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1-9 FA: A Maneuver TF
1-41 FA: A Fires Battalion

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The FA and COIN: Continuity and Adaptation

During peacetime, the institutional Army drives change. During war, the operating force drives change through gained combat experience.

General William S. Wallace, CG
Training and Doctrine Command
Military Review, March-April 2006

Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are essential to the successful prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the Field Artillery plays vital roles in these operations. America’s enemies continue to adapt to find ways to harm our country, our citizens, our allies and our Soldiers. They have adopted insurgent tactics to terrorize innocent civilians and attack free societies while avoiding direct confrontation with our conventional military power.

The Army, with its Field Artillery, is maintaining its military power in full-spectrum operations while adapting to defeat insurgents and must continue to do so.

**Fostering a Culture of Adaptation.** To defeat our enemies, we must embrace adaptation as a steady state rather than an end state.

An adaptive organizational culture is necessarily decentralized. Commanders encourage adaptation by issuing an overall intent and mission orders to junior leaders and encouraging those leaders to accomplish the mission with available resources.

Moreover, an organizational culture of adaptation must apply to all that an organization does, both deployed and at home station, both in the field and garrison. A unit that operates in a decentralized manner in training builds the expertise, confidence and initiative of junior leaders and Soldiers, preparing them to succeed in COIN operations.

For example, the article in this edition by Lieutenant Colonel Pat Antonietti describes his fires battalion’s training for and execution of decentralized platoon-based operations in Iraq. Until recently, Lieutenant Colonel Antonietti commanded the 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (1-41 FA), 3rd Infantry Division. During 1-41 FA’s 12-month tour, his “Hot” platoons were dispersed throughout an area of operations (AO) the size of Maryland and fired almost 6,000 rounds in support of its 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT). For more details, see the article in this edition “1-41 FA, A Fires Battalion in OIF III: Supporting Decentralized ‘Hot’ Platoons and Other Missions.”

Likewise our institutional, combat training center (CTC) and home-station training must foster a culture of adaptation in our leaders, Soldiers and units. We will never develop the “school solution” for COIN. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that worked last year may not work next year, and TTPs that worked in one place may not work in another.

We must build near real-time feedback loops into our training and institutions to capture the TTPs of the continuously adapting insurgents. By building systems that tap into the expertise of units in GWOT down to the most junior leaders, we will ensure we can adapt faster than our enemies.

The FA School is trying to do its part in helping our operating forces adapt faster than our enemies.

**School Programs and Initiatives.**

The Field Artillery School has several programs to provide more options for operating force commanders in COIN, both lethal and nonlethal, and initiatives to make the FA School more agile in adapting training for GWOT. These include fielding precision-guided munitions (PGMs), establishing specialized training for nonlethal capabilities, creating an innovative methodology to redesign school courses rapidly and standing up a cell and set of procedures to capture and incorporate GWOT FA lessons learned into institutional training.

**PGMs and Targeting.** In response to two operational needs statements (ONS) from the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of operations, we fielded the M31 guided multiple-launch rocket system (GMLRS) unitary last summer and soon will field the XM982 Excalibur unitary, a 155-mm PGM.

GMLRS unitary and Excalibur unitary are especially well suited for COIN in urban and close terrain, minimizing risks of fratricide and collateral damage and maximizing precision attack.

Army and Marine ground force commanders can employ these PGMs in all weather conditions, 24/7, as easily as a call-for-fire—no joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) are required. In addition, the forward observer (FO) on the front lines can determine the three-dimensional precision coordinates of a target’s location precisely enough to fire a PGM in just minutes using the precision-strike suite Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) software. Both the GMLRS unitary, with a range of 17 to 70 kilometers, and Excalibur unitary with a range of 7,200 meters to 40 kilometers, have an accuracy of significantly less than 10-meter circular error probable (CEP).

In Iraq, GMLRS unitary employment successes—100 percent direct hits—are feeding further successes. It is rapidly becoming the weapon of choice for COIN operations. In fact, GMLRS unitary’s accuracy caused one Marine to tag it his “70-kilometer sniper.”

Excalibur unitary, the Army’s first cannon-delivered fire-and-forget munition, can impact close to friendly troops—considerably closer than the current 600-meter restriction for danger-close fires. Its accuracy, non-ballistic...
trajectory, near vertical terminal angle of attack and 50-pound warhead allow it to take out an insurgent mortar crew or provide close support for friendly forces in urban terrain.

For more information on these PGMs and other precision capabilities under development to support the full range of military operations plus PSS-SOF software for precision target location, see the article “FA PGMs—Revolutionizing Fires for the Ground Force Commander” by Colonel Gary S. Kinne, et al, in the May-June edition.

Nonlethal Attack Options. As we move through major combat operations (MCO) into stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) and COIN operations and finally into the final phase in which our forces turn over increasing operational responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces, there is a decrease in the demand for lethal effects and an increase in the requirement for nonlethal effects. An effective COIN requires a careful blend of lethal and nonlethal capabilities, including electronic warfare (EW) and tactical information operations (IO).

In May, the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, directed the FA School to take the lead in developing training for EW officers (EWOs) at the operational level. EWOs will help commanders leverage emerging technologies to synchronize and integrate EW into operations, defeating insurgent improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and other asymmetrical tactics.

We currently are updating the EWO’s required competencies and will use the rapid course design process pioneered by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) by the leadership of the FA Captain’s Career Course (FACCC) to design the EWO course. This will allow us “to put boots on the ground” in theater as rapidly as possible.

According to Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations (February, 2003, Page 3-4), “Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support.” There is a direct correlation between the number of insurgent attacks, primarily IED attacks, and the level of Coalition support in a given area in Iraq. Our Coalition Forces must win the support of the Afghan and Iraqi people—it simply is not enough to maintain their neutrality.

Our three-week joint Tactical IO Course supports the tactical ground commander in COIN by training leaders and servicemen to win the support of the population. It trains joint personnel to integrate and synchronize the core, supporting and related IO functions into the commander’s scheme of maneuver—including operational security, public affairs (PA), civil-military operations (CMO), EW, psychological operations (PSYOP) and other functions.

The final pilot Tactical IO Course was conducted in April. Starting in June, we began the first of 10 courses per year with 30 students in each. Army personnel can sign up for the course via the Army training requirements and resources system (ATRRS). Joint personnel can sign up for the course by calling Major Erin A. McDaniels, Tactical IO Instructor, at DSN 639-1668/4508 or commercial (580) 442-1668/4508 or emailing him at erin.mcdaniel@sill.army.mil.

More Agility in Incorporating COIN Lessons Learned. Two recent initiatives are ensuring that FA School training reflects—and will continue to reflect—the contemporary operating environment (COE) with greater fidelity. The recent rapid redesign of our FACCC is a model we recommend for course redesigns/designs TRADOC-wide. In a related initiative, the FA School recently stood up the GWOT Lessons Learned Branch.

In March, the FACCC leadership created and implemented an innovative rapid course redesign process, updating the FACCC to reflect the COE, COIN and GWOT lessons learned. The FA School redesigned the 20-week course in 27 days and implemented the new course immediately. Using the traditional process, redesigning a course of this size would have taken months—probably years.

Along with tapping into the expertise of the FA School leadership, FACCC instructors, senior combat veterans, instructional systems technologists, senior trainers from the CTCs and other subject matter experts (SMEs), the leadership boldly stood down two classes of CCC students to help redesign the course. Most of the CCC students had had one tour in GWOT—many had had two tours. Once FACCC was redesigned, the two classes restarted in their respective weeks of the new CCC curriculum.

The total process took just under four weeks and not only incorporated the most up-to-date GWOT content very rapidly, it also updated instructional delivery methods to teach complex GWOT tasks in a continuous, realistic GWOT scenario. The teaching scenarios immerse the students in realistic complex challenges, helping to develop the captains into more agile, adaptive decision makers and leaders in the COE.

The FA School now is applying the same process to design not only the EWO course, but also to redesign the FA Warrant Officer’s Advanced Course (WOAC) and is preparing to redesign other courses. This rapid course redesign model can be applied to courses throughout TRADOC.

For more information, see the articles “Rapid Redesign of FACCC: A Four-Week Process for Updating Courses for an Army at War” by Major Robert A. Krieg and “Redesigning the FACCC—The Deliberate versus Rapid Methodology” by Dr. Pamela L. Raymer, both in this edition.

In addition, the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) in the FA School stood up a Lessons Learned Branch and process to more rapidly capture, analyze and disseminate GWOT lessons and TTPs for the school to incorporate into training, doctrine, material development,
etc. The branch has linked its online site to the Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) on Army Knowledge Online (AKO), so Redlegs around the world can access the FA lessons learned or submit new ones.

**Field Artillerymen as Pentathletes in COIN Operations.** Our incredible Redleg Pentathletes who are performing multiple missions in GWOT continue to prove Field Artillerymen are some of the most creative, adaptive Soldiers and leaders in the Army.

Among many other missions, Field Artillerymen routinely serve as maneuver forces in COIN. The task of providing the civilian population security is essential in gaining their support in COIN—all that insurgents need to succeed is the passive support of the civilians. Host nation civilians who feel secure provide intelligence on the insurgents, engage in political processes, participate in economic reconstruction and embrace sectarian and ethnic reconciliation.

Another outstanding example of an FA battalion’s being used as a maneuver battalion in CENTCOM is outlined in the article in this edition “Battlekings Return to Baghdad as a Maneuver Battalion: Doing More with Less” by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Merkel, Commander, and Major John Clement, Executive Officer, of 1–9 FA, 3rd Infantry Division.

Field Artillerymen also advise host nation security forces by serving on transition teams. The more Afghan and Iraqi military, police and border patrol units that are organized, equipped, trained and mentored, the more quickly Afghanistan and Iraq will be able to stand on their own against the insurgents, operating as free nations. Advising these host nation security forces is a priority mission for the Army.

While the Field Artillery and Army can take pride in adapting to the demands of GWOT, we never must become content with our accomplishments. In an Army in transformation and at war, change is the only constant.

Although COIN is the new way of war in GWOT today—and I suspect it will be for some time in the future—it is not the only way of war. As we adapt FA operations for COIN operations, we must continue to ensure Field Artillerymen can provide joint fires for ground commanders fighting at the high end of the spectrum.

Because the US military maintains its unprecedented capabilities, our enemies are afraid to mass, defend terrain or even remain stationary for long periods because they fear we will destroy them. In fact, our asymmetrical abilities to find and destroy targets quickly and precisely narrows our enemies’ options and increases US joint options.

We must continue to maintain our continuity of unprecedented capabilities while simultaneously adapting to be effective in COIN and full-spectrum military operations.

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**FA School Creates New Branch to Disseminate FA Lessons Learned**

Sharing observations, insights and experiences from the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and everyday training activities in preparation for GWOT is critical for current and future Field Artillery Soldiers. Lessons learned that apply to the force as a whole are available through the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) online at Army Knowledge Online (AKO), but this resource does not analyze lessons from an FA Soldier’s perspective.

To provide an effective, efficient mechanism for the analysis and timely dissemination of practical FA lessons learned, the Field Artillery School’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), Fort Sill, Oklahoma, recently created the Lessons Learned Branch.

**Capturing and Incorporating Lessons Learned.** Before the office was created, various organizations collected and analyzed FA lessons learned data in a variety of formats. Because lessons-learned solutions generally traverse the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains, the new branch organized a lessons learned work group with action officers representing each of the DOTMLPF stakeholders. This work group determines the scope of a field observation or problem, assigns an appropriate DOTMLPF agency to analyze and validate it, formulates a recommended solution and schedules a date of completion or implementation for the solution.

After analysis of each observation, insight or lesson learned, the ones validated are briefed to the FA Council of Colonels in the school with a course of action (COA) recommended for each. COAs might include incorporating the information into courses taught at the school, posting the information on Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) on AKO and notifying the relevant personnel of the posting, sending a commandant’s message to the field, writing an article for *Field Artillery*, or a combination of several.

If the Council of Colonels approves the COA, the lessons learned and COA are briefed to the Assistant Commandant (AC) for approval and implementation. The Lessons Learned Branch is online via the FKN’s front page. From there, a Soldier can review validated and approved FA lessons learned or submit his own observations, insights or lessons learned.

When submitting observations or insights, contributors should include three basic paragraphs of information: the issue, a discussion of the details/background of the issue and a recommendation. Each contributor also should provide his or her name, unit, email address and phone number in case the Lessons Learned Branch needs additional details or clarification of the issue.

**The Road Ahead.** The Lessons Learned Branch is implementing several initiatives to provide efficient and meaningful service to the FA community. Action officers will visit field units regularly to observe exercises and visit post-deployment after-action reviews (AARs) to gather observations and insights for lessons learned. They also will link with CALL embeds in divisional units to capture FA issues.

The Lessons Learned Branch requests your support in capturing and disseminating critical FA lessons learned. If readers have questions or suggestions, they can contact the author at jeffrey.moyer@us.army.mil or submit lessons learned on FKN.

**CSM(R) Jeffrey L. Moyer**

FA Lessons Learned Branch, DOTD, FA School, Fort Sill, OK
**Pentathletes in the 82nd Airborne Division:** Developing Critical Capabilities for the Army

This interview was conducted just before Major General Caldwell gave up command of the 82nd Airborne Division on 7 April.

*Editor*

**Q** You directed your division artillery (Div Arty) commander (Colonel Victor Petrenko) to transition the Div Arty into the division’s 4th Brigade Combat Team (modular BCT) and become its first commander. Do you think that Field Artillery officers should be eligible for Department of the Army (DA) selection to BCT commands?

**A** We must pick the most capable, qualified person to command our troops, regardless of branch. Branch designations should not be inhibitors for BCT commands. So the answer is, “Yes.”

Like the Chief of Staff [of the Army] said, we in the 82nd Airborne Division develop “Pentathletes.” We take people who already are proficient in their basic branches and have excellent skill sets and begin developing them into Pentathletes—we give them additional challenging responsibilities that broaden their career scopes.

For example, we take young FA officers who already have commanded a battery very successfully and give them second commands of headquarters companies in infantry battalions or troops in RSTA [reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition] battalions. We’ve taken an Artillery major who already had served successfully as a Div Arty S3 and on the division staff and made him a BCT XO [executive officer]. We made Major [Promotable Jeffrey M.] Jeff Sanborn an infantry brigade executive officer for a year because he was the most qualified person I had to serve in that position. And DA has endorsed my confidence in Jeff by selecting him to command an Artillery battalion.

Our 3rd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment [3-319 AFAR], the Gun Devils, deployed to Afghanistan to work for the 173rd Airborne Brigade and did an absolutely superb job as a ground maneuver force—in addition to providing indirect fires. [Lieutenant Colonel Bertrand A. Ges] Bert Ges [Commander of 3-319 AFAR] trained the Redlegs in one of his [105-mm] batteries as 155-mm gunners, and they conducted fire missions with M198 155s the entire year in Afghanistan. He also employed a 105-mm battery in Afghanistan and integrated infantry units into his battalion task force. He is a very competent officer who happens to be Artillery by trade.

I think I’ve got the best Artillerymen in the United States Army in the 82nd Division because they are so versatile and adaptable. It starts at the most senior levels with [Brigadier General James A.] Jim Cerrone, who worked for me as my Assistant Division Commander [ADC] for Support for one year, and I was blessed enough to keep him here as my ADC for Operations. My other DCG, [Brigadier General] Rodney Anderson, also is a Field Artilleryman. I served in the 25th Infantry Division when he was the Div Arty commander there. These officers are versatile, precise and capable—have done absolutely fabulous jobs.

My division command sergeant major is a Field Artilleryman: Wolf Amacker. In my 30 years in the Army, I’ve never had more respect or admiration for an NCO than I do Wolf. He gets up everyday saying, “What can I do for paratroopers today?”

But I didn’t choose any of these outstanding leaders for positions in the division because they were Field Artillerymen; I chose them because they were the best men to do the jobs. It is critical that we grow multi-talented Soldiers and leaders into adaptable, flexible Pentathletes.

For the past two years, we have done what the Chief of Staff said and developed Pentathletes. We’ve been doing that in every area, not just with Artillerymen. We’ve taken Armor officers and some aviators and put them in infantry brigade headquarters.

The reason we must do that is because we have seen in our deployments into Iraq and Afghanistan, time and time again, nobody executes standard missions. Everyone has become non-standard. And our deployments have been significant. We’ve deployed and redeployed 13,000 of our Soldiers into the CENTCOM [Central Command] theater—almost the entire division (which is roughly 15,000 Soldiers).
We, literally, have had a deployed Artillery battery commander fire FA or coordinate for indirect fire in support of a ground maneuver element in the morning and coordinate with some mullah for passageways for our forces through his area in the afternoon. The next day, he led a CMO [civil-military operations] team into a village and then commanded a ground maneuver convoy in the afternoon—then the next morning he was back in his headquarters.

The days when we could take an Artillery officer—any officer—and have him or her specialize in one skill set are gone. We don’t have that luxury anymore. He or she has to be a Pentathlete on the battlefield. We must train Soldiers and leaders at home station to develop the Pentathlete skills and mindset. We can’t wait until they’re in combat.

Q As your division is a modular force without a Div Arty, how do you cover the force FA headquarters capabilities, such as ensuring the training and certification of your FA division-wide?

A Our brigade combat team commanders are responsible for the oversight and training of their Artillery battalions. Those are their jobs now. And they’ve got the Red Book as the non-negotiable standard—which is becoming part of division Regulation 350-1 Training.

It’s working. I think in part, because we take Artillerymen who have already proven their branch skill sets in their branch qualification jobs and are putting them in other places in the BCTs. The 2nd BCT’s Artillery battalion training is probably just a little better because an Artilleryman is the brigade XO and he can ask the tough detailed questions.

Q How is the 82nd Division training Field Artillerymen to ensure they are proficient at providing fires?

A Because we have such well trained Field Artillerymen, we routinely have training exercises with some danger-close live-fire missions.

Years ago, the Artillery community in the 82nd Airborne Division developed a “Red Book.” It has all the standards, requirements and expectations for every Artilleryman who’s a part of the division—from individual to collective tasks. It’s our Bible, and we don’t deviate from it.

We deployed 10 battalion task forces to Iraq or Afghanistan in the last two years, and Field Artillerymen were in every task force. Those task forces counted on their Artillerymen to provide close and indirect fires. As the task force commanders reported to me, they understood and appreciated the value their Field Artillerymen brought. That is due, at least in part, to the fires training we conduct in the division.

In the 82nd Airborne Division, we have combined-arms live-fire exercises [CALFEXs]. These are not battalion CALFEXs but company CALFEXs where we integrate 60- and 81-mm mortars, 105-mm howitzers, attack helicopters and close air support [CAS]—rotary-wing CAS at a minimum. That’s very complex for the company level, requiring the best possible Artillerymen to integrate and work all those fires for their company commanders.

Q What do you think about the joint fires observer (JFO) concept?

A I’m a huge fan of the JFO. In the future, we are going to fight joint, so we have to develop the capabilities, such as JFOs, and train to fight joint. When I got to the division two years ago, we used to have “Large Package Week” once every two or three months. The Air Force would bring in a large package of aircraft for one week, and we’d conduct airborne proficiency training.

But we changed that about a year and a half ago. We now have eight exercises a year, called “joint forcible-entry exercises” incorporating all four services. Every operation will be joint. No matter what the mission is, at a minimum, we’re going to get on Air Force aircraft. We’re probably going to need to call for CAS using JFOs, JTACs [joint terminal attack controllers] or Marine ANGLICOs [air naval gunfire liaison company]. We’ll be using Navy P3s for imagery.

