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1LT Torry Gasch, a field artillery officer with Company B, 1st Battalion, 133rd Infantry Regiment, Task Force Ironman, a part of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 34th Infantry Division, Task Force Red Bulls, communicates with scout weapons teams during Operation Bull Whip in the Galsuh Valley March 28. More than 2,200 Afghan and coalition troops pushed through the valley, conducting key-leader engagements and searching for weapons caches. (Photo by SPC Kristina Gupton, U.S. Army)
In the last few months we’ve been hearing a lot about ‘mission command.’ Mission command, along with our Army Functional Concept for Fires, is part of the six warfighting functions that are linked to the Army Operating Concept and the Army Capstone Concept. In FM 3-0 Operations, the art and science of ‘command and control’ has been replaced with the term ‘mission command,’ but what does it truly mean to us? Simply, mission command places the responsibility on the commander to lead from the front and personally drive his organization. But what many don’t realize is ‘mission command’ is also an individual warfighter thought process and philosophy. The application of mission command enables our Fires commanders to decentralize authority and prevail in three increasingly important dimensions of military operations: the contest of wills, strategic engagement, and the cyber/electromagnetic contest.

That can be easier said than done; because with the adoption of this philosophy, comes the adoption of risk at increasingly lower levels. Embracing mission command as a viewpoint also means embracing risk – when and where it is prudent. Traditionally, it is through conducting risk assessments, both formal and informal, combined with the follow-on decision making process that enables our Fires leaders to mitigate risks associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact Fires effectiveness. However, in today’s fight we must share risk across echelons to create opportunities and seize the initiative on the battlefield.

Yet, not everyone is comfortable with assuming risk, especially our junior leaders. It’s these leaders who might not have experiences to draw upon to fully adopt the philosophy of mission command. So how do we generate a mindset among our ‘boots on the ground’ to fully adopt the philosophy of mission command? How do we go about creating an understanding among our Fires forces that in the business of integrating Fires, the best information and decisions can sometimes come from the bottom up rather than from the top down?

Talk about it. I think we can accomplish this through engaging in discussions across our force. Fires leaders must maintain a constant exchange of ideas with each other, not only at the top, but with subordinates as resources and authority become increasingly decentralized. Fires leaders must foster a command climate that allows for frank discussion of where risk exists and where risk can be mitigated. Oftentimes when making decisions, we need to focus more on what we have to gain, rather than what we have to lose. However, accepting risk isn’t recklessness, and we cannot abdicate our responsibility for our Soldiers’ or unit’s actions.

Although discussions should be clear, subordinates do have to get comfortable with a degree of ambiguity. However, ambiguity does not mean absenteeism on a leader’s part. As Fires leaders we must, ‘power down without powering off,’ to make our ‘intent’ known. As Fires leaders we must provide sufficient purpose, direction, and motivation for Soldiers to operate in support of the overall plan and commanders’ intent. Once that is accomplished we must be willing to underwrite mistakes as long as those who make the mistakes are operating within that intent. Courage and responsibility. As Fires leaders we must also practice courage and responsibility. It takes courage to...
withstand the rigors of war. It takes courage to assume responsibility for life and death decisions. It often takes courage ‘to do the right thing’ and make tough decisions in the absence of orders. Personal courage is one of the Army’s seven core values.

So along those lines, I invite you to read the July-August edition of the Fires Bulletin. This edition, like the ones before it, is chock full of great articles provided by our Fires professionals from across the Army. However, there are a few I would like to draw attention to because they highlight where our Fires leaders have embraced the essentials of mission command, its associated risk, and have been successful.

“Building an airplane in flight: Leading, creating high performance units,” by COL Randy McIntire details his experiences as a joint leader on a Counter-Rocket Artillery and Mortar mission. His hybrid leadership approach included leveraging personal risk and adjusting his leadership style to fit a very unique organization.

“Artillery in direct fire in command outpost defense in Afghanistan,” by 1SG Frank C. Luedtke, Jr. and MAJ Peter L. Jennings, not only highlights the fact that field artillery units are firing more than 6,000 rounds per month in Operation Enduring Freedom joint and combined operations, but shows how giving troops the latitude to operate within the commander’s intent while employing traditional artillery skills, can be highly successful.

“Emotional intelligence training: A missing element in our Army,” by CPT Robert B. Lackey advocates emotional intelligence not only as a skill Army leaders can use to initiate candid discussions at all levels to assume risk as necessary, but as a ability that can be useful to leaders who want to thrive in full-spectrum operations.

Lastly, I would like to highlight a package of articles by COL Eric Smith, COL James Lackey and Professor Gene Kamena. This package, which starts with the article, “The spectrum of risk in leadership,” by COL Eric Smith, gives Fires leaders at all levels practical solutions and suggestions on ‘how to’ balance risk and mission accomplishment to fully implement the philosophy of mission command.

The essence of mission command is a required mindset that dates back centuries, but is often ignored because embracing risk as necessary is not easy. This change to mission command is not merely rhetoric. It represents a shift in thinking that puts emphasis on the centrality of the commander – not materiel or systems – that are employed.

Leadership development and mentorship. We, as Fires leaders, must continue to commit ourselves to leader development. Field artillery and air defense artillerymen must fully understand that they are Fires brothers and at times will work within and across our forces. We must get back to the basics to counsel, professionally develop our subordinates through performance counseling and job assignments that broaden our fires leaders and develop the agility and adaptive attributes. We must set expectations for our Soldiers and families. I believe we must formalize our mentorship programs in order to develop special relationships that assist our Fires leaderships throughout their military careers and lives. We all need mentors to seek counsel and assist us in professional and life decisions.

Senior Fires leaders at each level must assume responsibility and create programs that ensure our Fires leaders are doing “deeds not just the words.”

Character counts. We, as Fires leaders, must not only have personal courage but the character to take ownership of our decisions. Character is the internal strength that enables Soldiers to do the right thing regardless of adversity and when no one is watching. It is about having high standards and discipline and making the tough decisions for our mission accomplishment and for our Fires Soldiers and families; as our business is dangerous and we cannot take back our actions after we have pulled out the lanyards and pushed the button.

We have been proving this in our Fires missions across the globe. Many of our units are operating on a tactical edge, making balancing risk a necessity, not a luxury. We know how to fight, and we fight with personal courage and character. Remember to respect your subordinates, your branch and yourself. We are relevant, and may Saint Barbara continue to watch over you all. Thanks for all you do.

Stay Strong, Stay Fires Strong!

Avenger Weapon Systems engage Remote Piloted Vehicle - Targets with a Stinger missile during a live-fire exercise conducted in a complex on Daecheon Beach, South Korea. The system is a gyro-stabilized weapons platform that can engage any aerial target within 6 km. (Photo by 1LT James S. Bellendir, U.S. Army)
GEN Robert Cone, new commanding general of Training and Doctrine Command, visited Fort Sill, Okla., and the Fires Center of Excellence, June 7. While visiting, he spoke about his 11 focus areas which are nested with the Secretary of the Army John McHugh’s priorities.

Cone assumed duties as commander of TRADOC April 29, after serving as the commander of III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas, and deputy commanding general of operations for U.S. Forces-Iraq.

His current focus areas are: the Army in 2020, the all volunteer force, the Army in the joint fight, the Profession of Arms Campaign, the Army Leader Development Strategy, adaptability through Mission Command, the tactical small unit, the knowledge, skills, and attributes of the 21st century Soldier, the Army learning and training concepts, requirements determination, and TRADOC organization for combat.

The Army in 2020. Cone stated since the Army’s involvement in Iraq, operational requirements have been forced to fundamentally change.

“We had to make decisions about what our future force is going to look like,” Cone said. The national strategy has changed as well, he said, and with that change the Army is once again going to have to adapt how it reacts.

There’s also a lot of ongoing discussion on how precision Fires will be delivered. “I think there are some significant lessons learned from places like Afghanistan,” Cone said. “The enemy counts on the weather to take away our “high-end technology.” Weapons systems, field gear, communications equipment and transportation which are designed for conventional wars most often work less effectively or fail totally in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan, he said. Lessons learned have shown insurgents fight just below the ridge lines and jump over the ridge when attacked with direct or indirect fires. Amiss of greater than 50 meters has the probability to go over the ridge and explode many hundreds of meters over, or explode under the ridge line—with the potential for killing or wounding non-combatants or U.S. forces and allies.

“So what’s the ‘exact-right-mix’ for the Fires community to deliver those Fires?” Cone asked. “I think that’s an important piece (we have to figure out).”
A lot of guys on the maneuver side would say, two maneuver elements and a reconnaissance element is good, but the reality is we probably need three maneuver elements,” Cone said. “What is the right amount of redundancy and back-up capability? I think all that needs to be examined.”

The all volunteer force. “This is a great success story,” Cone said. The Army has been an all volunteer force since the end of the Vietnam era, more than 40 years ago. Today the Army is a first-rate fighting force.

“The key point is, ‘how close are we to the American people?’” Cone asked. “Are we doing enough to reach out to the American population so they understand – we are our Army?”

Cone added, as a whole, the Army has to do a better job of ‘reaching out’ with the message of what service in the Army means.

The Army in the joint fight. “We never fight alone,” Cone said. Lessons learned have shown some situations demand the unique capabilities of only one service, but most will call for capabilities from all services. “We fight with the world’s best air force, the world’s best navy, and I think it most important that we deliver the world’s best land-delivered Fires.”

The Profession of Arms Campaign. “I think this is one of the most exciting things we are doing,” Cone said. What constitutes a profession? Cone explained creating profession is society’s way of organizing expert work, the kind of work it takes years to be taught.

“We form a ‘profession’ when we really have a hard problem to solve in society,” Cone explained. He used medical and legal areas of expertise as prime examples. So how does this pertain to the Army?

“When push comes to shove and we have to use violence – a controlled level of violence on behalf of our national interests – our nation needs to know we have professional Soldiers who make decisions based on standards,” For example, he said, standards such as how to minimize collateral damage and following the rules of land warfare.

Cone added, in the past, the Army as a whole has not put enough emphasis on what the Army profession is really about.

“It’s more than just ‘looking’ professional,” Cone said. He added the Army is in the process of clarifying its core values and attributes by implementing the Profession of Arms study.

“I think that it is really about having a dialogue, a conversation amongst us – all the way down to junior level Soldiers about what our profession means, because this is not the ‘kind of thing’ a general can come in and say, ‘By god this is the way it is,’” Cone said.

“I think by going through this process we will redefine ourselves, and we will have a better collective ownership of our profession,” Cone said. “This initiative will help us do that.”

On the same note, Cone added, as professionals, there are some things as a whole the Army needs to take back ownership of – mainly revamping doctrine and rewriting or creating field manuals and standards of operation.

“I think there are some things that must only be done by members of the military profession,” Cone said. “For example if there’s a new field manual – who should be the lead on that? There’s probably a colonel who just lead Soldiers into combat who should probably write the nuances of it.”

Cone said civilian contractors, while valuable, should not be the lead on how the Army conducts its business.

“It breaks my heart sometimes, when I think our greatest trainers on the face of earth are the U.S. Army noncommissioned officers and they are not being used to their capacity,” Cone explained.

When he travels around, Cone said when he talked to Soldiers, he will often ask, “What was the greatest training you had? Was it at the (Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, La., or at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.)? Was it at the (U.S. Army) Field Artillery School?”

Cone stated the answer he usually gets is Soldiers feel their most valued training comes from civilian contractors. It’s a problem, Cone said, he’s actively working to fix.

“Our best training should come from our noncommissioned officers and officers,” Cone said.

The Army Leader Development Strategy. The ALDS is an integral part of the Army Capstone Concept and provides the foundational basis for the direction and formulation of future leader development, Cone explained.

An integral part of this effort should focus not only on who the Army is teaching to become leaders, but how that teaching takes place, Cone said.

“What’s the best way to reach them?” Cone asked. “What’s the most efficient and effective means of instruction? I think as we move forward it will vary, from how we deal with privates all the way to how we deal with seasoned-combat noncommissioned officers.”

Live, virtual and constructive are the adjectives Cone used to describe the Army classrooms of the future. He mentioned he recently visited the University of Southern California Institute for Creative Technologies, in order to get familiar with some of the emerging technology that could possibly be used in the classroom.

“We talked a lot about immersive training,” Cone said. He described immersive training as learning and training environments that cause Soldiers to react to situations in terms of raising their heart rate and how it affects their nervous systems. This includes physical reactions as well, such as literally ducking, jumping and running in around obstacles.

“The closer training resembles actual combat the better it is,” Cone said. Because of budget constraints it’s not always possible to take Soldiers to NTC, complete with hundreds of role-players and artillery simulators going off. Developing realism in simulators and video games is being sought out as a more cost effective solution, he explained.

“We are finding ways to turn any room into an immersive learning experience,” Cone said.

Adaptability through mission command. The term ‘mission command’ was adopted out of necessity, Cone said. Mission command is defined as the ability for agile, adaptive leaders and organizations to execute disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent as part of unified action in a complex and ambiguous environment.

“(We found) we could not describe what our commanders do solely by using the term ‘command and control’,” Cone said. “If you
walk into a command post in Iraq (anyone could see), what they do today in terms of their understanding of tribal networks, the economic structure, the political aspects of nation building – all of the programs they are involved in – while they are commanding and controlling troops, the term command and control wasn’t enough of a description.”

The term mission command was adopted because it essentially means the commander drives the operations process, not the other way around. The process should not drive the commander, Cone explained.

Tactical small unit. The small unit, meaning the squad and the platoon, are without question now and will continue to be the most decisive elements in Army formations, Cone said.

“We’ve done amazing things in the last ten years with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, persistent overhead surveillance, and precision Fires,” Cone said. “We have focused on all these things and we have taken all this stuff to the next level.”

“The problem is when we go into Afghanistan or other urban terrain, war is still a very human process,” Cone said. “In the end, it’s still about guys on the ground. It’s about sons and daughters, and how has U.S. Army enabled them to have a better chance of survival in an engagement with a ‘bad guy’ than what our forces had in World War II, Korea or Vietnam.”

He stated currently most of the Army’s developments hang on the “network”.

“It’s not about the network,” Cone said. “The network should enable us to move information around on the battlefield. Who is (typically) not in the network? The guys on the ground, so how do we extend the network to focus on the squad?

“I believe any enemy who looks at us, knows the one weakness we have – we still haven’t done much for that guy on the ground,” Cone said.

He stated it’s all about leveraging the network and the capabilities that come with it. The network should enhance situational awareness, but not dictate it.

“I think we’ve been so busy and so worried about so many other things, but how much have we really invested in individual squad leaders?” Cone asked. “Because I’m telling you, if the squad leader doesn’t make the Soldier change the batteries, zero the weapon – all the rest of the basics – we just wasted a whole lot of money.

“So we really need to improve the advantages we give that young squad leader,” Cone said. “We got to improve the education system for NCO development. We need more investment in that.

“What’s the only formation our enemies can defeat on the battlefield? It’s the squad,” Cone said. “So what if we turned it around? What if we put so much power into the squad — we could turn this paradigm on its head. We could make the squad the strongest link in the chain.”

Cone stated all efforts to make this happen are currently being explored as, “what’s in the art of the doable?”

“I know what I can’t have,” Cone said. “That’s a bunch of wild technologies that aren’t going to deliver anything in the next five years. We have to look at realistically what we can get in the Soldier’s hands.

“The key and the thing we got to start moving out on, before anything else, is nailing down is leadership training – really focusing on that,” Cone said. “Every noncommissioned
officer I talked to about this, have responded with, “And how; sir, you have hit the nail right on the head. Doing it without (leadership training) is not going to work.”

Knowledge, skills, and attributes of the 21st century Soldier. Cone went on to state, although there are some improvements to be made with training, he’s really impressed with the caliber of Soldier in today’s Army.

“They are good kids, and they are made of good stock,” Cone said. “The generation of young leaders we have in the Army today, in my view, are the best I’ve seen in my 32 years. They are the most combat experienced, the most combat-tested, young people I have seen throughout my time.”

He noted combat experience is important, but it must be used to, “keep our eyes open.” Lessons learned must continue to be incorporated into Army curriculum as quickly as possible.

“But we don’t need to sit in a classroom and have someone pound it in,” Cone said. “It’s more practical to get an ‘app’ to these kids; they go somewhere, they sit down and (work on) it, and they come back with a mastery of the basics.”

Once the basics are mastered by using gaming or ‘app’ solutions, Cone said classroom time then can be used to add to basic knowledge in order to expand on higher, more complex learning.

The Army learning and training concepts. Cone said these concepts are proof the Army is fully committed to providing the best learning and training for Soldiers at all levels.

He also stated he was looking at how to push more training responsibility down to the commander’s level, like it has been more traditionally done in the past.

