949. Also on the 24th the United States froze the assets of Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary for failure to pay just American claims due under the peace treaty or to even reply to letters on the subject.

Comment. Severing diplomatic relations is a serious step. It has usually been followed by war. A new situation with the Russian satellites has begun. It may lead to severance of diplomatic relations with all of them. Disregard of human rights, treaties, and ordinary international courtesy are common within the Communist states.

It seems possible that Russia is directing the gradual increase of pressure against all citizens of the Western Powers behind the Iron Curtain, to eliminate all connections through that famous screen. This would have a double objective — first to prevent the Western Powers from receiving information of military value; and second, to prevent their own people from receiving information regarding the falsity of Russian propaganda. The logical outcome points toward an ultimate rupture of all relations with Russia and its satellites at some future date, which it is impossible for the West to determine in advance. In this Russia has the initiative.

MILITARY

Arctic Maneuvers, according to Swedish reports, are in progress with smaller forces than in preceding years. Experience has demonstrated that there is a limit to the number of troops that can be utilized in the Arctic in any one area. Three maneuver areas are known of: Near Murmansk—training for conditions existing in north Norway; Yenesei valley—training for conditions similar to those in North Canada; Okhotsk area — training for conditions similar to Alaska and the Aleutian Islands.

The Baltic Wall is a defensive line extending from the Gulf of Finland along the Baltic Sea to the vicinity of Stertin, thence southwards to the mountain border between Poland and Czechoslovakia, thence to the Danube River. It is being constantly strengthened, and is part of the Iron Curtain—works both ways, keeps those inside from getting out, and those outside from getting in.

In Czechoslovakia the important Skoda armament works are operating at high capacity. Priority is given to manufacture of propellers for submarines. As the propellers are large it must be assumed that the submarines are the long-range type. Other orders include an improved type of the old German V-1 bomb which was used against London. Production of infantry weapons exceeds the maximum during German Occupation days.

Romania, under its peace treaty, was limited to a military force of 120,000. Underground reports are that present strength is around 200,000, excluding Russian troops present, supposedly guarding lines of communication.

In Hungary, the Czechoslovakia Underground reports that a new Army Group Advance CP is now operational at Budapest. It is assumed, but not known, that this CP controls, or will control at the proper time, the group of divisions and air forces reported previously as stationed in the Lake Balaton area.

The Russian Navy, from Swedish reports, will be strengthened this year through the completion of three 35,000-ton battleships, all under construction at Leningrad. One is to be ready by April. The purpose of these large ships is uncertain. There is no comparable naval armament in the Baltic. The Baltic Wall (see above) will afford overhead cover for Russian naval forces anywhere within the Baltic Sea. It seems probable that in case of war these battleships might be used for the seizure of Copenhagen. This, if successful, would afford an exit from the Baltic Sea for Russian submarines; would enable attacks to be launched against Norway on the same plan as used by the Germans in 1940; would isolate Sweden; and would threaten the left flank of North Atlantic forces in West Germany.

JAPAN

Premier Yoshida on 23 January officially accepted the suggestion of General MacArthur in his New Year's address, that Japan should not, and had not, renounced the right to self defense. He added that, as Japan could not rearm without the consent of the Occupying Powers, he would rely on the Western democracies for protection against the communist threat from the Asiatic mainland.

On February 6, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff completed a short visit to Japan, including inspection of air and naval bases respectively at Itazuke, Kyushu, and Yokosuka, but not the air base at Misawa, Honshu, on account of inclement weather. As the Chiefs left, leaders of all Japanese parties except Communists agreed that Japan would grant army, air, and naval bases to the United States in return for military protection, to be specified in a peace treaty. Studies for a peace treaty are under way.

Meanwhile Russia on 1 February proposed to the United States that Emperor Hirohito and certain generals be surrendered to Russia for trial as war criminals. It was alleged that they had engaged, or had prepared to engage, in bacteriological warfare. Promptly, two days later, the United States rejected the Russian demand. Careful investigation had failed to show that Japan had used, or had attempted to use bacteriological warfare. It was believed that Russia's demand was camouflage to avoid explaining the fate of 370,000 Japanese POWs still unaccounted for.

Upon their return to Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the authority of General MacArthur, C-in-C in Japan, had been extended to include Naval Forces in the Far East. The USN estimate of Russian naval forces based on East Siberia shows about 90 submarines including...
some long range ones, and an undisclosed number of cruisers, destroyers, and other craft. The Chief of Naval Operations, referring to this force, stated that it "certainly cannot be disregarded when we consider the security of our positions in the Pacific and the security of our Lines of Communication."

The US Navy then announced that additional carriers and destroyers were being added to our Far East Fleet.

CHINA

The Kuomintang continues to hold Formosa as its main base; also Hainan and some small islands. It has been dominated by Generallissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who has ostensibly been on leave since 21 January, 1949. Vice-President Li Tsung-jen was acting President thereafter until December 1949, when he left for New York. He is still there, sick in hospital. On 28 February, the Generallissimo announced that, in view of the fact that no head of the government was present, he would surrender his leave, and report for duty as President on 1 March. In accordance with Chinese rules relating to modesty by public officials, the Generallissimo issued a GO accepting the blame for the sad state of China today. His order reads:

"In less than 5 years since the victorious end of the war with Japan, the state of national affairs has become such that I must put the blame upon myself. All that I can do now is to make up for what I have failed in the past and do my best in planning for the future."

Military Operations have been limited to air and naval attacks by Kuomintang forces. As the communists have neither air nor naval forces, and not much AA artillery, the Kuomintang has had an open field. Chief limitations are lack of proper air and naval bases, which preclude the proper repair of planes and ships. The Kuomintang would like to use Japanese bases but the United States has not agreed to this.

Heavy air raids have been made on repeated occasions on Canton and Shanghai, and less frequently on Amoy, Swatow, Nanking, and other places. At Shanghai power plants have been demolished. At all places loss of life has been considerable. The naval blockade intercepts few ships, but has caused a rise in insurance rates to prohibitive heights. This has not prevented blockade runners, of which about 40 a month sail out of Hong Kong. It

Political. Negotiations with Russia started at Moscow on 16 December, 1949, with the arrival of the communist China President Mao Tze-tung. He had come to congratulate Marshal Stalin on his birthday and offer presents to that great benefactor of communist humanity. Such a cheerful mission was considered to be an appropriate occasion to arrange for a Russian-Chinese alliance. On 14 February, it was announced that such a treaty had been signed that day.

The main mission of the alliance, so far as published, lies in this paragraph:

"The high contracting parties agree that they will jointly undertake all necessary measures at their disposal to prevent any repetition of aggression, or violation of the peace, by Japan or any other state which, directly or indirectly, may unite with Japan in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the agreeing parties being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her, thus finding itself at war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military and/or other aid with all means at its disposal."

Russia also agreed to withdraw from Manchuria by 1952 (this may be the planned date for World War III) or earlier if a peace treaty with Japan were arranged.