The joint forcible-entry exercise is one week long. Monday is the coordination phase; then Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday nights we execute the training with a big after-action review on Friday. In those three nights, about 3,500 paratroopers jump. We drop between 20 and 60 heavy pieces of equipment and do anywhere between 20 to 30 air-land operations on dirt strips.

At the same time, we have JSTARS [joint surveillance and target attack radar system] overhead with some of our people onboard. We send them for a week’s training on JSTARS before they fly on the surveillance aircraft.

If we can’t get JSTARS, then we use the Air Force’s Jackpot. It’s a command and control platform, a tubular unit that you fly on the surveillance aircraft.

If we can’t get JSTARS, then we use the Air Force’s Jackpot. It’s a command and control platform, a tubular unit that you push into the back of a C-130 aircraft. Jackpot has a communications suite to control the battle from the air. Our people get training on Jackpot too.
We also bring in the Air Force Red Horse team, engineers and a CRG, or contingency response group. Once the paratroopers have jumped in and seized an airfield, the CRG lands behind them and assumes control of the airfield.

We start planning each exercise a month in advance. We establish joint objectives, have joint planning conferences and conduct joint rehearsals.

Because of issues raised by the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, a request is in for the Army to code the BCT deputy commanding officer (DCO) position as O2 Officer Generalist. Please comment.

I agree that the DCO position should be branch-immaterial.

When I needed two DCOs for my brigades, I asked TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] for a list of two to five stud lieutenant colonels who have been out of the fight in TRADOC assignments for two years. I wanted to take people out of the schoolhouse who had been conducting the training that is so critical to our Army and bring them into the operational force.

TRADOC gave me a list of five great Americans. I selected two from that list who will deploy with their brigades in the next several months. One is coming out of the schoolhouse at Fort Benning, Georgia, and will deploy with one of my BCTs to Iraq as the DCO. The other is coming out of the Airborne School at Fort Benning where he’s been teaching airborne students for the last two years. He will deploy to Afghanistan with his BCT as DCO.

Now, both these DCOs turned out to be Infantrymen. But when I asked TRADOC for the list, I specifically said, “I’m not looking for any particular branch. I would prefer the list have Infantry, Artillery or Armor officers, but I’m wide open to recommendations.” In other words, I wanted the best officers for the DCO jobs, regardless of their branches.

The guided multiple-launch rocket system (GMLRS) unitary (no duds), a precision-guided munition (PGM), is very precise and has a footprint that is scalable to minimize collateral damage and optimize its use in urban and complex terrain, even when fired from as far away as 70 kilometers. GMLRS was first fired in the CENTCOM theater last fall and is being employed by Army and Marine forces with great success today. How important is this precision-guided capability for current and future operations?

I already have been briefed on GMLRS unitary in preparation for my next assignment in Baghdad [as Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects for the MultiNational Force-Iraq]. PGMs have had to be aerial-delivered by Air Force platforms. We now have an all-weather, 24/7 capability we can employ from extended distances that we’ve never had before. That is incredible.

GMLRS unitary is a critical force multiplier for the ground maneuver commander. (Notice I did not say “infantry commander” but “ground maneuver commander”—whoever that is.)

In recent testing, the new all-weather 155-mm Excalibur unitary, also a PGM, has done very well, impacting within four meters of the center of a 20-by-20-meter structure when fired from 19 kilometers away. This munition can range to 40 kilometers and has a near vertical trajectory for use in urban or close terrain operations or in close support of troops. It is projected for fielding in the CENTCOM theater in the First Quarter of FY07. How important will this organic capability be to ground force operations in CENTCOM?

I’m very familiar with Excalibur unitary. For the first time, we have an all-weather, fire-and-forget cannon munition.

The ground force maneuver commander now has control of a 24/7 PGM capability.

In combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, our troops repeatedly receive fire from places that they don’t want to return fire with artillery because of the collateral damage that would occur. Now the commander has the option of using cannons immediately with minimum collateral damage and close to friendly forces, which translates into saving American Soldiers’ and Iraqis’ lives.

What message would you like to send Army and Marine Field Artillerymen stationed around the world?

In my experience, you Field Artillerymen have proven to be multi-talented Pentathletes. In selecting officers and command sergeants major for challenging positions, branch should be immaterial. The decision should be about the qualifications and competence of the officer or NCO leader being considered for the position. When we select high-performers for “cross-branch” positions, then we are growing Pentathletes for the Army.

Major General William B. Caldwell IV is the former Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and now is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects in the Multinational Force-Iraq. In previous assignments, he was the Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon and Deputy Director of Operations, J-3, US Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith in Hawaii. Also in Hawaii, he was the Assistant Division Commander for Operations of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, the division in which he commanded his battalion. He served as the Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Chief of the Strategic Concepts Branch in the Office of the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5, on the Joint Staff, both at the Pentagon. He commanded the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York. He is a veteran of Operations Just Cause in Panama, Desert Shield/Storm in Iraq and Restore Hope/Uphold Democracy in Haiti. He holds two master’s degrees.
On the battlefield, information is power. This has not changed for as long as men have endeavored to defeat one another on the battlefield. What has changed is that the volume of information on today’s battlefield can overwhelm commanders and staffs.

This holds true as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, replicates the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Today’s “maneuver” Field Artillery (FA) tactical operations centers (TOCs) must collect and distribute all the information fed into them by a myriad of systems, such as the blue force tracker (BFT), the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS), the maneuver control system-light (MCS-L) and, of course, the radio systems. The TOCs must analyze all this information, process it into usable intelligence and distribute it to the right personnel.

Today’s TOCs have received many tools to collect the required information, thus increasing the number of tasks to complete. However, increasing the number of information systems to monitor and feed the information to the TOC has not been matched with an increase of personnel to perform these new tasks. The TOC now must conduct information management even more efficiently than before.

One way to increase efficiency is to consolidate events. Any organization that runs off a constant chain of meetings is not really running; meetings discuss events or actions rather than perform them. Actions do some things that affect the battle.

Most units conduct a battle update brief (BUB), a commander’s update brief (CUB) or some other type of meeting that allows the unit to share information on events during the last 24 hours and those planned for the next 24 hours and beyond. Battalion staffs also must conduct meetings to provide operational recommendations to the battalion commander, fragmentary order (FRAGO) briefs, back briefs and confirmation briefs. Why not combine some of these smaller meetings into the BUB and save time and effort?

Why not inject these suggestions into the TOC shift-change slides a unit uses? A suggested BUB slide packet is available on the Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) on Army Knowledge Online (AKO) by clicking on the following series of links: Combat Training Center, JRTC Fire Support Division Homepage, BN S3, Execution, and Shift Change Briefs to get the “FA TOC Shift Change Brief.”

Execution and Adjustment Recommendations. At the BUB, the staff makes its recommendations to the battalion commander on how to influence the area of operations (AO) to steer it in the direction the battalion commander wants. The battalion targeting meeting develops the recommendations before, not during, the BUB. The recommendations cover the execution and adjustment decisions for the time periods of D-Day and D+1/2/3.

According to Field Manual (FM) 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, “An execution decision is the selection, during preparation and execution, of a course-of-action [COA] anticipated by the order... An adjustment decision is the selection of a COA that modifies the order to respond to unanticipated opportunities or threats. Commanders make adjustment decisions during preparation and execution.” However the subjects covered by the staff in the execution and adjustment decision briefings are the same. See Figure 1 on Page 8.
The staff’s recommendations for execution and adjustment decisions are presented much like they would be presented in a ABU briefing during the military decision-making process (MDMP). This saves time and effort in the current fight.

Figure 1: The staff’s recommendations for execution and adjustment decisions are presented in the daily ABU briefing much like they would be presented in mission analysis and course-of-action (COA) briefings in the military decision-making process (MDMP). This saves time and effort in the current fight.

The staff’s recommendations for execution and adjustment decisions are presented much like they would be presented in mission analysis and COA briefings during the military decision-making process (MDMP). However, in the current fight, the staff presents them during the daily ABU supporting the targeting cycle.

After the staff has presented its recommendations to the battalion commander, he provides guidance on his execution and adjustment decisions. The list of subjects the commander covers when issuing both his execution and adjustment guidance generally are the same, as shown in Figure 1.

BUB Briefings. During the BUB, the staff can brief subordinate commanders on the newest fragmentary order (FRAGO). The subordinate commanders then can brief their units’ activities. This should include the subjects listed in Figure 2.

After briefing his “Unit Location” and “Combat Power,” the subordinate battery/company/troop commander briefs his “AO Assessments.” The assessment should cover all aspects of the AO, including intelligence, civil-military operations (CMO), information operations (IO) and a subjective assessment. Then he briefs the key events of the “Last 24 Hours” and the “Next 24 Hours,” which, basically, is a “Back Brief.” This portion of the briefing is conducted in accordance with the battalion’s standing operating procedures (SOP). The subordinate commander gives a “Confirmation Briefing” covering the next 48 hours based on the FRAGO the staff has just briefed, again in accordance with the battalion SOP. The last item the subordinate commander briefs is any issues or critical problems he may be encountering in preparing for upcoming mission.


Based on observations at the JRTC, the most practical way to have the subordinate commanders brief is topic by unit. For example, all subordinate commanders brief the last 24 hours in turn and then all brief the next 24 hours in “round robin” order.

There are many benefits from having the company-level commanders brief their plans for the entire TOC as opposed to just the battalion commander or some key staff members. This allows the battalion commander and his staff to understand how the units plan to accomplish their missions. This also allows the staff to coordinate, anticipate and validate events for the platoon or battery missions. There always is a possibility the staff may have left out critical information in the FRAGO and not realize it until hearing the commanders’ back briefings. The missing information can be issued on the spot, thus averting any mission failures.

The confirmation briefings confirm for the commander and staff that the subordinate units clearly understand the battalion FRAGO (that the staff may not have had a chance to brief) and ensure the subordinate units have no less than 36 hours to conduct troop-leading procedures.

If terrain and mission dictate that the battery/company/troop commanders cannot attend the BUB, then an FM commander’s call should occur to provide the battalion commander this same information. The BUB and the FM commander’s call also provide situational awareness and understanding for the TOC personnel.

Combining multiple briefings into fewer briefings allows the battalion commander and subordinate commanders to remain in their AOs, influencing the battle, only bringing the subordinate commanders to the TOC on a limited basis.

TOC and ALOC. A TOC and administrative and logistics operations center (ALOC) with situational understanding can provide better operational and logistical support for the subordinate units because the two battalion command posts (TOC and ALOC), can anticipate the subordinate units’ operational needs.

Traditionally, the S1 and S4 operate and maintain the ALOC. In today’s contemporary operating environment (COE), many ALOCs and TOCs are collocated; the S1 and S4 continue to plan and coordinate combat service support (CSS) for the battalion and track the current status of CSS assets and resources.

During the battalion BUB, the S4 must be prepared to give a quick snapshot of the battalion’s logistic posture. Also, the G company commander must be prepared to brief the activities that his forward support company (FSC) is conducting to support the battalion. This information is acquired through a close working relationship between the S4 and FSC commander. The FSC commander uses a format similar to the format the other subordinate commanders use, as shown in Figure 3 on Page 9.

When presenting the logistics status of the battalion, the S4 should use a stan-
standard tracking chart for each class of supply by unit. The S4 must anticipate logistics requirements based on the commander’s intent and initiate timely actions to support that intent.

During the battalion BUB, the S1 gives a quick snapshot of personnel issues. The S1 section should list operations for the 24 to 48 hours and brief the current risk assessment for the battalion. At the BUB, he briefs the S1 functions, as necessary. The medical platoon leader should brief all medical-related activities for the next 24 to 48 hours.

**Quick-Reaction Force (QRF).**

Another key person who should attend the BUB is the QRF commander. Because of the various missions the QRF may be assigned, the QRF commander must keep abreast of the tactical situation, know the missions and the tactical plans of the battalion’s subordinate units and be familiar with the terrain and enemy situation in the AO.

The battalion commander may have the QRF commander with him during the fight. Having the QRF commander attend the BUB is more thorough and efficient than providing quick instructions during dire situations where haste is paramount.

The QRF commander should brief priorities for planning and commitment criteria for both 24 and 48 hours out as a back brief and confirmation brief, respectively. He should brief his location and radio frequency, if different from the SOP.

The basic reason for the BUB is to ensure the battalion commander receives all the information he needs to describe his vision and provide execution and adjustment guidance for current and future operations. It is the staff’s and subordinate commanders’ responsibilities to make sure the information provided in the BUB is more than just a lot of information—that it is information the battalion commander needs to make decisions and issue guidance.

By combining briefings in the BUB, the entire battalion has the same situational understanding. The BUB, then, maximizes the information flow by combining many time-consuming briefings into one efficient briefing.

**New Fires COE Logo Selected**

On 1 June during the Joint Fires Seminar at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the Fires Center of Excellence (COE) logo was unveiled by Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Major General David C. Ralston, Chief of Field Artillery (FA); and Colonel Heidi V. Brown, Assistant Commandant of the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) School at Fort Bliss, Texas.

The new logo represents the “virtual” FA and ADA Fires COE. The FA and ADA Centers, currently at Fort Sill and Fort Bliss, respectively, are combining at Fort Sill with the ADA’s physical move projected to be completed in FY11.

The new logo was selected by the

FA and ADA senior leadership from 121 logos submitted in a contest. The winning logo was designed by Angel Quezada, Chief of the Digital Training Access Center at Fort Bliss, who received $1,000. Second place went to Wesley Pewewardy, Lead Illustrator in the Graphics Section of the Training Services Center, Fort Sill, who received $300. Third place went to Staff Sergeant James P. Lynch, a Systems Analyst in the 6th ADA Brigade, Fort Bliss; he received $200. The prize money was provided by the US FA and ADA Associations.

**Major Roy E. Walker is attending the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. Previously, he was a Fire Support, Firing Battery and then an FA Battalion Fire Direction Observer/Controller (O/C) at the Joint Readiness Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, he commanded the Fires Center of Excellence (FA); and General David C. Ralston, Chief of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) logo was unveiled by Lieutenant Colonel Matthew R. Anderson, until recently, was the Senior Fire Support NCO O/C at the JRTC. He has held every leadership position from Platoon Forward Observer to Battalion Fire Support NCO in 1-82 FA, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; 1-319th AFAR, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg; and 1-15th FA, 2nd Infantry Division at Camp Casey, Korea. He deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003. Among other schools, he is a graduate of the Joint Firepower Control Course at Nellis AFB, Nevada; Jump Master and Ranger Schools, Fort Benning, Georgia; and Air Assault School, Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew R. Anderson, currently at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the Fires Center of Excellence (COE) logo was unveiled by Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Major General David C. Ralston, Chief of Field Artillery (FA); and Colonel Heidi V. Brown, Assistant Commandant of the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) School at Fort Bliss, Texas.

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The new logo was selected by the
The cadre of the 20-week Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course (FACCC) recently finished a rapid redesign of the FACCC program of instruction (POI) in 27 days. Given the current operating environment (COE), we knew we could not complete the redesign using the traditional deliberate instructional design process that, for a course this size, could have taken years to complete; thus, we had to “think anew and act anew” to develop a model to conduct a rapid redesign.

This article describes why we redesigned the FACCC, what the process is and what the new more relevant course presents to officers who attend it. This redesign model can be used to rapidly incorporate COE lessons learned in other courses, including those at other schools.

Background. Anyone who attended the FACCC during the last decade understands why we redesigned the course. The old POI last taught in February was similar to the POI taught during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991. Although our Army occupies much of the same battlespace today as in these past operations, the operational environment presents radically different challenges and demands. The training our officers and future commanders receive must reflect those challenges and demands.

Our professional military education must train agile, adaptive leaders. Our courseware for these future fire support officers (FSOs), staff officers and commanders also must be agile and adaptive.

In late 2005, the FACCC cadre began to develop a vision for the redesign of the FACCC. The cadre set a goal to complete the redesign by FY07 with an implementation date of calendar year 2007. This plan seemed aggressive as compared to the traditional deliberate courseware development described in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-70 Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes and Products.

In 2006, the cadre began to develop products to facilitate the redesign. We drafted core competencies, a revised critical task list and a proposed “roadmap” for the course content and practical exercises (PEs) using a continuous...
scenario based on the TRADOC common teaching scenario (CTS). The cadre also received instruction from the Director of the Field Artillery Center Quality Assurance Office (QAO) on developing lesson plans using the experiential-based learning model.

On 22 February the redesign plan drastically changed. After gaining the approval of the Chief of FA, Major General David C. Ralston, the Assistant Commandant (AC) of the FA School, Colonel Mark McDonald, and 30th FA Regiment Commander, Colonel Anthony J. Puckett, ordered us to redesign FACCC in a unique manner: stand down two FACCC classes comprised primarily of veterans of the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater and use their expertise to redesign the FACCC in a matter of weeks.

The AC issued his guidance on 22 February: “Begin redesigning the course on 6 March (D+0) and implement the new POI on 20 March (D+14); shut down the FACCCs and leverage the skills and experiences of the students; use the time between 22 February (D-12) and 6 March (D+0) to develop a plan to execute the redesign. Capture the COE, counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and operational lessons learned in the POI, but don’t extend the current course’s length.”

Because we are most familiar with the military decision-making process (MDMP), our rapid redesign followed that process. As reflected in Figure 1, we developed the timeline using the Army operational process to describe the phases of the rapid redesign: plan, prepare, execute and assess.

This rapid redesign process combines many of the steps in the systems approach to training used in the deliberate design process, follows the principles of instructional design and applies teaching methodologies more appropriate for the majority of COE tasks. See the article “Redesigning FACCC—The Deliberate versus Rapid Methodology” by Dr. Pamela L. Raymer, Director of QAO, in this edition.

**Planning Phase.** Before the end of the meeting, we received guidance on the proposed roadmap for FACCC. We also set up milestones for the planning process between D-12 and D+0. First, we planned a meeting for D-10 to evaluate and review the contents of the current POI. Second, we planned to back-brief the AC on D+11 on the POI’s design and progress toward execution on D+14.

I issued warning order (WARNO) #1 to the FACCC cadre immediately after the meeting and began developing the commander’s estimate. Upon the FACCC students’ release, the cadre met that evening to conduct a mission analysis to rapidly redesign FACCC. The cadre performed a deliberate 17-step mission analysis in accordance with Field Manual (FM) 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production. During the mission analysis, the cadre emphasized identifying “tactical” risks during the process and focused on information requirements to continue the MDMP.

During the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) part of the mission analysis, the cadre identified the FACCC area of interest and area of influence to pinpoint the personnel, organizations and agencies needed for the planning process. We invited all concerned personnel in the area of influence to the POI review on D-10.

On D-11, we conducted a mission analysis briefing to the 30th FAR Commander who answered many of our questions and gave us his intent, key tasks and guidance. At the close of the briefing, he approved the following mission statement for the rapid redesign: “F Battery, 1st Battalion, 30th FAR (F/1-30 FAR) with FACCC Classes 1-06 and 2-06 (reinforcing) develop an FACCC POI not later than 17 March 06 in order to prepare FA officers to conduct full-spectrum operations within the COIN environment.”

On D-10, Colonels McDonald and Puckett and Marine Detachment Commander, Colonel James A. Pace, led the cadre and all personnel within the FACCC’s area of influence through a review of the POI. (The FA School at Fort Sill trains Marines as well as Army Field Artillerymen, so the Marine Detachment Commander was involved in the process.)

The meeting began with a short mission analysis briefing and review of TRADOC-mandated training. The purpose of the meeting was to determine which lesson plans to delete, modify and (or) add to the POI.
After the POI review, the cadre began developing a course of action (COA). The cadre developed two POI COAs that incorporated the experiential-based learning model into the instruction and focused on structured learning activities (SLAs) to support the terminal learning objectives. Both COAs used current and emerging doctrine as the baseline and integrated lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to amplify the doctrine. The POI would incorporate the brigade combat team (BCT), fires battalion and fires brigade modular design into the PEs. While maintaining the students’ abilities to plan and understand major combat operations, the cadre would add more robust training on COIN operations, urban operations, urban IPF, fire support in urban operations and information operations (IO).