“I think we got into a rush – especially with the surge,” Cone said. He stated Army training has become too dependent on mobile training teams and other forms of transient training, but essentially training should be the area of expertise of the commander.

“People can come through the door here at Fort Sill and train until they are blue in the face, but as a commander, I have the moral responsibility to deploy that unit in combat,” Cone explained. “I need to know more (about the equipment, mission, etc.) than my troops. So we are working on that.”

Requirements determination. Cone stated the Army overall has put a lot of energy into future combat systems.

“Frankly, we were staring out over the horizon and we were trying to get it all right, and 9/11 pops up,” Cone said. “The problem was, it would have been magnificent if our vision of future combat systems was exactly what we needed to fight, but we struggled. Our future combat systems needed to be brought into the ‘near term’ problems we were facing.”

Cone did state some improvements have been made in that area.

“We had some spin offs; intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, all these (systems) have come back into the near term (solutions),” Cone said.

He went on to explain because development of technology is moving so fast, TRADOC is definitely following the precedent of technology is moving so fast, TRADOC is definitely following the precedent of technology.

He went on to explain because development of technology is moving so fast, TRADOC is definitely following the precedent of GEN Martin Dempsey, former TRADOC commander and the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, set of “buy less, more often.”

“In the past we have purchased large amounts,” Cone said. “With money budgets and tight finances, we have to make some very hard decisions based on very sound science and technology.”

He continued to explain there is some truly “dazzling technology out there.” A main concern is, can it be translated from a “one-time vision” into something “Joe” in a MRAP facing 113-degree heat in Ramadi, Iraq can use? “That’s my hardest challenge,” Cone said.

TRADOC organization for combat. Cone added that this is his second trip to Fort Sill and the Fires Center of Excellence.

“I am really impressed (with Fort Sill and the FCoE),” Cone said. “I brought my wife with me; I think they had good results.”

Recently TRADOC headquarters moved from Fort Monroe located in Hampton, Va., to Fort Eustis located in Newport News, Va. “I think this has been a good thing,” Cone said. Cone said he is also pleased with the results of the Army BRAC 2005 which created the Army’s Training Centers of Excellence.

“I am very pleased with the centers of excellence and the jobs the commandants are doing,” Cone said. “They have dealt with resource shortfalls, but have and continue to do, remarkably well.”

Cone added that this is his second trip to Fort Sill and the Fires Center of Excellence. His first was during the Fires Center of Excellence’s 2011 Fires Seminar, held May 16-20.

“I am really impressed (with Fort Sill and the FCoE),” Cone said. “I brought my wife this time; what does that tell you?”

(Then) LTG Robert W. Cone, commanding general of III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas, looks at the pictures hanging in the Hall of Remembrance. The hall was officially opened to the public Jan. 11, 2010, and honors the fallen with a central Texas or Fort Hood affiliation. (Photo by Joy Pariante, U.S. Army)
The Skystriker
Executing air and missile
From the earliest days of the republic, Army units have found themselves in situations requiring the ingenuity of Soldiers and leaders in order to prevail. In 2010, the Soldiers of 3rd Battalion (Airborne), 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment showed the same resourcefulness and adaptability by providing trained and ready PATRIOT fire units for worldwide deployment. The battalion’s saga provides a unique opportunity to validate Army Force Generation and air and missile defense gunnery doctrine, due in large part to the battalion’s deployments and extended transformation from an airborne short range air defense battalion into an air and missile defense battalion.

Problem set. The Skystrikers faced a unique problem set as they developed the training glide path due to deployments and modified table of organization and equipment changes. The Army relieved the battalion of its assignment from the 82nd Airborne Division in 2005, where it had served since 1972, in order to transform the unit to an AMD battalion consisting of four PATRIOT batteries and one Avenger battery. Due to equipment shortages across the force, the battalion was initially established as a PATRIOT Advanced Capabilities 2 battalion. Although the battalion drew PAC 2 equipment, it never reached Table VIII certification, instead deploying several batteries to Iraq in 2008 to conduct detainee support operations. In 2009, Echo Battery (Avenger) deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom in support of the 1st Cavalry Division, conducting sentinel operations and convoy security in and around Baghdad.

The first wave redeployed in mid-2009, with Echo Battery returning in early
2010. While Echo Battery fell back in on equipment placed into the Left-Behind Equipment Program, no such option existed for the PATRIOT firing batteries. The first several months back from deployment saw them reorganizing from a military police organization, filled by 14 series Soldiers with no equipment. The deployment of the battalion’s sister unit on Fort Bragg, N.C., 1-7 ADA, allowed the battalion to again sign for PATRIOT equipment, nearly five years after being designated as an AMD battalion. This equipment had the unfortunate distinction of being some of the oldest un-reset equipment in the Army, a factor which would present significant challenges throughout the train-up and during the Table VIII attempts.

By this time, core junior NCO skill sets normally found in any other PATRIOT battalion redeploying from operations were largely absent in 3-4 ADA. The junior 14T and 14E NCOs and junior officers raised in the battalion had never been certified collectively on their primary military occupational specialty tasks. While they had leadership skills honed in the day to day operations of Iraq, they had almost the same technical knowledge they possessed upon graduation from advanced individual training.

According to the battalion command sergeant major, CSM Paris Williams, “We did not have a lot of depth in PATRIOT experienced NCOs. We had sergeants who executed gunnery for the first time in accordance with the Army training and evaluation program standard this year. We struggled.” This forced the battalion leadership into a very deliberate training plan based on FM 3-01.86, Air Defense Artillery PATRIOT Brigade Gunnery.

The battalion electronic missile maintenance officer, who is also responsible for all PATRIOT evaluations, and battalion readiness chief held crucial roles during this phase, as Soldiers signed for equipment they had little to no experience with operating or maintaining. After executing the new equipment training and extended deep maintenance program, the battalion began an “AMD University” to teach the basic skills that junior and mid-grade NCOs normally impart to their troopers.

By this point, more than six months had elapsed since the welcome home ceremony at Pope Air Force Base, and nearly nine months remained until the battalion reached a state of readiness. None of the PATRIOT batteries had ever completed combined arms training strategy or CATS tables. The two-tier maintenance company was still less than 12 months old, and the equipment expertise rested almost exclusively with the senior warrant officers and NCOs.

The forcing function of this training plan was the brigade ready battery program linked to a contingency expeditionary force, prepare to deploy order. The brigade, along with the 32nd Air and Missile Defense Command, pinned Oct. 1, 2010, as the mark on the wall to have a battery ready to deploy a minimum engagement package within 96 hours, along with elements of the headquarters. Other batteries would follow the BRB out the door if activated along cascading timelines, permitting the battalion to establish a BRB 1 through BRB 4. This rationalized the training and maintenance, as well as created a concrete goal to motivate both Soldiers and leaders.

Road to PATRIOT Table VIII. The cornerstone of the battalion’s training program was the AMD University Program. This was spearheaded by the battalion EMMO, and focused on the two mission essential task list tasks of provide air defense and exercise command and control. The training provided each battery with the knowledge and skills to successfully execute Table IV and Reticle Aim Level V, as well as train others to the Table IV standard. The battalion executed this training in six phases. The first phase was deployment to the AMD simulation center and conducting system integration as a battalion. The second phase consisted of classroom instruction and practical exercises. Following the classroom instruction, the batteries redeployed to the motor pool to recover equipment in accordance with newly established maintenance and recovery standing operating procedures. The batteries returned to the AMD simulation center in phase four to link into simulation feeds, followed by Table IVB, RAL V certifications.
and Table IVC (Phase 5). In the final phase the batteries redeployed from the AMD simulation center and postured the units for a field training exercise.

Upon conclusion of AMD University, the battalion headed to the field. By this point, the battalion had set conditions for field problems through the extended deep maintenance program, weekly assembly area operations and AMD University. The battalion executed these field exercises in the northern training area of Fort Bragg, near the old Overhills estate, donated to Fort Bragg in the late 1990’s by the Rockefeller family. In the same fields where the Rockefellers once surveyed their farming operations, battery commanders oversaw march-order and emplacement drills. Just a few miles from an original Donald Ross golf course where the family honed their golf skills, PATRIOT missile launchers raised towards the sky as troopers honed their war fighting skills. The training areas used by the 108th ADA Brigade in NTA VIII include commercial power lanes, as well as a site for use by tactical operations centers.

The first FTX was Operation First Flight, the purpose of which was to establish staff battle rhythms and for the batteries to perform specialty team training while continuing RALs 6-10 training in preparation for pre-standardized PATRIOT evaluation and assessment reporting evaluation or SPEAR. This was the battalion’s first chance to validate the new field standing operating procedures that was tailored to include PATRIOT operations. The previous FSOP was a carry-over from the battalion’s divisional air defense days. Key tasks for this FTX included RALs 6-10 training, conducting a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear decontamination training of personnel and equipment run at the battalion level with each battery rotating through, battery level specialty team training to establish team SOPs, and a pre-SPEAR evaluation of all firing teams.

Upon conclusion of this FTX, 3-4 ADAR successfully established an initial battalion from a simulated battle field tactical operation center, and the firing teams gained experience and improved specialty team SOPs and decontamination procedures. The end results was each firing team returned from Operation First Flight with more knowledge regarding team SOPs and an evaluation of PATRIOT fire unit drills.

The fire direction section, along with Bravo Battery and Delta Battery, were ready to take their shot at Table VIII. Charlie Battery and Alpha Battery would make their attempt in October and November, respectively. This internal staggering began as a consequence of training proficiency, but unintentionally provided the battalion leadership flexibility in dealing with maintenance issues that arose during the Table VIII attempts. As equipment from batteries conducting Table VIII went down, the battalion leadership made controlled exchanges from the remaining batteries. These ranged from system components all the way to entire radars and engagement control stations. This near-continuous juggling of equipment led the battalion commander, LTC Serafin Meno, Jr., to say, “It takes a village to Table VIII a battery at Fort Bragg.”

Air conditioners on environmental control units posed the most significant maintenance challenge to the battalion. A poorly designed drainage system, coupled with the lower air flow capacity in the engagement control station itself, cause variable frequency drive failures in 17 air conditioners. This was consistent with failures across the force, creating a long lead time for repair parts. Letterkenny representatives deployed to Fort Bragg with VFD units to repair the systems in time for the battalion Table VIII attempts. The battalion leadership discussed and approved controlled exchanges several times each day in order to keep the units training as maintainers worked with Letterkenny to bring each system back online.

With leaders managing the maintenance challenges, Bravo Battery executed their Table VIII gunnery on Aug. 10, making them the first unit in the 198 year history of the Skystriker battalion to certify as a PATRIOT firing battery.

The fire direction section and Delta Battery followed shortly after, along with the communications platoon. The remaining batteries executed their Table VIII gunnery over the course of the fall, with Alpha Battery completing their last run in early December. By this time, the battalion staff had the experience required to manage each gunnery table. While the battalion still had to manage controlled substitutions, the cooler autumn conditions provided a more hospitable environment for gunnery operations.

Deployment readiness. The tendency for an operational pause upon completion of a major milestone like Table VIII is strong amongst all Army units, and leaders constantly struggle to ensure that troopers keep their eyes on the long-term goals. With the brigade ready battery program, the batteries had to do more than simply complete their combined arms training strategy tables before they could rest. As previously discussed, one battery had to be prepared to deploy by Oct. 1, with equipment postured and Soldiers ready to head out the door. Against the backdrop of Table VIII, the battalion executed a SPEAR in September, followed immediately by an emergency deployment readiness exercise. While the SPEAR challenged the team, the battalion had focused on honing those skills for some time. The EDRE, on the other hand, tested completely different skill sets and systems.
While the batteries and FDS sharpened their air defense proficiency, the staff and battery executive officers prepared for the EDRE. The first step was to create a standing operating procedure for deployment readiness, designed to deploy PATRIOT batteries out of Fort Bragg.

When the battalion served in the 82nd Airborne Division, this type of readiness was cyclical and routine and codified in the Division Readiness SOP. However, nine years of deliberate deployments and the change in battalion organization and equipping eroded these skills. Additionally, Fort Bragg had no experience deploying PATRIOT equipment since 1-7 ADA deployed without equipment in 2009. The EDRE served as an educational opportunity for both the unit and Fort Bragg. The deployment standing operating procedures served as the guidebook for the batteries and battalion, with the EDRE as the validation exercise.

The brigade executed the EDRE in the final week of the fiscal year along a notification hour sequence. The scenario exercised the two recently Table VIII qualified batteries, elements of maintenance company and HHB. Bravo battery conducted air load training on a C-17, validating the air movement section of the deployment standing operating procedures. Delta battery conducted rail load operations with PATRIOT equipment, validating the DSOP rail load section. Finally, HHB conducted a 100 km road march supported by a refuel point established by maintenance company, validating the ground movement DSOP sections and simulating a movement to one of the two sea ports supporting Fort Bragg (Wilmington, N.C., and Charleston, S.C.).

Prior to any movement, brigade subject matter experts inspected each battery to verify the readiness of vehicles, PATRIOT systems, personnel (both administrative and medical), weapons, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear equipment, and communications systems. These inspections served as the operational readiness survey. For Bravo Battery, the ORS was the first step before moving to Pope Air Force Base and processing through the arrival/departure airfield control group. Upon arrival at the A/DACG, installation and Air Force inspectors conducted joint inspections of the minimum engagement package equipment and eventually conducted loading and unloading of a C-17 from Charleston, S.C. This enabled them to validate and update the PATRIOT air movement appendix of the DSOP, which was almost entirely based on Appendix F of FM 3-01.85. By the end of the week, the brigade determined that 3-4 ADAR met the training objectives and conducted a comprehensive after action review. This completion also proved the battalion was ready to deploy the BRB from Fort Bragg and provide air defense.  

**Doctrinal challenges and recommendations.** The ARFORGEN model is primarily designed to build and sustain brigade combat teams ready for worldwide operations. It is also applicable for enabling units such as Fires brigades, sustainment brigades and air defense battalions. The current model, from redeployment to availability, contains several intrinsic assumptions that were not valid in the case of 3-4 ADAR. As such, Army leadership must identify and authorize deviations from the ARFORGEN model. This allows for the model to recognize the holistic impact of non-standard missions, significant MTOE changes, or significant mission changes. Just as doctrine rationalizes combat developments, ARFORGEN rationalizes force generation. Acknowledging these deviations is essential to keeping force generation synchronized along the multiple lines of effort such as equipment, personnel and training.

The most significant challenge the battalion faced was the combined disruption of a non-standard deployment and transformation into an AMD battalion. When units conduct non-standard missions, they lose core skills in favor of newly required skills. This is most significant at the junior enlisted and junior officer levels. By late 2009, many of the junior NCOs and junior captains had no experience conducting or training for air defense missions.

This crucial knowledge base, especially at the NCO level, created a knowledge gap that the battalion leadership had to build from the ground up through the deliberate training program. Transformation exacerbated this problem by extending the timeline of the knowledge gap since the battalion had never been a fully trained PATRIOT unit prior to the non-standard deployment.

Transitioning to a PATRIOT unit from an airborne Avenger/Stinger unit is not much different than building a new unit, and in the case of 3-4 ADAR, the battalion was rebuilt three separate times. The first was when the battalion changed from Avenger/Stinger to a PAC-2 battalion that did not have the opportunity to certify at Table VIII. The second was when the battalion transitioned to an MP formation, and the third was the transition from a MP MTOE to a PAC-3 MTOE with PATRIOT equipment.

Given the fact that the battalion started its training with no previous baseline of PATRIOT proficiency, 3-4 ADAR Soldiers and leaders had the unique opportunity to execute the entire battalion gunnery program laid out in FM 3-01.86, *Air Defense Artillery PATRIOT Brigade Gunnery*. Since the battalion did not have a corporate understanding of ‘what right looked like,’ the leadership followed the doctrine methodically and deliberately. While some batteries had quicker success than others, the battalion’s application of the doctrine brought each fire unit to the same successful conclusion.

The battalions’ main recommendation for future editions is to re-look the current Table VIII. The current Table IV, consisting of a ready for action drill and air battle, should be the new Table VIII standard. This would demonstrate that the unit is prepared to conduct live air battles and ready their system, and would be validated biannually. The current Table VIII should become the annual Table XII. This would permit the battalion to sustain proficiency without starting over every six months.

The battalion’s experiences also identified some inconsistencies with FM 3-01.85, *PATRIOT Battalion and Battery Operations*. During the brigade EDRE, Bravo Battery validated air load planning figures from the battalion DSOP, which was based almost entirely on the air movement appendix to FM 3-01.85. The battalion’s experiences showed that the reality of air load is less restrictive than the published doctrine.