There are probable secret protocols attached to this treaty. The arrival at Moscow on 30 January of a delegation representing Sinkiang indicates that some arrangement had been made regarding Russia in Sinkiang. Otherwise why the visit? In view of the report of the presence of large numbers of Chinese laborers in both European and Asiatic Russia, coupled with the Intelligence Report of 1 February by General Mao Sen (no relation to Mao Tze-tung), chief of Kuomintang guerrillas on the mainland, that thousands of Chinese were being shipped to East Siberia to build depots for commissary supplies and other purposes, a protocol on labor to be furnished by China is also probable. Russian press reports showing unusual interest as to the necessity for China communists to seize and occupy Tibet at an early date point to some kind of agreement on that strange and distant land. There may well be other adjuncts to the Alliance not yet ascertained.

The Russo-Chinese Alliance is undoubtedly directed against the United States. The Russian press is rather free in pointing this out. Initial operations will probably be limited to consolidating the Russian control of China. Large numbers of Russian officials have appeared, and are spreading out over the country, holding key positions. On account of the size and enormous population of China, it will not be easy to enforce communism on an ancient race which doesn't want it, but there may be no active opposition for some time; Russia may secure bases for future operations. In the meantime China is lost to the Western Powers.

On 6 January, a dispute arose in Peiping between the Communist Government and the U. S. Consul, a part of whose premises, guaranteed to the U. S. by treaty, was demanded. The Consul stood by the treaty, whereupon the communists took the premises any way. In view of this discourteous action the United States has withdrawn its consulate.

The British Government has recognized communist China. However, its offer to exchange diplomatic representatives has been rebuffed. Communists gave the same answer as had been given to Burma—send a delegation to explain. This has not been done. Best evidence is that China, as well as other Russian satellites, does not want diplomats from the Western Powers within their countries, or even citizens. An eastern Iron Curtain is going down.
has resulted in very high prices within communist China. Examples: Gasoline sells in Hong Kong at 20¢ a gallon, but in China at $1.25. Many goods are shipped out of Hong Kong by land. This has resulted in Kuomintang planes attacking the communist depots just over the boundary from Honk Kong. They have shown considerable ability in this. On 5 February they destroyed 1800 drums of gasoline; on the 22nd 220 more drums. Locomotives have been machine-gunned, and transportation forced to move by night.

The air and naval blockade greatly disturbs the communists for it increases the dangerous economic conditions into which China is falling. On 28 February, the Peiping radio charged that the bombing of China was conducted by American planes piloted by either American or Japanese pilots and bombardiers. Only Kuomintang connection was their name and insignia, which had been lent to the Americans, together with the furnishing of part of the staff to execute American orders.

This propaganda goes all over the Far East.

Communists are preparing to "invade" Formosa. This is the top priority project. Invasion does not necessarily involve an amphibious expedition. It may mean buying off the Kuomintang troops whenever Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek ceases to have sufficient funds to pay his own command more than the enemy can offer. This danger should not be discounted—it is standard practice for Chinese wars.

### SOUTHEAST ASIA

#### BURMA

**Political.** The complicated civil war between the central government of 42-year-old Premier Thakin Nu at Rangoon and six different kinds of insurgents has with one exception quieted down. This is due in part to lack of funds, ammunition, and supplies.

The Central Government claims not to be communist. Yet it took the lead in promptly recognizing the communist state of China. The latter has failed to respond to this offer of friendship. It advised that a delegation should report at Peiping for appropriate instructions. This action may be due to the fact that Moscow has for some time maintained liaison with the White Communists (one of the insurgent groups), and may desire to establish permanent relations with it. No delegation has been sent to Peiping.

Premier Thakin Nu has stated he has no objection to communism, and if the Burmese want that they can go ahead and elect a communist government at the next election. As the Burmese are unfamiliar with elections, and in all of their history have evicted governments by force, they consider this the natural way to obtain the kind of government they prefer. The Premier has publicly stated that Burma prefers to receive military and economic aid from the Western Powers, particularly from the United States. For this purpose requisitions as to what is desired have been submitted. He has stipulated that acceptance of gifts will be thankfully received, but that Burma will not undertake to aid the West against communism and must be left to do just as she pleases.

China now claims that Burma is part of its territory. It has been listed as due for "liberation." That mission appears to have a low priority, as Formosa and Indo-China precede it. An attack on Burma during 1950 is possible, but to date no preparations therefor have been noted. Chinese maps, recently issued, show Burma as part of China.

China's claim rests upon the fact that prior to 1886 North Burma, but not Central or South Burma, recognized China as a feudal superior. Same situation as regards Tibet, Sinkiang, Mongolia, etc, where Chinese suzerainty was nominal only. In 1886, China by treaty surrendered its nominal rights in Burma to Great Britain. Later treaties of 1 March, 1894, and 4 February, 1897, fixed the boundaries between Burma and China as now found. China, with Russia publicly supporting her, now claims that all these treaties are scraps of paper of no value, and were obtained improperly.

**Economic.** Owing to the civil war the rice export, main source of wealth, during 1949 was only about 1/3 of the usual amount. This has had a bad effect on India, which has to import millions of tons of rice annually for its people, and a bad effect locally, as the Government is unable to collect usual taxes.

Economic disintegration is threatened, and it is freely acknowledged that without foreign aid the Central Government may fall this year. This would be hastened if the Chinese invaded Burma. In 1945 nine Chinese divisions did move into Burma to report to our General Stilwell for duty to oppose the Japanese. They were highly inefficient and were defeated by a small number of Japanese. However, the practicability of invasion was demonstrated. The next time, the divisions may be better ones. This threat prevents capital from being interested in Burma.

**Military.** There are six main insurgent groups, all unrelated to each other, and each at war with the Central Government and each of the other five groups. However, for special operations groups occasionally unite. These forces are:

1. **Karens.** Well organized, and have 1 division with some armor, artillery, and planes. CP is at Toungoo. Population over a million, of which about half are Christian—Baptists and Catholic. Occupy lower Sittang valley, area around the Gulf of Martaban. Have liaison with Thailand and Malaya, and are believed to receive munitions from those countries; but this has not been proved.

2. **White Communists.** Hold the lower Irrawaddy valley from Letpadan to Minbu (both incl.) then east to their CP at Pyinmana. They have an effective government, which operates railroads, river lines, etc. They are in liaison with Moscow. Have not conducted any military operations for some time.

3. **Red Communists** are not in liaison with Moscow. They hold Arakan.
neither attacked nor been attacked. The Moslems support this group.

4. People's Volunteers occupy a belt between Groups 1 and 2, and with them blocking all lines of communication between Rangoon and the north.

5. Kachins hold north Burma around the famous Stilwell Road. They rule themselves and have been inactive. If the war comes their way, their future action is uncertain. Their C-in-C is Naw Sing.

6. North and South Shan States desire to remain neutral. They are in direct line of a Chinese invasion. Future action also uncertain.

The C-in-C of the Central Government is Lieut. General Ne Win. He has 1 division under him, reinforced with air support and some armor, but short of weapons and ammunition, which is strictly rationed. He believes the enemy is shorter of ammunition than he is, and for this reason decided to attack the Karens, as the strongest and ablest opponent. If the Karens can be subdued other groups may surrender.

The campaign was planned to jump off on 20 February and to be completed within 60 days, which would coincide roughly with the arrival of the rainy season. Troops started on schedule from Daik-u in the Sittang valley. The enemy was met 10 miles out near Pyintaza. That was captured on the 25th, by a three-pronged night attack with air support. The advance was resumed on the 26th as far as the RR Junction at Nyaunglebin. As this account closes at the end of February, the Burma Division was still there.