Every PE in both of the COA POIs included the targeting methodology (lethal and nonlethal) and fire support considerations for full-spectrum operations. The COAs leveraged lessons learned and capitalized on scenarios and products developed at the combat training centers (CTCs) as part of the Caspian Sea-based common scenario. This would facilitate the practical application of full-spectrum operations and ensure the use of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations.

The main difference between the two COAs was the sequence of the classes and PEs in the POIs. COA 1 had conference-style classes in small blocks that were then reinforced by PEs, or structured learning activities (SLAs), within a continuous common scenario as the students progressed through the course. COA 2 had most of the conference-style classes at the start of the course. Then the students completed the SLAs within a continuous common scenario throughout the remainder of the course in a less episodic fashion.

On D-5, the cadre presented a COA decision brief to the AC and the FA School Directors. We recommended COA 1 (Figure 2), which the AC approved.

**Preparation Phase.** This phase consisted of the actual FACCC redesign (D+0 to D+11). During the transition, the AC briefed both of the FACCC classes that would take part in the rapid redesign process. He underlined the impact of the rapid redesign and described the effects their efforts would have on the future of the branch and the force as a whole.

F/1-30 FAR dedicated the senior instructor, nine small group leaders (SGLs) and 74 students to perform the rapid redesign. Two SGLs served as cell chiefs for each major block of instruction—Fire Support, Field Artillery and Battery Command—for a total of six SGLs. Each cell had about 16 students. Three more SGLs served as cell chiefs for the Fundamentals Block and the Common Scenario PEs. This cell had roughly 27 students.

The cell chiefs identified tasks for each day from D+0 to D+11. These tasks included developing or modifying the conference-style instruction, SLAs and lessons plans for each class in the POI. The senior instructor developed charts for the cell chiefs to track and brief their status daily. At the end of each day, the cadre met and briefed the status of their cell’s progress and discussed issues pertaining to the rapid redesign.

During this process, FACCC used many outside resources to develop the products and provide expertise. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRD) at Hohenfels, Germany; provided products, such as operations orders (OPORDs) and target folders to facilitate developing the common scenario and SLAs. JRTC’s Fire Support Division sent several observer/controllers (O/Cs) to Fort Sill from D+0 to D+4 to help with the rapid redesign process.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, an expert on COIN, and the 212th FA Brigade Rear Detachment Commander, who recently redeployed from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, provided oversight on the rapid redesign process and subject matter expertise on developing the common scenario.

We coordinated with the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in Charlottesville, Virginia, at the beginning of the preparation phase. We asked for and received one-meter resolution imagery on the Caspian Sea battlespace that we used to develop our common scenario. NGIC gave us maps and digital imagery to plan and execute the common scenario for future classes. In three weeks, we had all of the maps and imagery needed for the common scenario.

We used warrant officer education system (WOES) instructors as subject matter experts (SMEs) on diverse lessons, such as targeting and reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA), and focused on collection assets and target mensuration of joint fires. Where practical, we established commonality with our courseware to facilitate multi-echelon training within the school and practical application within the operational force.

The Fort Sill Battle Lab established liaison with the FACCC cadre during the preparation phase of the rapid redesign. As the students and cadre developed the common scenario, technicians from joint conflict and tactical simulation (JCATS) began building the scenarios into a simulation. At the same time, the technicians from the joint fires and effects trainer system (JFETS) revised their scenario to meet the FACCC training requirements.

The Preparation Phase of the FACCC rapid redesign process ended on D+11 with a back-brief to the AC, 30th FAR Commander and 1-30 FAR Commander, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Rikard. We received approval to execute the POI on D+14.

**Execution and Assessment Phase.** We executed the new POI in its entirety with FACCC 4-06 that started in April and will graduate in September. We assessed our process continuously and relied on a wealth of SMEs, both for contents and instructional systems design, to keep us on track. And with the implementation of the first redesigned FACCC with Class 4-06, we are assessing and adjusting the course for subsequent iterations.

From the beginning, we all understood that this rapid redesign process would not produce a 100-percent solution. I estimate that when we implemented the course, we had a 95-percent solution in content and a 75-percent solution in the redesign of how the content was taught. In addition to rapidly incorporating the content of the course to reflect the COE, COIN and lessons learned, we also reformatted the content’s presentation to reflect more modern teaching methods, reducing the number of hours of “talking-head instructors” on the platform and “death by PowerPoint.” The methods emphasize “seeing what’s right,” “doing it, and redoing it in multiple iterations and changing conditions to develop not only technically competent leaders, but also more agile, adaptable leaders who are better able to make effective decisions in the ambiguous, rapidly changing COE.

We incurred risks throughout this process by the nature of the way we conducted the redesign. First, we did not use the deliberate TRADOC model for courseware development that is well proven (although time-consuming and labor-intensive). Second, we had little time to conduct quality assurance and
quality control throughout the rapid redesign process. Next, the process was “stove-piped,” as a group, the SGLs did not have oversight of other planning cells’ activities. As a result, the SGLs executed training on D+14 using materials they had not seen.

Finally, we stood down two FACCCs—FACCC 1-06 in its 13th week of instruction and FACCC 2-06 in its sixth week of instruction and FACCC 2-06 in its 13th week of instruction. The thought was that students of the 20-week CCC—to redesign the course. The thought was that students would learn more from the relevant materials and FACCC 2-06 in its sixth week of instruction and FACCC 2-06 in its 13th week of instruction. When the redesign was completed, we re-started the FACCC classes in the new curriculum.

We must take measures to lessen the risks of the rapid redesign process in the future. First, we must incorporate the instructional design specialists throughout the process. Second, we must allow more time for quality control and quality assurance. Finally, we must develop a means to provide the SGLs oversight of the overall POI’s development to ensure they have the time they need to produce new materials before teaching the new classes.

The New FACCC. The following is a synopsis of the course content in the new POI, as outlined in Figure 2.

Fundamentals (19 Days). This block focuses on several areas. It provides a forum for the TRADOC- and Army-managed training on subjects, such as sexual assault and response, equal opportunity, and equal opportunity.

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**Legend:**
- A’/C’² = Army Airspace Command and Control
- AFATDS = Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
- APOE = Aerial Port of Embarkation
- BCT = Brigade Combat Team
- Bde = Brigade
- Bn = Battalion
- CAS = Close Air Support
- COE = Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
- C’1 = Command, Control, Contemporary Operating Environment
- COIN = Counterinsurgency
- RD = Road to War
- OPORD = Operations Order
- MLRS = Multiple-Launch Rocket System
- FRAGO = Fragmentary Order
- FSCMs = Fire Support Coordinating Measures
- HBC = Heavy BCT
- HIC = High-Intensity Conflict
- IBCT = Infantry BCT
- IPB = Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
- JCATS = Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation
- JFETS = Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System
- JTF = Joint Task Force
- JRTC = Joint Readiness Training Center
- LNO = Liaison Officer
- MC = Maneuver Control System
- RIP = Relief in Place
- RSTA = Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition
- SAPR = Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
- SEAD = Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
- SH = Sexual Harassment
- SLA = Structured Learning Activity
- TLP = Troop-Leading Procedures
- TOA = Transfer of Authority

Figure 2: FACCC Redesigned, March 2006
etc. This block also exposes students to manual and automated gunnery skills focused on the duties and responsibilities of battery commanders and battalion fire direction officers (FDOs), including instruction on the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS).

Fire Support (26 Days). In this block, students learn the fundamentals of Army operations, tactics, command and control (C3), and Marine Corps organization and operations. WOES instructors teach the students the targeting methodology, using various sensors and target mensuration means. The block immerses students in command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) systems and emphasizes the MDMP and joint fire support considerations for major combat operations (MCO).

The SGLs and various SMEs provide conference-style instruction and structured learning on joint fires—naval surface fire support, mortars, attack aviation, clearance of fires, Army airspace command and control (A2C2), close air support (CAS) and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). The fire support block concludes with a road-to-war briefing that introduces the common scenario followed by fragmentary order (FRAGO) #1 for the first SLA of the common scenario, a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) in the attack.

Field Artillery (32 Days)—The FA block of instruction begins with students receiving an overview of multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) operations focused on the battery commander’s and battalion FDO’s duties and responsibilities.

Next, the SGLs introduce students to the organization of the fires battalions and brigades. Students learn how to organize FA units for combat and what the various command relationships are. The students must be able to plan and sustain FA operations.

The FA block introduces the students to COIN and urban operations. It also introduces them to IO and the application of lethal and nonlethal targeting in Army operations. The students plan face-to-face engagements and negotiations. They also receive classes on cultural understanding and the application of cultural aspects to military operations.

The students then analyze the Battle of Fallujah II that was conducted in Iraq in November of 2004. The common scenario reinforces their training as they plan the next two operations.

FRAGO #2 places the students in an infantry BCT (IBCT) fires battalion. The students receive a transfer of authority (TOA) briefing from the HBCT (FRAGO #1). Before the actual TOA, the students plan offense and stability operations in an adjacent area of operations (AO). Once the TOA is complete, they plan stability and COIN operations in an assigned AO as the fires battalion in the IBCT.

Battery Command (23 Days). The SGLs begin the battery command block by giving the students conference-style instruction and SLAs on FA battery operations and troop-leading procedures (TLPs). The students receive added instruction on conducting engagements and media awareness. The students then use the last FA battalion FRAGO produced as part of the common scenario and conduct TLPs as battery commanders to execute stability operations. After completing the final SLA of the common scenario, the students attend classes on battery maintenance and supply operations.

Next, the students attend a leadership symposium with current battalion and battery commanders and command sergeants major. Also, various keynote speakers and veterans give the students their viewpoints on leadership. The SGLs give the students leadership and decision-making training with interactive software (Gator 6).

The course ends with a five-day capstone training exercise “in the box” at the JRTC that demands the students exercise multiple skills taught in the FACCC. Students plan and coordinate fire support in full-spectrum operations and conduct TLPS as they prepare for cordon and searches, combat patrols, convoy operations, engagements and negotiations, and other operations they will conduct as battery commanders and fire support officers.

The Way Ahead. Since the completion of the FACCC’s rapid redesign, we continue to seek feedback from the field. We have had FA commanders recently redeployed from Iraq or Afghanistan review the POI and its instructional methods.

We established a link with the Pre-Command Course (PCC) to conduct multi-echelon training with the students’ future battalion commanders. PCC students serve as battalion commanders for FACCC students to brief as part of the MDMP.

The FACCC cadre continues to develop its relationship with the JRTC and hone the capstone exercise.

Also the cadre is enhancing the FACCC students’ physical readiness. We recently began a pilot combatives program to provide Level I Combatives Certification to all students who meet the requirements. The FACCC also is in the process of developing a demanding, challenging and rewarding Iron Redleg Physical Training (PT) Program to ensure students graduate from FACCC in peak physical condition.

As part of the Execution Phase of the Army operational process, we continuously assess the course. As usual, we will conduct a course-end critique with the FACCC 4-06.

In addition, we are applying our rapid redesign process to the FA Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) and have started planning to rapidly redesign other courses in the FA School.

The goal of our course redesign process is to rapidly incorporate emerging doctrine, lessons learned and feedback from the force that is operating in a high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and constantly changing environment. With further assessment and refinement, this process promises to bring new agility to the FA School’s courses, ensuring graduates are relevant and ready for any future operations.

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Redesigning the FACCC

The Deliberate Versus Rapid Methodology

By Dr. Pamela L. Raymer

The leadership of the FA Captain’s Career Course (FACCC), Fort Sill, Oklahoma, recently created and implemented a bold initiative to redesign the course rapidly. The leadership stood down two FACCC classes to help in the redesign, used the expertise of other veterans and subject matter experts (SMEs) and redesigned the 20-week course in less than four weeks. (See the article “Rapid Redesign of FACCC—A Four-Week Process for Updating Courses for an Army at War” by Major Robert A. Krieg in this edition.)

Redesigning a course the size of the FACCC and developing lesson plans using the deliberate (traditional) method would have taken months—maybe years. With the high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of today’s Army in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), that timeframe is unacceptable. Even if Army schools had enough qualified training developers and SMEs to redesign courses and create lesson plans using the deliberate redesign method, courses would be outdated before the training development work was completed.

In the rapid redesign process, the FACCC leaders not only updated the course’s content quickly, but also updated the instructional methods used to teach the content. Today’s FACCC incorporates the contemporary operating environment (COE), counterinsurgency operations (COIN) and lessons learned from operations in the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater. But it also uses instructional methods that better prepare FA captains to solve complex problems and perform complex tasks—the types of challenges leaders face in GWOT.

The deliberate course redesign process has served the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools adequately when designing instruction for “well structured,” simpler tasks. But new methods are required to teach leaders to be more agile and adaptable while performing the more complex, “ill-structured” tasks on CENTCOM’s asymmetrical battlefield.

This article discusses the difference between designing instructional methods for well structured vice ill-structured tasks and the benefits gained from the latter and compares the deliberate and rapid course redesign processes. The rapid redesign process enables schools to better prepare Soldiers and leaders to perform in the COE.
Well Structured versus Ill-Structured Tasks: Well structured tasks are tasks performed, essentially, in one way. In comparison, ill-structured tasks are more complex tasks or problems that can be performed or solved in more than one way and are more difficult to assess.

An example of a well structured task is the disassembly and assembly of the M16A2 rifle. Except for allowing for deviation in some steps during assembly and disassembly, the clearing, disassembly, assembly and functions check of an M16A2 rifle are performed one way. This task is clearly observable, and performance can be assessed easily.

Decision making may be inherent in well structured tasks and is certainly a large part of ill-structured tasks. Whether it is a simple well structured task of employing a hand grenade or a complex ill-structured task of planning fire support, the instructional design concept is the same. If during instruction on the well structured task of employing a hand grenade, Soldiers are not given opportunities to decide when to use a particular throwing technique over another, their skills may be constrained. They may use an inappropriate technique in combat. Placing them in situations during training where they must determine which technique to use rather than being told only to demonstrate performance of each technique is appropriate and an example of immersive, authentic training.

Ill-structured tasks or problems can be solved in more than one way. For example, clearing a building includes specific procedures Soldiers must follow, but the variables for different types of buildings require the Soldiers’ on-the-spot adjustments. Similarly, for convoy operations, decisions that must be made on-the-spot for what might be encountered during a convoy are endless. Training such tasks to established schoolhouse solutions or standards (as done for well structured tasks) can be too restrictive to the goal of maximizing learning to prepare for complex environments.

Leader tasks, such as planning fire support for major combat operations (MCO) and applying lethal and nonlethal targeting to Army operations, are more complex and filled with multiple variables. What a student knows about performing these tasks or solving these problems is not always visible. As a result, designing, training and assessing these ill-structured tasks are more difficult. The traditional deliberate course redesign model is not very effective in developing training for ill-structured tasks, yet most of the tasks needing training in the COE are complex, ill-structured tasks executed in an ambiguous environment.

Deliberate versus Rapid Redesign Processes: The figure contrasts the phases of the deliberate or traditional TRADOC redesign method with the rapid redesign process recently devel-
oped to redesign the FACCC. In the figure, the rapid redesign process has the Army operational process (plan, prepare, execute and assess) noted beside the respective terms for instructional design (analyze, design/develop, implement and assess). This draws a parallel to Major Krieg’s discussion of his rapid redesign of FACCC using Army operational terms in his article.

In the deliberate redesign model, extensive analysis is conducted during a number of phases. In the Analysis Phase, a list of collective tasks is established after a mission analysis of doctrine. From those collective tasks, a job analysis is conducted to identify the various requirements in a specific enlisted or officer job. Military occupational specialty (MOS) or leader task performance at different skill levels are considered. Within each of those levels, a task list is compiled and approved. As part of the analysis, the performance required by the job’s combat standard may be adjusted to a training standard for institutional training.

During the Design Phase, the outcomes or objectives are defined, e.g., terminal and enabling learning objectives. In the Development Phase, lesson plans that detail how to train and assess each specific task are created. Typically these are prescriptive and often presented in lecture format followed by practical exercises (PEs), giving the student opportunities to practice each task to standard. The intent is to give the student all the knowledge needed before performing the task. The last week of the course usually is reserved for putting students through a culminating exercise that requires them to demonstrate all or most of the tasks trained during the course.

In contrast, the rapid redesign model applied to the FACCC maximizes a new approach to developing and instructing a course. As the figure shows, the entire Design and Development Phase focuses on training technical content and problem-solving capabilities in varying authentic situations vice focusing on tasks trained to schoolhouse standards. Not only does the rapid redesign model take advantage of more appropriate methods to train ill-structured tasks (and enhances training for well structured tasks), it also shortens the time necessary to develop training materials significantly.

Through the application of an experiential model that encapsulates the best of multiple learning theories, learners can transfer vast amounts of information and data into actionable knowledge and skills. Immersing students in a simulated authentic environment maximizes learning, giving students the skills and experiences to make more effective decisions when performing ill-structured tasks in the future.

Immersing students in real-world situations (battlefield scenarios) improves the school’s ability to train ill-structured tasks. These real-world situations already are filled with a multitude of tasks. Extensive analysis is not necessary. During the FACCC redesign, combat veterans contributed a wealth of knowledge in the Analysis Phase and in developing battlefield scenarios.

Lessons plans from combat scenarios must be carefully constructed to ensure that critical tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and all the knowledge necessary to solve the problem are built in as resources that students must acquire or assimilate during the in-class research process. Progressing through the course, students are put in increasingly difficult situations in which to solve complex problems, called structured learning activities (SLAs). As such, students are challenged continuously to apply what they are learning as they solve the problems. The culminating exercise is not saved until the end—right before graduation.

Placing these problems in context deepens the students’ understanding of the learning materials as instructors provide more complex data and situations.

In contrast to the deliberate model where instruction is presented up front, students are given or acquire information “just in time” in the rapid redesign model. They immerse themselves in solving problems and are provided information and concepts when they need to apply them.

These types of lessons can be built for novice learners as well as experienced learners. Determining when, where and how much information the students need at various stages in the training process must be taken into account. Instructor notes, although no less important in the deliberate redesign training, are especially important in detailing the instructor’s role in the SLAs.

Assessment includes measuring the student’s ability to complete tasks to standard but in the larger context of solving a real-world problem. For example, determining whether a fire direction officer (FDO) has the skills and knowledge to perform his job is often based on assessing his knowledge of specific tasks, such as manual and automated gunnery. Successfully passing exams that measure his ability to calculate manual gunnery problems allows the instructor to determine whether the student has achieved the standard specified in a terminal or enabling learning objective.

However, the desired performance should not end with assessing the student’s ability to calculate manual gunnery but rather with assessing whether or not the FDO can determine why a round didn’t land on the target. Computing manual gunnery solutions focuses on training individual well structured tasks to standard as opposed to the immersive method’s focus on the “real” problem of field performance. Focusing on solving complex problems rather than focusing on achieving standards for each task keeps the emphasis on the battlefield objective. The FDO still must solve manual gunnery problems but only to give him a tool to apply within the context of solving the real problem of determining why the “steel” didn’t hit the target.

Instructional design is complex. It is part art and part science. Any discussion of these two models in this short article cannot capture the complexity of considerations for designing and developing training that encompasses COE and COIN instruction.

However the rapid redesign model developed and applied to the FACCC emphasizes designing training to give leaders and Soldiers the ability to solve ill-structured problems in a real-world environment—better preparing them to perform complex tasks and make effective decisions that are typical of the challenges they will face in the COE.