While Appendix F states radars must be disassembled to fit in a C-17, Bravo troopers and the Air Force loaded the radar in its standard configuration with low air in the
tires, as well as the prime mover, provided that it is driven in straight (vice backed into the aircraft). Appendix F also states that the launchers can only be loaded after removing the canisters, outriggers and onboard power generation. Bravo Battery successfully loaded the launchers with the outriggers and generators attached, along with the prime mover. Finally, the battery loaded the engagement control section, information and coordination center, and communications relay group, without de-mating the shelters as described in Appendix F.

The battalion S3 is submitting doctrine change forms to update the Appendix F, which should in turn ease some of the concerns with PATRIOT air movement planning.

The Skystriker battalion has a long history of rapidly adapting to changing missions and conditions. In 1814, artillery crews from Captain Samuel Archer’s company of artillery deployed to Tunisia with the United States Navy in support of operations against the Barbary pirate states based in Algiers. This company was reorganized into the 4th Artillery Regiment in 1821, the historical basis of today’s 3rd Battalion (Airborne), 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment. The battalion still flies the Barbary War campaign streamer.

This is only one example of the flexibility and tenacity of the battalion’s troopers with a history that includes campaigns from the War of 1812, the Indian Wars, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, Grenada, Panama, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Viewed in this light, the transformation of 3-4 ADAR from an airborne SHORAD battalion in support of the 82nd Airborne Division into a PATRIOT and Avenger air and missile defense battalion is merely the latest in a long line of changes.

The lessons learned along this journey are broadly applicable across the force and contribute to the continuous doctrinal debate. The Skystrikers now stand ready to deploy anywhere in the world to defend America’s Soldiers, allies, and interests.

Major Glenn A. Henke is the battalion executive officer for 3-4 ADAR. He has served in troop and staff positions in Fort Bragg, N.C., Germany, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the National Capital Region. His most recent assignment was as the chief of Future Plans (CJ5) for CJTF-82 and Regional Command (East), Afghanistan. He is a graduate of Command and General Staff Officers Course and the Advanced Military Studies Program at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds a Master of Arts in Security Studies from Kansas State University, a Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science with a minor in mathematics from Seattle University. He has previously written for Military Review.

Major Daniel T. Collins is the battalion S3 for 3-4 ADAR, a position he has held since June 2009. He has served in troop and staff positions in Fort Bliss, Texas and Korea. He also served as a liaison officer for the 4th Battlefield Coordination Detachment throughout the CENTCOM area of operations, to include Iraq, Afghanistan, and onboard aircraft carriers. His most recent assignment was as a military advisor to the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces for the United States Military Training Mission. He is scheduled to attend the Naval Command and General Staff School in Rhode Island in the summer of 2011. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in History from Ripon College, Wisconsin.
Western stimuli and the rise of militant Islam

By Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov

The role of “Islamic factor” in the international relations has attracted a particular attention of American and Western experts in relationship to contemporary Islam. Islam has become a significant political phenomenon not only in the internal political and social life of the traditionally Islamic countries, since the 1950’s and 1970’s, but in current international relations as well.

The “Islamic Revivalism” of the 1970’s and 1980’s mainly consisted of three components, which were the Islamic revolution in Iran, events in and around Afghanistan, and the activation of the Muslim organizations and movements around the world. This period also witnessed the first signs of unification of some anti-Western regimes in the Middle East. As a result, these events have significantly changed the character of international relationships between the traditionally Muslim world and the West.

Over the years, the West has had to deal with a group of countries whose foreign policy is coordinated and integrated around Muslim religious beliefs. Moreover, they had their international organizations partially or entirely based on religious principals such as the Organization of Islamic Conference, The League of Arab Countries, The Regional Union of Development, The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the Islamic Bank of Development, among others.

According to Leonard Binder, the traditional perception of “Islamic factor” by U.S. and Western experts on Islam, technological and social progress should have inevitably led to replacement of these religious views by the secular ideologies. Generally, they ultimately expected secularization in the traditionally Muslim societies to prevail. However, the reality is this approach did not happen as expected which compelled most Western researchers of Islam to acknowledge the erroneousness of their original thinking.

In “Iran: Change in Islam, Islam and Change (International Journal of Middle East Studies),” Nikki R. Keddi, an American cultural expert, states (Western scholars) couldn’t foresee and expect such a “strong attack” of the “Islamic Revivalism” in the late 1970’s.
They also realized, with the emergence of Colonel Muammar Kaddafi in Libya with his "third world theory," and the Islamic Revolution in Iran were not just a coincidence of circumstances, but the result of a natural, historical process. In essence, this process consisted of appropriate psychological, socio-political and economic changes in the structure of world’s outlook which took shape over centuries in this geopolitical area. Islam had become an integral part of this change in ideology.

The end result was Islam, with its traditional values and culture, emerged to make an "Islamic civilization." Historically, Islamic societies have always played the role of ideological protector for people whose circumstances have differed from the rest of the world’s internal political, social, and economic life as a whole; just as Islam has always been a factor of consolidation for various strata of society. Keddi writes, for these countries, Islam is not only the basis of their morale and discipline; it is also their legal order.

This vitality and "revivalism" of Islam can be explained by many factors, in particular by 1) nationalism, 2) peculiarity of Islamic mentality which has taken root in these countries, 3) centuries old cultural heritage and legacy being formed within the Islamic

More than 400 Muslims line up in a massive formation for "Salat el Maghreb," the fourth of five daily prayers in Islam, during Ramadan in Doha, Qatar, Aug. 25. After prayer, they resumed embracing each other while bestowing hopes for peace and happiness. Inside the tent’s serving area, food consistent with Gulf-Arab traditions filled each table top: lamb, hummus, bread, rice and salad. Chefs cut and served baby camel meat as requested. (Photo by Dustin Serrget, U.S. Army)
ideology, 4) politicization of Islam, 5) the modernization of Islam, 6) activation of Islamic factor in international relations, and the role of the Western cultural influence.

The first “post-colonial stage” consisted of the representatives of big business circles dominating in power and characterized by “passion” for modernization of social structure, simulation of capitalist and quasi-socialist methods of economic management. Therefore, some kind of “imitation” in accordance with the local conditions of the “Northern” and particularly Western political models and ideas of governance of the state policy was taking place.

The “second stage” of the development of Islamic countries started in the 1970’s was termed by the Western experts to be the “Islamic Revivalism.” This revivalism reflected the significant changes in the socio-economic and political life of the Muslim countries relatively in a short period of time.

As a result “the Islamic factor” started to play a significant role in the international politics.

In the 1940s and through the 1960s, traditionally Muslim countries, which just gained their political independence, had inherited weak economic and ideological systems. They were mainly characterized by passive participation of different social groups in the political life of these states and the region as a whole. This period was marked by an independent primary search for options for national development in order to overcome the backwardness of their economies and the difficult legacy of feudal and half-feudal relations that currently existed. As a result there were a lot of difficulties and challenges, particularly in the sphere of ideology.

Despite the efforts of Jamal Ad-Din Afghani, who is considered the founding father of Islamic modernism, and Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian jurist, religious scholar and liberal reformer, the basis of Islam remained preserved until the end of the 19th century. Their ideological followers also could not fully succeed in effective adaptation of Islam to the requirements of new realities and concepts of social development which if implemented would have overcome the backwardness of their way of life.

Western and American models of economic, political and military development seemed to be attractive for the leading Muslim countries until the mid of the 1950s. But the process of emergence and formation of the national ideology was increasingly taking place in the Islamic societies in the 1950s and 1960s in each of the Muslim countries in specific forms and a different degree of intensity. In the center of this process was Islam which was supposed to be reformed and transformed for requirements of contemporary conditions.

However, it wasn’t until the end of the 1960s that the “modernists’” movement
started to take the lead in the reform of Islam. Mostly, their efforts were aimed at revising the interpretation of religious dogmas and conceptions in order to make them more adaptable to the demands of modern living. Overall, these modernists hoped to create a combination of ideology which consisted of contemporary ideas merged with traditional ones. However, this new Islamic theory didn’t prevail within the normal functioning of all spheres of the state, public and family life. There was still a connection and a strong tendency in the official ideology of the Muslim countries to limit the use of Islam in the spheres of education, culture and ethics.

In direct opposition to these “modernists,” the “traditionalists” who had been consolidating their efforts, stepped up their influence and continued to sway the mainly poor and unsatisfied strata of the Muslim population to stay within the traditional ideology. Their efforts defended the preservation of traditional Islamic theory and eventually expanded it throughout Muslim countries to make it the dominant ideology. In the course of this struggle between the “modernists” and “traditionalists” a new political stage emerged in the late 1970’s called “the Islamic Revivalism.”

Since the 70s, the supporters of the “Islamic Revivalism” have been gradually taking more initiative within their country. When the Islamic countries have completed the process of strengthening their national sovereignty and reached a certain level of socio-economic transformations, the tendency was then to start reforming of Islam. But, this change was followed by weakening of the influence of the ideas of “modernists” in the political and philosophical lives of the Islamic societies and started to increase the demand for an alternative and more national ideology based on the fundamentals of Islam. This call for fundamentalism was diametrically opposed to the democratic capitalist system and the Western conception of freedom and liberalism.

The religion of Islam has several sects or branches. The largest denomination of Islam is the Sunni (Sunnah) interpretation, which is based on the belief that the Prophet
Muhammad died without appointing a successor to lead the Muslim community (ummah). There are four known main schools within Sunni Islam: Hanbali, Hanafi, Shafi’I and Maliki which the majority of Muslims adhere to. Beyond that, the Salafi (from Arabic for “predecessors”) movement under the leadership of the Syrian Rashid Rida (1865-1935) followed the activities of Muhammad Abduh and steadily moved towards the type of fundamentalism which later prevailed as a result of the failure in modernization and Westernization of the Muslim societies. Within the broader Salafi movement there is a more extreme Wahhabi sect, named after the eighteen-century thinker Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and inspired by the thirteen-century Syrian theologian Ibn Taymiya.

The Salafi movement rejects many mainstream Islamic traditions as “innovative” and favors a more “pure” Islamic ideology. Organizations such as Hizb at-Tahrir (The Party of Liberation), Al-Qaida (the raising base), Hamaas(enthusiasm), Islamic Jihad (the Holy War), Ikhwan Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) share this same kind of ideology, but have different political agendas.

The withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan and subsequent demise of the Soviet Union, in turn created favorable ground for the next stage in ‘Islamic Revivalism.” This time it was aimed against the West and its democracy which is based on liberalism, freedom, initiative and opportunity at the individual level. The culmination of this stage was 9/11 events in the U.S.

Additional factors for the present increase of anti-Western sentiments in Muslim communities are the outdated legal and security mechanisms which do not allow mainstream Muslims to effectively operate against Muslim radicals who live throughout Europe and other parts of the world. These radical sects openly regard liberal democracy as “haram” or that which is forbidden by God.

As a result, Europe is now beginning to realize the dangers of alienating its Muslim population. Because of insufficient immigration systems and the lack of providing meaningful and active roles for Muslim residents in the economic, social and political life of their respective countries of residence, these Muslim populations are now at risk for radical recruitment. Multiculturalism of the European societies would be an effective mechanism to prevent the radicalization of these Islamic communities.

The current situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya Somalia and other places are ironically helping the radical Islamist groups to recruit new members justifying that it’s a “war against Muslims.”
The hearts and minds of all Muslims must be won. It is only by doing so that the West will be able to prevent the spread of militant Islam. If Muslims should become equal members of the Multicultural Western societies, the militant concept of “Western conspiracy” against Muslim societies would lose its ground.

A great example of why to work against “alienation” of Muslim societies comes from relations with Turkey. This nation is an important ally and the only Muslim member of NATO. Turkey lies in a strategic location next to Iraq, and other Arab countries, as well as Iran, Afghanistan and the Muslim republics of the former USSR. The failure to accept Turkey to the European Union could further alienate the country and create the favorable conditions for radical Islamic trends to germinate, allowing radicals to explore the concept of “Christian West conspiracy” against “Muslim Turkey.” In fact, anti-Western and anti-American sentiments in the Turkish society are currently at a record high.

The traditionally Muslim republics of the former USSR, which include Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan, Azerbaijan are also going to be very important for the global geopolitics in decades to come. For example, the recent bloody revolt and regime change in Kirgizstan, a small former Soviet Central Asian Republic, which hosts the major U.S. air base “Manas” for military operations in Afghanistan, caused a lot of concern among U.S. officials. In April, 2010, Stephanie Gaskell with the Daily News reported statements of some its leaders of the new interim government indicated the lease for the U.S. air base could not be extended after its expiration.

As a former high-ranking diplomat, he helped open the first embassy of Azerbaijan in Washington, D.C., and while working for the U.S. Department of State, he instructed diplomats in languages and cultures. He also provided vital assistance as a multi-lingual cultural adviser to U.S. forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom II and became the subject of a Department of Defense newsreel, “Jack of all Languages.” Dr. Ibrahimov specializes in the cultural issues of the former Soviet Republics, south central Asia, and the Middle East. He is the author of, “An Invitation to Rain: A Story of the Road Taken Toward Freedom,” and numerous other publications.
The advent of precision weaponry is changing the definition of the principle of war and mass, as we know it. No longer does it require a heavy concentration of systems or bombs to destroy a target at a single point.

For the past two decades, the U.S. Air Force has embraced precision weapons and used them to effectively attack targets in order to facilitate achieving the commander’s end state for battles and campaigns. If the field artillery embraces a redefinition of mass through precision attack, the branch could utilize the concept to drive a transformation that would make it the most lethal and effective field artillery branch in the world.

This article advocates that our branch latch on to this concept by demonstrating how it works for airpower, how mass is redefined, and what we can do to leverage it for the future advancement of the field artillery.

Massing Fires. Mass is one of the nine principles of war and has traditionally meant the concentration of forces and or Fires on objectives and targets to facilitate the defeat of the enemy. FM 3-0, Operations, currently defines mass as the “concentration of the effects of combat power at the decisive point and time. Commanders mass the effects of combat power (troops, Fires, non-lethal assets) in time and space to achieve both destructive and constructive results.”

Additionally, FM 3-09.21 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Battalion states “massing all available Fires enables the artillery to inflict maximum damage on the enemy.” In other words, commanders and field artillery units had to bring together resources in the form of units, systems and metal at the right place and time to facilitate the desired effect on the enemy force.

For example, Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair’s book, “A General’s Life,” states, in World War II the Eighth Air Force massed 2,246 aircraft for Operation Cobra, in July 1944. These aircraft dropped more than one million tons of ordnance to help create the opening for massed armored units, from several divisions, to break out of the hedgerows of Normandy. Also, according to the book, “Certain Victory,” by BG Robert H. Scales, as well as my personal experience as a member of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C., in the Persian Gulf War during Operation Desert Storm, artillery from the 18th Field Artillery Brigade massed all 90 guns and 27 rocket launchers on a single objective – Objective Rochambeau – on Feb. 24, 1991.

This enabled maneuver forces of the 82nd Airborne Division and the 6th French Armored Division to quickly overrun the defending Iraqi unit. Therefore, the weight of many units, guns and people were required to provide the devastating blow that unhinged
municions a new definition of mass is the ability to attack multiple targets from many distributed points across the battlefield, with precision accuracy to produce the desired effect on the enemy in accordance with the commander’s intent. Airpower used this concept to transition from 1,000 strong B-17 bomber attacks, in World War II, on a single target to assaulting 1,000 targets simultaneously across Iraq, in 1991, with a fraction of aircraft. Could the field artillery adopt this new definition and transform its force, too?

A new definition. Adopting a redefinition of mass could facilitate a transformation of the field artillery branch in terms of organization, equipment, and employment. Precision weaponry provided numerous advantages for airpower that would benefit the field artillery in a similar manner. For example, precision weapons would reduce the number of systems required to deliver effective fires. Correspondingly, fewer systems and precise delivery will reduce the logistics tail required to support field artillery units. Traditionally, transportation requirements strained the logistic capacity of units across every command echelon in supporting field artillery units. Mass redefined could significantly reduce the tonnage of munitions needed by those units. This net gain in transportation will increase the overall mobility of the entire force and make it easier to move field artillery units in conjunction with maneuver units. Deployability provides the maneuver commander with greater flexibility in employing his forces.

Redefining mass will change the way the field artillery is organized and employed on the battlefield. Fires battalions would become smaller, reflecting the reduction of systems, yet they would retain or exceed the lethality of their predecessors due to the effectiveness and precision of the munitions. Further, units could deploy in a more distributed way to provide better force protection and coverage for their supported units. Fewer elements mean fewer targets for the enemy to engage thereby reducing risk. At the same time, operating in a distributed manner provides the ability to conduct parallel (simultaneous) engagement of multiple targets. Massing as we understand it would have required all systems firing at the same target at one time. The new definition means that many systems distributed across the breadth of the battlefield can engage many targets simultaneously multiplying the effect of Fires many fold. Ultimately, this provides the maneuver commander with a range of capabilities in his organic Fires battalion previously unheard of.