MALAYA

The communist rebellion continues. The communists operate out of the jungle and mountains in small bands which murder and rob. More of the bandit type than of a patriotic order. Personnel, less minor exceptions, is Chinese, who are detested by the native Malays, who are mostly Moslem. The Malaya population is nearly evenly divided between Malays and Chinese, with a large part of the latter repudiating the communists.

During the first ten months of 1949, the communists lost 1,006 killed and 556 POWs. 5,000 other Chinese, arrested out of uniform, were shipped to China. The British captured during the year some 2,000 rifles and over 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. There is no evidence that the communists are receiving supplies and munitions from outside. The enormous stocks abandoned by the British in 1942 and by the Japanese in 1945, plus that parachuted in by British and Americans during the war, will suffice for some time to come.

The communists have established in Thailand a camp for rest and reorganization. So far as known no supply of weapons is on hand there. In October 1949, the British concluded an agreement with Thailand authorizing British forces to pursue bandits into Thailand to a depth of 40 miles after securing an accompanying Thailand police detail at the frontier. Several pursuits have been made. No camp was found within the 40-mile belt and no bandits were captured.

The High Commissioner of Malaya, Mr. Henry Gurney, in an effort to settle quickly an annoying situation, announced an Anti-Bandit Month, to commence on D-Day. Elaborate preparations were made. On Saturday 25 February, a proclamation announced that 6.00 p.m. that day was H-Hour of D-Day. An estimated 325,000 Volunteers, wearing blue and white arm bands, reported. They set up road blocks at entrances of all towns and road junctions, thereby freeing a large number of police and military. The Volunteers are to screen all passers-by and it is hoped will identify numerous communists. The people seem to be enthusiastic about this movement, for their own losses, and disturbance to trade, have been considerable. Reported loss for 1949 includes among troops 283 killed and wounded, 442 from police forces, 39 European civilians, and 1011 native civilians.

INDO-CHINA

Political. The new state of Viet Nam, composed of the former colonies of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin-China, is functioning under Chief of State Bao Dai (former Emperor of Annam). The communist rebellion, under Moscow-trained Ho Chi-Minh, is strongest in Tonkin, but controls considerable territory in Annam and Cochin-China. The people, who are insufficiently educated to understand the difference between Communism and Democracy, are just beginning to distinguish between communist terrorism and the law and order of French-inspired Viet Nam.

A British Commonwealth Conference held in Ceylon in early January decided to support Viet Nam. That country normally furnishes, and is furnishing, enormous quantities of rice to feed deficient India, West Pakistan, Ceylon, and Malaya. Interruption to this rice supply might gravely advance communism in the states concerned.

On 19 January, communist China recognized Ho Chi-Minh as the lawful ruler of Viet Nam. Russia followed this example; so did the Russian satellites. It is assumed therefore that the communist world, through China, will intervene in Indo-China. From communist broadcasts Indo-China is second in priority for "liberation" by Chinese forces.

On 7 February the United States extended full recognition to Viet Nam under Bao Dai; also to the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, which with Viet Nam compose Indo-China. These three states remain within the French Empire, but have local autonomy, the right to diplomatic relations, and to maintain their own military forces.

On 14 February Viet Nam Premier Nguyen Phan Long requested American aid. Principal item on his requisition was a loan for $146,000,000. $100,000,000 is for economic purposes, and is to be repaid within two years in rubber and rice; $46,000,000 is for military purposes. On the 27th France objected to the proposed loan on the ground that more was needed for military purposes, which, at this time, is more important than economic improvements. She suggested the loan be made through France, which would thereby be able to supervise its use.

Military. Strongest force of communists is in Tonkin. In that area Viet Nam controls the delta of the Red River, including Hanoi and road blocks on lines of communication into China. France has 3 divisions in Viet Nam, including armor and parachute troops; with a supporting air force, in all about
140,000 men, of which about half are colonial troops. Viet Nam has 5 infantry battalions in line, and is training 3 more. Including services and troops in rear areas, Viet Nam now has about 25,000 troops. If the desired loan from the United States is secured, it is planned to raise this force immediately to 40,000, including 12 battalions in line. Ultimately the Viet Nam ground forces are to number 200,000. An ROTC unit is functioning at Hue, and a small Navy to patrol inland waters is to be raised.

On 14 January communist forces intercepted a column of 20,000 Kuomintang troops escaping from China. under escort of French planes. The column was reported as losing 4,000 men. 12,000 other Kuomintang troops on another road reached internment without incident.

On 11 February the communists, using artillery and armor for the first time, attacked a small fort near Pholu, held by 100 French and Viet Nam troops. The post fell on the 18th. The French High Command interpreted this small operation as indicating that the enemy had received heavy weapons and tactical guidance, and could now be expected to pass to a regular military offensive in lieu of guerrilla operations.

Nothing like that has so far happened. The Chinese border is tranquil, with trade normal. Communist troops have been identified by air observation as in China. Bands of under 200 men have been intercepted in Tonkin during February about 20 miles east from Langson, near Moncay, and on the Caobang Road, but in each case made good their retreat into China. This is a situation similar to that which prevailed in Greece.

To date Chinese aid has not been serious and supplies sent have at least in part been intercepted. Chinese are furnishing only what is paid for and as Indo-Chinese communists are short of funds they are able to purchase but little. This situation may change, but as this account closes there is lack of evidence that the communists are capable of engaging in a major operation.

**INDONESIA**

The new state of Indonesia has been functioning since 27 December, 1949. The Dutch troops, 3 divisions plus services, are withdrawing. The Dutch Navy is by agreement to remain during 1950 but to operate under Indonesia orders.

The Statute of Independence for Indonesia leaves that state economically under Dutch control. It protects Dutch investments, provides for unlimited transfer of funds to the Netherlands to pay dividends, insurance, pensions, etc. Dutch firms may not be taxed more than comparable native properties, of which so far there are none. Within quotas that may be established by law, Dutch imports may not be restricted.

On 15 February, President Soekarno (has no first name) opened the first Parliament at Jakarta, new name for Batavia. He admitted a difficult situation. The budget was short US $650,000,000. The government did not have as much popular support as it had had in 1945, at the end of the Japanese occupation. Already a rebellion had started in west Java. This rebellion is led by Captain Raymond P. Westerling, who served honorably in the Dutch Army in Europe in 1940, then with the Allies in Burma, and again with the Dutch in Indonesia. He was honorably mustered out in 1948. His father was Dutch and his mother a Turk, and is frequently called Turk Westerling. By religion he is Mohammedan. He has raised a private army, small but efficient, designated as The Heavenly Host. Mission is to rid Indonesia of the pro-Japanese element.

He started operations on 4 January, when 2 battalions of about 1,000 men each by a surprise attack raided Brebes (25 miles east of Cheribon). On the 22nd he raided Chamahi (11 miles west of Bandoeng), and next day captured Bandoeng itself, where he secured many arms and supplies. Minor operations occurred in February. On 23 February Westerling flew to Malaya, ostensibly to secure aid and funds. He stated that as a guerrilla force he could continue, but that for major operations outside support was needed. Indonesia G-2 estimates that Westerling's forces number between 10,000 and 15,000 troops, and include former Dutch paratroops and men from former Commando organizations.