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The FA is Alive and Well
In Fact, Thriving

Soldiers and leaders have heard stories of the FA reconfiguring as part of the modular Army. It seems some only hear the downsizing aspects of the FA transformation and are certain the FA is dead or, at least, on life support.

Some believe that the Field Artillery-men’s only contributions to the future Army will be driving trucks, becoming military police (MP) and serving as operating base mayors, as some Field Artillerymen are doing in the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater today. While these jobs are important in Army operations, they are not what the FA’s job has been since 1775—providing fires for the ground force commander. The same misinformed people who only see the downsizing believe the FA no longer will play a critical role in joint and combined arms warfare.

Nothing could be further from the truth. The FA is alive and well—in fact, thriving. When the modular reconfiguration is complete, the active Army will have more FA weapons systems and more FA battalions in direct support (DS) of brigade combat teams (BCTs) than it had in Force XXI. In addition, the majority of Field Artillery units in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) are providing FA fires for their BCTs while, simultaneously, serving as motorized infantry units with the same duties and responsibilities as their Infantry and Armor brethren.1

This article provides five major reasons why the King of Battle is alive and well and dispels rumors about the demise of the FA. These reasons are (1) The FA in the active force BCTs actually is growing; (2) New technology is giving our branch unprecedented capabilities for the joint and combined arms fight; (3) US joint force operations require a balance of fire support from the ground and the air; (4) The FA is leading the Army in developing “Pentathletes;” and (5) The Army will continue to conduct full-spectrum operations in the future—requiring FA fires.

1. The FA in the active force BCTs is growing. With the increase in the number of modular BCTs, there will be more FA battalions than in Force XXI. With the expansion of BCTs from 33 to 42, the growth of fires battalions in the BCTs will provide more battalions to fill the previous DS role performed by battalions under the division artillery (Div Arty) organization. Before this transformation effort, the typical organization was three to four Artillery battalions in each of the 10 Div Artys. The modular design’s implementation calls for each of the BCTs to have an organic cannon-equipped fires battalion. This reorganization to make the battalions organic to the BCTs translates into 42 fires battalions, some with 155-mm weapons and some with 105-mm weapons. This is a net increase of seven battalions over the Force XXI construct.2

The active modular force also will have six fires brigades, each with at least two Artillery battalions and most with three battalions, all with a mix of rocket/missile capabilities fired from the M270A1 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) launcher or high-mobility artillery rocket launcher.
system (HIMARS) along with 155-mm Paladin or lightweight M777 howitzers.

It seems that some thought the “sky was falling” on the FA when the Army decided to have fewer FA weapons per battalion (12 vice 18) and fewer firing batteries per fires battalion (two vice three) in the heavy BCTs (HBCTs) and infantry BCTs (IBCTs). And if the sky is falling on the FA, it also is falling on Infantry and Armor because the modular redesign calls for fewer Infantry and Armor weapons per company and fewer companies per combined arms battalions in the HBCTs and IBCTs.

At the same time, the FA is moving from a 3x4 organization (three batteries per battalion with four howitzers in each battery) in the Stryker BCTs (SBCTs) to a 3x6 organization to facilitate platoon operations. All echelons-above-brigade (EAB) units will retain their 3x6 organized FA battalions.

For the active force, adding FA battalions and weapons systems does not signal the demise of the FA—it is growth in the FA.

The Army National Guard (ARNG) FA is losing some force structure in EAB. Although that might sound like “bad news,” it ultimately will benefit the total Army by enhancing the remaining ARNG FA units’ modernization, making them more capable and deployable.

The Army is in the process of rebalancing the force to generate the kinds of capabilities it needs. ARNG FA units that are not deployable, such as those with Vietnam-era M102 105-mm howitzers or other modernization deficiencies, will be drawn down or converted into other capabilities the Army needs.

However, for the first time in US history, the remaining ARNG FA units will mirror the active FA units in terms of modernization—they will have all the systems and capabilities as the active FA units.

Unit-for-unit, the total Army will have more fully capable FA units available for deployment in full-spectrum operations than in the Force XXI.

In addition, the ARNG will have seven of the 13 fires brigades, also fully modernized to match the active force’s fires brigades.

2. New technology is giving our branch unprecedented capabilities for the joint and combined arms fight. The FA is alive and well with new technologies that are providing unprecedented capabilities—in fact, capabilities beyond any FA in history. The ground commander now can precisely locate, target, and attack a point target with precision-guided munitions (PGMs) in all weather conditions, 24/7, and have “steel” on target faster than before. His FA now gives him a choice of rocket, missile and 155-mm PGMs and also is improving the precision of his suppression and area fires for increased effectiveness in full-spectrum operations.

Today in the CENTCOM theater, Soldiers and Marines are using the guided MLRS (GMLRS) unitary PGM in urban operations with incredible effectiveness. GMLRS unitary has no duds; minimizes collateral damage, even when fired from as far away as 70 kilometers; and can impact within 200 meters of friendly forces. Its target sets are enemy structures, light vehicles and personnel.

The Army’s first fire-and-forget 155-mm round, the Excalibur unitary high-explosive PGM, will be fielded in CENTCOM in the Second Quarter of FY07. Its non-ballistic flight trajectory, nearly vertical terminal dive and ability to penetrate concrete optimizes it for urban operations from an expanded range of 40 kilometers (objective). Excalibur unitary’s test results have been excellent; it will be fielded to the BCT’s fires battalion as a brigade-level PGM.

In addition to these PGMs, the FA already has the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS) Block 1A quick-reaction unitary (QRU) in the inventory. It is a fire-and-forget missile that provides precision effects from a range of 270 kilometers. It first was employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) major combat operations (MCO) in 2003 with great effectiveness.

In FY08, the Army will field the FA’s new precision attack missile (PAM) to the Evaluation BCT (EBCT) at Fort Bliss, Texas. PAM has 15 missiles in a portable container that can be fired from standoff distances. These fire-and-forget missiles will be able to attack moving targets. They will be effective against both hard and soft targets from up to 40 kilometers away, allowing ground force commanders the ability to employ them in a variety of scenarios across the spectrum of conflict. PAM also will be in the fires battalion, a PGM readily available to the BCT commander.

The FA has fielded or is developing these PGMs, along with the precision guidance kit (PGK) to improve the precision of existing 155-mm and 105-mm “dumb” rounds. For more information on these PGMs and other munitions’ advances, see the article “FA PGMs—Revolutionizing Fires for the Ground Force Commander” by Colonels Gary S. Kinne, John A. Tanzi and Jeffrey W. Yaeger in the May-June edition online at sill-www.army.mil/famag.

The FA PGM article also discusses the use of the precision strike suite-special operations forces (PSS-SOF) software that now allows forward observers (or joint terminal attack controllers, JTACs) on the front lines to determine three-dimensional grid coordinates accurately.
enough to employ PGMs, including the Air Force’s joint direct attack munition (JDAM). Locating the target precisely enough to employ PGMs previously had to be done at the theater level, a process called “mensuration” that took 30 minutes. Now the front-line observer can determine precise enough coordinates for PGMs in minutes.

3. **US Joint force operations require a balance of fire support from the ground and the air.** A reader can find many success stories of close air support (CAS) for Soldiers in combat from World War II to the present. I think everyone agrees that the US Army always will fight as part of a joint force and rely on joint capabilities for its ground operations, including Air Force, Navy and Marine CAS. However, there are times when CAS cannot be employed due to adverse weather or the non-availability of aircraft or because of the munition’s large footprint that would endanger friendly troops in close proximity to the target.

In Iraq, the weather in the spring of 2003 served as a reminder of why the Department of Defense (DoD) needs a balance between air and ground fire support. When the “Mother of All Sand Storms” slowed the 3rd Infantry Division’s advance on Baghdad, “the all-weather capability of artillery and mortars became literally a lifesaver when the storm limited the ability of airpower to deliver precise, close-in strikes.”

When air support cannot fly because of weather, FA units can conduct missions in a variety of environments, 24 hours a day. For example, in adverse weather, ATACMS Block 1A QRU can take out an enemy stronghold from 270 kilometers away in support of a moving friendly force. In fact, ATACMS Block 1A QRU was employed in excellent weather conditions in conjunction with operational-level joint airpower during OIF MCO to eliminate several Iraqi command and control nodes.

Redlegs have argued for the need for a balance between air and ground forces for fire support. In the article “Why Organic Fires?” Colonel Robert Barry, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Systems Manager for Cannons, argued for the continued fielding of organic fire support assets. He used examples, such as the 1973 Arab Israeli War, the US involvement in Vietnam, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OIF, to argue for the use of FA to support maneuver commanders. He recommended that as the Army moves forward with transformation, we remember the lessons of the past.

Another argument for FA fires for the joint force is in the article “It’s a DUMB idea” by Colonel Daniel Whiteside, a retired Field Artilleryman. He argues for maintaining the FA and maximizing the effects created using both air and ground fires.

Joint fires must complement and supplement each other. FA fires fill some of the joint warfighting gaps that airpower cannot.

4. **The FA is leading the Army in developing Pentathletes.** Both the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Peter J. Schoomaker, and the Secretary of the Army, the Honorable Francis J. Harvey, are promoting the development of Pentathletes in the Army. In part, the Pentathlete is a “multi-skilled leader” and is a “competent full-spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the Soldier.”

The Army’s Soldiers and leaders overall have demonstrated tremendous adaptability and flexibility in OEF and OIF, characteristics of Pentathletes. However, the FA, probably more than any other branch, has successfully executed the most diverse variety of nonstandard missions in GWOT. Redlegs not only have served as transporters, MPs and motorized infantrymen as already mentioned, but also as coordinators/synchronizers of nonlethal effects (information operations, civil military operations, civil affairs, etc.) at the company, battalion, brigade, division and corps levels in GWOT. That is not to mention that Field Artillerymen also have been delivering thousands of FA rounds per year in GWOT.

When the Army needed MCO fires during OIF, the FA was there. When the Army needed other skills sets for stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), the FA was there. When BCTs did not have enough ground-owning units, the FA was there. (See the figure.) With leaner modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs), FA battalions transformed into maneuver battalions, while their brother maneuver battalions had considerably more assets to execute the same mission. In addition, most of those same “maneuver” battalions maintained the capability to provide their BCTs FA fires.

As indicated in the figure, Field Artillerymen not only have command maneuver battalions, but also maneuver BCTs in both OIF and OEF. In addition, the 4th BCT in the 82nd Airborne Division was stood up and first commanded by the 82nd Div Arty commander who has gone on to become the Chief of Staff of the division.

Some have been concerned that the drawdown of the Div Arty and corps artillery organizations has limited opportunities for Field Artillerymen who successfully command FA or motorized infantry battalions/task forces to command at the brigade-level. The active FA’s current brigade-level commands are the six fires brigades and four battlefield coordination detachments (BCDs).

A request for Field Artillerymen to become eligible for DA selection to command BCTs is before Army’s senior leaders. If approved, it will be good for the Army to be able to consider not only the most capable Infantry and Armor officers, but also the most capable Field Artillery officers to command these critical organizations.

5. **The Army will continue to conduct full-spectrum operations in the future—requiring FA fires.** Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations states, “Full-spectrum operations are the range of operations Army forces conduct in...
war and military operations other than war.19 The current employment of the FA in non-FA tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq will not always be the rule.

During an interview, Major General Martin Dempsey, who commanded the 1st Armored Division in Iraq for 15 months, instructed Field Artillerymen to “… maintain your ability to provide full-spectrum fires and effects whenever the ground force needs them, including massed fires and precision lethality.”20 This sound advice is important for FA leaders to remember, no matter what the state of change is within the Army.

Using history as a way to predict the future, the FA always must be ready and capable of conducting lethal, high-intensity conflict at some time in the future. The US has relied on the FA since 1775. In modern, mechanized warfare, the FA was a significant part of World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm (ODS), OEF and OIF. Experience in combat repeatedly has demonstrated the need to conduct operations using a joint and combined arms approach.

FM 1 The Army lists offensive operations as one of the three types of operations for overseas joint campaigns. It states offensive operations “carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces . . . and imposing the commander’s will on the enemy.”21 During MCO, the FA contributes to full-spectrum operations by providing the means to destroy enemies with overwhelming firepower.

In addition, consider what the status of the US would be if its military lethargy warfighting superiority “slipped.” Would we ever want an Air Force that did not first “own the skies”—or a Field Artillery that, bottom line, was not superior to potential enemy artillery to conduct counterfire to protect our ground forces and enable their operations? That all translates into maintaining military superiority in high-intensity conflict. Perhaps because of our military superiority, future conflicts will be with enemies who will be reluctant to come “toe-to-toe” with our military might—enemies who will be inclined to fight us asymmetrically in guerrilla or insurgent operations, most often in urban environments, as is the case in Iraq today. However, even in this scenario, the Army needs the FA’s fire support capabilities.

First, the FA will provide high-intensity fires during MCO. As conflict slows for SRO, the requirement for FA fires will become less and less frequent but when required to support or protect the force, just as critical as those for MCO. During SRO, inevitably there will be the occasional conflict “spikes,” such as in the battles of Fallujah II, Tal Afar and many others in OIF. FA fires in those conflict spikes in urban operations also will be critical to our success and the protection of our forces.

During the times that FA fires are required less frequently, Pentathlete Field Artillerymen will be multiply useful to serve in nonstandard roles, as already demonstrated in GWOT. The role of Field Artillerymen in full-spectrum operations is expanding, not shrinking.

But before we become too focused on current operations as the “way of warfare,” I would caution that we look around the world and see who our potential enemies could be in the future and note that several have considerable military might, which still is growing, and much larger armies than ours. That caution alone ensures the future of the best, most lethal Artillery in the world.

For the foreseeable future, the FA will continue to contribute to joint and combined arms warfare. The Army is not a static institution; change is inevitable for it to stay relevant, effective and superior. That change process is helping to ensure its Field Artillery—its most lethal surface fire support—is very much alive and well.

Major Mark E. Brock recently graduated from the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) and the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This article, in large part, is based on his 2006 SAMS monograph “We Cannot Take Your Call-for-Fire Right Now—Does the Global War on Terrorism Signal the Demise of the Field Artillery?” Currently, he is a Division Plans Officer in the G3, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. In his previous assignments, he served as a Battery Trainer at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and commanded A Battery, 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery (A/1-77 FA) (Multiple- Launch Rocket System) in the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, III Corps Artillery, at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He also was a Battery Fire Direction Officer (FDO), Company Fire Support Officer (FSO) and Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) in 1-10 FA, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia. He holds a Masters of Military Art and Science (MMAS) from SAMS.

Endnotes:
2. General Railean said, “Our incredible Field Artillerymen ‘keep on keeping on,’ firing thousand of rounds in Iraq and Afghanistan last year and continuing today.” He then goes on to document his statement.
3. Ibid., 2.
4. Ibid.
6. Sam Coffman email.
7. Ibid.
13. Colonel Annie Baker, “Is It Time Now for HQDA to Implement a Practice Proven Successful in the Field and Select Field Artillerymen to Command BCTs?” being considered for publication. Colonel Baker discusses FA Pentathletes and the diversity of missions Field Artillerymen have been performing in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).
16. Lieutenant Colonel David J. Brost, Chief of the FA Propriety Office, gathered the information in phone conversations with Lieutenant Colonel James L. Miller and Joseph R. Connell, Senior FA Observer/Controllers at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA, and the Joint Readiness Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA, respectively. Lieutenant Colonel Miller says that in the past 18 months, all FA units rotating through the NTC have maneuver missions and 95 percent also have fires missions.
17. Field Artillery (November-December 2005), 30. Lieutenant Colonel Connell says that 100 percent of FA units rotating through the JRTC have maneuver fires missions and 95 percent also have fires missions.
18. Colonel Kevin P. Stramara, 4th Infantry Division Artillery Commander, commands a division with an area of operations in northern Baghdad from April 2003 until March 2004 during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as stated in an email from Colonel Stramara dated 3 May 06.
19. Colonel Gary H. Cheek, Commander of the 25th Infantry Div Artillery, commanded the Combined Task Force Thunder for 12 months in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as outlined in his article “So You Want to Be a Maneuver Commander? CFT Thunder in Afghanistan,” Field Artillery (March-April 2005). Colonel Richard C. Longo, 1st Infantry Div Artillery Commander, was selected as a Coalition and combined arms brigade for six weeks in the hotly contested region of An Najaf, Iraq, to cover the gap between the 1st Armor Division’s departure and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Force’s (MEF) arrival as he discussed in his article “1st ID in Iraq: The FFA HQ Mission Endures,” Field Artillery (May-June 2005).
21. Colonel Victor Petrenko, former 82nd Division Artillery (Div Arty) Commandant, stood up and, until June of this year, commanded the 4th BCT in the 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He was selected for that mission and command by Major General William B. Caldwell IV, the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division. See the letter-to-the-editor “High Praise for the 82nd Div Art’y’s Support of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Relief” by Major General Caldwell, Field Artillery (November-December 2005). Colonel Petrenko currently is the Chief of Staff for the 82nd Infantry Division.
Members of the 793rd Military Police Battalion take cover when shots are fired near the objective area during a 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA) operation to disrupt an insurgent support zone. The Battlekings formed a strong relationship with the battalion and synchronized security patrols with MP patrols as an economy-of-force initiative. The MP battalion also provided forces for 1-9 FA operations.
The 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA) Battlekings, the fires battalion in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division, returned to Iraq once again, but this time for a very different mission as a maneuver battalion. The Battlekings with their deadly M109A6 Paladin howitzers had proved instrumental in the 2nd BCT’s drive to Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I in 2003, but the character of “the fight” had changed during the intervening years. 1-9 FA’s mission as a maneuver task force (TF) for OIF III involved building the confidence of the Iraqi people to help eradicate insurgents in our area of responsibility (AOR) and working closely with multiple assets to conduct operations out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Loyalty in Baghdad.

Although our infantry battalion counterparts in the 2nd BCT made our lean post-transformation fires battalion look like a dwarf, the Battlekings’ duties and responsibilities remained on par with theirs. In addition to conducting full-spectrum operations in 163 square kilometers of southeast Baghdad, the battalion was tasked with camp force protection, security escort for a quick-reaction explosive ordnance detachment and main supply route (MSR) security. The Battlekings also had to be prepared to provide indirect fires via a platoon that remained “Hot” 24/7, but fires were not necessary during the deployment.

With the delivery of fires secondary to our maneuver mission, our operations required an efficient realignment that maximized resources without unduly increasing operational risks. During course-of-action (COA) development, the battalion staff (primarily comprised of combat veteran fire supporters) saw a unique opportunity for our lean fires battalion to demonstrate the advantages of effects-based operations (EBO). EBO uses valuable resources efficiently by maximizing both lethal and nonlethal capabilities against an enemy modeled as a system. Quite literally, our plan was to mitigate the manpower challenges we faced by working smarter and more efficiently.

**Doing More with Less.** Months before the deployment, it was clear that the battalion required some reorganization and additional training to shape itself for the broad range of missions it would undertake in Iraq. We quickly learned that personnel changes were a zero-sum game with most FA Soldiers coming into the division being assigned to the new fires battalion in the recently formed 4th BCT. Im-
To improve the troop-to-task ratio, we began unit distribution operations.

Eagle Team. With the battalion’s being stationed at a FOB, the requirements for both survey and communication sections were reduced. We formed a platoon of two patrol sections with these personnel and augmented them with Soldiers from the personnel and logistic staff sections. The headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) executive officer (XO) became its platoon leader. The new organization, which was one of the great success stories during our deployment, was given the name “Eagle Team.”