Achieving transformation. Precision weapons have certainly changed the way we fight wars. They have made the way we fight more efficient by reducing the wastage of munitions that fail to hit the target. Further, precision has made the munitions delivery more effective, through greater probability of achieving an acceptable outcome against the target. This has changed the definition of mass. Adopting this new definition, proposed here, could drive transformation of the field artillery and provides the impetus to make the branch the most lethal and efficient artillery organization in the world. This idea drove airpower development for decades and resulted in unquestionably the most powerful Air Force in the world. The time has come for the Army to adopt this concept to facilitate development of Fire support, for the foreseeable future.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Forsyth is an instructor at the United States Air Force Academy’s in the Department of Military Strategic Studies, Colorado Springs, Colo. He commanded 2nd Battalion, 77th Field Artillery Regiment in the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colo., which included service in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom X. He has also served as the executive officer for 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), as well as the battalion S3 and executive officer for 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment in 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) both at Fort Drum, N.Y. He commanded a battery in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky. and has four combat tours during his service, the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and three tours in Afghanistan supporting the Global War on Terror. He has authored two books about Civil War campaigns entitled, “The Red River Campaign of 1864,” (McFarland & Co. Publishers, 2001) and “The Loss of the Civil War by the Confederacy,” (McFarland & Co. Publishers, 2003). He holds a master’s degree from Louisiana State University and a Master of Military Art and Science from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies.
U.S. military leaders have been uniquely successful in history. Why? My experience linked with education, strongly suggests respect for the individual service member. This coupled with the following set of key leadership traits: genuine concern for troops, commitment to mission, tactical and technical competence ... all packaged in cast iron integrity are the attributes found in successful leaders.

Being honest, candid, fair and firm reduces the organization’s stress while having the most favorable impact on both the organization and the mission. My leadership philosophy is a compilation of all the leaders I’ve worked with for more than 28 years of military service – mostly good, some bad and very few ugly. I believe the combination of experience mixed with theory is indispensable for success beyond the tactical level of command.

This essay captures my personal highlights of joint leadership in a fast-paced, highly-innovative combat environment with the Counter - Rocket Artillery and Mortar program. The mission of standing up a joint task force for combat requires an easily recognized and universal leadership style. Working with other services is becoming the norm. Selecting a hybrid approach to leadership is necessary in order to create high performance units that will perform effectively in a joint operational environment. This approach requires forethought and an understanding of organizational behavior.

Leadership means different things to many people and is a fascinating subject to explore. Field Marshall Sir Slim, a British military commander, the 13th Governor-General of Australia, who also fought in World War I and II and was wounded in action three times, emphasized, “that command is an intensely personal affair.”

Some individuals possess certain natural...
Aspects of various leadership theories that will work best for their personal circumstances and fit the organization.

**Background on C-RAM.** In 2004, the commanding general, Multi-National Corps – Iraq became increasingly concerned with protecting the force from insurgent attacks. Inasmuch, the operational commander drafted a joint urgent operational needs statement, asking the Pentagon to look at developing a solution to counter the persistent indirect fire attacks on forward operating bases. At that time, I was an action officer, serving on the Army staff, and witnessed the remarkable speed in which the acquisition community assembled the first stages of the C-RAM program. Engineers, scientists and experts from the defense industry leveraged existing systems found in the Army and Navy inventories and rounded out the shortages with commercial off-the-shelf technologies. Using the Army’s Firefinder radars and the Navy’s Close in Weapon System 20 mm gun, the joint Fires and effects cell within MNC-I developed a capability that sensed incoming rounds, warned friendly forces and intercepted incoming rockets and mortars projected to impact high value assets. Providing this sense, warn and intercept capability was clearly a ‘joint endeavor’ in regards to personnel, equipment and ideas coming from both services to produce a ‘system of systems,’ within 11 months.

In the initial stages, the C-RAM program experienced its fair share of challenges. As a result, the program sustained early skepticism and criticism from many decision makers, particularly the Army staff. Over the course of several years, numerous adjustments and materiel improvements were made using combat field testing and spiral development. Several changes to the program were made with the fundamental approach to training, mission command and organizational structure; these changes increased performance and improved the capabilities strategic value with the operational commander by protecting coalition forces from numerous indirect fire attacks. However, inserting a leadership element at the Task Force level was by far
the most important aspect of the overall synchronizing effort.

**Setting the conditions.** Before taking command, I studied the impressive story of the IBM turnaround; I found a strong connection with a thought provoking quote from Lou Gerstner, the chairman of the board and chief executive officer for IBM until 2002, on the importance of culture.

“Until I came to IBM, I probably would have told you that culture was just one among several important elements in any organization’s make up and success – along with vision, strategy marketing, financials and the like. I came to see, in my decade at IBM, that culture isn’t just one aspect of the game, it is the game.”

Establishing a new culture is uniquely different than changing an existing culture. Both tasks have their challenges and there are several models guiding a leader when confronting these issues independently. However, the aspects of creating a new culture while merging existing service cultures make a difference for an organization.

**Leading innovation.** Leading a unit filled with innovation that merges two different service cultures requires fostering a climate that plans, coordinates and harnesses technology with critical thought in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. Adaptive leaders are conscious of their position in the organization and strive to develop a system that can successfully implement technological changes into an organization that has emerging capabilities.

Shaping the environment to encourage open dialogue on successes and failures is essential for improving the capability. Finding methods to reward innovation on improving the tactics, techniques and procedures establishes intrinsic value in an organization. Learning organizations skillfully advance the progress of technology to counter emerging threats. These technologies eventually become core competencies which have strategic value by providing operational capability to the joint force commander. I have garnered awareness for the dedication of Naval leaders like Admiral Hyman Rickover, who completely immersed himself into a technologically challenging field of nuclear energy, while single-handedly shaping a new Navy culture.

**Understanding organizational behavior and developing a winning strategy.** Having an appreciation of organizational behavior theory is essential for a commander to understand the lifecycles his unit will experience. Anticipating the recognizable stages a unit will encounter during team building provides valuable insight when assembling high performance units. Psychologist Bruce Tuckman first came up with the memorable phrase, ‘forming, storming, norming and performing,’ in 1965. He used it to describe the path to high-performance. Later, he added a fifth stage, ‘adjourning’ (and others often call mourning). While building the joint task force, we used this simple strategy repetitively and every Soldier and sailor understood the leadership’s approach to building combat power. Moreover, we had “universal buy in” and unit members understood the vision, mission and end state. Launching a vision that would unite and inspire this formation was the first key step in establishing our own identity.

Our motto was, “building an airplane in flight,” and this seemed very appropriate for the circumstances. We rallied around
relationships was essential. The wisdom of leaders with the skills to work through their friction. Planning for this phase and preparing service cultures and the rapid pace units augmentees coming from the Navy. The fact that 140 members were individual apart. Making this even more challenging was and the other two at Fort Hood, Texas, with units would be located at Fort Bliss, Texas was further complicated by geography, as two units would be located at Fort Bliss, Texas and the other two at Fort Hood, Texas, with subordinate units that were over 500 miles apart. Making this even more challenging was the fact that 140 members were individual augmentees coming from the Navy.

Forming the C-RAM task force. Recruiting the right personnel with the right skills when building an organization provides an opportunity to establish and sustain the culture that the leadership values. The impressive story of Major General Ira Eaker establishing the newly formed Eighth Air Force during WW II in Britain describes the struggles of getting started. Mary Raum and Ira Eaker, authors of, “There are no Reluctant Leaders,” write, Eaker’s first move as head of the expeditionary force was to personally select a team to oversee operations. Relying on old connections and his past experienced judgment and finding people who were ‘available,’ he chose six men.

Similar to Eaker, we formed the unit with six people: two officers, two noncommissioned officers and two enlisted Soldiers. The initial stages of building the organization centered around 20 personnel, mostly handpicked, to serve as the staff and provide command and control of the task force. This small group formed the nucleus that four subordinate units, consisting of Army and Navy personnel, would be created around. The mission was enormous – we had to build, train and deploy this unit to Iraq within seven months. This truncated timeline was further complicated by geography, as two units would be located at Fort Bliss, Texas and the other two at Fort Hood, Texas, with subordinate units that were over 500 miles apart. Making this even more challenging was the fact that 140 members were individual augmentees coming from the Navy.

Forming inside the training environment. The blending of two service cultures and the rapid pace units were formed was certain to produce some friction. Planning for this phase and preparing leaders with the skills to work through their differences and develop productive working relationships was essential. The wisdom of was embedded into the majority of the organization we could effectively move forward. With everyone on the same fighting team, organizational structures consisting of routines and procedures were starting to align. The unit was able to concentrate on quality individual training while focusing on the upcoming tactical mission. Indications of junior leaders taking responsibility and demonstrating initiative to make things better at their level signaled we were ready to progress into the collective training phase.

Our mission rehearsal exercises were designed to place added stress on the organization and test the resiliency of the newly formed organization. The results of these rehearsals highlighted some important leadership areas that could be improved to strengthen and improve our communications skills between services.

Moreover, as a leader I realized some of the skills we sought when hiring people for establishing the organization were not the same skills we needed for fighting the task force. For example, with a small staff, we needed to cross train administrative and logistics officers to serve as battle captains in the operations center.

Finally, we were starting to see signs of an organization that was able to accept constructive criticism and becoming more comfortable with the exchange of ideas. CSM Paris Williams was helpful in allowing us to move quickly through this phase when he reassured the task force, “we weren’t making sailors into Soldiers, nor turning Soldiers into sailors.” This set the tone for achieving ‘unity of effort’ as the mission was too critical and peoples’ lives depended on our ability to perform our jobs in theater. Having a critical mission to perform was a powerful underlying message for uniting the team as well. Moreover, going through this turbulent cycle at home station was vitally important to the overall strategy. We could not afford to go through ‘inter-service rivalries’ down range.

Forming at the lower echelons. Once the mindset of going to war was to personally oversee operations. Relying on old connections and his past experienced judgment and finding people who were ‘available,’ he chose six men.

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Moreover, as a leader I realized some of the skills we sought when hiring people for establishing the organization were not the same skills we needed for fighting the task force. For example, with a small staff, we needed to cross train administrative and sailors performing combat missions on 15 forward operating bases in Iraq. Our battle space stretched from Mosul in the north to Basrah in the south. The 570 mile separation between units in Texas proved to be advantageous in our ability to effectively communicate over long distances in Iraq. We had grown accustomed to decentralized operations and working across long lines of communication. Inculcating the ‘train as you fight’ mentality, we had inherently developed procedures to cope with overcoming distant communication challenges. Interestingly enough, over the brief history of the task force, including deployment and redeployment, we never had more than three of the four units assembled together at any one time. Communicating commander’s intent and empowering subordinates to take responsibility was key in achieving unity of effort. Consequently, the Soldiers and sailors performed magnificently with hundreds of successful early warning messages and double-digit intercepts on their watch.

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Moreover, as a leader I realized some of the skills we sought when hiring people for establishing the organization were not the same skills we needed for fighting the task force. For example, with a small staff, we needed to cross train administrative and
task force was just as important as building the organization. Conducting a proper transfer of personnel and equipment requires just as much energy in planning. The pride associated with mission accomplishment and the bonds built during combat deserve special recognition. The opportunity to conduct a ‘travelling roadshow,’ highlighting the lessons learned was integral in the process of reconnecting after redeploying. I believe I express the sentiment of many members of the Task Force 3-3 ADA (C-RAM) by stating we undeniably experienced a ‘period of mourning’ as described by psychologist Bruce Tuckman earlier in the paper. Our official inactivation ceremonies, awards, and recognition by senior leaders assisted with closing out a tremendous journey.

**Linking past experiences with education.** The academia of Newport has allowed me to link some very important concepts and refine my leadership repertoire. General Omar Bradley summed this idea best with the following thought, “…some are born with a certain amount of leadership…I am convinced nevertheless that leadership can be developed and improved by study and training.” During my time spent at the Naval War College, the leadership seminars have provided me with quality time and the breadth of case studies to reflect on my recent observations of leading Soldiers and sailors in the joint operational environment.

Looking back on the C-RAM mission, we encountered tremendous learning opportunities while building and deploying the unit into combat. Upfront, deliberate decisions were made about the training strategy and the road to war. We realized early, communicating and embedding the ‘Command Philosophy’ into the new culture was critical for establishing unity of effort over extended operating distances. Fostering a positive command climate and building trust were two important aspects of our strategy. Together with my closest advisors we applied the leadership principles that had worked well for us in other Army formations. Fortunately, we realized early in this endeavor we were heading into some unchartered waters working with the Navy. This joint adventure required the use of every instrument in the leadership toolbox, plus a few new ones, to make this unit successful at performing its mission.

In closing, all that we do as military leaders must occur with full knowledge of the impact on building combat power. Leaders must study and anticipate the normal, predictable turbulences that occur when forming of a new organization and take advantage of the opportunities that occur to shape organizational behavior.

Creating a strategy that is easy to understand and provides focus to each and every member of the unit, to include families, is important for working across long distances. Communicating a clear and simple vision embedded into the culture early will provide the foundation to rally the troops later. Finally, leading an organization involved with such a wide range of technical activities can be a challenging and rewarding experience, as it provides a ‘leadership laboratory,’ filled with many opportunities for junior officers to become senior leaders.

Colonel Randy McIntire returned from Iraq last year where he lead a joint task force of Soldiers and sailors that had the mission of fighting and protecting service members from insurgent rocket and mortar attacks launched against coalition Forces. He recently graduated from the Naval War College and will assume command of the 69th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas, this summer.
This annual contest obtains high-quality photos that tell the story of today’s U.S. artillery professionals conducting training or engaged in full-spectrum operations. These photos may appear as a cover or other shots for future editions of the magazine, as part of the Fires Center of Excellence poster series or in other esprit de corps or strategic communications projects. The competition is open to any military or civilian, amateur or professional photographer.

Photo Categories:
There will be two main divisions in the 2011 contest:
1. Professional
2. Amateur
Each division will have subcategories:
1. Training for combat/stability operations
2. Actual combat/stability operations

Prize Winners:
1st place prize winners will receive $300 and 2nd place prize winners will receive $100. Enter as many photos as you wish, but winners will be limited to one per category.

Contest Rules:
* Only photos taken in the last 36 months are eligible.
* Entries must be received by the magazine no later than August 31, 2011.
* Each photo must be a jpg or tif image with little or no compression.
* Each photo must be taken with a camera on its highest resolution setting.
* Images cannot be manipulated.
* Photos cannot be copyrighted or owned by an agency/publication.

Judging:
This year judging will take place online. The online voting process will be published soon in future editions of the Fires Bulletin, on the Fires Center of Excellence Facebook, and on the Fires Knowledge Network.

Photo Submissions:
* Each submission must include the photographer’s name, unit/affiliation, e-mail address, mailing address and phone number.
* Caption information must include who, from what unit, is doing what, where and when (date) in the photograph - for example: “SGT Joe B. Smith, C/2-20 Fires, 4th Fires Brigade, fires the M777A2 howitzer during unit qualification training at Fort Hood, Texas, Jan. 5, 2011.”

Where to submit photos:
Photos can be sent by e-mail or compact disk. CDs will not be returned.
* E-mail image files (one image per e-mail) to Fires Bulletin at paul.e.jiron.civ@mail.mil. Mark the subject line as “2011 Photo Contest/ Entry Category -Your Last Name.”
* Mail CDs to ATTN: Photo Contest at P.O. Box 33311; Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311.
* FedEx or UPS submissions to 652 Hamilton Road, Rm 204A, Fort Sill, OK 73503-5600.

All submissions may be used at the discretion of the Fires Bulletin and Fires Center of Excellence STRATCOM staff. Questions? Contact the Fires staff by e-mail at paul.e.jiron.civ@mail.mil or by phone at DSN 639-5121/6806 or 580-442-5121/6806.
Artillery in direct fire in command

By 1SG Frank C. Luedtke, Jr. and MAJ Peter L. Jennings

Advanced digital technology has greatly automated the employment of artillery on the modern battlefield. For example, sophisticated radar systems tell us where to shoot; digital systems allow us to lay howitzers for direction and elevation; and global positioning systems guided artillery rounds allow us to hit a target 40 km away. Overall, these systems and others have greatly improved the accuracy and effectiveness of artillery.

However, advanced digital technology does not enable one traditional but often overlooked artillery function that has proven significant to forward operating bases and combat observation post defense in Afghanistan – direct fire.

Direct fire is an artillery function that is dependent on the skill of the artilleryman: it requires a section chief to identify the target, determine its location and the best munitions to engage that target; and it requires a gunner to find and manually adjust his sights to hit the target.