**PHILIPPINES**

The economic condition in the Philippines is none too good. Like all other countries in Southeast Asia they are seeking financial and other aid from the United States; but are not too willing to do anything in return.

**Military.** At the beginning of 1950, the Army consisted of 1 battalion of infantry, plus some services; the Air Force of 135 planes, of which only half were operational; and the Navy of 38 small vessels, of which 18 were operational. The Constabulary (MPs) had 18,000 men, including some armor and planes, and were nearly all engaged in seeking to suppress the Hukmalahap rebellion. Notwithstanding over 3 years of campaigning, the Huks are increasing in numbers, strength, and extent of operations. These now extend into the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, Quezon, Cavite, Bataan, Zambales, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, and Isabella (Cagayan valley). The Huks are communist led and directed.

To protect themselves against Huk raids, owners of estates have employed armed anti-communist guards. This has worked well. Seeing that success, governors of provinces have similarly raised armed guards, which operate without authority of the central government. These guards are a tough lot, and on election day were used to prevent undesired voters from casting their ballots. With Huks, Constabulary,

(Continued on page 94)
Cool, Competent Analysis of Russia

MY THREE YEARS IN MOSCOW By
Walter Bedell Smith. 346 pages. J. B.
Lippincott. $3.75.

By Dr. Julian Towster

This serious and absorbing book will
be particularly welcomed by all who are
easternly concerned with coming as
close as possible to the ascertainable
truth in the search of light on Russia.

It is not too much to say that never
before in the history of this republic was
sound knowledge of a single foreign
country of such vital import to the
national interest. Unfortunately, it is also
ture that there has never been a time like
the present when so much emotional
writing on the subject is flooding the
market. It is works such as this account
by our former ambassador to Moscow
that help to redress the balance.

The volume is singularly free of
sensationalism, bias or bombast, and is
richly rewarding in penetrating insight
on many crucial topics of Soviet
government and politics. In concrete and
realistic terms, the book appraises the
roles and personalities of Stalin and his
associates, surveys the nature of
propaganda, religion and culture, and the
mechanics of elections and police
surveillance in the system of rule, offers
first-hand observations on industry,
agriculture, and lesser subjects, and
estimates the goals and prospects of
Soviet policy abroad. Even where the
data or conclusions are not new, they
derive particular value from the fact that
General Smith brought to his task an
incisive mind and dispassionate
approach and—despite the unique
handicaps attending the foreign diplomat
in Moscow—was able to observe
conditions and verify interpretations on
the spot. There is, in consequence, a
quality of reality about the book which
the distant scholar, with the best of
intentions and abundant use of source
materials, can rarely approximate.

General Smith corrects a number of
existing conceptions about the Soviet
rulers. He holds that Stalin is neither an
absolute dictator nor a prisoner of the
Politburo, but more like a "chairman of
the board with the decisive vote," and that
while there are cliques and divisions on
policy in the Politburo, none is anti-
Stalinist. As regards the Party, he
confirms the view that it has emerged
even stronger from the stress and strain of
the war, continuing and augmenting the
practices of employing the
instrumentalities of repression, education
and propaganda to maintain its power and
exercise total control over the lives and
activities of the citizenry. In one of the
profoundest observations of the study,
General Smith lays this control in large
measure to the influence of the despotic
Tsarist heritage on Soviet organizational
concepts, and to the desperate struggle to
overcome Russia's historical
backwardness and attain a footing of
economic equality with the West—a
struggle in which "the fear of defeat in
war" has been the main driving force.

The author sees as the fundamental
issue dividing the Soviet Union from the
Western democracies the striving of the
former to extend its pattern of control to
the rest of the world, as opposed to
America's desire for one world
organized on the lines of Western
democracy, which would guarantee
inalienable rights to the individual.
Probing the ideological basis of Soviet
foreign policy, he finds that now as ever
the ultimate goal of that policy remains
world revolution and Communist world
domination. And pointing to Lenin's
statement in 1919 that "the existence of
the Soviet Republic side by side with
imperialist states for a long time is
unthinkable," he contends that in the
light of this dictum—repeated in later
Party statements—current Soviet
protestations that communism and
capitalism can coexist in the same world
"for a long time" must be regarded as
mere tactical maneuvers.

Nevertheless, General Smith refrains
from drawing gloomy conclusions. He
believes that the Soviet Union cannot
overtake the U. S. A. in 5 or 10 years,
that the resentful East European and
Asiatic satellites constitute a continuing
strain on Soviet power, and that judging
by past experience the USSR is not
likely to risk defeat in aggressive war in
the near future. Nor does Soviet
possession of the atomic weapon
necessarily increase the probability of
war, since the factor of fear of retaliation
would still operate. General Smith also
points out that because of their long-
range theory that regardless of
temporary stabilization capitalism is
decaying while exemplary progress is
taking place in the USSR, the Soviet
leaders may feel that the relative
position of the Soviet Union is bound to
improve with time, and that military
adventures are consequently
unwarranted. In his final conclusions,
General Smith sees a chance for a
protracted coexistence of the present
kind in the mustering of the united
strength of the West. He visualizes,
however, the best assurance of peace in
the total strength of our own nation, first
and foremost in its passionate devotion
to the free way of life.

There is little in this splendid volume
that lends itself to challenge. Some may
perhaps feel that the identification
of Communism and "Great-Russianism" is overemphasized. The partial return to traditional Russian values was used during the war to hold the allegiance of the central, Great-Russian nationality. But Russian nationalism per se has little appeal for the Soviet minority groups and can never serve as a magnet or unifying symbol for peoples beyond the frontiers. The Soviet leaders will probably continue to walk an ideological tight-rope in this dilemma, alternately emphasizing traditional Russian symbols and such slogans as "proletarian internationalism."

A more crucial question is encompassed by the carefully weighed conclusion that the Soviet leaders are prisoners of a slavish and unquestioning devotion to Communist ideological concepts, including those which posit a continuing struggle between the Communist and non-Communist world. Its implication for the future of relations between nations is worth pondering about. General Smith slightly qualifies his strong conviction that the Soviet leaders cannot be expected to change their long-standing beliefs with the statement "unless circumstances forced them to do so." It is what those circumstances are going to be, and how long they can be made to last, that goes to the heart of the problem, and in the last analysis the total balance of power—material, military and moral—will be the decisive factor. Whether the consideration that "coexistence is preferable to coextinction" can prevail long enough to wear down and ultimately render untenable the Soviet thesis of inevitable conflict, only the future can tell.

In conclusion, the singular balance of judgment which permeates this book deserves particular commendation. On the question of forced labor, for instance, General Smith makes the pungent comment that whether there are one or ten million political prisoners in the USSR is from our viewpoint less important than the fact that individuals are deprived of their liberty and sent to concentration camps for political and economic reasons. He displays no disposition whatever to minimize the effectiveness of Soviet troops, equipment, engineering, or defense preparedness. And on the disputed topic of internal tensions he remarks that he does not share the view of seething resentment against the regime, that in fact the vast majority of the Soviet people, without experience in the processes of democracy or any standards of comparison, believe that they possess the fruits of democracy and see in Stalin the protecting "little father" that the national psychology appears to require.