Eagle Team was dual-tasked as the camp’s quick-reaction force (QRF) and the command group’s security detail. Due to aggressive training and competent, confident Soldiers, Eagle Team proved itself in a variety of combat situations. Eagle Team’s training started at home station, continued through the mission readiness exercise (MRE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, and culminated during reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) in Kuwait.

Forward Support Company (FSC) as an Infantry Company. Based on a need to improve the troop-to-task ratio, we made the FSC a “ground-owning” unit with two patrol sections formed from traditional support elements. The battalion maintenance section, reinforced by mess-section Soldiers, conducted countermortar/counterrocket patrols in a sprawling former Iraqi military base that had been reduced to an ominous moonscape of rubble and squatter huts.

The distribution platoon formed the second patrol section to conduct logistic convoy escort and, ultimately, replaced a line platoon as the explosive ordnance detachment security escort detail once the brigade forward support battalion (FSB) began unit distribution operations.

Day after day, these two patrol sections validated the phrase that Major General William G. Webster, Jr., Commanding General of the 3rd Division, “drove” into us before deploying: “Every Soldier is a riflemen.”

Civil Affairs (CA), Information Operations (IO) and Force Protection. We formed a CA S5, IO S7 and force protection section around the battalion signal officer, fire direction officer (FDO) and chemical officer. The battalion fire direction center (FDC) and the meteorological (Met) section provided the bulk of the Soldiers for these staff sections. In the end, each member of the team had to work harder with one Soldier per 12-hour shift responsible for maintaining the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) connectivity and currency.

A sister fires battalion shared Met support for the Baghdad area of operations (AO). Ultimately, a pair of Soldiers with little supervision provided Met support for the division with the new organic mobile profiler system (MPS).

Battery Platoons as Patrol Sections. Each platoon within the two line batteries organized into two patrol sections. Each patrol section consisted of 20 personnel and four M1114 up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) equipped with either an M2 or M240B machine gun. The platoon leader and platoon FDO served as the two patrol leaders. Because of leader attrition and environmental leave, platoon sergeants and gunnery sergeants also led patrols.

Tactical Psychological Operations Team (TPT) and CA Team Alpha (CAT-A). The brigade commander attached a TPT and CAT-A to our battalion shortly after the transfer of authority (TOA). We quickly learned that the TPT and CAT-A were invaluable. Each has a unique specific skill set, so we used them differently and rarely in conjunction with each other. Although they most often operated physically separate from each other, their effects were both complementary and tangible.

The TPT, secured by a patrol section, principally focused on the more adversarial essential effects tasks (EETs), while the CAT-A focused on more supportive EETs. The battalion S5 and S7 sections provided organic combat power and resources sufficient for the CAT-A to operate independently and securely throughout the AOR.

The distinction between the direct action patrol sections of the line units and the CAT-A provided a constructive layer of separation that we exploited during post-operational assessments and consequence management. In short, the Iraqi people quickly learned that when the patrol sections showed up it meant that an operation likely was underway, and they made themselves scarce. On the other hand, the CAT-A Soldiers spent a great deal of time interacting with the locals, so the Iraqis got used to seeing them and talking to them. This made it easier for the CAT-A to assess the attitudes in the neighborhoods we were responsible for.
Before deploying to Iraq, we did not fully appreciate how valuable the TPT and CAT-A would be as combat multipliers. They quickly became essential to every operation and enhanced the battalion’s ability to conduct focused EBO.

**Effects Planning and the Effects Working Group (EWG).** During pre-deployment mission analysis, the lack of an active Coalition presence south and east of the AO was a major concern. To gain additional insight into the current situation, key members of the battalion planning staff deployed three weeks early to embed with the mechanized infantry battalion we were to relieve, including our battalion operations officer and intelligence officer. The planning staff arrived in Baghdad the week before the January 2005 elections and gained valuable experience that we used later in the October 2005 national referendum and the December 2005 national election.

The battalion planning staff in Baghdad also updated all of the military decision-making process (MDMP) products, to include increasing the specificity of the essential tasks associated with the initial combat phase. As a result, the *Battlekings* executed their first battalion-level operation only two days after the TOA.

The dynamic battlefield within the *Battlekings*’ AOR necessitated a deliberate and continual process to assess where we were, based on the commander’s intent, and what we needed to change to achieve the desired effects. We used the decide, detect, deliver and assess (D³A) target methodology. This process resulted in the weekly effects tasking order (ETO). The ETO is an operations order (OPORD) derived from the EWG using the current brigade EET’s cross-walked against the current lines of operations (LOOs).

Using the D³A process, the battalion could provide a coordinated and specific task, purpose, method and desired effect (TPME) for each patrol section or support element that went outside the FOB. (See the figure for the effects planning cycle.)

The EWG meeting was the most critical step in the effects planning cycle. The battalion commander, XO, operations officer, battle captain, S2, S5, S7, TPT chief, CAT-A commander, medical officer and each of the battery commanders participated in the EWG. It is important to note that the EWG meeting was not a series of briefings. Each participant already knew what resources were available in his element for the specific time period to be discussed.

During the meeting, the battalion leadership and key staff deliberately and collaboratively assessed the AOR and decided which resources to focus in what part of the AOR to achieve the commander’s desired effects. Such a “lean” organization only could achieve the commander’s desired effects by the synchronized, sequential or simultaneous application of all available elements of combat power—leadership, maneuver, firepower, protection and information on the battlefield.

The EWG agenda began with battalion intelligence, operations, CA and IO officers presenting updated staff estimates. Next, the leaders and planning staff systematically reviewed a five-week period. The process began with an after-action review (AAR) focused on Week-1 to consolidate information about recent operations’ impact on the Iraqi people and Coalition Forces. This was important to ensure the battalion remained adaptable in such a fluid environment. The AAR also ensured we provided adequate resources to the patrol sections for future operations.

Next there was a back briefing about Week-0. During this back briefing, we used the AAR feedback from the previous week to update our intelligence assessment and refine our plan.

The third step was to plan week+1. The battalion operations officer provided the battery commanders, TPT and CAT-A the TPME for any missions or operations being conducted during that week. Finally, the battalion commander issued guidance for Week+2 and Week+3. The operations officer then prioritized or requested resources for future operations based on the enemy situational template and current trend analysis from ongoing EBOs. The TPT and CAT-A recommended focus areas and methods of employment to better achieve the commander’s intent. Although Week+2 and Week+3 were not finalized, the analysis of available resources and desired effects for each period gave the battery commanders and staff enough information for planning and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

**Leveraging Available Assets.** The ability to identify potential future operations two to three weeks in advance proved essential to our success in leveraging all available assets and staying ahead of the enemy in our AOR. We were able to mass for offensive operations by synchronizing a variety of assets. Remarkably, the battalion’s combat power would double or triple during battalion-level clearance or disruption operations that were conducted once a week, on the average.

*Iraqi Police and Public Order Forces.* The battalion quickly established valuable relationships with potential operational partners. The arrival of an Iraqi special police transition team (SPTT) to our FOB gave us an opportunity to establish a consistent relationship that provided access to an entire Iraqi public order brigade’s worth of combat power.

Our battalion provided the SPTT living space, automation support, maintenance resources and staff products. Our close
relationship with the SPTT paved the way for us to execute large combined operations with the public order brigade frequently. Depending on the troop-to-task needed for a specific mission, a line battery would have an attachment that might range from a company to a full battalion of Iraqi public order brigade soldiers.

Our ability to work side-by-side with the Iraqi forces helped the special police in their training mission and also built the local Iraqis’ confidence in them. The increase in manpower also allowed the battalion to clear more areas and structures in less time and reduced the operation’s overall risks.

**US Military Police (MP).** We formed a strong relationship with the general support (GS) MP battalion based in a FOB six kilometers away. The fact that the MP battalion included two National Guard FA batteries helped strengthen our friendship. The Battlekings synchronized the MSR security patrols with the MP patrols as an economy-of-force initiative.

The MP battalion also provided forces for our operations. Using the MP to control routes leading into and out of the objective significantly reduced operational risks while ensuring that more individuals and Iraqi vehicles in the target area were searched and passively engaged by a patrol section. We used these passive engagements or interactions between patrol sections and Iraqi citizens to gauge sentiment and gather the concerns of the people.

Another benefit of our relationship with the MP battalion was that it helped improve our cooperation with the local Iraqi police. The MP battalion had teams at each police station, coaching and mentoring their Iraqi counterparts. The battalion commander’s sphere of influence (SOI) engagement plan was synchronized with a complementary MP battalion plan. The result was camaraderie between the Battlekings’ patrol sections and the local Iraqi police. The Iraqi police routinely augmented the US MP elements on traffic control points (TCPs) during offensive operations.

The ability to communicate the commander’s intent in Arabic and the unique cultural insights of local law enforcement professionals placed an Iraqi face on the perimeter of the operation and further reduced the threat to US Soldiers. More often than not, after each major operation, we further strengthened our relationships with the Iraqi police and public order brigade by conducting AARs with key Coalition and Iraqi leaders at the FOB. While certain themes on ways to improve future operations were always woven into the program, the event customarily was something closer to a dining-in with both Iraqis and US Soldiers sitting together, telling war stories and sharing ideas.

**BCT Public Affairs (PA).** The battalion also gave the brigade PA section office space in our headquarters building. Daily contact with the PA officer (PAO) and a constant feed of draft battalion press releases from the S7 section solidified a strong working relationship.

The battalion regularly asked for and received both print and video coverage from the PAO and Combat Camera. This gave us the opportunity to tell the “good news” story of Iraqis working to provide a safe and secure environment in Baghdad. Because the brigade’s organic MP platoon provided security for the PAO and Combat Camera personnel, we also benefited from additional observation and combat power that further reduced our operational risks.

**Division Assets.** Another advantage of the five-week D’A planning cycle was the brigade staff had sufficient time to request division-level resources. It was rare for the battalion to conduct a large offensive operation without attack helicopter and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support. The battalion tactical operations center’s (TOC’s) ability to watch a live feed from the UAV on a large screen television in the operations center helped ensure a common understanding of the current situation across the team.

The synchronized effects of combined police (US and Iraqi) TCPs, the massing of line batteries with attached Iraqi public order brigade units, attack helicopters overhead and the TPT’s loudspeaker element delivering audio messages detailing our expectations of the local Iraqi citizens within the objectives gave the Battlekings control of and the ability to react to almost any situation.

Generally, a few days after an operation, we sent the CAT-A into the objective area to conduct a post-operation assessment. This provided an additional passive engagement opportunity and a chance for local citizens to comment on the impact of the operation.

For those truly needy families, the CAT-A brought humanitarian assistance bags filled with food and common necessities. If there was any collateral damage from the operation, the CAT-A personnel ensured the Iraqi citizens understood the claims process and reviewed the claims cards for completeness and accuracy to facilitate payment.

A member of the 1-9 FA Civil Affairs Team A (CAT-A) delivers a humanitarian assistance bag while conducting a post operational assessment with local citizens to gather their comments on the impact of a recently completed operation.
planning staff procured sniper weapons to train four Soldiers. The early deployed training team (MTT) sniper course to Georgia, we took advantage of a mobile operation.

area, the battalion planned a sniper increased IED contact within a defined area without placing a patrol section on a target within a single structure. The commander's effects guidance. In short, effects drove intelligence and intelligence drove operations. As the S2 produced actionable intelligence, the battalion used patrol sections to conduct precision offensive operations to isolate a target within a single structure.

We often used snipers to mitigate the risk of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in our AOR and were fortunate to have four snipers on our team. More often than not, if trend analysis identified increased IED contact within a defined area, the battalion planned a sniper operation.

Before deploying from Fort Stewart, Georgia, we took advantage of a mobile training team (MTT) sniper course to train four Soldiers. The early deployed planning staff procured sniper weapons from leave-behind equipment stocks, including both M14 models and a large caliber M107 weapon.

All sniper operations were deliberately planned, rehearsed and well resourced with a forward-positioned security element, retransmission team to facilitate communications and periodic UAV coverage to observe dead space. Snipers gave us the ability to target a high-risk area without placing a patrol section on the contested route.

In January, the Battlekings returned to Fort Stewart. Our Soldiers had executed more than 25 battalion-level offensive operations to shape and control the battlespace, resulting in the capture or elimination of 154 terrorists, the seizure of hundreds of weapons (including two D30 howitzers and one S60 air defense gun), the destruction of more than eight tanks, and the rescue of six hostages kidnapped by rebels near Salman Pak. While each of our assets were able to execute objective or target-based operations independent of each other, the coordinated application of all their effects allowed us to do more with less.

As a maneuver battalion in Iraq, we took great pride in executing the missions the Army needed us to execute and being members of the most flexible branch in the Army—the Field Artillery.

1-9 FA Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). The battalion constantly changed many variables to stay unpredictable yet remain within the insurgent decision cycle. For example, we conducted battalion operations at least once a week with the objective locations, day of the week, time of day, amount of advance information provided to the Iraqis, ingress and egress routes, link-up locations and other variables changed for each operation. While physically demanding, the frequency of our operations allowed the battalion to clear the entire AOR many times and repeatedly mass resources in areas of higher insurgent activities.

After several months in Iraq, we realized that a key task of every operation had to be developing human intelligence (HUMINT) sources. As a result, when patrol sections cleared buildings, they interacted with the occupants and asked them questions about their neighborhoods. We often referred to this as a “passive engagement.” If the patrol leader felt the occupant had information of value, elements of the intelligence section were called forward to question the occupant and develop sources.

In an insurgent environment where the enemy blends into the population, we found that HUMINT offers the highest chance of neutralizing insurgent activities. Our logic was simple—the more passive engagements our patrol sections conducted, the better our chances would be of finding that one cooperative Iraqi citizen with actionable information.

During the year-long deployment, the battalion intelligence officer was successful in developing a productive HUMINT network focused on the commander’s effects guidance. In short, effects drove intelligence and intelligence drove operations. As the S2 produced actionable intelligence, the battalion used patrol sections to conduct precision offensive operations to isolate a target within a single structure.

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A Fires Battalion in OIF III: Supporting Decentralized “Hot” Platoons and Other Missions

By Lieutenant Colonel Patrick M. Antonietti and Captain Donald K. Brooks

The 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Raiders, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), deployed from Fort Stewart, Georgia, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III from January 2005 to January 2006. The Raider Brigade—the first unit to reach Baghdad during OIF I—again led the Army as the first to reorganize as a modular heavy BCT (HBCT) and deploy to Iraq for a second tour. 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery (1-41 FA), Glory’s Guns, deployed as the 1st BCT’s organic fires battalion.

During OIF III, Task Force (TF) 1-41 FA fired 5,860 rounds in support of operations throughout the 1st BCT’s battlespace, which was the size of Maryland. TF 1-41 FA’s Hot platoons located throughout the brigade’s large area of operations (AO) fired autonomously in support of their maneuver TFs. 1-41 FA’s direct support (DS) mission for the TFs was in addition to several other missions. This article discusses lessons learned during TF 1-41 FA’s 12-month tour in Iraq, highlighting Hot platoons in decentralized operations.

1st BCT replaced the 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from the New York National Guard for the first 10 months then to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) for its final two months in Iraq.

The transfer of authority (TOA) and relief in place (RIP) with 2/1ID was directed by III Corps to be “one for one” down to the platoon level. 1st BCT executed this directive as closely as possible, given that the BCT was replacing a legacy brigade. When the dust settled, 1st BCT controlled seven maneuver battalions and its organic fires battalion plus brigade support and brigade troop battalions.

The BCT partnered with many Iraqi Army, police and special police units and had facilities and infrastructure under its operational
A Fires Battalion in OIF III: control (OPCON). Command and control over such a large and diverse organization in such a large AO was an immense task for the 1st BCT, but it proved up to the challenge.

TF 1-41 FA’s Mission and Pre-Deployment Preparations. 1-41 FA had three key tasks to execute in Salad ad Din Province: prosecute the countermortar/rocket campaign across the brigade AO, including augmenting the brigade tactical command post (TAC) at Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda to synchronize joint targeting and counterstrike efforts; command and control Forward Operating Base (FOB) Remagen; and execute the brigade’s Provincial Police Partnership Program. Although I do not discuss the last key mission in this article, it involved partnering with and advising the Salad ad Din Provincial Chief of Police, his police headquarters (HQ) and his 10,000-man police force.

TF 1-41 FA also helped and advised the Salad ad Din Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) in Tikrit that planned and executed the historic constitutional and parliamentary elections. In addition, the battalion provided Soldiers for the 1st BCT’s military transition team (MiTT) that worked with the 1st Brigade of the 4th Iraqi Army Division, also in Tikrit.

Before deploying, the battalion established communications from Fort Stewart, Georgia, with the 2/1ID in Iraq. However, communications were difficult because most information of value was classified, and 1st BCT had only one secure internet protocol net (SIPRNET) computer in the entire brigade.

Three pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) were critical for the battalion to understand the mission, environment, terrain and peculiarities of the fluid AO. The surveys, also known as leaders’ reconnaissance, helped the battalion adjust home-station training.

Task Organization and Command Relationships. 2/1ID fielded four firing platoons and provided radar coverage with 10 Q-36 and Q-37 radars, which was crucial to prosecuting the counterfire fight. The 1st Infantry Division Artillery (Div Arty) HQ managed the maintenance and orientation of the radars; the 42nd Div Arty continued this mission during OIF III.

LSA Anaconda, a vital corps logistics hub, was in the BCT’s battlespace and the target of frequent mortar and rocket attacks. Disrupting the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) fires directed at the LSA was a major effort.

The battalion had to conduct split-TOC operations between FOB Remagen and LSA Anaconda. FOB Remagen was home to the 3rd division’s internment facility and 350 FOB support civilians, contractors and third country nationals (TCNs) who serviced five other FOBs near Tikrit. The battalion’s headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) (-) was responsible for FOB Remagen force protection and G company (-), 1-41 FA’s forward support company (FSC), was in charge of base operations.

1-41 FA positioned a trained and lethal Hot platoon on four FOBs that fired for at least one and sometimes up to three TFs.

The battalion headquarters could not fully control fires in the AO, given the distances to the Hot platoons and unique circumstances of each TF fight.

The battalion ensured each platoon had the means to meet the five requirements of accurate predicted fire, maintain its howitzers and fire direction center (FDC), resupply Class V (each platoon had an attached maintenance section and prescribed load list, or PLL, clerk from G company) and execute its TF commander’s scheme of fires nested with the brigade commander’s concept for fires.

Fires in the 1st BCT AO. When it returned from OIF I, 1-41 FA focused its training at the platoon level. The policies and procedures instituted by the 3rd Div Arty for certifying howitzer and fire direction sections, platoons and batteries were instrumental in guiding training both at Fort Stewart and while the battalion was deployed. Those procedures remain intact today.

All firing platoons in Glory’s Guns were DS to the maneuver TFs they supported. The platoons were on the same FOB as the supported...
The platoons were OPCON to their respective TFs for force protection and under the TFs’ administrative control (ADCON) for leave management, etc. These command relationships were easily worked out because the 1st BCT battalion commanders were “team players.” The 1-41 FA battalion commander and command sergeant major (CSM) circulated the brigade’s scheme of fires that nested with the brigade’s scheme of fires. Then, given a well-trained Hot platoon, executing those fires depended on the TF fire support officer (FSO) in conjunction with the brigade FSO, the TF fire direction officer (FDO) and the BCT fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). This coordination was much easier to do in Iraq, given the decentralized nature of the fight at the TF level.

Each maneuver TF operating in the vicinity of Bayji, Tikrit, Samarra, Balad, Ad Duliiyah, and Ad Dujayl had unique circumstances regarding its fight. The TF commanders in those areas were very aggressive in using artillery to prosecute the countermortar/rocket campaign.