This article presents four vignettes that illustrate how artillerymen with proper knowledge and training in direct fire operations can effectively repel insurgent attacks on International Security Assistance Force forward operating bases and command outposts. Insights and lessons regarding the proper planning and execution of direct fire are discussed.

Four direct fire vignettes. As part of our population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, International Security Assistance Forces have located combat outposts “among the people” throughout Afghanistan. These bases are often situated on terrain surrounded by high ground that does not permit effective standoff and frequently come under enemy direct attack. The vignettes below describe four such attacks and illustrate how artillery direct fire was used effectively in the defense of the COP.

Vignette 1: June 13, 2005, COP Wright, (1/D/319th AFAR). COP Wright is located near the provincial
capital of Asadabad, Afghanistan. At approximately 10:30 p.m., COP Wright was attacked by an unknown number of insurgents. The attack involved 107 mm rockets, rocket propelled grenades and machine gun fire from the west of the COP at approximately 1200 meters. Enemy fires targeted a bulk fuel storage area located within the COP and were effective (See Figure 1: COP Wright).

When the attack began, artillerymen of the 1/D/319th AFAR manned their guns and immediately went into action as part of the COP defense plan. The section chief assessed the enemy was too close for indirect fire and notified the tactical operation center of his intent to go into direct fire mode. He quickly determined the direction and distance of the enemy utilizing 6400 mil range cards that pre-identified all potential enemy firing points. These range cards were part of an integrated defense plan which tied the guns in with the crew served weapon systems on the COP. Based on the information in these range cards, the guns were loaded with a pre-determined standard shell/fuze combination, and charge that would inflict the maximum amount of damage to the enemy while simultaneously limiting collateral damage.

The TOC fire support officer established the restricted operations zone and completed the clearance of Fires procedures. Two rounds were fired approximately 30 meters below the insurgent position causing them to break off the attack and retreat down the reverse slope. Coalition forces aircraft on station provided grid locations for three insurgents retreating towards the bottom of a dried riverbed. The tactical operations center and fire direction center computed a high angle fire mission. Gun two fired four, high-explosive rounds with a variable time fuze, charge one.

In this vignette, artillery direct fire provided a decisive combat multiplier to repel the enemy attack. Key to success was integration of direct fire into the COP defense plan. Advanced preparation of 6400 mil direct fire range cards pre-identifying all potential enemy firing points is the key tool to accomplish this. In addition, establishing standardized fuse/
shell combinations enabled the gun team to be more responsive and accurate in executing the direct fire mission.


COP Monti is located in the Hindu Kush mountain range, in the Asmar District of Kunar province, close to the border with Pakistan. At approximately 8:30 p.m., COP Monti was attacked by insurgents from ridgelines to the north, west and southeast. Enemy Fires included rocket propelled grenades, machine gun and small arms and were coordinated and effective, impacting in and around the COP and causing damage to some structures including the B-Huts in which Soldiers were sleeping. All COP defensive weapon systems returned fire. Soldiers manned the walls of the COP and engaged with crew-served weapons, but these Fires ceased to break the enemy attack.

Gunline Soldiers consolidated and moved to their gun positions while under fire, using buildings, vehicles and bunkers for cover. The platoon sergeant and section chiefs assessed the situation and determined that direct Fires should be directed towards the enemy on the ridgeline to the west – the location of the most intense and effective enemy Fires. From the west, the enemy occupied four firing positions at a distance of approximately 900 meters. The fire direction center was notified that the guns were going into direct fire mode.

Distance and direction were obtained from target reference points on range cards prepared for each gun. This data was then used to determine the elevations on which to lay the howitzers.

The target reference points were previously established using the laser range finder on the Gun Laying and Positioning System. The GLPS is the primary instrument used to orient howitzers and determine grid location, establish directional control, and allow the operator to transfer directional control to the individual howitzers using standard laying commands.

Additionally, the GLPS eye-safe laser range finder eliminates the need to measure subtense to determine the target distance to the howitzer.

Gun one fired on the two northern points and gun two fired on the southern points (See Figure 2: COP Monti). Each gun fired two missions: the first mission consisted of four rounds and the second, five rounds. Standardized shell fuse combinations were used in order to limit collateral damage. Enemy fire from the west ceased after these missions were fired. Coalition forces air support then came on station and successfully engaged insurgents on the ridgeline to the north.

The insurgents from the southeast broke off firing after the western and northern positions were subdued. Battle damage assessment revealed that direct fire stopped the attack from the west, allowing air support to focus on the insurgents to the north.

This vignette illustrates the decisive use of artillery direct fire. Accurate target rating points based on data obtained from GLPS, increases responsiveness and accuracy of Fires. TRPs also give the section chief the

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Figure 2: Depiction of the battle on May 25, 2008 between insurgents and 3rd Platoon, Bravo Battery, 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment. (Photo illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., Fires Art Director)

COP Kherwar is located near the village of Bakshikhala, Kherwar district, Logar province, Afghanistan.

At approximately 9:25 p.m., COP Kherwar was attacked by a squad-sized insurgent element from two positions to the west and southwest. The attack consisted of direct fire 82 mm mortars, rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire. The gun crew consolidated near the combined living area in the center of the COP and moved approximately 150 meters to the gun position and through a trench line established to provide covered movement.

The gun position was located on high ground on the north end of the COP. An M119A2 howitzer was positioned there to serve as a large-bore, crew-served, direct-fire weapons system. The howitzer was equipped with the M913 GELON mount and PAS 13 thermal sight. The GELON was designed to mount in the direct fire telescope mount. It has a rail system that can mount a night vision optic, laser and rangefinder. When bore sighted and aligned with the howitzer tube, these systems allow the howitzer to be fired like a crew-served weapon with better accuracy and with less collateral damage. Having a howitzer that could see at night proved effective in target acquisition and provided a distinct advantage in this line-of-sight direct fire duel.

Once at the gun position, the gunnery sergeant and section chief identified the enemy firing position to the southwest, approximately 700 meters away, and oriented the howitzer in that general direction (See Figure 3: COP Kherwar). They notified FDC that they were in direct fire mode and requested clearance to fire. With the ground cleared, they fired the first mission of seven rounds and effectively silenced enemy fire from the southwest.

The gunnery sergeant and section chief then shifted the howitzer towards the second

Figure 3: Depiction of the battle on May 10, 2010 between insurgents and 1st Platoon, Bravo Battery, 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment. (Photo illustration by Rick Paape, Jr., Fires Art Director)
enemy position located 600 meters to the west. Using the thermal sight to identify the mortar they fired two volleys of five and six rounds each on the second enemy position. Upon completion of this fire mission, the enemy attack ceased.

This vignette illustrates an “out-of-the-box” employment of artillery. Positioning the howitzer on the COP high ground enhanced its direct fire capability and gave the COP additional fire power to quickly end a sizable insurgent attack. The use of M913 GELON mount and PAS 13 thermal sight gave the artillery section a decisive night vision capability that enabled them to eliminate an enemy in a position it previously considered safe. This was the first time these systems were used in combat by this new Airborne artillery battalion.


At approximately 8:30 p.m., COP Kherwar was again attacked by a squad-sized insurgent element from the north. High volume and effective rocket propelled grenades, machine gun and small arms fire was directed towards the exposed M119A2 gun pit. The paratroopers moved to the gun position and while under fire, the platoon sergeant determined distance and direction utilizing TRPs on the direct fire range card.

Because the insurgents occupied a defilade position among dense trees and high brush, the platoon sergeant decided to fire a “Killer Junior” mission (See Figure 4: COP Kherwar 2). Killer Junior is a technique for employing artillery direct fire airbursts. It involves firing an HE shell with the fuse set to function causing an airburst over the target. When set properly, the shell explodes approximately 10 meters (30 feet) above the ground at ranges between 200 and 1000 meters.

The FDC calculated an elevation for a “Killer Junior” mission and the gun crew set the data on the howitzer and fuses. Using the mounted PAS 13, the gunner laid the howitzer directly on the insurgent’s position. Five rounds were fired: the first round effectively diminished the enemy fire and the subsequent rounds ended the enemy attack.

This vignette illustrates an effective use of “Killer Junior” technique. The key to success of this mission was utilizing the FDC to compute the firing data for elevation to produce first round effects. In addition, use of TRPs using the GLPS and a direct fire range card minimized the time required to accurately engage the enemy. Using techniques similar to those of an AC 130 gunship, the section chief was able to verify the howitzers aim point through the use of aiming lasers attached to the GELON mount.

Discussion and recommendations.

The above vignettes illustrate how artillery used in direct fire mode provides a decisive response to enemy attacks on vulnerable COPs. As a large-bore, crew-served weapon, it enables the COP to bring maximum firepower to bear on the enemy while simultaneously minimizing collateral damage and interference with aircraft or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets operating within the restricted operating zone. To be employed...
effectively, however, it requires personnel who are knowledgeable and competent—from the gun crew to the section chief up through the COP commander. Below are some of the key tasks/skills required for the effective employment of artillery in direct fire mode:

**Direct fire range cards.** Direct fire range cards are used with all direct fire crew served weapons in a COP defense plan. They should also be used for artillery and integrated into the COP defense plan with the other crew-served weapons so that overlapping sectors of fire are established. In Afghanistan, artillery uses a 6400 mil range card. The 6400 mil ring is broken into 400 mil increments; the inner ring distances are determined based on historical data and the surrounding terrain. Some locations may only need maximum distances of 1000 m, others may need the full 2500 m range. This range determined the inner ring distances anywhere from 100 m to 500 m. [This gave us a very accurate location in which to determine the best means to engage the enemy when attacked from there.]

**Target reference points.** Pre-identifying all targets on the direct fire range cards provides data needed to compute direct fire and “Killer Junior” missions and reduces time required to determine distance to target and further increases artillery responsiveness. TRPs are initially based on assessment of the terrain surrounding the COP and analysis of historical data of enemy attacks.

**Gun Laying and Positioning System.** The GLPS system enables artillerymen to laze targets up to 2500 m. It provides a ten-digit grid for accuracy, elevation and direction which can then be applied for initial firing data. Using the GLPS to laze TRPs increases the accuracy of direct fire range cards and facilitates better COP defense planning.

**Set aside standardized fuse/shell combinations for direct fire missions.** Setting aside a pre-designated lot of ammunition for direct fire missions further enhances artillery responsiveness. Standardizing fuse/shell combinations and settings in advance reduces tasks necessary to complete a fire mission.

Establishing a lot for direct fire engagements eliminates confusion during the execution of direct fire missions, as well as based on high-explosive stock levels, designate the smallest lots for direct fire. This also ensures that the maximum amount of calibrated ammunition is maintained for counter fire and troops in contact missions.

**Communication between the section chief and ammunition team chief.** Since direct fire missions are conducted while the COP is under attack and often while artillerymen are taking effective enemy fire, communication between the section chief and ammunition team chief is critical. Thorough gun crew training and rehearsals are required to ensure that everyone is comfortable with the range of direct fire missions and associated commands.

**Killer Junior.** As illustrated in vignette 4, “Killer Junior” can be an effective and sometimes necessary direct fire capability. When firing “Killer Junior,” it is preferable to have the FDC compute the data. Based off the range card data, the FDC can give more accurate elevation and time setting,
minimizing adjustments and achieve a better chance for first round effects. It also enables the COP commander to know precisely what the blast area will be so that he can mitigate any collateral damage.

For “Killer Junior,” prepare ammo in locations around the gun pit and designate strictly for “Killer Junior” fire missions.

Clearance of Fires. When seeking clearance to fire direct fire missions, it is imperative that the COP operations center and the supported commander fully understand the capabilities of direct fire. Many commanders and TOC personnel have limited experience with artillery direct fire and are hesitant to provide clearance. Therefore, it is important for battery and platoon leadership to educate COP commanders and key personnel on direct fire capabilities, target selection and planning, responsiveness and minimization of collateral damage, as part of the COP defense planning.

It is also important to establish policies and procedures for clearance of fires during COP attacks. To facilitate this process, it is helpful for the gun crew to schedule a live rehearsal to demonstrate their capabilities and processes so the COP commander and key personnel can better understand and appreciate direct fire capabilities.

The importance of rehearsals. Even with advanced planning (using direct fire range cards, TRPs and pre-designated ammunition lots and fuse/shell combinations) and enhanced capabilities (the GLPS and M913 GELON mount and PAS 13 thermal sight), human skill and intuition are still required to accurately employ direct fire techniques. It is important that the gun crew conducts rehearsals, constant maintenance and boresight verifications during fire control alignment tests and dry-fire training, to ensure that all elements involved in the execution of this type of mission are comfortable and able to perform under combat conditions.

Growing up in a cold war and peacetime Army, artillerymen trained on all core competencies. As artillerymen, we were comfortable with deliberate occupations, hip shoots, drop zone missions and air assault missions. However, directfire, “Killer Junior” and self-illumination firing are skills that were never developed to the same level of proficiency. The above vignettes illustrate the importance of these traditional artillery skills. In Afghanistan, direct fire is often a decisive means of defending vulnerable FOBs/COPs against insurgent attacks. It is important we develop and maintain our proficiency in these traditional artillery skills.

First Sergeant Frank C. Luedtke, Jr. served as 1SG of Bravo Battery, 4th Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment during OEF X and VIII as well as platoon sergeant of 1/D/319th AFAR during OEF VI and OIF I as part of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team since 2003. He has been an operations sergeant, intelligence sergeant and master gunner as well. During his deployments, he built or supervised the construction of seven artillery firebases in RC-East in Afghanistan. He used his experience to train and develop his Soldiers to employ direct fire as a COP Defense weapon system.

Major Peter L. Jennings is a Major in the U.S. Army Reserve and currently serves on active duty as the Research Director for the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) at West Point. He served as a CALL representative during OEF X. Major Jennings holds a B.S. in Economics from Miami University and an M.B.A. from Michigan State University.
“From your laptop to your smart phone, the new i-edition of the Fires Bulletin keeps you connected on the go.”

The new interactive edition is online @ http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin
There is a stimulating opportunity on the horizon for the United States Army. As the Army continues to conduct full-spectrum operations in support of the Long War, much is being demanded of leaders at every level. It is not enough for Army leaders to simply have the technical knowledge needed to perform their duties in the current fight; full-spectrum operations require more. This article will dissect the efficacy of emotional intelligence and present a case for an emotional intelligence training implementation program. By educating and training on the importance of being emotionally intelligent, Soldiers will be better prepared to perform the complex duties required of them in full-spectrum operations.

Emotional intelligence, the big picture. Emotional intelligence is a wide-ranging and thought-provoking area of the human experience. In his work, “Working with Emotional Intelligence,” Daniel Goleman suggests the ability to control one’s emotions and certain personal qualities, such as “initiative and empathy, adaptability and persuasiveness,” are the essential ingredients to success in the workplace. Moreover, academic ability and more specifically, a person’s intelligence quotient or IQ, play second fiddle to one’s emotional intelligence in being an effective predictor of future job performance. This operating paradigm is particularly true in leadership positions.

Goleman further presents the theory of emotional intelligence as a new and incredibly significant indicator of job performance. He believes it is emotional intelligence that separates star performers from the mass of average achievers. His position is supported by data and surveys he has conducted throughout the business world. Goleman’s examples of emotional intelligence correlate well to what the Army refers to as situational awareness, common sense, maturity and the ‘whole person concept.’

Why the Army should care. Perhaps the linchpin in the whole idea of emotional intelligence is how to objectively measure or capture the level of adaptability or persuasiveness in a person.

These qualities or aspects of emotional intelligence are not easily identifiable in a person and it requires an extended period of time to honestly and accurately assess an officer’s adaptability and persuasiveness. The Army today is demanding its leaders and persuasive, to be fast-paced and ever-changing environments of the

U.S. Army “Whole Person Concept”

Situational Awareness

Maturity

Common Sense

When military leaders unfamiliar with emotional intelligence first hear about it, they are generally unreceptive. But there is more to judging this book than its touchy-feely-sounding cover.”


By CPT Robert B. Lackey
Long War. In other words, Army leaders must possess emotional intelligence. Therefore, Goleman’s emotional intelligence is exactly what the Army needs to incubate, promote, and foster in its leaders.

Interestingly, senior leaders of the Army are currently attempting to devise a new and improved system of evaluation criteria to quantifiably measure personal qualities, such as adaptability, persuasiveness and incorporate the quantified results into the formal officer evaluation form. The Army has outwardly identified, as Goleman theorizes, academic achievement and an officer’s IQ are not the lone ingredients in the recipe of successful leaders. The former commanding general of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command in Arlington, Va., GEN Martin Dempsey, refers to qualities such as adaptability and persuasiveness as “intangibles.” These intangibles are what Goleman believes constitute emotional intelligence.