If the lessons of our wartime political research have proved anything, it was the great value of careful and balanced research, of avoiding the danger of either overestimating or underestimating trends, conditions and capabilities in the international arena. This has obviously been likewise the guiding principle in the composition of this excellent book. Therein lies its intrinsic and enduring merit.

**Pivot of the Cold War Front**

**DECISION IN GERMANY. By General Lucius D. Clay. Doubleday and Co. $4.50.**

By Dr. Walter L Dorn

No one who professes any concern for the responsibilities and burdens of American policy in Europe since the war can afford to ignore this timely, important, and remarkable book. It is true, *Decision in Germany* is neither a full history nor a critical study; it is rather a report that seeks to draw the upshot of American Military Government, written by the only person who could write it, the United States Army General who for four years was the responsible executor of American policy in Germany. Such a report, available to the general public, was long overdue and General Clay has earned the gratitude of this public for having undertaken the arduous task.

Perhaps no operation of the American Government has been more frequently investigated and reported upon with more contradictory resulting opinion than our Military Government in Germany. Now, for the first time, have the countless and varied strains of Military Government operations been brought together into a single volume and brought into a sharp focus where the relationship between these operations become plainly visible. Now, too, for the first time it is possible to review

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the entire operation with its successes and failures with something like a balanced judgment. General Clay writes with a sobriety and clarity that are calculated to inform rather than conceal, and, while he does not stint with personal convictions and judgments, his modesty and restraint will not escape the reader. It may be that General Clay's book will not answer entirely every question which the inquisitive reader raises, but it will carry him a very long way in that direction. The book wants a close reading, for many of his most important remarks are often tucked away as obiter dicta in places where the reader least expects to find them.

Decision in Germany presents a panoramic record of Military Government as General Clay sees it at the moment when he surrendered his responsibilities to the new High Commissioner, Mr. John McCloy. If there are passages where this record appears a trifle complicated, it is because the subject itself is one of infinite complexity. Since General Clay is one of the most agile, resourceful and quick-witted of men in conference, the reader will find his chapters devoted to the successive meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers dealing with German affairs and especially the Four Power Control Council in Berlin among the most informative and arresting of the entire book. Most dramatic, of course, is the chapter on the blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Military Administration, although it is by no means the pivotal chapter as the title of the book might suggest. General Clay is at his best, his logic most compelling, his mastery of materials most flawless, when he writes of the problems of post-war German economy, of food and agriculture, of reparations and the successive permitted levels of German industry, of the currency reform of 1948 and the Marshall Plan, and of the discussions that led to the Ruhr Statute and the International Ruhr Authority.

This reviewer at least regards the chapter on Security easily the most penetrating and brilliant of the entire book. His discussion of decartelization and deconcentration of excessive concentrations of economic power in German industry constitute a convincing and effective reply to the hypercritical Ferguson Report. No less absorbing and illuminating is the final chapter dealing with the Bonn Parliamentary Council and the drafting of the Basic Law of the Western German Republic and General Clay's own role in the final acceptance of this document by the three Western Allies. By comparison the chapters dealing with denazification, the press, and education are less felicitous. Many readers will not share General Clay's apparent satisfaction with the work of the Education Division, regarded by many as Military Government's most conspicuous failure, a failure, to be sure, which was partially retrieved by more enlightened leadership in the last year of Clay's administration. But even in these chapters Clay's cautious and sober judgment never deserts him.

What are some of the larger considerations that emerge from a reading of this volume? First, the volume effectively disposes of the widely accepted myth of the independent American proconsul in Europe. Almost every page of this book bears testimony to General Clay's close association with his government in Washington and his refusal to act unless and until he was covered by corresponding instructions from home. That a strong, resolute, and well informed person such as General Clay should frequently influence the policy involved in these instructions goes without saying, and, as the reader will find, this influence was usually on the side of sanity and good judgment. That disagreements with the State Department did in fact arise is generally well known. However, these differences were not of Clay's making but due rather to the fact that he was administering appropriated funds and that he felt himself in duty bound to adhere to the terms of appropriation even when the State Department advocated a more enlightened policy. The difficulty lay in Washington and not in Europe.

The other reflection which emerges from a careful perusal of General Clay's though-provoking volume is the
industrial combines, or in the matter of the level of industry, dismantling industrial plants or reparations.

Perhaps the candid discussion of all these vital issues by General Clay in the volume under discussion will help to clarify the atmosphere and eventually produce a consistent policy in Germany which is now so sorely needed.

Topside Ringside
WAS THERE. By Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. Whittlesey House. 525pp. $5.00.

By Dr. R. A. Winnacker

Fleet admiral Leahy occupied one of the potentially most important positions in World War II. As Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army and Navy, he presided at the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, drafted messages and statements for the President, and daily briefed the President on current military developments. A man more personally ambitious and less inclined to a strict and limited definition of his duties than Admiral Leahy could have made this job the most influential one in the government, next to that of the President. The fact that such ambitions never controlled his actions explains the Admiral's strength and limitations as well as President Roosevelt's and President Truman's feeling that he was indispensable.

One quarter of the book is devoted to Admiral Leahy's activities as American Ambassador at Vichy during 1941 and 1942 and the other three quarters to a compilation of notes and reminiscences on the major strategic developments from July 1942 to the end of hostilities with Japan in August 1945. The Admiral attended all the conferences between the Allied leaders during the latter period, except Casablanca. He accompanied the President on most of his vacations and inspection trips. He participated in all the discussions of our professional military leaders. Nobody had a better ringside seat during the war than Admiral Leahy.

In view of all these activities, the reader might expect some new and startling revelations on our wartime policy. Such expectations will be disappointed. The book is more important for the light it throws on the author than for its new contributions to our knowledge of World War II. In general, Admiral Leahy confirms what we have been told by Secretaries Stimson, Hull, Stettinius, and Byrnes and by Robert Sherwood in his "Roosevelt and Hopkins." The differences between the Army and the Navy, the difficulties in coordinating British and American policy, the persistent attempts to obtain Soviet cooperation, the struggle to build a peaceful world against overwhelming odds, all these events are highlighted once more. What is new is the Admiral's reaction to these events, his likes and dislikes, his reports on the opinions of his contemporaries. For all this, the book is indispensable to any student of World War II.

Those who still believe that we had nothing but a military policy during World War II will be confirmed in their opinion by Admiral Leahy's account. By temperament conservative and by training interested in immediate results, Admiral Leahy evaluated political developments above all by their direct contribution to military goals. Nothing in these pages would make the reader suspect that Petain and his associates were arch-reactionaries. Mussolini "brought about an improvement of conditions which previously had verged on anarchy," but "made his fatal mistake by joining Hitler." The opposition to Darlan's rule in North Africa seemed explainable only as the result of some sinister plot. The complexity of political forces and their importance in war and peace appear to escape the author almost completely. As President Roosevelt remarked in jest: "Bill, politically, you belong to the Middle Ages."