Early in our deployment, there were some major deliberate brigade operations involving more than one TF, particularly in the vicinity of Samarra. But after those successes and the reconstitution of the Iraqi police force and introduction of Iraqi police commandos in Samarra, operations reverted to the TF level.

**Platoon Operations.** Each firing platoon supported one to three separate maneuver TFs and various HQs, to include the brigade HQ, division main and rear HQs, and corps assets at LSA Anaconda. Each battery commander conducted split operations and moved between FOBs with his personal security detachment (PSD).

Generally, the first sergeant was on one FOB with a firing platoon while the battery commander was on another. Sometimes the battery commander and first sergeant were together, depending on the unit’s needs.

The TFs used their organic mortar platoons as maneuver elements in order to project more combat power into their AOs. Therefore, the artillery platoons were the sole providers of uninterrupted fire support for the TFs. Close air support (CAS) and attack aviation were available, if the maneuver commander needed it, but artillery was available 24/7 in all weather conditions.

Each firing platoon had to track and execute counterfire missions within its TF’s battlespace in accordance with the TF commander’s scheme of fires. The platoons fired in response to AIF mortar and rocket attacks and conducted terrain-denial and troops-in-contact (TIC) missions. Terrain-denial fire missions were executed with high explosive (HE) and high-explosive rocket assisted (HER) rounds during the day and, primarily, with illumination rounds at night.

For deliberate operations, platoons stood up more than one Hot gun, depending on the mission. Each platoon always had one Hot gun ready to fire, 24/7. FDCs also were manned 24/7.

In the southern half of the AO, the AIF mortar and rocket fire proved to be the heaviest, especially around LSA Anaconda and FOB Paliwoda in the vicinity of Balad. The platoon firing in Paliwoda, which had to support three maneuver TFs and LSA Anaconda, was the busiest. So, based on our home-station train-up, we put our best firing platoon at this location.

The deputy brigade commander led the BCT TAC at LSA Anaconda. HBB/1-41 FA augmented the TAC with the battalion S3 and S2, battalion FDO and fire direction NCO (FDNCO), intelligence analyst, battalion FDC, a maintenance section, and communications and supply Soldiers. These Soldiers greatly facilitated the TAC’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and joint targeting process for the counterfire fight under the control of the deputy BCT commander. However, their absence at FOB Remagen, which was two hours to the north via Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa, made the task of commanding and controlling FOB Remagen a bit more challenging.

The platoons in the BCT’s southern sector fired almost two-thirds of the counterfire missions, which is a testament to their autonomous capabilities and ability to operate within the guidance of the maneuver commander. The battalion fired almost 6,000 HE, HER, illumination and smoke rounds in support of operations during OIF III.

**Howitzer Section Fighter Management.** Having four sections in a firing platoon was critical to the battalion’s success. The fighter management scheme for howitzer sections consisted of a section’s being Hot gun for two weeks (one week for a night time rotation followed by a second week during the day).

When coming off a Hot gun rotation, a section conducted maintenance for a week and was tasked with force protection. In the fourth week, the section trained to be a Hot gun again while still being tasked by the battalion for other missions.

Cross training Number 1 Men to be Gunners and Gunners to fill in as Section Chiefs was critical to keeping trained crews in the fight. This was particularly important because the leave numbers...
allocated to the battalion were not consistent throughout the deployment.

Keeping sections Table VIII certified during the deployment also was important. Table VIII certifications were executed by battery commanders and incorporated as terrain-denial missions by the TF commander and FSO.

Platoon operations centers (POCs) worked 24/7 for 12 months. They were not tasked for force protection or other duties, given their manning. Two of the four POCs were located inside maneuver TF TOCs. Given space constraints, two other POCs were in separate smaller buildings on those FOBs although they maintained constant communications with the TF fire support element (FSE).

**Debate Over Terrain-Denial Fires.** Many argue that terrain-denial fires are counterproductive. Fire supporters tasked to observe the target area of interest (TAI) containing the target telegraph Coalition presence in a particular area.

It is difficult to measure the success of terrain-denial fires if the AIF is not shooting. It is difficult to measure a lack of enemy indirect fires due to a unit having a well rehearsed and executable counterfire battle drill.

1-41 FA put this notion to the test in consultation with our BCT commander and ceased all proactive counterfire missions for 30 days to see whether or not AIF fires would increase as a result our only shooting when the insurgents shot first. The data collected across the BCT was that AIF fires did increase during this time, so we reinitiated proactive counterfires.

**Command and Control and Force Protection of FOB Remagen.** The task to command and control FOB Remagen, outside of Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit was a challenging mission, based on the troop-to-task available to the TF. This FOB was centrally located in the northern half of the AO close to the brigade TOC and division HQs on nearby FOBs. This allowed for efficient communications between 1-41 FA Soldiers, the brigade TAC, firing platoons and battery commanders.

1-41 FA had its headquarters, HHB (-), G company (-) and one firing platoon on FOB Remagen and was augmented with elements from a signal battalion, the brigade’s forward support battalion and brigade troops battalion. These units were OPCON to the battalion for force protection, and their Soldiers greatly contributed to the protection of FOB Remagen.

Because several of TF 1-41 FA HHB Soldiers were in the BCT TAC on LSA Anaconda, the battalion TOC at FOB Remagen relied heavily on primary staff officers to serve as battle captains. Key NCOs and Soldiers from other units cross trained for TOC operations. The battalion executive officer (XO) and the Assistant S3 (who became the S3 for all practical purposes) managed the manning of these TOC shifts.

With the battalion positioned on six FOBs across Salad ad Din Province, ammunition resupply and maintenance operations were a challenge. The FSC proved invaluable when tasked to execute this mission.

G company provided the battalion the heavy-haul capabilities needed to move ammunition supplies throughout the AO. It also supported the sustainment of FOB Remagen by conducting multiple weekly combat logistics patrols (CLPs) to FOB Speicher and LSA Anaconda to resupply Class I, II, III, V and mail and support Soldier leaves. These CLPs often incorporated large numbers of support trucks that supplied the FOB with vital Class I and III supplies. The drivers and truck commanders participated in the CLP leader’s troop-leading procedures and rehearsals.

The G company’s DS maintenance capabilities kept the operational readiness (OR) rate for each platoon at 95 percent or higher throughout the deployment. The combined efforts of the distribution platoon and the maintenance sections allowed for the timely movement of repair parts from one FOB to another and the timely repair of vehicles and equipment. This further allowed the firing platoons the flexibility to operate without the battalion’s direct involvement.

**Lessons Learned.** During our deployment, we learned several lessons.

Don’t let the “fog of war” begin with the commander’s intent. Face-to-face and frequent communications with subordinate units were difficult because of the distance of the BCT’s AO and the distances involved. Battle update briefings (BUBs) were incorporated weekly as were regular visits by the battalion command group to the units. However, the battalion commander could not be everywhere and was not always available, depending on the BCT’s missions.

Giving clear guidance and intent to battery commanders was critical. It helped that all commanders in OIF III were OIF I veterans and very experienced and capable. In addition, many of the first sergeants, platoon sergeants and section chiefs had OIF I experience. Also, the firing battery commanders remained in command the entire rotation.

**Junior Leaders are vital in decentralized operations.** The battery commanders were not always with their platoons. Given the nature of our 24/7 counterfire fight, they relied on their platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, gunnery sergeants, section chiefs and FDOs/NCOs to make the tactical and technical decisions to support the TF commanders.

Junior leaders made many decisions within the framework of the battalion’s mission and commander’s intent throughout OIF III and demonstrated that a Paladin battalion can be very successful without a direct, centralized headquarters element. The battalion’s success validated the training philosophy devised at home station to focus training at the platoon level.

Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) will enhance the counterfire fight. One of our biggest concerns in Iraq was collateral damage. This forced the artillery either to not shoot targets or to shoot offset grids to limit damage in built-up areas. The AIF quickly learned that, when firing near populated and built-up areas, Coalition Forces only responded with maneuver forces conducting combat patrols and air weapons teams, if available.

If PGMs had been available during our deployment, their accuracy would have allowed for immediate responses to AIF indirect fire attacks with smaller collateral damage estimate (CDE) rings.

The proper use of fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) will clear airspace more quickly. Clearing the battlespace was one of the biggest challenges in providing responsive counterfire.

Many times throughout OIF III, missions were canceled due to the inability to confirm that there were no aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flying in the area. An even greater percent of the time, missions were delayed several minutes—time the enemy used to escape from the target area—and fired only after 100 percent of every aviation unit confirmed there were no helicopters or planes along the gun-target line (GTL).

Part of this problem was solved when a Sentinel radar was incorporated into the BCT TOC. Part of the problem was training. If the DS battalion commander at FOB Remagen is not responsible for the brigade FSE, it is difficult to correct deficiencies noted in the FSE. Properly
employing and tracking active FSCMs would have accelerated the air-clearance process.

1st BCT used free-fire areas (FFAs) over locations the AIF repeatedly used for attacks on Coalition Force FOBs. Despite the great effort put forth by the TF that owned the terrain where FFAs were located to explain to the local populace that they had to stay out of these FFAs, it was a challenge to get the word to every Iraqi. Battle tracking friendly elements that patrolled these FFAs also was critical. Blue force tracker helped with this.

Informal and formal airspace coordination areas (ACAs) would have been better FSCMs for air units to move through the area and keep GTLS as clear as possible.

Units can task a battery to command and control a FOB’s force protection. The HHB commander was charged with force protection on FOB Remagen under the direction of the battalion TOC. HHB ran a 10-day force protection rotation cycle on the entire FOB with OPCON units adjusting to this cycle. Having one commander responsible ensured standards, guard mounts, communications and rehearsals of base defenses were easy to execute.

At the end of each 10-day cycle, the HHB commander conducted an after-action review (AAR) with all Soldiers coming off of force protection duty to garner lessons learned and determine the resources needed to improve execution. He also ran a weekly force protection meeting to pass information to the FOB support civilians, division interment facility NCO-in-charge (NCOIC), maneuver unit that owned the terrain outside the FOB and all tenant units.

The FA needs long-range communications. The distance between the firing platoons and the battalion headquarters increased the need for long-range communications. During the deployment, the battalion relied almost solely on digital non-secure voice telephones (DNVTs), SIPRNET, non-secure Internet protocol net (NIPRNET) and the Force XXI battle command information server (FBCB2) for communications. We used the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) in the two battalion TOC nodes to communicate with the POCs, and it proved to be a fairly reliable communications system, given the distances.

Maintain key battalion systems while deployed. Units should stay proficient on the key systems and procedures necessary to make a battalion function, regardless of the mission and location. 1-41 FA focused on arms room procedures, ammunition handling and accountability, vehicle maintenance and routine dispatching of vehicles, supply accountability and monthly 10 percent inventories, modified command inspections, leader professional development (LPD), promotion boards, health and welfare inspections, awards ceremonies and morale-building events led by the CSM.

Working with the FOB morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) organization, the CSM organized a monthly commander’s cup competition built around the battle rhythms of the subordinate units. This usually involved four to five sporting events followed by a monthly recognition ceremony at the dining facility for the winners. He also held a version of better opportunities for single/unaccompanied Soldiers (BOSS) meetings for deployed Soldiers, which was a forum for issues that might improve the quality of life on the FOB and keep morale high.

In addition, the battalion had a set of Soldiers’ rules that augmented the Raider Rules published by our BCT commander. The NCO supervisor chain inculcated these rules for the Soldiers’ effectiveness and safety. See the figure.

During our deployment, 1-41 FA fought as a true fires battalion, firing artillery in an active counterfire environment in support of maneuver units spread across a large AO. Our Soldiers proved that the battalion could accomplish this primary mission to standard plus offer the BCT commander the flexibility to have us tackle other lines of operation (LOOs) for him during OIF III.
America’s overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on. Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strengths—firepower, maneuver, technology—and come at us and our partners the way the insurgents do in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Commander, Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Events during the last two decades demonstrate that insurgency and terrorism are the most likely and most dangerous threats our country will face for the foreseeable future. Like the rest of the Army, the Field Artillery must continue to adapt to become more capable in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations that will mark the 21st century.

Precision fires play an important role in countering these threats, and it is essential that the King of Battle remain capable of providing such fires. However, both the Army and the FA would benefit were the King of Battle to take responsibility for what is, perhaps, the most vital task in counterinsurgency—developing host-nation security forces.

The Threats of the Long War. Our thinking enemies have studied our strengths and weaknesses and adapted their tactics to inflict maximum harm on our society. Those who have faced the US in conventional, interstate combat (Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan under the Taliban and Iraq under Saddam Hussein) have suffered defeat in days or weeks. However, those who fight the US using insurgent tactics (Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia and the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq) have fared far better.

The stark contrast between the 1991 Gulf War and the current war in Iraq clearly demonstrates this dichotomy. In 1991, we destroyed the world’s fourth largest Army in 100 hours of ground combat. In 2006, we have spent three years, thousands of lives and billions of dollars to stabilize Iraq, yet our insurgent enemies remain a dangerous and capable force.

A thinking enemy has a better chance of exhausting our political will through a protracted insurgency than to defeat our military through conventional combat. Insurgent tactics negate our asymmetric advantages in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision fires by using innocent civilians as cover and concealment and the media as strategic “fires.” By hiding “in plain sight” among innocent civilians, insurgents maintain their freedom to maneuver. Insurgents rarely mass or defend terrain. Instead, they seek to discredit and demoralize free societies and societies who aspire to freedom by terrorizing innocent civilians.

For the foreseeable future, the least
likely form of combat our forces will face is conventional interstate combat with a major military power. China, Russia, India and Pakistan all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea and Iran are determined to acquire them at any cost. A small but secure nuclear arsenal is capable of deterring an attack by even the most capable conventional force. Simply put, nuclear weapons make their possessors virtually invulnerable to invasion and regime change.

Were the US to invade a state with a secure nuclear capability, we could neither deter nor prevent that state from turning its nuclear arsenal on our forces, allies or homeland. A nuclear-armed regime facing a conventional invasion literally has nothing to lose and every incentive to go down fighting.

The US understands this point. We never have attacked a nuclear power, and we spend a great deal of energy attempting to prevent nuclear proliferation. Our potential adversaries understand this point and have either acquired or are actively attempting to acquire nuclear weapons.

When confronting a nuclear-armed enemy, the US may opt for diplomacy or covert action. However, unless science or tactics solve the stand-off created by nuclear weapons, conventional war among nuclear powers is implausible.

When the US engages in major combat operations (MCO) in the future, our most likely adversaries are weak states and non-state actors. Weak states (e.g., Grenada 1982, Panama 1989, Haiti 1994, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003) by definition have neither a nuclear deterrent nor the conventional forces to resist the US for any prolonged period of time. In these situations, the conventional might of American power quickly destroys the enemy’s capacity for organized resistance, and US forces quickly transition to stability and reconstruction operations (SRO).

Another possible scenario for MCO occurs when non-state actors, such as terrorists or insurgents, choose to mass forces and defend terrain. This scenario has occurred several times in Iraq, including in battles in Fallujah (2004), Najaf (2004) and Tal Afar (2004 and 2005). When our enemies commit the blunder of massing and defending terrain, our joint forces seize the opportunity to destroy them. Such operations are limited in both time and space and quickly return to COIN operations, once we destroy the enemy’s capacity to hold ground.

**The Essential Role of Precision Fires in Future Combat.** Precision fires will play an essential role in future combat and are essential for America to maintain her dominance in MCO. In those comparatively rare instances when our enemies choose to mass and defend terrain, precision fires enable US forces to destroy targets with minimal losses to friendly forces or innocent civilians. Coupled with our superb maneuver and support forces, precision fires enable us to destroy our enemies’ capacity to defend terrain.

Precision fires also play an important but more limited role in COIN. Time-sensitive targets in areas where friendly security forces cannot strike are ideal targets for precision fires in COIN. However, effective COIN makes such targets rare by denying insurgents sanctuaries outside the reach of friendly security forces. Precision fires have a more limited role in COIN due to the inherent difference between COIN and MCO.

In MCO, friendly forces use the maximum force allowable to destroy the enemy. The rapid and overwhelming application of force hastens the collapse of enemy forces with minimal loss to friendly units.

In COIN, the opposite is true—units must rely on the minimum force needed to subdue insurgents. In fact, in COIN, “the more force you use, the less effective you are.”3 In a COIN environment, the use of fires can affect intelligence collection adversely, and intelligence is the lifeblood of COIN. When we capture an insurgent, we can exploit his knowledge of the terrorist network; when we kill an insurgent, his knowledge of the terrorist network dies with him.

The use of fires also can affect civilian perceptions of security adversely. After the use of fires, insurgents often claim that the strikes were necessary due to the host-nation government’s inability to provide security or that the victims of the strike were innocent civilians. The truth of these claims is beside the point; by employing fires, we create an insurgent propaganda opportunity. Commanders must weigh these adverse effects carefully when employing fires in COIN.

MCO and COIN require different forces with different capabilities. (See Figure 1.) Some capabilities are in high demand for both MCO and COIN—intelligence, communications, engineers, logistics, psychological operations (PSYOP), military police (MP), infantry, special operations forces (SOF) and aviation are required in roughly equal amounts for both COIN and MCO. Other capabilities in high demand during MCO are less well suited.
for COIN—armored combat and fires, such as FA, air defense artillery (ADA), mortars and airpower. This decreasing use of firepower is consistent with the principle of employing the minimum force necessary to defeat insurgents.

However, even in COIN, it is necessary to preserve the capability to transition to MCO. As operations in Fallujah, Tal Afar and elsewhere have demonstrated, there are rare opportunities in COIN in which the enemy chooses to mass and defend terrain. When these opportunities occur, we must rapidly transition to MCO for periods limited in space and time to defeat insurgent forces.

Other forces are in demand less during MCO but become critical in COIN. Providing security and other services to civilian populations is essential to COIN. Military transition teams (MiTTs), police transition teams (PTTs) and border transition teams (BTTs) develop the host-nation security forces needed to provide security for the civilian population. Civil affairs (CA) units build host-nation governance capacity to redress popular grievances, including the need for sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical and security (SWEAT-MS).4

During the transition from MCO to COIN, forces organized, trained and equipped for MCO tasks must transition to tasks that are in high demand. By doing so, friendly forces maintain continuous pressure on the enemy and deny him the ability to hide in plain sight among the civilian population.

If forces are so specialized that they are unable to make the transition from MCO to COIN, then the population will be without security and other essential services in the post-conflict environment. This failure to adapt provides the enemy an opportunity to create chaos immediately after the end of MCO and fuels the growth of the insurgency.

A New Role for the FA in COIN. The Army and the FA would benefit greatly if the King of Battle would take primary responsibility for developing host-nation security forces. The Army would benefit by ensuring that an important new mission is led by a branch that can take a holistic approach to innovation. The FA would benefit because its newly formed fires brigades are ideal for this vital mission. (While fires battalions within brigade combat teams, or BCTs, have many of the same attributes as fires brigades, the fires battalions usually are fully committed as maneuver formations in a COIN environment.)

Assigning the Fires Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, responsibility for developing the host-nation security forces would benefit the Army as a whole. Innovation occurs best when one branch or service takes a holistic approach to developing a new capability. This holistic approach includes not only doctrine and training development, but also manning cohesive units dedicated to the mission with promotions tied to performance in the new mission field. The development of armor, amphibious operations, submarines, bombers and SOF in the 20th century confirms this observation.

Furthermore, scholarly research shows that innovation flourishes when innovative practices are linked to professional advancement. According to Stephen Peter Rosen, “innovation may thus require the creation of a new promotion pathway to the senior ranks, so that young officers practicing the new way of war can rise to the top, as part of a generational change.”5

Forces Command (FORSCOM) currently has responsibility for the host-nation security force mission with support from the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. FORSCOM is centralizing all advisory team training at Fort Riley, Kansas, with primary responsibility for the mission being assigned to the First Infantry Division upon its re-stationing at Fort Riley in the late summer of 2006.