A call for change. Army leaders at all levels must be aware of emotional intelligence’s importance and clearly convey its presence to their Soldiers. The life and death decisions that Army leaders make, and scenarios they find themselves in, on a daily basis, demand it. The Army is behind the power curve when it comes to recognizing that emotional intelligence exists and should be formally evaluated when assessing and promoting within the ranks of the organization’s structure. The Army fully supports the ‘whole person concept,’ but through its negligence, in the area of failing to evaluate emotional intelligence, it has been unsuccessful in creating a system for truly evaluating the ‘whole person.’

The current Army evaluation and promotion system is based on cognitive expertise and intellect while formally and clearly ignoring the largely learned abilities of emotional intelligence. Our Army must recognize that emotional intelligence is what separates an average performer from a high flyer. In doing so the organization will drastically improve its ability to accurately evaluate and retain talented leaders, and take the organization to new levels of efficiency and productivity.

Current Army leadership programs and opportunities. In “Military Leadership: A Context Specific Review,” by Leonard Wong, Paul Bliese and Dennis McGurk, the authors suggest, Army “leadership at all levels tends to have a large impact in terms of personnel” because there are so many people within the organization, and leaders have an increasingly large
number of subordinates as they continue along their career paths. They reflect the organizational framework of the Army, an extremely traditional hierarchical system with clear channels of formal power and command authority.

Wong, Bliese and McGurk also note the Army’s role in world affairs has expanded in recent years. Now more than ever, the Army is a de facto police force and, as such, must deal with diverse people and groups on multiple levels. This increased responsibility relative to dealing with people is something the Army was not prepared to handle in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Unfortunately, this is a problem the Army is still searching for the right answer to. They consider even though the Army is a traditional organization, it is singularly unique because there is no other organization like it in terms of people and mission.

Wong, Bliese and McGurk depict current Army training and identify a leadership development system in need of change. The traditional, yet unique, nature of the Army demands the weaknesses and opportunities within the current system be addressed. In the midst of a protracted and unpopular war, implementing the wide-scale change required to reap the benefits will take considerable leader dedication, resolve and fiscal appropriations.

He emotional intelligence debate. In his writing, “Emotional Intelligence and the Army Leadership Requirements Model,” LTC (Retired) Gerald F. Sewell questions whether or not there is a role for emotional intelligence in the leadership doctrine and practice of the Army. Sewell provides a detailed definition of leadership according to the Army through current doctrinal manuals, specifically Field Manual 6-22 which covers Army leadership tactics, techniques and procedures. Sewell believes that emotional intelligence is not captured in the current definition of Army leadership which is, “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”

Sewell surmises a historical framework of emotional intelligence in the context of the current Army system. He notes current Army doctrine, “does not discuss how to develop the skills necessary to employ the many facets of emotions successfully.” Sewell also attempts to compare the Army leader attributes as laid out in FM 6-22 to Goleman’s elements of emotional intelligence and finds them to be more similar than not. Sewell does not fully address the road ahead for the Army or how to more fully implement Goleman’s ideas across the entire organization of the Army.

Sewell provides a starting point upon which to build the role and reach of emotional intelligence in Army leadership doctrine. He operates from the viewpoint of a retired senior leader, who is now an instructor at the Army’s highest professional education institution, The Army War College. He also compares the leadership principals of the Army to the ideas of Goleman. However, Sewell does not delve into an emotional intelligence training implementation plan.

For any training program pertaining to emotional intelligence to work, Goleman’s ideas must be deliberately integrated into the formal Army education system at an
early stage. Emotional intelligence must be taught early since it is an ability that does not magically appear overnight. Any Army training program for emotional intelligence must start in Basic Combat Training and the Basic Officer Leadership Course.

Emotional intelligence and its effects on organizational effectiveness. In “Emotional Intelligence and Organizational Effectiveness,” by Dr. Cary Cherniss, the author contends emotions are contagious and presents a story about an Army general in the 1980’s who was kidnapped by the enemy.

The general was able to influence his captors to not immediately kill him, by using emotional intelligence skills he acquired during a leadership seminar. Specifically, he was able to assess the emotional state and mood of his captors and play off them, through scenarios such as striking up a conversation and buying time.

The general was ultimately rescued and credits his life to the emotional intelligence training he received prior to being held captive. This heroic story provides a context for Cherniss to believe that emotional intelligence, “can help people be more effective at work.” Cherniss thinks emotional intelligence influences every aspect of organizational effectiveness. Cherniss notes more people leave organizations because they do not like their boss than for any other reason and bosses who can manage with emotional intelligence will likely retain employees. Cherniss agrees with Goleman in saying that emotional intelligence starts with relationships that spread the positive effects of emotional intelligence across the organization. Cherniss says, “to improve the emotional intelligence of organizational members... naturally occurring relationships,” must be affected and training programs must be supported by the culture and leadership of the organization if they are to have any staying power.

The information Cherniss provides is invaluable because it almost provides a blueprint for what the Army must do to set the conditions for a successful emotional intelligence education and training program. Buy-in for the training program must come from and be supported fiscally by the senior leaders of the Army if any program of this nature and scope is to be at all effective.

The sheer enormity of the training program required, should make senior leaders take notice, create a training program, and not just espouse verbiage to written doctrine, which is too often the case when such ideas come up in the current Army organization.

Critical views of emotional intelligence. “Emotional Intelligence: Theory, Findings and Implications,” by John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey and David R. Caruso suggests emotional intelligence includes, “the abilities to accurately perceive emotions, to access and generate emotions... to understand emotions... and regulate emotions.” They provide a thorough review of the theory and the various tests that have been designed in an attempt to measure emotional intelligence. Mayer, Salovey and Caruso question the validity and accuracy of many of the tests by suggesting some of the tests that are currently being utilized have questions that are purely subjective, and there is no right answer to many of them.

Cherniss says, “to improve the emotional intelligence of organizational members ... naturally occurring relationships,” must be affected and training programs must be supported by the culture and leadership of the organization if they are to have any staying power.

They also refer to emotional intelligence as “EQ” or emotional quotient.

Mayer, Salovey and Caruso are absolutely correct in their questioning of the various emotional intelligence tests, particularly regarding the alleged performance predictive capabilities. Many of the tests that measure emotional intelligence are simply surveys that are answered by survey participants. This method of testing in and of itself is prone to error, since the ability of a person to accurately assess themselves is already effectively being measured by allowing them to answer questions. There must be some sort of inherent survey error, but that facet is never discussed in any of the literature thus far.

It is clear emotional intelligence is not a fully understood or developed theory. There is much still to be researched and learned over time. They are on the right track when they suggest the validity and accuracy of emotional intelligence and its ability to predict performance is still widely misunderstood.

Historical criticism of emotional intelligence. In the article, “Some Historical and Scientific Issues Related to narrow, Landy does not think supporters of emotional intelligence have studied with the due diligence required to fully validate and legitimize the theory. Landy even alludes emotional intelligence researchers are afraid to broaden their research out of fear their theories could be disproven or their results seem less significant than they currently argue.

Landy bases his harsh criticism of emotional intelligence on the fact that emotional intelligence has focused on, “children, adolescents, or college students as participants,” in the studies. Since the study population has been somewhat historical and scientific criticism of emotional intelligence. In the article, “Some Historical and Scientific Issues Related to narrow, Landy does not think supporters of emotional intelligence have studied with the due diligence required to fully validate and legitimize the theory. Landy even alludes emotional intelligence researchers are afraid to broaden their research out of fear their theories could be disproven or their results seem less significant than they currently argue.

Landy’s argument should not be ignored. After all, there are always two sides to a coin. It is true there has been a historically narrow focus in the studies that have been conducted on emotional intelligence. The Army must partner with a major research institution if it is to implement an emotional intelligence training and education program.

An emotional intelligence study within the Army would provide access to millions of participants and an opportunity for the scientific community to broaden the breadth of emotional intelligence research, while assisting the Army along the path of gaining better understanding of the significance of emotional intelligence within the organization.
Support for emotional intelligence. In the report, “Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: a Conceptual and Empirical Foundation,” authors Allison Abbe, Lisa M.V. Gulick and Jeffrey L. Herman state emotional intelligence is needed in an Army that must increasingly deal with people and emotions across many cultures. They believe, now more than ever, emotional intelligence plays a key role in being successful in the business of the U.S. Army. The Army is currently stretched thin in a drawn out conflict. Each Soldier’s ability to use emotional intelligence, and specifically emotional intelligence dealing with verbal communication skills, is to his advantage, and may well be the difference between life and death on the battlefield. In today’s Army, cross-cultural competence revolves around having the emotional intelligence to deal with people from many cultures.

The United States Army has drastically increased language and cultural training since Sept. 11, 2001, in an effort to provide Soldiers the knowledge to fight and win the Long War. The authors also suggest a broader cultural ability is necessary to enable leaders to adapt to any cultural setting they may encounter, especially when future enemies may be heretofore unknown. Further, they note the Army has done very little to address the actual Soldier characteristics that “contribute to success in such settings.”

Abbe, Gulick and Herman make some valid and timely observations concerning a gap in training Soldiers currently receive through the expansive spectrum of the Army Training System. The broader training required is a knowledge and understanding of emotional intelligence and how it can help Soldiers influence and deal with people they must encounter to win the current War on Terror.

The authors do not explicitly mention emotional intelligence by name, but emotional intelligence is exactly what they are describing as what is needed to improve Army training and leader development. Tactic knowledge and job skill expertise are not enough. A Soldier must be self-aware, able to read and interpret the emotions of himself and others, and then use that data to formulate a decisive course of action.

Emotional intelligence and conflict resolution. Christopher Gambill and Molly Lineberger present an interesting case in their article, “Emotional Intelligence and Effective Conflict Management,” that emotional intelligence assists greatly in conflict resolution and management. They provide several examples of emotional intelligence helping resolve conflicts within a church congregation setting. Their article further illustrates that sometimes emotions are misgauged and people make a big issue out of something when there is, in actuality, nothing to be concerned about. A good observation they provide is that conflict “can make or break” any group of people.

Gambill and Lineberger state, “knowing how to perceive and use emotion ... has a huge impact on an individual’s ability to form and maintain effective relationships.” During conflicts it is important to have the emotional intelligence to choose the appropriate management style to efficiently and effectively resolve the conflict. They think that emotional intelligence comes easier to some people then others and it is significant to go into a conflict in the right emotional state or issues are bound to arise.

It is interesting that Gambill and Lineberger are two pastors talking about the importance of emotional intelligence. Churches and congregations are made up of people, and dealing with people is perhaps the most
important aspect of a pastor’s job. The ideas presented by them can be applied to any organization, not just churches. Emotional intelligence is profoundly important in the face of conflict, where emotions run high, and they do an excellent job of providing examples and anecdotes to support their observations.

**Emotional intelligence and leadership styles in the Army.** The Army is well versed in the theories of transformational and transactional leadership styles. The universal sentiment in the Army is transformational leaders are far more valuable to the organization, and it is the leadership style of choice.

Transformational leadership relies heavily on emotional intelligence and building lasting relationships. John E. Barbuto and Mark E. Burbach, authors of “The Emotional Intelligence of Transformational Leaders: A Field Study of Elected Officials,” conducted a study of eighty elected officials and their results and conclusions suggest transformational leaders tend to be more in tune and possess more emotional intelligence than other forms of leadership styles. However, Barbuto and Burbach think more research between the relationship of emotional intelligence and transformational leaders is needed in an effort to draw more succinct conclusions about the significance of emotional intelligence in leadership.

Barbuto and Burbach found transformational leaders show more empathetic responses to their employees concerns, thoughts and feelings, which shows they contain a higher level of emotional intelligence. Additionally, transformational leaders are able to regulate their moods, and in doing so, better provide consistent leadership to the organization, particularly during stressful situations.

Barbuto and Burbach also postulate that transformational leaders have an internal motivation that is seemingly contagious in the organization and have the self-awareness to manage effectively. Lastly, they assert an objective measure of emotional intelligence that should be ability-based and not in a self-report format.

Barbuto and Burbach provide a legitimate link between the popular theory of transformational leadership and emotional intelligence. Clearly, transformational leaders possess a higher level of emotional intelligence than their peers of different leadership styles. Also, the ability-based measure of emotional intelligence is what the Army should be concerned with relative to an emotional intelligence training and assessment program. Any alternative tool used to measure emotional intelligence in the Army is far too subjective in nature to be utilized in a formal performance evaluation system where careers and families’ well-being are at stake.

**A n Army emotional intelligence implementation strategy and recommendations.** Implementing emo-
Abrahams identifies that FM 6-22, “does not discuss the leader’s need to be self-aware.” Abrahams then examines the theory of emotional intelligence as presented by Gardner and Goleman, and gives implications for Army leaders if they were to practice some of what Gardner and Goleman preach. Abrahams thinks that self-awareness is the key to emotional intelligence. But, emotional intelligence is not just about self-awareness, and this is where his article is lacking. Though Abrahams provides a good history of the theory, he focuses on only one aspect of the theory of emotional intelligence.

Abrahams is fairly similar to Sewell in they both identify a need to incorporate emotional intelligence. Both authors provide an excellent history of the evolution and emerging popularity of emotional intelligence outside of the Army. Where both articles fall short is describing how to implement emotional intelligence into Army leadership training. It is true that Army doctrine and publications to a certain extent identify that emotional intelligence is important, but Army doctrine does not provide a training program for emotional intelligence. Another issue that must be resolved, current Army doctrine does not suggest a specific aspect of emotional intelligence that should be measured on performance evaluations nor how to quantifiably measure emotional intelligence.

Much work is needed on the current officer and non-commissioned officer evaluation forms if emotional intelligence is to be
synergistically incorporated throughout the evaluation process.

**How is emotional intelligence measured?** In “Psychological Assessment of Emotional Intelligence: A Review of Self Report and Performance-Based Testing,” Carolyn MacCann, Gerald Matthews, Moshe Zeidner and Richard D. Roberts emphasize self-report methods of measuring emotional intelligence do not correlate to any accurate scientific measurements. As such, MacCann et al. think that self-reporting measurement methods are not valid and are very limited in their ability to predict, and utilize.

They further note that accurate measures of performance are what matter. Even expert judgment as an alternative to self-reporting is flawed and limited to an extent. Overall, the authors recommend further research of emotional intelligence is required before any “real life decisions about individuals” can be made.

These authors question the validity and accuracy of current emotional intelligence measurement tools and their ability to predict performance in the workplace. They also state there are currently two models for measuring emotional intelligence: mixed models and ability models. Of the two models, they believe the ability model is the preferred and more accurate method of determining the level of emotional intelligence.

MacCann’s, Matthews’, Zeidner’s and Roberts’ work demonstrates the importance of an ability-performance based measurement of emotional intelligence. It is extremely important the Army not rely on self-reporting as a measurement of emotional intelligence because it is not accurate and is open to much debate. A successful emotional intelligence training program will rely on performance based assessments of emotional intelligence that should improve the individual and organization.

**The way ahead.** Emotional intelligence appears to be an area of job performance that is under-evaluated formally in the workplace. A significant deficiency in Goleman’s theory of emotional intelligence is most people will agree there is more to job performance than just a person’s IQ, but how do you measure personal qualities like adaptability, emotional control, persuasiveness and empathy? This is just one of the issues the Army must work through if it is to reap the many rewards understanding emotional intelligence offers.

The Army should be concerned with evaluating the emotional intelligence of its leaders. Emotional intelligence training must be provided during initial military training for officers and enlisted service members before bad habits relative to emotional intelligence are formed and it is too late for significant change. With concerted effort and the dedication of senior leaders placing emphasis on emotional intelligence, the conditions will be set for an emotional intelligence program to flourish across the Army. If there is no effort put forth on the part of Army senior leaders, this much needed training and education will fall by the wayside as do many new ‘good ideas’ and projects that emerge within the Army culture.

Just as with any leadership or behavior theory, emotional intelligence has its detractors. Their arguments are just and many are well formulated. Even in the midst of this criticism, the Army must attempt an emotional intelligence training implementation program. It is true any such program would be the largest emotional intelligence training program ever established, therefore, it is crucial to bring in researchers from the civilian business community, who are at the forefront of emotional intelligence research.

Our Army does not currently possess the objectivity or depth of knowledge to create a program from within its ranks without outside assistance.

With a properly implemented program, the Army will swiftly reap the rewards of leaders who are more self-aware, can better control their emotions and can interact with others in a more proficient manner. Success in the Army and any organization relies heavily on relationships.

Emotional intelligence is thus all about relationships. The intangible skills and abilities that are the by-product of emotional intelligence will take the Army to new levels of productivity and further enhance an environment where leaders can thrive.