On his likes and dislikes, the author leaves few doubts, though at times it is difficult to discover whether his judgments were made at the moment or are based on hindsight. Next to the two Presidents whom he served, Harry Hopkins and his colleagues in the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff receive the highest praise. He admired Churchill but was deeply suspicious of British policy. For de Gaulle nothing bad enough can be said. Mrs. Roosevelt's idealism and her conversational
skill come in for some criticism. He considered Hart, King, and Nimitz as the best of the high naval command. Of the many incisive comments on leading personalities throughout the book, the one inadvertently most pointed is addressed to Mr. Herbert Evatt, the Australian Minister of Defense: "He spoke with an Australian accent that made it difficult for me to understand despite my having been familiar, forty years before, with the colloquial speech of uneducated inhabitants of Australia."

Regarding the policies pursued during World War II, Admiral Leahy felt strongest about our French policy, which he believes resulted in our "imposition" on France of the Government of de Gaulle. Whatever concessions were made to Soviet Russia at Yalta were in his opinion reasonable, but, like many other Navy officers, he never felt that Soviet participation in the Japanese war was necessary. He points out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though they ordered the preparation of plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, never authorized the invasion itself. He disapproved of the trial of war criminals and strategic bombing and belongs to the school which holds that the use of the atom bomb was of no material assistance in our war against Japan.

The book concludes with serious apprehensions about the future. The atom bomb, bacteriological warfare, and poison gas have brought "a modern type of barbarian not worthy of a Christian man," but, like the vast majority of us, Admiral Leahy sees no alternative under present world conditions to a strong armament policy.

I Was There is a valuable book, honest and straightforward, a credit to one of the outstanding public servants of our times.

Cold War Tactics

THE COMING DEFEAT OF COMMUNISM. By James Burnham. 278 pages. John Day Company. $3.50.

By Richard Cordon McCloskey

Mr. Burnham deals with the menace of Communism as a problem in logic. As a former Communist familiar with the twists and turns of the Communist party line he should realize the illogicality of the approach. His slogan on the title page of this book says, "Who says A, must say B." That may follow logically, but it doesn't follow in world politics.

The Russians said A in the Berlin blockade, but when we said "airstrike" and produced it, the Russians did not say B. They said A in Greece, but when we countered with a military mission and other help, the Russians didn't say B. They said A in Iran in 1946, but when the UN bristled the Russians didn't say B. They said "Sorry," and got out.

Mr. Burnham says that the Russians are waging war against us right now—an opinion in which I concur. Dropping an A, H or X bomb on Russia would not, he claims, prevent war, it would only prevent defeat—and he's not too sure it would prevent that. He does not advocate open war as a retaliatory measure, he advocates using Russia's methods, but using them "smarter and quicker." Stir up strife among the satellites, encourage desertions and escape from Russia itself, subsidize underground movements, strengthen Germany, quadruple our propaganda barrage—in short, beat the Russians at their own game.

Agree with him or not, Burnham has written a controversial and enjoyable book. It will be quoted a lot by those who can't cope with the constant disorder of life and who prefer pat solutions, who believe that "Who says A, must say B."

The American System

THE PRICE OF UNION. By Herbert Agar. 691 pages. Notes, index, maps. Houghton Mifflin Co. $5.00.

By Allan L. Otten

Herbert Agar, distinguished American historian, editor, lecturer and government official, here gives his own interpretation of U. S. history from the beginning of real resistance to the British in the 1760's down to 1909, after which time "the political passions of today confuse the issue and much of the evidence is not yet sifted." His basic history is sound; he has added a fresh and intelligent interpretation; and he has made the entire period seem amazingly contemporary and interesting. In short, he has accomplished that rare and difficult feat of writing a readable history.

The basic thesis, which colors the telling of every incident, is that our democracy has survived and flourished not only because it fulfills a basic need of mankind but also because the written Constitution has been given resilience and flexibility by an unwritten constitution. First, the government planned as a very loose federation grew steadily more centralized as the need for central control developed. Second, the office of the president, instead of remaining out of control of the mob as intended, was actually captured by the emerging democracy in the Jackson era. And finally and most important, modern political parties emerged and "stabilized the other changes and saved the whole system from stagnation."

It is this evaluation of the party system that is the most controversial and yet most interesting aspect of Mr. Agar's thesis. He claims the parties are the only device capable of solving the regional problems created by America's size and diverse interests and the constitutional problems created by the separation of powers between the states and federal government, and within the federal government, among the branches. It is through parties, he maintains, that compromises are worked out—which the parties became dogmatic we had Civil War. It is through parties that the minority groups are felt and the absolute rule of the majority softened, that the President is strengthened when necessary and checked when necessary, that the powers of the states are maintained.

The faults are admitted. "Brains and energy are lavished not on the search for truth but on the search for bargains, for concessions which will soothe well-organized minorities, for excuses to justify delay and denial. Every interest which is strong enough to make trouble must usually be satisfied before anything can be done. This means great caution in attempting new policies. Obstruction, evasion, well-nigh intolerable slowness—these are the costs of America's federal union. And the endless bartering of minor favors is also part of the price. And so is the absence of a clear purpose whenever the
President is weak and self-effacing." Yet no matter how high this price of union, Mr Agar concludes, "it is small compared to the price which other continents have paid for disunion and to what America paid for her own years of disunion."

Much can be questioned in all this, of course. Maybe we should be more worried than Mr. Agar is about this business of deliberately sidestepping issues. Maybe a slow-moving system good enough for the 1940's is not enough for the 1960's. Maybe a policy which worked when the U. S. was one of the five or six world powers is inadequate when the U. S. is one of two leading contenders in a global struggle. Nonetheless, these are questions which the reader will be in a far better position to understand and decide once he has read this very excellent book.

Literary Flak


By John R. Cuneo

Mr. Andrews, military writer for the Washington Post, here tries to down the Goliath of strategic air power with this small book angrily hurled from his typewriter with all his power.

His attack is primarily directed against the prevailing doctrine that strategic air power is our only sword and shield in a possible war with Russia. In the course of his argument he tilts with the air-power advocates on a multitude of minor issues. In my opinion he is more successful in his main attack than in some of the collateral matters.

He has a good chapter which summarizes the current military situation and the problems which face us. His conclusion is that we face a land war to be fought by the Allies at the end of long seaborne lines of communication. The "victory through air power" solution is unfavorably compared with a coupling of land, sea and air power into a balanced unit. He has, it must be emphasized no idea of neglecting strategic bombardment of proper objectives, but he denies that it is our only means of defeating Russia. In fact such a doctrine in his opinion invites defeat.

This leads him to a consideration of the necessity for sea power — particularly in the field of logistics—and for Naval control of its own aircraft. He presents a better argument than the Navy did last fall when it allowed itself to be drawn into strategic bombing argument before Congress.

Mr. Andrews then calls attention to the apparent neglect of air support of ground operations — a situation which the Army has been silently accepting. He is concerned about the sorry position of the Army whose high command, in his opinion, has accepted a secondary role assigned to it by the Air Force in which the ground forces are merely to occupy territory won by bombing. His chapters in this field will set many army heads nodding in agreement.

He is not blind to the fact that air power is the darling of the public who accepts its doctrines as absolute truth. He attempts to show how the Air Force came to dominate the military establishment. He illustrates this with an instance how the Air Force wangled a violently partisan study of the Pacific war into print as a part of the Bombing Survey—otherwise known for its fairness and objectivity.