While developing host-nation security forces is vital to the war on terrorism, no branch has the responsibility for holistically developing this capability. Perhaps more importantly, the current method of forming advisory teams to develop host-nation security forces offers no promotion pathway to reward the best leaders for mastering this vital skill. We must send our best personnel as advisors and give them the training required for success in this most demanding mission.7

Developing host-nation security forces is a new way of war. A branch that sees this work as a mission-essential task should lead the mission and reward the leaders and Soldiers who master it.

The steps necessary to implement such a significant change are too complex to cover in this space. However, Figure 2 briefly outlines 10 steps that the Artillery Branch could take were it to embrace

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1. Revise “DA Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management” to recognize service as a host-nation security force advisor as a key developmental assignment for Field Artillery officers.

2. Create a leader’s course for developing host-nation security forces at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in cooperation with the COIN Academy at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

3. Develop a plan for transitioning fires brigades and their subordinate battalions into advisory units.

4. Propose to Forces Command (FORSCOM) that future MiTT/BTT/PTT/SPTT requirements be filled by fires brigade units.

5. Assign Iraqi and Afghan exchange officers to Fort Sill.

6. Develop cooperative programs with the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California, and colleges and universities for Arab area and language studies; endow one or more chairs in these institutions to support culture and language training for Field Artillerymen.

7. Assign a liaison officer (LNO) to Fort Riley, Kansas, to coordinate host-nation security force development doctrine with the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Infantry Division (1/ID).

8. Assign Field Artillerymen with experience in developing security forces to the combat training centers (CTCs) to serve as observer/controllers (O/C) during fires brigade mission readiness exercises (MRXs).

9. Assign LNOs to the MultiNational Security Transition Command, Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the Phoenix Academy, also in Iraq, to provide feedback on training Iraqi security forces.

10. Offer FORSCOM a fires brigade to reinforce and, eventually, replace 1/1ID with a fires brigade as the lead unit for training units deploying as security force trainers.

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Figure 2: Ten Steps for the Field Artillery Branch to Embrace the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Mission of Advising Host-Nation Security Forces
the mission of developing host-nation security forces.

Taking responsibility for developing host-nation security forces would benefit the FA by providing fires brigades a high-priority mission during COIN. Fires brigades have many attributes that make them ideal to be advisory units. They are cohesive units that are readily available during the transition from MCO to COIN. Upon conclusion of MCO, fires brigades could transition to developing host-nation security forces, thereby denying insurgents freedom of action in the immediate post-conflict environment.

Fires brigades contain a high ratio of leaders, including centrally selected senior commanders and command sergeants major. This ratio of leaders enables embedding security force advisors down to the platoon level. Advisory teams currently do not extend to the company and platoon levels.

Fires brigades have the staff expertise needed to develop the host-nation security forces’ ability to perform vital administrative, logistical, and command and control tasks. The organizational structure of a fires brigade would make a superb division-level MiTT. (See Figure 3.)

Finally, fires brigades can coordinate for fires in the event insurgents try to overwhelm and destroy a host-nation’s security forces. To be effective, security forces must disperse among the civilian population they secure. However, this dispersion places them at risk for insurgent attacks. Redlegs with the ability to call for fire reduce this risk and increase the confidence and the effectiveness of host-nation security forces.

FA forces already train host-nation security forces as well as superbly perform many other tasks, including serving as maneuver forces, MPs, truck drivers, CA and PSYOP Soldiers, and area support group staff members. However, Field Artillerymen should not be content to fill in gaps for high-demand capabilities in COIN operations.

The FA’s future is served better by taking responsibility for a vital COIN requirement: advising host-nation security forces. FA doctrine must teach leaders how to perform this task, and FA institutional and unit training must hone this difficult but essential craft.

The FA’s “staking out” this skill would ensure that fires brigades are in high demand for both MCO and COIN. Combatant commanders fighting active insurgencies would seek fires brigades to build the combat power needed to defeat insurgents. Likewise, combatant commanders who seek to deter conflicts would seek fires brigades to build host-nation deterrent capabilities.

The struggle to defend free societies and societies seeking to be free from the perils of insurgency and terrorism will be the work of a generation of Army leaders. Defeating these threats requires full-spectrum capabilities.

The Field Artillery is a powerful instrument for destroying America’s enemies. The branch must become an equally powerful instrument for strengthening America’s friends. Developing host-nation security forces is vital to victory in the long war and is a mission worthy of the King of Battle.

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Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Yingling is the Deputy Commanding Officer for the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the same unit in which he served as the Effects Coordinator (ECOORD) during OIF III. Among other assignments, he was the Executive Officer (XO) for the 212th Field Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; XO of 2-18 FA, 212th FA Brigade, during OIF I; and Chief of Plans, G3, 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. He commanded A/25 FA (Target Acquisition) during Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia and served as a Platoon Fire Direction Officer in the 1st Infantry Division during ODS. He taught International Relations at West Point. He holds an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), both at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Figure 3: Fires Brigade Structure in MCO and COIN. The fires brigade would make a superb division MiTT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>MCO</th>
<th>COIN</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Brigade Commander</td>
<td>Division Senior Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>Brigade Senior Advisor</td>
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<td>Brigade Primary Staff</td>
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<td>Battery Commander</td>
<td>Battalion Senior Advisor</td>
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<td>Captain/1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>Battalion Primary Staff</td>
<td>Battalion Senior Advisors</td>
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<td>Platoon Leader</td>
<td>Company Senior Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>Section Chief</td>
<td>Platoon Senior Advisor</td>
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</table>

2. See Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” in Robert Art and Ken Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, Military Power and International Politics, 4th Edition (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of American, 1993) 333-349. Waltz argues, “Nuclear weapons strip conventional forces of most of their functions...The probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero...We do not need ever larger forces to deter. Smaller forces, so long as they are invulnerable, would be quite sufficient.”
During recent months, the Field Artillery has undergone many career changes, as monitored by the FA Officer’s Branch at Human Resources Command (HRC), Alexandria, Virginia. One of the most significant has been the shift in the career development philosophy from the historically prescriptive path to a more flexible career progression. The shift’s intent is to grow multi-skilled Artillerymen with more diverse career assignment opportunities and more potential for commands.

The Army continues to fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) while simultaneously meeting the demands of restructuring for modularity and transforming the force for the future. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA’s) vision is of a new breed of Soldiers and officers for the future—a breed of Pentathletes who think quickly, adapt easily and are competent in a myriad of skills. The Pentathlete is a full-spectrum warrior and leader with an expeditionary mindset.

Building such Pentathletes is the basis of recent revisions to “DA Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management.” October 2005. Among other changes, DA Pam 600-3 no longer prescribes “branch-qualifying” jobs for Field Artillerymen. For example, battery command is no longer branch qualifying and required for selection to major—in fact, the first captain who had not commanded a battery was selected to major on the most recent major’s board. Others will follow.

Instead of branch-qualifying assignments, DA Pam 600-3 outlines some “key developmental assignments,” allowing FA officers a more flexible career development path.

This article not only outlines the new career paths for active component (AC) FA officers, but also reports on the FA’s current status and projects the future. The FA branch report is that the Field Artillery is vibrant with an outstanding future ahead—and the facts prove it.

Throughout our modularity restructuring, we have grown in personnel in all categories. The officer corps has increased by 100, warrant officer (WO) corps by 168 and the enlisted ranks by 1700. FA battalion-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotion Rank</th>
<th>FA %</th>
<th>Army %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>97.7</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>88.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Promotion percentages for FA officers are the highest in the Army, based on the last published promotion lists. From major to colonel, the FA’s average promotion percent matches or is higher than the Army’s average promotion percent.

By Lieutenant Colonels Jeffrey C. Lieb and John F. Dunleavy and Captain J. Ryan Cutchin

LTC Mark Johnson, Commander of 2nd Battalion, 20th Field Artillery (2-20 FA) in Iraq. Approximately 15 to 20 percent of officers are selected for battalion command. (Photo by SSG Kevin L. Moses, Sr., 55th Combat Camera, COMCAM)
level tactical commands have grown from 54 to 61.

In addition, promotion rates for FA officers, majors to colonels, are the highest in the Army. See Figure 1. Our 131A FA 'Targeting Technician WOs' promotion rates also have been exceptional, including the most recent 50-percent selection rate to chief warrant five (CW5).

And while the Army at war is undergoing the most significant changes in its history, Field Artillerymen consistently have demonstrated their diversity—shown they are Pentathletes, taking the lead in successfully executing a wide variety of nontraditional missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well documented in this magazine.

With all these positive facts, some still have concerns. Perhaps the biggest concern of FA officers for the future is the number of brigade-level commands available to them. With the restructuring of the Army and drawdown of the division artillery (Div Arty), fewer brigade-level commands are available to FA promotable lieutenant colonels and colonels, even though the number of battalion-level commands have increased.

Today, a request for Field Artillerymen to be eligible for DA selection to command brigade combat teams (BCTs)—as they already have been commanding in GWOT—is before the Army’s senior leadership for approval. With the push toward developing multi-capable Pentathletes who have multiple opportunities to use their capabilities in the Army, the request has an excellent chance for approval.

For those officers who want to develop skills in their interest areas and don’t want to command, the new flexibility in their career paths allows them that option with promotion potential and career satisfaction.

This article offers FA officers of all ranks career advice based on current trends and future opportunities. See the FA officer career development life cycle and utilization model in Figure 2.

FA Lieutenants. The Army has approximately 1,619 FA lieutenants; of these 1,168 are serving in FA- (13A)-specific jobs, 17 in branch-immaterial (O1A) jobs, two in combat arms branch-immaterial (O2A) jobs and 432 are in transit, such as permanent changes of station (PCS), in the basic officer leader course (BOLC)/schools or on medical hold.

New FA officers can expect to attend BOLC II after BOLC I training from their commissioning source. The seven-week BOLC II course immerses the officer in warfighting doctrine and is conducted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or Fort Benning, Georgia. The course focuses on current lessons learned in GWOT and basic Soldiering tasks.

BOLC III is approximately 15 weeks and is conducted at Fort Sill. Here the officer learns the core competencies needed to be a successful FA officer.

Upon arriving at BOLC II, each second lieutenant will know where he will be assigned, and after successfully completing BOLC III, he will go to his unit. Upon completion of BOLC III, a limited number of officers will receive additional assignments for officer training, focusing on the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) or Paladin.

A second lieutenant can expect to hold many positions, ranging from fire support officer (FSO), fire direction officer (FDO), platoon leader, executive officer (XO) and others. For a list of potential duty titles and a “standard” timeline, see Figure 2.

Some of the positions will be nontraditional. In fact, FA lieutenants execute, probably, a wider diversity of nontraditional positions in GWOT than lieutenants in other branches, helping to earn the Field Artillery’s reputation for spawning Pentathletes.

Second lieutenants are promoted to first lieutenant at or about the 18th month of commissioned service. A first lieutenant can expect to hold positions of greater scope and responsibility.

Promotion to captain generally occurs at the 39th month of commissioned service. Senior first lieutenants and junior captains must talk with their assignment officers to request attendance at the FA Captain’s Career Course (FACCC), Fort Sill. This is the next professional development step and the last formal school that deals explicitly with FA.

FA Junior Captains. The Army has approximately 1,410 junior captains; of these officers, 1,116 are serving in FA-specific jobs, 36 in branch-immaterial jobs, 26 in combat arms branch-immaterial jobs and 232 in transit, such as PCS, expirations of term of service (ETS), in schools or on medical hold.

Professional development does not follow the prescriptive time line as in the past. The environment has been created to allow a junior officer to seek assignments “off the beaten path.”

According to the DA 600-3, two key developmental assignments for captains are battery command and battalion FSO. Although captains now can obtain the rank of major without a command, officers who want to serve as battalion S3s, XOs or battalion commanders in the future should seek a battery command to gain the experience needed for those higher level positions.

Once a lieutenant becomes promotable, he is managed by the Junior Captain’s Assignments Officer. The first goal is to get the officer to FACCC. Officers can attend FACCC by submitting a DA Form 4187 Personal Action requesting a school date through their chains of command.

The newly revised FACCC reflects the contemporary operating environment (COE), counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and GWOT lessons learned. The 19-week-four-day course immerses students in a continuous, realistic GWOT scenario with multiple hands-on structured learning activities. The focus is to develop agile leaders who rapidly can make complex decisions in the COE, build teams and command a battery. This course prepares FA officers for future staff positions and potential commands.

Officers also can compete for a sister service school, such as an alternate combat arms branch CCC or the Marine Expeditionary Warfare Course (MEWC) at Quantico, Virginia. These seats are highly competitive, and FA Branch at HRC will select the officers with the best files to attend.

Once in CCC, the officer fills out an assignments preference sheet. The information requested on this sheet, the officer record brief (ORB) and a branch interview enable the assignments officer to slate the officer for his next assignment. The preference sheet and updated ORB are vital for the assignment slating.

During the slating process, FA Branch takes many factors into consideration to ensure the right officer is selected to fill the right job. The officer’s skills and experience, dwell time on station, months deployed, professional development, preference, joint domicile, exceptional family member and year group are key factors for slating.

GWOT has created new Army requirements, and, above all other factors, these requirements dictate the officer’s next assignment. Deploying units and transition teams for advising host nation security forces are the manning priorities. These units and teams will expedite the withdrawal of American forces from combat zones.
**FA Senior Captains.** The Army has approximately 228 senior FA captains. Of these officers, 116 are serving in FA-specific jobs, 37 in branch-immaterial jobs, 28 in combat arms branch-immaterial jobs and 47 in transit.

Senior captains serving in the FA are experienced, combat-proven leaders with a great deal to offer in many areas in the Army. After serving in a key developmental position as a captain, historically more than 80 percent of FA senior captains will serve in recruiting or reserve component (RC) assignments, while 20 percent of FA officers will serve in nominative positions. See Figure 3 on Page 40. These nominative assignments include internships on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the personnel exchange program (PEP), a foreign exchange; service at a combat training center (CTC); fellowships; reserve officers training corps (ROTC) and the advanced civil schooling (ACS) program. An officer’s manner of performance in key developmental positions and the right skills and experience are significant considerations in selection for a nominative position.

Officers are encouraged to research options when developing goals to align their expectations, background and experience with the Army’s needs and priorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Service</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Goal: 36 Months in Key Branch Developmental Assignments</th>
<th>Goal: 36 Months in Key Branch Developmental Assignments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Function Area Decision</td>
<td>Major OPCF</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Career Field Decision</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Typical FA Developmental Assignments**

- Firing Battery Platoon Leader
- Company FSO
- Platoon/Battery FDO
- Battery Operations Officer
- Battery XO
- Reconnaissance Officer
- Battalion Ammunition Officer
- Radar Platoon Leader
- Battalion LNO
- Staff Officer
- Battery/Company Commander (12-24 Months)*
- Battalion FSO (Maneuver/ Special Operations)*
- Other FSO (Battalion/Brigade/Division/Corps/BCT)
- CTC OIC
- School SGL/Instructor
- Battalion FDO
- Battalion Assistant S3
- Battalion/Brigade/Division Operations Staff
- Primary Staff Officer (USMA/ROTC/Branch)
- Other Nominative Assignments/Training
- ROTC/AC/RC/Staff HQs
- USAEC
- FA/Fires Battalion S3/XO*
- Brigade FSO*
- Brigade/Battalion S3/XO*
- SGL or O/C (CTC)
- Other FSO (Battalion/Division/Corps/BCT)
- Staff (Division/Corps/EAC)
- AFSCOORD
- Brigade Primary Staff
- Corps Artillery Assistant G3
- Operations Officer (FSC**/BCT/FAIO)
- Nominative Assignments (ROTC/USMA/etc.)
- Joint/Interagency/Multinational/Army HQs or Staff
- Exchange Officer Programs
- Other Assignments
- Battalion Commander (24-36 Months)
- FA Brigade/Fires Brigade/Div Arty S3/XO
- Joint/Interagency/Multinational Staff
- BCT-Level XO/DCO
- Brigade FSCOORD
- Division DFSCOORD
- Corps/Fires Brigade FSC
- CTC Senior O/C
- ROTC/AC/RC/USAREC
- Special Assignments
- Other Assignments
- Brigade-Level Commander (24-36 Months)
- Division FSCOORD
- Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff
- Joint/Army/Interagency/Multinational Staffs
- BCD Commander
- IET Brigade Commander
- TRADOC Systems Manager
- Other Assignments

**Legend:**

- AG = Active Component
- AFSCOORD = Assistant FSCOORD
- BCD = Battlefield Coordination Detachment
- BCT = Brigade Combat Team
- BFIST = Bradley Fire Support Team
- BOLC = Basic Officer’s Leader Course
- CCC = Captain’s Career Course
- CTC = Combat Training Center
- DCO = Deputy Commanding Officer
- DFSCOORD = Deputy FSCOORD
- Div Arty = Division Artillery
- EAC = Echelons Above Corps
- FAIO = Field Artillery Intelligence Officer
- FDO = Fire Direction Officer
- FSC = Fire Support Cell
- FSCOORD = Fire Support Coordinator
- FSO = Fire Support Officer
- HQs = Headquarters
- IET = Initial Entry Training
- ILE = Intermediate-Level Education
- IO = Information Operations
- LNO = Liaison Officer
- MLRS = Multiple-Launch Rocket System
- OPCF = Operations Career Field
- OBC = Officer’s Basic Course
- O/C = Observer/Controller
- PME = Professional Military Education
- RC = Reserve Component
- ROTC = Reserve Officer Training Corps
- SGL = Small Group Leader
- SSC = Senior Service College
- TRADOC = Training and Doctrine Command
- USAEC = US Army Recruiting Command
- USMA = US Military Academy at West Point
- XO = Executive Officer

Figure 2: Field Artillery Officer Career Developmental Life Cycle and Utilization Model
Recent changes have affected the career path of senior captains. The primary look for promotion to major now is at approximately nine years of service (vice the previous 10 years of service) with a pin-on date of about the 10th year of commissioned service. One impact of the shortened promotion time is a captain has less time to complete a key developmental assignment or serve in a post-key developmental senior captain’s position before pinning on his major’s oak leaves.

On the positive side, officers now have more opportunities to serve in staff positions for majors before attending Intermediate-Level Education (ILE) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Accelerated promotions also have caused a small number of officers to have their primary look for major with no command reports in their files. Analysis of the results of the previous majors’ promotion board has shown that officers are not placed at risk for promotion for having less than 12 months in a key developmental assignment.

Although every position counts, battery command will remain an important gate for FA officers to remain competitive for battalion commands and success in the operations career field (OPCF). There are four career fields in the Army: OPCF, 69 percent; operational support (OSC), 14 percent; institutional support (ISCF), 10 percent; and information-operations (IOCF), seven percent.

The Artillery officer’s goal for his first command should be to command for 15 to 18 months. An officer selected to serve in a second command should expect his first command to be 12 months followed by a 12-month tour in his second command for a total of 24 months. This approach will allow the command queue for junior captains to remain manageable and provide senior captains command experience in various parts of the Army.

Officers in life cycle manned units—Army Force Generation, or ARFORGEN—can expect to remain in the unit until the end of the life cycle or pursue release through an exception to policy. That means some officers who have completed their commands will remain in their respective units awaiting the end of the life cycle.

The exception to policy for release from a life cycle unit is approved by the major Army command (MACOM) commander of the unit of assignment. FA Branch will not work an assignment for an officer without the approval/notification of his chain of command.

FA Majors. The Army has approximately 718 FA majors; of these officers 464 are serving in FA-specific jobs, 54 in branch-immaterial jobs, 67 in combat arms branch-immaterial jobs and 133 are in transit.