Soldiers of the 101st Sustainment Brigade conducted a convoy through the Salang Pass. The pass navigates through the a winding road and tunnel through some of the harshest terrain in Afghanistan. Nearly two miles above sea level, the Salang Pass connects the Parwan and Baghlan provinces and serves as one of the routes to move cargo and supplies from the main logistics hub at Bagram Air Field, located in eastern Afghanistan, to Regional Command North. (Photo by SPC Michael Vanpool, U.S. Army)

**Captain Robert B. Lackey,** field artillery, is the battalion operations officer for 1st Battalion, 410th Field Artillery Regiment, which is part of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Knox, Ky. He has served as the commander of Service Battery, 434th Field Artillery Detachment, platoon leader and battery executive officer for 1-12 FA, battery executive officer for HHB 17th Field Artillery Brigade, assistant brigade S-3 for the 434th Field Artillery Brigade, and battery executive officer 1-79 FA, all at Fort Sill, Okla. During Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, he served in the 17th Field Artillery Brigade as a platoon leader and convoy commander. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Commerce and Business Administration from The University of Alabama and a Master in Administrative Leadership from The University of Oklahoma.
Risk is inherent in everyone’s life, and mission planning involves assessing, mitigating, and accepting the possibility that some form of danger or failure may occur during mission execution. Indeed, some activities, such as reading or watching TV, lack physical danger and have little associated risk; while activities, such as extreme downhill skiing or NASCAR racing, are inherently dangerous and include large amounts of risk. Leaders should acknowledge that some degree of risk is always present, and failing to properly identify and mitigate this risk may hamper or prohibit mission accomplishment – possibly resulting in physical injury or death to others. To lessen the potential for failure or injury avoidance, leaders frequently face pressure from above to minimize risk, often with a preference for eliminating all but the slightest chances of failure. A sinister variant of this leader may portray the potential of risk and failure as a disguise for his not wanting to accomplish the mission.

Next on the continuum is the risk averse leader who, like the risk avoider, places emphasis on the need for safety and risk management. The risk averse leader focuses on mission accomplishment, but may allow mission degradation to occur through risk mitigation. Although this leader has a thorough understanding of mitigating risk, his/her meticulous employment of risk mitigation may hamper organizational growth or subordinate learning due to risk constraints intended to identify and reduce potential risks. Risk averse leaders place great emphasis on using safety equipment and consider safety and risk management coequals with mission completion.

The third leader on the continuum is the high-risk operator. This leader’s confidence comes from his history of successfully pushing limits and overcoming other’s resistance for his acting aggressively. This leader is often eager to demonstrate his personal skills...
and abilities, as well as showcasing the capabilities of his organization. High-risk leaders place emphasis on successful mission accomplishment, while refusing to allow risk mitigation to interfere or limit the mission’s outcome. Although this leader is comfortable in his execution of high-risk missions, his subordinates may encounter problems when they attempt to emulate the high-risk mission leader’s example.

The final leader depicted on the risk continuum is the reckless leader. This leader has little, if any, regard for risk management, and further dismisses or changes safety and risk management procedures whenever he feels constrained. In addition to ignoring the need for risk management within his/her organization, this leader may chide other leaders or organizations for assessing and reducing risk. The reckless leader’s cavalier attitude toward risk management may permeate throughout his organization.

Achieving the optimal balance. Which of the above leaders provide the most effective perspective on risk management? Leaders should pursue an optimal balance among the four categories described above, and this balance must shift along the continuum depending on the circumstances inherent in each mission. Leaders who operate on the risk extremes (risk avoidance and risk reckless) pose a danger to their organizations.

Risk avoiders who refuse to push their organizations to achieve greater results may miss or forego opportunities that will cause their organizations to grow through these challenging experiences. Similarly, subordinate leaders can learn through challenging experiences. In contrast, risk reckless leaders may engage their organizations in risky endeavors with little or no planning for the potential hazards that may exist.

An ill prepared organization may endure unnecessary injuries during mission execution that can negatively impact morale and foster hesitation during future operations. Subordinates who are imitating high risk or risk reckless leaders may commit errors in judgment from being overly fatigued or overwhelmed by the pace of the operations. Leaders should accept that allowing for an acceptable amount of risk in some situations will foster unit maturation and subordinate leader experience growth, while mitigating unnecessary risk will minimize the risk of injury and equipment damage.

The optimal solution to risk mitigation is striking a balance for each situation where a leader focuses on understanding the potential risks, as well as the implications of employing risk mitigation procedures on the outcome. Missions with high payoffs will require the shifting of risk management toward the high risk description, whereas, missions with low benefits will necessitate the more stringent risk management characteristics found on the risk averse area of the continuum.

Risk balanced leaders understand that unforeseen risks can harm mission performance, but also considers ways to accomplish tasks despite the threat of his mission being challenged by risk. Balanced risk leaders accept risk and by doing so expand their mission profile by allowing his organization to learn new methods for task completion.

Where are you as a leader on the spectrum of risk?

Colonel Eric Smith is a military faculty member (Army) at the U.S. Air Force Air War College, where he instructs in the Strategy and Leadership Department and Grand Strategy Program. COL Smith, also, teaches a military ethics elective entitled Command and Consience. He is an Air War College graduate, and his previous deployments include Operations Desert Shield/Storm (Gulf War) and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Leaders willing to take and accept risk have an advantage over risk adverse leaders. Risk is inherent in developing organizations and people. In our military today, it’s easy to rationalize risk avoidance and to “play it safe.” Our history, however, is filled with numerous examples of leaders who took calculated risks. Unfortunately, too often in today’s high-operational tempo environment when something goes wrong people are punished, many times those people assumed personal risk. Subordinate leaders see this and are discouraged from incorporating risk into the mission. In two previous articles published in the “Wright Stuff,” we examined why leaders avoid risk and we proposed a risk continuum that suggested risk has positive attributes and can actually assist in organizational and leader development. This article explores ways to encourage leaders to incorporate risk and offers three actions that leaders can take today to change how risk is viewed.

Rethinking risk. First, in order to change the mindset about risk we must rethink the way risk is viewed. Currently, there is a negative connotation of risk on the part of many military leaders. Risk is a four letter word and must be avoided at all costs…people get fired for taking risk that do not pay off. Instead, we need to view risk as something that will make people and organizations more effective and in our military allow us to save lives in the operational environment. Military service in and of itself is inherently risky and similarly risk is an essential and positive component of the mission. We will never change the negative view of risk until we stop negatively impacting leader’s careers when they take risk and something goes wrong.

Instead, we should learn from what went wrong as a result of the risk, learn and grow as an organization and continue to encourage risk taking in our leaders at all levels.

Finally, reward and recognize subordinate leaders who incorporate calculated risk into the mission. This will help foster a positive connotation of risk in organizations over time and organizations will prosper as a result.

General Patton used the term calculated risk. What did he mean by calculated risk? I believe he meant that calculated risk were risk taken as a result of a leader’s analysis. Leaders arrive at calculated risk through analysis that thoughtfully considers all aspects of the risk being undertaken. This risk analysis process allows leaders to visualize and anticipate the cost benefits of the risk being considered as well as the friction/danger points inherent with the risk being considered by the leader. Common sense and experience also play a key role in this leader’s analysis. In the end, calculated risk is risk undertaken that significantly benefits the organization and its effectiveness with leaders understanding that something unfortunate could occur as a result of the risk taken.

For example, if you were the leader of a military logistics organization would you choose not to do convoy live fire training because it was risky and people could get hurt…playing it safe or would you choose...
to take calculated risk and conduct this type of training?

Our recent history has shown in terms of this example that playing it safe resulted in people being killed and wounded in the operational environment unnecessarily and the larger organization leaders being “surprised” into taking calculated risk and doing this type of training. The lesson learned is leaders who are afraid to assume some risk in peacetime may get people killed in combat. In combat, risk often leads to initiative, without some risk, we may hand too much freedom of action over to our adversaries. When our adversaries gain freedom of action on the battlefield the result is often catastrophic to our organizations and the people in those organizations.

**Changing the perception.**

What else can a leader do to change the mindset on risk? There are three actions leaders should take today to change how risk is viewed. As a start, leaders can personally set the example in their organization by going out on a limb themselves and accepting some personal risk. An example of this might be: stepping up to the plate for a subordinate leader whom you believe in but that the leader’s boss has issues with.

A risk adverse leader would say, “It might cost me personally,” and would not take the personal risk by going to bat for the subordinate leader. Either choice sends a powerful message to those in the leader’s organization about risk taking. Stepping up for the subordinate leader sends a positive message in terms of risk to the leader’s organization and fosters organizational growth for the long haul. Failure to step up sends a negative message to the organization about risk and risk taking.

A second step is to underwrite mistakes and provide top cover for subordinates who do take calculated risks in their duties. Subordinates must know that reasoned risk is not only tolerated, but expected.

Finally, leaders can educate and train subordinates in their organizations and encourage calculated risk taking by allowing subordinates “inside the head” of the leader. By this I mean leaders can share with their subordinates verbally and visually how they go through their leader analysis process to arrive at taking calculated risk. This “getting inside” the leader’s head has powerful potential for educating subordinates on risk taking and organizational development as a whole.

**It’s up to you leaders, risk or no risk?**

In our profession can we really afford to “play it safe” and have the end result be our organizations failing in the operational environment and lives needlessly being lost because we “played it safe.”

As Frederick Wilcox once said, “Progress always involves risks. You can’t steal second base and keep your foot on first.”

Colonel James Lackey, is the chief of the Army Advisory Group and senior army advisor to commander, Air University in Montgomery, Alabama. He also teaches in the Leadership and Warfighting departments of Air War College. During Operation Iraqi Freedom he commanded 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery in the 3rd Infantry Division. His deployments include; Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Kosovo and OIF. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Management from the University of South Alabama and Masters degrees from Webster University and Air War College.
Leadership on the cheap: Avoiding risk at all cost

By Professor Gene Kamena
assisted by COL Eric Smith and COL James Lackey

Leadership is an up close and personal business and one that requires investment. Leaders invest in those they lead and often that investment requires personal risk. Observing our military today it is becoming increasingly challenging to find leaders willing to “lay it on the line” and take personal risks for their people and their organizations. Are we losing our way?

What does the absence of leaders willing to take personal risk bode for the future of our military and our nation?

Leaders who are more concerned with the personal consequences of making a decision than doing what is required paralyze an organization. These leaders often stall or even grind to a halt the decision-making process.

Worse yet, sometimes they simply wait until someone else makes the decision for them. Our people expect more from their leaders. Subordinates will forgive mistakes made by a leader who is engaged and trying to do the right thing, but they will not willingly follow a leader who is not vested in them or their organization...a leader who will not take a reasonable risk when justified.

At some point in their careers all leaders wrestle with - and hopefully come to terms with - the concept of personal risk. Effective leaders realize risk is integral to the business of leading. Leadership, particularly military leadership, entails taking care of people, making decisions, and making things happen. To be an effective leader, you must take on some degree of personal risk.

Categories of risk. I divide risk into three broad categories: physical, emotional, and professional risk. Physical risk is the easiest type of risk for military leaders to comprehend; it is what separates the military leader from a corporate manager. Even the most junior lieutenant realizes military service to the nation may involve physical risk.

Emotional risk occurs when a leader invests time, energy and emotion in people and mission. An emotional toll is exacted on a vested leader when subordinates, peers, or superiors fail or when a mission does not go as planned. It is, however, the last category of risk – professional risk, risk to career or professional standing — that is often avoided at all cost by many of today’s leaders.

The key to leadership. Too many leaders are uncomfortable risking their own personal standing for their people or their organization. They have yet to realize that true leadership is selfless leadership. This is not to say, leaders should not be concerned with career, promotions, reputation, or professional standing. The point is there are times when a leader must be willing to assume risk, even to one’s career.

Military leaders overly concerned with personal reputations, career progression, or professional standing are hollow; they shrink from hard decisions forcing others to bear the brunt of making the tough calls. Most of us have seen or even worked for people who do not like to make decisions or take on risk. Risk averse leaders generate a lot of frustration, but little else.

So what is the right amount of risk and when is the appropriate time to take risk? The answer is “it depends.”

It depends on the particular situation, the potential payoff and the confidence of the leader. Every leader must decide when professional risk is warranted, circumstances that come to mind include:

- Response to moral or legal divergence – if something is not right or just plain wrong a leader must act even if a superior is involved.
- To take care of people – leaders take risks to ensure the welfare of others.
- To make things better – sometimes risk is involved in trying a new approach or an “out of the box” solution to a challenge. If there is a chance to make things better for the organization or
your people risk is justified.

- To underwrite mistakes of subordinates – if a leader wants subordinates to work hard and show initiative, some mistakes must be underwritten. When there is success, a leader ensures subordinates receive the credit; consider it a load that will be paid back in good time with interest.

The return on investment (risk) for a leader often is trust and confidence gained from the people they lead. In other words, demonstrated risk by a leader usually results in demonstrated loyalty by followers. People will invest trust and confidence in a leader if they believe that leader will support them in times of need. The return on investment is exponential.

A few considerations. There are some considerations when exercising risk. Taking risk is not the same thing as gambling. Risk involves careful deliberation and understanding there is a reasonable likelihood for a positive outcome.

Gambling requires betting on an uncertain outcome, “beating the odds.” Taking risk need not be a reckless endeavor, nor should it be. Good leaders do not gamble where mission and subordinates are concerned.

Leaders are expected to take on reasonable risks based on the best information available at the time. To be effective, risk should be taken in a timely manner to affect a favorable outcome.

Unfortunately, some leaders will read this article and think to themselves that this subject does not apply to them. Therefore, if you are not sure if you are risk averse, I challenge you to reflect on your personal decision making process. If you consistently do any of the following you may be a risk averse leader:

- Your first consideration is how this decision will affect you personally and professionally.
- You tend to wait until someone else solves the problem for you.
- You wait for perfect information, in an attempt to reduce your professional risk.

So what kind of leader are you? Are you willing to take on professional risk, to invest in your people and the organization? Sometimes risk is required to support those you lead or to make a situation better.

When used wisely risk is powerful. The potential return on investment makes risk worth considering.

When was the last time you “laid it on the line” for someone? A little risk goes a long way.

Professor Gene C. Kamena currently teaches Leadership and Ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Ala. He is retired from the Army as a colonel of infantry. He holds a B.A. in History from Auburn University and a Masters Degree in Military Art and Science from CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He graduated from the Army War College in 1998 and Commanded the 2nd Brigade, 1AD. He also served as the chief of staff for the 1st Infantry Division, director of staff of U.S. Space Command and the deputy chief of staff for U.S. Northern Command, director for Iraqi Security Forces and formed and led an Iraqi special border commando brigade on the Syrian border. His operational deployments include: Desert Shield Desert Storm, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom.)
The human, spiritual, ethical dimensions of leadership in preparation for combat

By Dr. John W. Brinsfield and Chaplain (LTC) Peter A. Baktis
If I learned nothing else from the war, it taught me the falseness of the belief that wealth, material resources, and industrial genius are the real sources of a nation’s military power. These are but the stage setting... national strength lies only in the hearts and spirits of men.”

— Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall

In “The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor,” Andrew Abbot writes in the quest to re-examine and possibly redefine the Army profession, the key roles, skills, and knowledge required of military leaders are indispensable elements for analysis. No profession can compete with competent outsiders without defining itself, its special expertise requirements, and its solutions to the problems of transformation in perceived influence, power allocation, internal organization, and organization of knowledge to support its special claims to jurisdiction.

The historical mission and jurisdiction of the joint military services are to win the nation’s wars. Traditionally, all other missions were secondary to this national security responsibility. Yet, at the beginning of the 21st century, our conception of the U.S.’s security umbrella has been broadened to include domestic police, fire, and drug enforcement activities as well as international humanitarian and peacekeeping missions — to the detriment, some would say, of the Army’s main war-fighting role. In fact, the system of professions within which the Army competes is crowded with U.S. government entities such as the other military services, the State Department, Border Patrol, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau

Senior officers and enlisted advisors from United States Forces - Iraq join in prayer during the Easter Sunrise Service held on Camp Victory, Iraq, April 24. This is the last Easter service held on Victory, as U.S. forces are expected to draw down from Iraq by the end of the year. (Photo by SPC Paul A. Holston, U.S. Army)
of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and a growing cadre of commercial contractors performing battlefield tasks. Don M. Snider and Gale L. Watkins, authors of “The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need for Renewal and Redefinition,” state the nation’s formerly well-integrated system of professions addressing security has mushroomed, “without a commensurate expansion in the legal, cultural, or workplace mechanisms that legitimate each profession’s jurisdiction.” Mission creep and the post 11 Sept. 2001 ethos, combined with an erosion of the professional military culture by the commercialization of traditional military roles, have challenged the Army’s understanding of its role in the nation’s defense.

Moreover, in the quest to establish its professional boundaries, Richard A. Gabriel, author of, “To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier,” writes the Army has had to rely on a civilian leadership often having little or no experience in the military for its mission definition and resources, all the while competing with the lure of college and the job market for the hearts, minds and purses of the recruits who may become its future leaders. These challenges, among many others, seem to require a redefinition of the components of military professionalism and leadership for the future.