To show how confused is general thinking on the problem, he quotes the statements of some of our Congressmen. It should puncture the pose of many a pretended expert. Similar statements in the field of farming or foreign relations would haunt the makers to their graves but nobody seems to pay any attention to their ignorance in military matters.

The author has his solution to the whole problem: a division of the military establishment along functional lines into a Combat Force, Logistical Force and Support Force. It is a logical development but even the author admits there is very little chance of its adoption.

An argumentative book of this type written by an able writer is exciting reading and its brevity with a minimum of citations makes it easy. It is designed to appeal to the general reader and may gain a wide audience. I doubt if it will do more than sting the Air Force on the surface. This is not because its doctrine is unpuncturable—as he shows. But I'm afraid the public won't listen to the other side.

World’s Aircraft, Navies and Merchant Marine


The 1949-50 editions of these classic reference books contain several new features in addition to latest available data on all ships of air and sea. The top-listed volume celebrates the publisher’s fortieth year of recording the development of aviation and leads off with commemorative articles by Glen L. Martin and F. Handley-Page. Format slightly differs for the better from former years with three columns per page rather than two, more readable type and more effective placement of illustrations; the section on acro-engines is divided into gas-turbine and piston-type subsections; approximately 85% of the illustrations are new. American and British aviation continue to dominate the sections on individual aircraft types, with France a slow third. As before, scanty data on Russian craft has been obtainable, though this edition features an interesting discussion of general Russian aviation developments, and drawings of the later Russian jet-types based on observers’ impressions rather than the wartime photos apparently from captured German photos which formed the bulk of illustrations in previous editions. An addenda contains latest jet-types revealed while the book was already being readied for the press.

Jane’s Fighting Ships this year is able to establish quite clearly the peacetime level of nations’ navies as they have emerged from the swollen war quotas. The colossal U. S. fleet of 2,600 warships tops the list; a Japanese section is included for the first time since WW II; ironically reversed from aircraft editorial experience, the editors report an unwieldy flood of data on Russian naval building, which made it necessary to sift and reject a great deal to avoid disseminating propaganda and fear. This might be ominous as well as ironical.
This year Merchant Ships is half its former price (last edition 1944) and lists by class rather than country, with small recognition drawings and photographs of individual ships; it includes a list of allied shipping lost during the war, and all shipping under construction to March 1949. NLD

Aircraft and Industry
SLIPSTREAM. By Eugene E. Wilson. Whittlesey House. 328 pages, index. $4.50.
By John R. Cuneo
Although Mr. Wilson is best known as a spokesman for the aircraft industry, the first half of his book is a personal view of naval air history from 1919 to 1930. To a large extent it revolves about Admiral Moffett. While Moffett's work is not unknown, his substantial achievements have received little attention in comparison to the publicity given more glamorous figures. Recognition is long overdue. Without his work the Navy might have entered World War II with an air arm as weak as its British counterpart.

It's a breezy account of an interesting career. From the Navy he went into the aircraft industry and experienced the slow times of the thirties until World War II opened the floodgates to orders. The manufacturing achievement is not the least important aspect of our air power in World War II and this book gives many sidelights on this phase.

(Continued from page 87)

armed guards — provincial and private — all operating against each other, peace and order is disappearing. February the Government increased the Army by seven infantry battalions, amounting to some 3,000 men. The men were obtained by transfers from the Constabulary, whose strength was decreased by the same number of men. This move is a rescinding of the GO issued in September 1948, which transferred 8,000 infantry, armor, and artillery to the Constabulary and charged the latter with suppression of the Huks. Transfers of more men in the near future seems to be intended.

The Army was issued orders also on 21 February to initiate campaigns for exterminating the Huks in the vicinity of Subic Bay (much jungle and mountains); along the Quezon and Laguna border (close to Manila, and site of a strenuous Japanese defense in 1945); and in Cagayan valley.

Similar orders have been issued in the past, but the Huks continue to grow. It is supposed, but not proved, that the Huks receive aid from China. They are not popular with the mass of Filipinos, who are staunch Catholics and opposed to communism. Huks are not at this time strong enough to threaten the Government, but they may become so in time.

ATOMIC WARFARE

President Truman on 31 January announced that he had "directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or super-bomb." No nation has acknowledged having the hydrogen bomb, but calculations indicate that it is immensely more powerful than the uranium bomb.

Notwithstanding the above, there are unconfirmed reports that Russia has already tested at least one hydrogen bomb, and is about ready to test others. Since the possibility of hydrogen bombs has been known for at least 6 years within the United States, and possibly in other countries, it is not impossible that Russia may have manufactured some. Reports on Russian production of uranium bombs, all unconfirmed, now are that it is about 50 per annum, with a considerable stock pile already on hand.

Reports from Berlin state that Russia claims to have discovered and is manufacturing an insulin derivative which immunizes against atomic radiation. First priority has been given to providing 20 million doses for Moscow. The explanation for such a large number for a single place is that immunization lasts for only three days.

Comments. In spite of numerous objections to the use of atomic war on the ground that it is immoral, it is possible that there will be no hesitation to use it whenever it appears advantageous to do so. On 2 February, the Vatican in an informal statement stated that for President Truman to have made his grave decision of 31 January meant that the United States, most interested in peace, could find no other solution, as agreement with Russia seemed to be impossible.

Spy organizations have been, and are, extensive. It is now known that since 1944, or even earlier, major American discoveries and decisions on atomic warfare have been communicated to Russia. In view of the intense interest in atomic war, continuous efforts to discover what is being accomplished are sure to continue. Experience indicates that there is no assurance that new developments can be kept secret for long.
In these postwar years when it sometimes seems that most of those who recently laid down the sword hastened to grasp the nearest pen, it is supremely appropriate to note that Duff Cooper reveals in his book *Sergeant Shakespeare* (Viking—$2.50) that the baffling bard himself served a tour of military duty immediately prior to his own literary career. Results thereafter soon lost much resemblance to those of our latter-day literary soldiers but the original parallel is deftly constructed in a piece of Shakespearean research, as he probes the bard, includes some very effective cuts at the boudoir—and the large proportion of martial temperament of all ages. 

Provocative comments on the military project is the book in which the author makes his case with graceful brevity, wit and common sense rather than scholarly detail. He starts with several logical speculations concerning those early years of Shakespeare's life of which we have no direct evidence, continuing in light vein but with strong sinews to form an ingenious framework of literary detective work among the plays and even the sonnets. Shrewdly and persuasively he cites Shakespeare's remarkably frequent and knowledgeable allusions to things military—often in situations as far removed as the boudoir—and the large proportion of martial characters and scenes throughout the plays. (We might wish the author had weighed for us the fact that such preoccupation is true of most other Elizabethan playwrights.) Cooper's sound scholarship and World War I combat experience equally underlie this refreshing piece of Shakespearean research, as he probes the bard, includes some very effective cuts at Bacon and Oxford followers and furnishes provocative comments on the military temperament of all ages.