FA majors’ assignments have gone through a great deal of change in the past 18 months. Based on comments from the field, the key areas to address are the following: timeliness of ILE attendance, the process for selection for a foreign or sister service school, key developmental jobs and competitiveness for battalion command selection.

ILE replaced the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), beginning with Year Group (YG) 94 officers. In year groups before 94, boards selected the officers with the top 50 percent of the files to attend resident CGSC. The other 50 percent of the officers had to complete the course in a non-resident status.

OPCF, YG 94 and beyond, all now attend 10-months of courses as part of the resident ILE course as long as they have been selected for major. OPCF, ISCF and IOCF majors attend a 14-week common core course (taught at four different locations) followed by their own functional area specific courses at various locations.

The issue of timeliness of attendance at ILE is affected by the fact that all majors attend ILE, as designated by their particular career fields. Simultaneously, the Army needs majors for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and transformation efforts. Although ILE can handle almost 1,200 students per year, Army assignments officers cannot send 1,200 majors to ILE because of the needs of the Army in other positions.

Each branch has an allocation per ILE class. Normally, more officers are eligible for ILE than the number of allocations, so a slating process occurs. This process determines who will go to ILE and who will continue on or PCS to another assignment to meet Army requirements.

The current template has an officer attending ILE approximately two years after promotion to major. This allows some officers the ability to complete key and developmental jobs before attending ILE. HRC makes a great effort to slate officers into ILE at the earliest possible time, factoring in the needs of the Army.

ILE slating priority goes to YG 93 officers and earlier who were selected for CGSC, but for some reason have not yet attended and are available. Second, are YGs 94, 95, etc., based on YG seniority and time-on-station. Because each branch’s attendees are based on the branch’s allocation, it may be possible for, say, an Armor officer in YG 95 to go to ILE before an Aviation officer in YG 94.

Within each branch an order of merit list (OML) is developed, based on YG seniority and time-on-station. There is no board for this process. File strength is not considered. However, at the same time, officers will be selected to attend foreign and sister service schools, making them ineligible for ILE.

To attend a foreign or sister service school, the officer must submit a memorandum requesting attendance at the desired school. Also, although letters of recommendation are not required, they are highly encouraged. The Officer
Enumerated reports matter, and direct and concise language is best.
He must be Military Education Level 4 (MEL-4)—either a graduate of an ILE-level course or, at a minimum, in the resident course at the time of the board.
The officer must have at least one S3 or XO report in his file at the time of the board; if he only has one report, it must be strong. The number of S3 and XO reports will decrease, beginning with YG 91.
Manner of performance in all of these assignments will dictate who is selected. Field-grade performance will weigh much heavier than company-grade performance.
Finally, deployments matter. Strong reports while deployed weigh heavily with a board.

**FA Lieutenant Colonels.** The Army has approximately 365 FA lieutenant colonels. Of these officers, 210 are serving in FA-specific jobs, 27 in branch-immaterial jobs, 87 in combat arms branch-immaterial jobs and 41 are in transit.

Today’s FA lieutenant colonel enjoys a wider range of assignment opportunities than his predecessor. This translates into greater assignment satisfaction, regardless of command and promotion potential.

Key areas of professional/career concern for FA lieutenant colonels continue to be battalion command opportunities, selection for senior service college (SSC) and promotion to colonel. Analysis of board results from the last several years makes it clear that the three remain closely linked. Simply stated, FA officers not selected to command battalions, in turn, have not been selected for SSC or colonel.

However, this linkage is changing. First, 14 percent of FA officers recently selected for battalion command have been above-the-zone (AZ) officers who have continued to perform at high levels in troop and joint assignments. Also, for the first time in recent memory, a handful of officers from combat arms branches not selected for battalion command were selected for promotion to colonel in FY05.

It is impossible to know why this happened, but the general consensus is that boards are starting to give more consideration to top-performing officers in non-command positions—especially those serving in combat. Although there certainly is no guarantee, we are hopeful that some non-command-select FA officers will be selected for SSC and more to colonel in the future. The types of assignments that will enhance an FA lieutenant colonel’s competitiveness for battalion command, SSC and promotion are troop and joint duty assignments.

Historically, conventional wisdom was that unless an FA lieutenant colonel was selected to serve as a tactical FA battalion commander, his opportunities to serve in the tactical “muddy boots” Army ended with promotion to lieutenant colonel. With the transition to the modular Army, that has changed.

The modular design has increased the requirements for FA lieutenant colonels in tactical formations (divisions and BCTs). This increased authoriza-
tion of Field Artillerymen to serve as deputy commanding officers (DCOs) in BCTs and fire support coordinators (FSCOORDS) in BCT headquarters is providing FA lieutenant colonels new opportunities to continue to serve at the “tip of the spear.” Although we’ve experienced some initial difficulties resourcing some of these positions due to the limited number of FA lieutenant colonels available, we expect to start assigning more officers to these positions in the next few years.

Additionally, more and more FA senior majors and junior lieutenant colonels are being selected to serve as BCT XO’s. This trend is especially important as the FA has lost a significant number of brigade-level XO and S3 jobs with the inactivation of the Div Arty headquarters.

Another opportunity for troop time is with MiTTs that are developing host-nation security forces, a mission that is critical to America’s success in Iraq and Afghanistan. These jobs are demanding, and officers are screened to ensure they have the skills and experience required.

A strong trend for competitiveness for command and promotion is excellent performance in recent deployment experience. These jobs are important, and they count.

Joint duty assignments generally are viewed as enhancing to an officer’s competitiveness for command and promotion. Additionally, these assignments often provide unique career experiences for those officers, regardless of promotion or command potential. Although we generally try to assign officers with significant command and promotion potential to joint assignments, joint opportunities for lieutenant colonels who have not commanded battalions are still available.

**FA Colonels.** We currently have 192 FA colonels and promotable lieutenant colonels in our population. Of these officers 26 percent serve in FA- (13Z)-specific jobs, 21 percent in branch-immaterial jobs, 26 percent in combat arms branch-immaterial jobs and 27 percent serve in other positions (schools, the retirement account and other functional areas). For the past four years, the promotion percentages of FA officers to colonel have exceeded the Army’s average percentages.

The greatest area of concern continues to be the decrease in the number of colonels’ commands. Although training and strategic support (TSS) and institutional command opportunities remain steady, the number of tactical commands for colonels has decreased in modular restructuring. Currently, we have 10 tactical brigade-level commands available to AC Field Artillerymen—six fires brigades and four battlefield coordination detachments (BCDs).

The good news is that the Army senior leaders are considering a proposal to allow Field Artillerymen to be eligible for DA selection to command BCTs along with Infantry and Armor officers. With Field Artillerymen having commanded BCTs, both in and out of the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of operations, the time might be right for the proposal’s approval.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army recently approved the grade increase of the division FSCOORD from lieutenant colonel to colonel. The increase is in recognition of the fact that a colonel provides the requisite expertise to coordinate and interface with the broad array of joint, interagency and multinational (JIM) organizations that are necessary to leverage the division’s lethal and nonlethal effects. Division commanders rely on their FSCOORDs to coordinate the division staff’s efforts in joint fires and effects planning, preparation and execution. Additionally, a colonel FSCOORD will mentor, train and provide readiness oversight over the division’s fires battalions, one organic to each of the BCTs.

At the Senior Leader Development Office (SLD), the Colonel’s Management Office’s goal is to fill all the division FSCOORD positions with colonels by August 2007. Priority for filling these positions is to deploying divisions.

In another significant initiative directed by the CSA and Secretary of the Army, SLD was officially established on 23 January 2006. SLD is the Army’s single organization to develop and manage the Army’s senior leaders, including general officers and AC colonels and promotable lieutenant colonels.

Previously, general officers were managed by the General Officer Management
Office (GOMO), and colonels were managed by OPMD. By establishing SLD, the CSA and Secretary of the Army have expanded their role in developing Army competitive category colonels and promotable lieutenant colonels.

SLD is working to implement a number of initiatives to provide Army colonels with additional developmental opportunities and senior leader customer support. The initiatives for the development of Army colonels include additional training opportunities in joint, multinational and interagency communities and fellowships to institutions and agencies, such as the Brookings Institute, Harvard University and the Council of Foreign Relations. In accordance with the CSA’s guidance, the Colonel’s Management Office has established a working group to explore additional developmental opportunities using the same systematic management approach used for the general officer population.

FA Warrant Officers. The future for our 131As is extremely bright. Army modularity restructuring has created a need for approximately 168 additional 131A positions by FY07. We started FY04 at 205 authorized and 204 assigned. Our current 131A authorizations are at 344 with 225 assigned. The Army average for 131A authorizations is approximately 69 percent. Authorizations will continue to increase to 383 by FY07.

The majority of the new 131A positions are in BCTs, newly formed fires brigades and tactical command posts (TACs). This means promotion opportunities for 131As will be good for some time to come.

The FY06 promotion board results were released on 25 April 2006. Not surprisingly, 100 percent of the CW2s were selected for promotion to CW3, 97.3 percent to CW4 and 50 percent to CW5.

The “down side” is that newly appointed WOs could be assigned to higher positions more quickly without gaining the necessary skills and expertise. Previous senior WOs have had the opportunity to develop over time. To meet the needs of modularity and transformation, we are “building an airplane while it’s in flight.”

131A WOs Career Manager has the challenge of recruiting more qualified NCOs to fill the WO ranks. The Army G1 has increased 131A accession numbers from 26 per year in FY04 to 54 through FY09.

Career development for WOs is very important. There are few technical schools for 131A WOs, so most of the professional development is gained through on-the-job training (OJT). See Figure 4 for the 131A WO’s life cycle development and utilization model. The model in Figure 4 is only a representative guide.

There are many jobs throughout the Army for 131As, but not all will be available when a 131A is. Performance is everything. Each 131A should give 100 percent in every assignment to have a successful career.

To meet the special requirements of a new position, the WO Career Manager arranges for schooling for a WO on route to his next assignment, when possible. An example might be his attending the Joint Firepower Control Course at Nellis AFB, Nevada. Long-term development, such as degree-completion programs, may be considered for exceptional WOs who meet the 131A prerequisites as outlined in Army Regulation 621-1 Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions linked to HRC’s home page.

The Army’s stabilization plan is designed to allow Soldiers and families assigned to continental US (CONUS) installations to stay for longer periods.

Based on the CSA’s guidance, the goal for a CONUS tour length is approximately seven years.

A 131A can expect to be stationed in CONUS for at least three to seven years, depending on his professional development needs. Special situations may require a select few to do a short-notice PCS or temporary change of station (TCS).

The Separate WO Division, HRC, officially dissolved as of 7 November 2005. OPMD merged the assignments officers for WOs into the proponent branches for each career specialty. The intent of this merger is to provide synergy with the WO specialties and the branches in OPMD.

There are many transformation changes going on at HRC. To stay abreast of them and read the current DA Pam 6003-3, go to the FA Branch website at https://www. hrc.army.mil/site/protect/active/opfa/ fastrep.htm. This site also provides information on upcoming events and the email addresses and telephone numbers of all FA Branch representatives.

Undoubtedly, the rate of change throughout the Army will continue for the foreseeable future. But changes bring opportunities. Today’s FA officer has the ability to serve in a wider variety of assignments leading to success following a less prescriptive career path—continuing to build Pentathletes for the future.

Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) Jeffrey C. Lieb is the Field Artillery Officer’s Branch Chief at Human Resources Command (HRC), Alexandria, Virginia. He also served as a Military Assistant in the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (1-27 FA) in V Corps in Germany, deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I. Among his other assignments, he served in the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, as the Division Artillery (Div Art) Executive Officer (XO), Deputy Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) and Battalion S3 for I-21 FA. He commanded A Battery, 6-27 FA (A-6-27 FA) in the 75th Brigade, III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, deploying the battery to the Gulf for Operations Desert Shield/Storm. He will attend the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, DC, this summer.

Lieutenant Colonel John F. Dunleavy is the Lieutenant Colonel Assignment Officer in the Field Artillery Officer’s Branch, HRC. His previous assignments were in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) where he served as the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st Brigade at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and, while deployed for OIF, as Battalion XO for 2-320 FA and then Div ArtY XO. Among his other assignments, he served as an Observer/Controller (O/C) at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; commanded A-3/16 FA, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and served as a Platoon Leader for C/1-27 FA in V Corps during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Captain J. Ryan Cutchin is the Junior Captain Assignment Officer in the Field Artillery Officer’s Branch, HRC. In his previous assignment, he commanded Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 75th Fires Brigade, and B/1-77 FA and then Div ArtY XO for 1st Brigade at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and, while deployed for OIF, as Battalion XO for 2-320 FA and then Div ArtY XO. Among his other assignments, he served as an Observer/Controller (O/C) at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; commanded A-3/1-16 FA, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and served as a Platoon Leader for C/1-27 FA in V Corps during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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Current Operations Section of the Modular Brigade FEC in Afghanistan

By Captain Terrence A. Adams

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has entered the seventh phase of operations in Afghanistan, and a new type of unit has entered that battlespace: the modular design infantry brigade combat team (IBCT). It has the ability to obtain specific effects, not just generate raw combat power.

One of the IBCT’s main components is the fires and effects cell (FEC), which recently was renamed the brigade fire support cell (FSC). The FEC is responsible for coordinating not only lethal fires, such as artillery, but also nonlethal effects. These nonlethal effects include information operations (IO), psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs (PA) and civil-military operations (CMO).

There is little doubt that the FEC has enhanced the IBCT’s capabilities. With the advent of the FEC came the requirement for the current operations section, which only is stood up during deployments. The responsibilities and manning of the current operations section is diverse and often complex. But even with the new manning and technology, the current ops section faces challenges.

This article discusses the FEC current operations section operations and challenges in the 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, while deployed to Afghanistan.

Current Operations Section Responsibilities and Manning. The current operations section includes a captain, two sergeants first class, four Soldiers and Air Force joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs). It is responsible for coordinating, gathering and managing the task forces’ (TFs’) lethal fires assets to ensure mission success and the highest level of force protection. Its other responsibilities include quality control of airspace control measure requests (ACMRs) for restricted operating zones (ROZs), information management operations and assistance for TFs with troops-in-contact. Tracking all fire support assets in country from M198s down to 60-mm mortars is an additional duty.

The current operations section also tracks target acquisition assets in the TF’s area of responsibility (AOR). These assets range from Q-36 and Q-37 Firefinder radars to the unattended transient acoustic measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) system, called UTAMS.

Finally, one of the most important jobs the current operations section performs is processing and quality control of air support requests (ASRs) for close air support (CAS). This increases the level of force protection for all TFs in the AOR and allows units greater flexibility of movement.

Supervising the clearance of fires for the TFs is another important function of the brigade FEC current operations section. The requesting battalion’s fire direction center (FDC) and tactical operations center (TOC) are responsible for clearing fires in their battlespace. The brigade helps clear fires only when the battalion cannot reach an agency required to clear the fires. These are agencies such as a civilian air agency, military fixed- or rotary-wing, or other Coalition forces.

The current operations section is not permanently manned—it only forms when the brigade deploys. When the brigade is in garrison and not performing its wartime functions, the members of the current operations section are part of the lethal and nonlethal fires sections within the FEC.

According to the modified table of
organization and equipment (MTOE), the captain or officer-in-charge (OIC) of the current operations section is the brigade fire control officer (FCO). When the section is stood up, this officer’s main responsibility is to supervise the current operations personnel. He ensures that all brigade TFs have the fire support assets they need to accomplish their missions. This means ensuring that all ASRs are prioritized and processed.

In addition to daily battle-tracking responsibilities, the OIC of the current operations section also attends the division’s daily joint fires board (JFB) meetings via information workspace. The JFB discusses assets requested and needed for upcoming continuous operations (CONOP). This includes lethal assets, such aircraft on ASRs and fire support assets, and nonlethal assets, such as IO.

The current operations officer or NCO reviews the ASRs that are 72 hours out and confirms that the brigade and division are tracking the same requests. In addition to the JFB, the current operations officer also may produce strike requests and help the brigade fire support officer (FSO) or the effects coordinator (ECO-ORD), as required.

The fire support operations NCO for the current operations section is, arguably, the most important Soldier in the section. His responsibilities include managing the current operations desk as well as taking care of all the administrative functions of the section.

Fire support NCOs manage the fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) for the entire regional command, which includes seven TFs. They perform quality control of ASRs for both CAS and ACMRs. They also ensure all section Soldiers stay current on the training needed while deployed, including weapons qualifications and preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) of all assigned equipment.

The Soldiers of the brigade FEC’s current operations section collect the ASRs from the various TFs. They also manage the brigade advanced FA tactical data systems (AFATDS) box and all the FSCMs for the area of operations (AO).

Improving Operations in the FEC’s Current Ops Section. While deployed, the current operations section ran into several challenges. ASRs and CAS. These areas are important to IBCT operations and some of the most difficult to master. One reason they are difficult is the lack of a system to process air requests.

The system we finally developed consolidated all requests for a specific date and let one shift handle them. This system worked well and ensured that all requests had been inspected for mistakes by two sets of eyes before they were forwarded to division for processing.

Another problem that quickly presented itself was Soldiers’ and leaders’ lack of formal training in completing and inspecting ASRs. Our Air Force counterparts solved this problem by giving FEC personnel classes on what to look for and helping with quality control of all ASRs.

I strongly recommend that current operations personnel coordinate for JTAC training on ASRs and CAS before deploying. All requests are not the same, and Soldiers must understand the differences.

Lack of Understanding of Electronic Warfare (EW) Capabilities. The new technologies that have emerged to counter the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have caused units to field new systems to protect themselves. Commanders must understand the capabilities and limitations of these new EW systems.

These EW assets require detailed planning to achieve maximum effects. For example, if units must delay movement for some reason, then they should adjust the EW plan to have maximum coverage.

Current operations section personnel must understand the use of EW aircraft and help educate their supported TFs.

ACMR Processing. A problem that the brigade FEC has had with processing ACMRs is the type of coordinates used by aviation. Too many requests have had incorrect latitude and longitude coordinates.

Each ACMR requires three types of location data for processing. The first is the military grid reference system (MGRS). The second type is the universal transverse mercator (UTM) system. The third is latitude and longitude information.

A common trend among the TFs is to use incorrect latitude and longitude information on their requests. The most common error is a format of hours, minutes and seconds with seconds incorrectly rounded off.

The second issue with ACMRs is the misperception that the FEC processes the requests. The FEC current operations section only collects the requests, performs an initial check of information and then forwards the requests to the brigade aviation element (BAE). All ACMRs are processed by the BAE and then forwarded to the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD).

Just because a request has been submitted to the brigade FEC doesn’t mean the ACM is, or will be, approved and established. TFs have made the mistake of submitting requests and then immediately assuming the ACMs in AFATDS have been established.

This initially proved to be a challenge, but after a few cases of ACMs being established in the AFATDS by the TFs but then cancelled by the brigade FEC, the problem resolved itself and no longer was an issue.

Tracking FA Replacement Parts. The brigade FEC current operations section tracks the status of all fire support assets within the AOR. One issue that caused confusion was the misperception that the current operations section tracks the progress of replacement parts for FA assets.

Tracking parts is an S4 function, not a fires function. The current operations section resolved this issue by keeping the staff functional lines clear.

The initial performance of the brigade FEC has been outstanding. The idea of having an institution within a BCT with the ability to affect the battlespace with lethal and nonlethal assets to gain specific effects has proven to be very effective. But even with these proven abilities, there are still areas for improvement in the FEC. With problems identified and improvements made, the following months of operations within OEF VII will continue to be a success in the Global War on Terrorism.

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