Three recent entries reiterate the evils of the Soviet system as seen through greatly different eyes. *Leaves from A Russian Diary* by Pitirim A. Sorokin (Beacon Press—$3.50) reprints the author's 1924 revelation of how the Bolsheviks took over the original Russian revolution of the liberal intellectuals, of whom Sorokin was a prominent member as Kerensky's secretary. In diary form and taken from journals apparently maintained almost day by day during the tremendous political upheavals, purges and counter-purges through which he passed from 1917 until exile in 1922, these pages convey a vivid first-hand impression of the revolutionary struggles, the people and parties entangled there, and much that is prophetic of the world today. Sorokin, founder of the Sociology departments of Petrograd and Harvard Universities, now on the faculty of Harvard, adds an illuminating chapter which weighs the success and failures of the Russian Revolution 30 years afterward.

Peter Pirigov tells the story of his own flight from Russia twenty-six years after that of Sorokin in *Why I Escaped* (Duell, Sloane Pearce $3.50). In a tone of simple and compelling spontaneity he relates his early training, service in the air corps, gradual revulsion against the Soviet system, hazardous escape with another officer and subsequent life in the United States (including details of the headline story when Soviet agents attempted to kidnap him). The book is noteworthy as an indictment of the Soviet government by a young man who was completely a product of its training and occupied the relatively favored position of air corps officer; its detailed treatment of Soviet Army life during and after the war will be of particular interest to military men.

In *The Police State* (E. P. Dutton—$3.00), Craig Thompson sums up two years as journalist in Russia with a short readable analysis of outstanding aspects of the Soviet past and present, drawing a good deal from source books previously reviewed in this column. His book is a lighter and lesser replica of *The Country of the Blind* (see Jan-Feb. JOURNAL), though a chapter on the Red Army is new and important material.

One of the most unusual and colorful sidelights of the recent Pacific war is interestingly recollected in both fiction and nonfiction this month with, respectively, *The King of Faisarai* by David Divine (MacMillan—$3.00), and *King Doctor of Ulithi* by M. P. Wees and F. B. Thornton (MacMillan—$2.50). Each book concerns Navy doctor Wees' six-month assignment to bring health and new hope to the dying natives of Ulithi atoll, foremost naval base for our Philippine and Okinawa invasions. Japanese occupation and disease had decimated the population and nearly broken their spirits; Dr. Wees, with no knowledge of the native language or customs, landed as "Task Force One" and so completely won back the island people physically and spiritually that they made him king. It was no easy job to overcome native apathy, distrust of the modern medical science brought by this last of many conquerors and each book reflects the combination of idyllic South Sea life with the fervor of a crusade. Both books illuminate the beauty, drama and humor of this island resurrection; together they form an interesting contrast in fictional and non-fictional treatment of an identical incident. Divine's novel embellishes effectively without outraging fact while the doctor's own "case history" stands easily on the factual merit of his unique experience.

An informal, erratic and often hilarious side of regular Navy life, completely unexpected to most Army men who recall their recent allies, is revealed by William J. Lederer (Commander, USN) in *All The Ship's at Sea* (Sloane—$3.00). Military career novels have recently dragged the market; this novel career will revive all jaded casualties. The author's highly original approach to Navy life is clear at the outset: many have obtained entry to the Naval Academy through a well-packed head; he gained the opportunity from a well-polished Navy one. Thus flushed with success, he and his chosen friends seldom relaxed their unorthodox tactics through peace or war, afloat or ashore, and a rollicking yarn blithely unravels.

Typical bright spots are the exploits of Abe Brown, colored mess steward, in making a hot fighting ship out of a demoralized destroyer; Lederer winning a Chinese waterfront dive in a crap game, then billing his captain (in detail) for the latter's month of refreshment and entertainment there; desperate development of the most remarkably operated ship's mess on the high seas.

There are vivid flashes of combat action, revealing vignettes of leadership and men at sea and a growing sense of the development of a seaman and commander to enrich the book's humor. His 292 pages are as casually crammed as an old seabag, permeated with a delightful salty tang.

The first complete firsthand survey of Sinkiang Province, Inner Asia's melting-pot

PIVOT OF ASIA

By OWEN LATTIMORE

Author of "The Situation in Asia"

The foremost authority on the deep interior of Asia here describes the tiny province where Soviet Russia stands at the back doors of China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. For the vital truth about a spectacularly important spot on the map of Asia read this informed, accurate, vastly important study of power and politics, against a comprehensive background of little known peoples and their civilization.

As Atlantic Monthly Press Book

U. S. Field Artillery Ass'n 1218 Conn. Ave., Wash. 6, D. C. $3.50
picture of the diplomatic world—an arena of such overwhelming importance to us today—and of the new as well as old forces in conflict there.

Which animals (excepting most human ones) are actually the most intelligent, the most neurotic, least like what we think them to be? In Animal IQ (Dial—$2.50) Vance Packard answers these and many other questions in a series of illustrations—both text and photos—from recent tests by animal psychiatrists. Chimpianzees top the list for intelligence, frequently out-thinking 5-year-old humans in set problems, wild animals generally outdo the domestices, and the horse is near the bottom of the ladder. The discussion of such concepts as the difference between instinct and reasoning, proven animal ability at limited conversation and their similarities to humans proceeds with much wit and wisdom to shatter most of our cherished notions of the animal world.

In the wake of George Orwell's highly impressive and successful novel Nineteen Eighty-Four emerges his Coming Up for Air (Harcourt-Brace—$3.00), written in the late '30's but not before published here. Instead of the dark future, this book projects its main character, George Bowling, into the golden past, for a lower class cavalee of England from 1893 to 1938. Bowling comes up for air from the stagnant pressure of family row-house existence via an escape bubble of seventeen pounds won at the races, takes a secret vacation to the village of his birth to reflect on man's origins and objectives. There is an engaging blend of whimsical humor and blunt Cockney reality in this journey to the past; like 1984 it has Orwell's observant sympathy for the small man of the machine age in his search for dignity and meaning, but its main tone is warm nostalgia rather than grim despair.

The Hunter (Scribner's—$2.75) by Hugh Forsburgh (Scribner's—$2.75) is a novel of stark masculine impact, hinging on three ill-matched men in a violent mountain-lion hunt among the New Mexican mountains. Monk Taylor, who equally rejects all bonds of eastern or western life, including the girl who loves him, lives mainly for the elemental challenge of the hunt; on a climatic foray he takes along two easterners, one mature and arrogant, one young and eager. Human tensions rise even higher than the driving pace of the chase; their final eruption under pressure of mortal danger temporarily shatters Monk's self-centeredness and scars all except the lion. It is a novel of conflict on several levels, stripped down for action and simply woven of tough fiber.

Frank S. Smythe, noted British mountain climber, has created a strikingly beautiful book in Behold The Mountains (Chanticleer—$5.00). His skillful text recreates the highlights of his own and others' adventures in four great mountain climbing sectors of the world—the Himalayas, the British hills, Switzerland and North America. Of these, the Himalayan accounts and superb photos are outstanding in dramatic power while the American coverage is understandably spotty. Fifty-seven magnificient color photographs with full explanatory captions make the book a vivid experience for the expert or the fireside climber.
The wartime commander of Air Forces in the South Pacific under General MacArthur gives a vivid, punchy and professionally valuable account of the problems and personalities involved in fighting land-based aircraft from Australia to Japan.

$4.50

$5.00

"—I consider it one of the best books on the war and one which should be read by every officer engaged in planning activities of all three services . . ."

—ADMIRAL C. W. NIMITZ

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