Soldiers are the Army’s heart, life force, and strength no matter what their mission may be. They determine the Army’s effectiveness, success, or possible failure. They must respond to the unique demands of the profession of arms: total commitment, unlimited liability, possible lengthy separations from family, community, and civilian primary support systems; and total loyalty to a values-based and service-based organization. In time of war, they may be asked to sacrifice themselves for the nation and for one another as guardians of the republic.

The new warrior ethos assigns many of the skills and responsibilities traditionally reserved for officers to enlisted Soldiers, challenging traditional roles and definitions in the profession of arms. Likewise, the advent of new technological tools of war threatens to ignore the human dimension. Any internal analysis and definition of the profession of arms must include, therefore, an inquiry into the Soldier’s human, spiritual, and ethical needs, lest, to paraphrase the words of GEN Robert E. Lee, they are asked for more than they could possibly be expected to give.

As part of such an effort, this chapter seeks to analyze the human and spiritual needs of Soldiers as part of the special knowledge required by Army leaders to motivate, train, and command their personnel and their units in peace and war. It also suggests some considerations for preparing Soldiers psychologically, spiritually, and ethically for future combat operations.

The working hypothesis is all Soldiers have human needs and most have spiritual needs broadly defined, and converting these needs into strengths of will and character is an important part of combat leadership — and thus of Army professionalism itself. This article is composed of three major parts: (1) definition and discussion of human and spiritual needs, including an analysis of the theory of needs as applied to Soldiers; (2) description of some of the past efforts to capitalize on human and spiritual needs so as to achieve confidence, cohesion, and courage; and (3) consideration of proposed combat training approaches as related to the human dimension of Soldiers serving in the Army. Because certain aspects of human nature cannot be directly observed, but must be inferred from observed behavior, the data for analysis rely on multidisciplinary sources, which include the humanities as well as the social sciences.

Assumptions. Since the subject matter of this analysis deals with the needs of the Soldier, a review of sources relating to the individual will be useful before we move to the level of the organization or profession. Much of the research data involve individual responses from Soldiers in small units rather than Army-wide studies. In taking this approach, we may assume first, military leaders do and will recognize their dual obligations to complete their missions successfully and take effective measures to ensure the health and welfare of as many personnel as possible within their commands. This is an ancient canon of the military art, as explained by Sun Tzu in “The Art of War,” in the early part of the fourth century B.C.

“And therefore the general who in advancing does not seek personal fame but whose only purpose is to protect the people and promote the best interests of his sovereign, is the precious jewel of the state. Because such a general regards his men as his own sons, they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons, and they will die with him. If he cherishes his men in this way, he will gain their utmost strength. The general must be the first in the toils and fatigues of the army.”

There are, of course, many other authoritative utterances regarding the commander’s duty to care for Soldiers, but few of such established antiquity. Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do, perhaps the most authoritative contemporary guidance, states simply, “Accomplish the mission and take care of your Soldiers.”

Our second assumption is a holistic knowledge of the human and spiritual needs of Soldiers, yet to be defined, will be of value to the military leader in providing support and resources for meeting these needs, thereby strengthening the capacity of the fighting force to complete its missions successfully. FM 22-100 states, “In war, Soldiers’ comfort, insofar as comfort is possible, affects morale and thus combat effectiveness.” The Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer embraces this concept in its brief declaration that, “all Soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership. I know my Soldiers, and I will always place their needs above my own.” Further, the new Soldier’s Creed implicitly states it is not solely the responsibility of officers and noncommissioned officers to be self-aware and adaptable, but rather all Soldiers will exemplify those traits.

GEN Creighton Abrams, former Army Chief of Staff, goes to the heart of the matter, “The Army is not made up of people; the Army is people. They have needs and interests and desires. They have spirit and will, strengths and abilities. They are the heart of our preparedness and this preparedness — as a nation and as an Army — depends upon the spirit of our Soldiers. It is the spirit which gives the Army life. Without it we cannot succeed.”

FM 22-100 also states, if leadership means gaining the willing obedience of subordinates who understand and believe in the mission’s purpose, who value their team and their place in it, who trust their leaders and have the will to see the mission through, then leaders must understand two key elements: leadership itself as well as the people they lead.

Religion, spirituality, and human and spiritual needs. Toward the end of his classic study of the psychology of Soldiers, “The Anatomy of Courage,” Lord Charles Moran turned to the subject of religion and
spiritual power, “I have said nothing of religion, though at no time has it been far from my thoughts. GEN Paget asked me once to talk to officers commanding divisions and corps and armies in the home forces. When I was done, they broke up and came to me, one or two at a time, questioning. Often that night I was asked about the importance of religion. Speaking as if they did not know how to put it, they separately told me how faith had come into the lives of many of their men.”

Moran also stated the following about religion, “Is it so strange? Is it not natural that they are fumbling for another way of living, less material, less sterile, than that which has brought them to this pass? What are they seeking?”

Lord Moran’s questions are well posed, for the separate disciplines of psychology and religion often look to separate sources of authority, separate methodologies, and different language to describe human behavior. Nevertheless, many psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and physicians recognize the phenomenology of religion as abstracted from any claims concerning its essence. In other words, religion may be studied and respected as an element of culture without subscription to its content.

W.I. Thomas, one of the leading sociologists of the past century, explained, “if a culture believes something to be real, we must respect that belief in dealing with that culture.” Recently the profession of arms has developed a growing interest in the pervasiveness of religious authority in traditional cultures and the necessity of understanding religion as a motivating force in many world communities.

Many Soldiers in the U.S. Army’s culture identify with a specific religious faith—299,958 or 64 percent of active duty Soldiers in April 2001 — but many are also reluctant to define too closely what they mean by religion, faith, and especially spirituality, according to data furnished by Chaplain Michael T. Bradfield, Department of the Army Office of the Chief of Chaplains. Even though spiritual strength is mentioned in many Army publications, for example, in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s “TLS Strategy: Change, Readiness, and the Human Dimension of Training, Leader Development and Soldiers,” as well as in the Department of the Army’s “Well-Being Campaign Plan.”

Part of the reason why Soldiers are reluctant to discuss religion openly is their perception that religion is a very personal subject. Two generations ago Professor Morris Janowitz found, “a tendency among leaders in a political democracy, and especially among the military, to resent being questioned about their religious background.” A strong adherence to a particular religious point of view can be perceived as politically divisive and detrimental to unit cohesion. More commonly, religious language itself is not well understood, for the same terms may have different meanings in different faith groups. Military leaders like to have a clear idea of what they are saying and supporting, as do most people.
At the same time, many educational institutions, including the U.S. Military Academy, have recognized a spiritual domain in their philosophies of comprehensive education. The Cadet Leader Development System, a strategy for total commissioned leader development at West Point, links the spiritual domain to a common quest for meaning in life, “This [spiritual] domain explicitly recognizes that character is rooted in the very essence of who we are as individuals, and discerning ‘who we are’ is a lifelong search for meaning. Cadet years are a time of yearning, a time to be hungry for personal meaning and to engage in a search for ultimate meaning in life.

Formally recognizing this fundamental aspect of human development is not unique to West Point; educators have long held that individual moral search is an inherent, even vital, component of any robust undergraduate education. In other words, cadets’ search for meaning is natural, it will occur, whether or not we explicitly recognize and support it as an institution or not.

For some, the quest for meaning will lead to questions of religion. For others, meaning is found through spirituality, a broader and possibly less distinct category than institutional religion.

Is there a useful lexicon for such terms as religion, spirituality, identity, ultimate meaning, and self-actualization in individual development?

Dr. Jeff Levin, Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Healthcare Research and a scholar of the relationship between religious faith and health tackles the problem of defining religion and spirituality as follows, “Historically, ‘religion’ has denoted three things: particular churches or organized religious institutions; a scholarly field of study; and the domain of life that deals with things of the spirit and matters of ‘ultimate concern.’ To talk of practicing religion or being religious refers to behaviors, attitudes, beliefs, experiences, and so on, that involve this domain of life.

This is so whether one takes part in organized activities of an established religious institution or one has an inner life of the spirit apart from organized religions.

“‘Spirituality,’ as the term traditionally has been used, refers to a state of being that is acquired through religious devotion, piety, and observance. Attaining spirituality—union or connection with God or the divine—is the ultimate goal of religion, and is a state not everyone reaches. According to this usage, spirituality is a subset of a larger phenomenon, religion, and by definition is sought through religious participation.”

Dr. Levin goes on to observe, however, that in the last 30 years the word ‘spirituality’ has taken on a wider meaning. ‘New Age’ authors and some news media have limited ‘religion’ to those behaviors and beliefs that occur in the context of organized religious institutions.

All other religious expression, particularly private meditation and secular transcendent experiences including feelings of awe in the presence of nature and oneness with it, are now encompassed by the term ‘spirituality.’

This wider definition reverses the relationship...
between religion and spirituality to make the former now the subset of the latter.

Many scholars of world religions agree that Levin’s wider definition of spirituality seems to fit the beliefs of many faith groups, even those with non-theistic views. Two separate books, one by Robert D. Baird and Alfred Bloom and the other by Houston Smith state that although the majority of the world’s religions do claim to be the vehicles for a personal experience with God, Allah, Brahman, or one of the other of the world’s named deities, there are others for whom spirituality is a non-theistic pilgrimage to individual enlightenment, wisdom, and transcendence.

For example, in Zen or Ch’an Buddhism, “the highest truth or first principle is inexpressible,” that is, the divine is so remote from human perception as to make its essence indescribable, thereby rendering an organized, doctrinal religion impossible; however, a mind-expanding, experiential awakening called “satori” is still available through meditation, mentoring by masters, and self-discipline.

Geoffrey Parrinder, author of “World Religions: From Ancient History to the Present,” writes in the Shinto religion of Japan, the perception of ‘kami’ may be simply the reverence one has for the awesome power and beauty of nature even though gifts are frequently left at Shinto shrines for the spirits that inhabit such places. The spiritual goal of reaching Nirvana is found in both theistic Hinduism and non-theistic Theravada Buddhism. Saeed Ahmed’s article, “Falun Gong: Peace of Mind,” tells how Falun Gong meditation which began in China in 1992 consists of spiritual exercises to promote health, cure illnesses, and allow the practitioner to absorb energy from the universe in order to ascend to a higher plane of human existence, but there are no named deities.

Thus, to summarize the period since the 1970s, the context of religious institutions and spiritual practices in America has become enormously more diverse. The number of separate religious denominations has grown in a 60-year span from about 45 in 1940 to more than 2,000 at present. These proliferations of religious and spiritual options suggest that Levin and others are correct to identify spirituality with the individual quest for greater insight, enlightenment, wisdom, meaning, and experience with the numinous or divine. Religion does refer in most current literature to the institutionalization of symbols, rites, practices, education, and other elements necessary to transmit the specifics of religious culture to the next generation.

However, there is no evidence that the world’s major religions are in decline. Indeed, as Samuel Huntington has argued, there is a worldwide revival of interest in traditional faiths, including Christianity in Russia, Buddhism in Japan, and Islam in Central Asia, faiths which offer meaning, stability, identity, assurance, and fixed points of reference in the face of the “clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order.” Moreover, traditional religious institutions but will certainly be directed toward meeting broader individual needs. In a current study conducted for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Dr. Charles Moskos found that 26 percent of his study group of 500 Soldiers stated being deployed had a positive effect on their religious feelings.

Theory of human needs applied to Soldiers. The psychological study of Soldiers is a relatively new academic endeavor. In the preface to his book, “The Anatomy of Courage,” Lord Moran, who had served as a medical officer in France and Flanders during World War I, explained,
behavioral theory that the theory of needs as applied to Soldiers found its most eloquent proponents.

Motivation and human behavior. The nature of the relationship between motivation and human behavior has been a subject of philosophical and psychological interest for centuries. Josh R. Gerow, author of “Psychology: an Introduction,” along with other authors have written there are multiple modern formulations which seek to explain motivation in general, including hedonistic, cognitive, drive reduction, and needs theories – to mention a few. In Psychology, Gardner Lindzey et al., state that for more than 40 years, a theory popular in U.S. Army literature was Dr. Abraham Maslow’s concept of ‘self-actualization’ as the driving force of human personality, as set forth in his 1954 book, “Motivation and Personality.” Gerow also writes Dr. Maslow was associated with the humanistic movement in psychology which emphasized the person and his or her psychological growth. Lindzey believes Maslow described ‘self-actualization’ as the need ‘to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming,’ or, in other words, to be all one can be.

Lindzey goes on to say, according to Maslow’s self-actualizing theory, the components of identity arise from two sources: the individual’s unique potential, and the different ways the individual copes with impediments placed in the way. Maslow identified human needs in three categories: 1) basic needs arranged in a hierarchy which included physical necessities, safety and security, and love and social belongingness, 2) esteem or recognition needs; and 3) metaneeds which included spiritual qualities such as order, unity, goodness and spirituality itself. Basic needs are deficiency needs, necessary for functional survival, and must be fulfilled before a person can turn attention to the metaneeds. Esteem or recognition and metaneeds are growth needs; if properly satisfied, a person will grow into a completely developed human being — physically, emotionally, and spiritually—and have the potential to become a self-actualized person.

Maslow recognized a spiritual component in the human personality, but argued it was a natural component which sought meaning in a cause outside oneself and bigger than oneself, something impersonal, not merely self-centered. Moreover, the spiritual need impelled persons toward vocations, callings, and missions which they described with passion, selfless, and profound feelings.

Maslow believed that such metaneeds are universal, but that usually only self-actualized people attempted to meet them. Maslow goes on to say, that the most highly developed persons we know are meta-motivated to a much higher degree, and are basic-need-motivated to a lesser degree than average or diminished people are. The full description of human nature must then include all intrinsic values.

These intrinsic values are instinctoid in nature, i.e., they are needed to avoid illness and to achieve fullest humanness or growth. The highest values, the spiritual life, the highest aspirations of mankind are therefore proper subjects for scientific study and research.

Finally, Maslow argued the spiritual aspirations of the human personality are a natural phenomenon, neither a theological construct nor limited to the domain of religious institutions. In his book, “Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences”, Maslow explained, “I want to demonstrate that spiritual values have naturalistic meaning, that they are not the exclusive possession of organized churches, that they do not need supernatural concepts to validate them, that they are well within the jurisdiction of a suitably enlarged science, and that, therefore, they are the general responsibility of all mankind.”

The Army leadership adopted Maslow’s theory of basic and metaneeds enthusiastically after 1970. This was because, in part, it correlated well with observable behavior among Soldiers and because it was in consonance with the compelling analogies that if missions have requirements and weapons have a basic load, then Soldiers must have human requirements and basic needs. In a collection of Bill Mauldin’s World War II cartoons titled “Up Front,” G.I. Willie in his torn and dirty fatigues tells a medic, “Just gimme a coupla aspirin, I already got a Purple Heart.” Willie’s basic needs, in Maslow’s terms, clearly claimed priority over his esteem or recognition needs.

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, is a standard text for thousands of the Army’s leaders, incorporates Maslow’s hierarchy of basic physical, safety, and social needs almost verbatim. The manual’s authors explained, “As a leader, you must understand these needs because they are powerful forces in motivating Soldiers. To understand and motivate people and to develop a cohesive, disciplined, well-trained unit, you must understand human nature.”

However, there were three divergences from Maslow’s theory in the 1983 leadership manual. First, rather than discuss the need for esteem or recognition, which is the fourth need in Maslow’s hierarchy, the leadership manual addressed ‘Higher Needs,’ i.e., the need for religion, the need for increased competence, and the need to serve a worthwhile cause. With regard to the need for religion, the manual’s writers explained historically, many people not normally religious become so in time of war.

The danger and chaos of war give rise to the human need to believe a greater spiritual being is guiding one’s fate for the best, regardless of whether one lives or dies. In this sense, it helps Soldiers to believe they are fighting for a cause that is moral and right in the eyes of their religion. According to FM 22-100, this is an important source of motivation for Soldiers all over the world.

Although the authors may have reflected their own beliefs accurately, Maslow argued spiritual needs are universal, not dependent upon crises in war except perhaps as one of many catalysts for revealing such needs and
not always leading to faith in a greater spiritual power so much as to a greater potential state of individual spirituality.

In more recent years, the Army has modified its language in describing the needs of Soldiers and their families. Part of this change was due to advances in medical and behavioral research, notably by the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences and by the Academy of Health Sciences at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, among others. Nevertheless, human needs as embodied in the Soldier are still represented in roughly the same hierarchy Maslow propounded. According to the Army Well-Being Strategic Plan of 2001, produced by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel defined Army, well-being is “the personal—physical, material, mental, and spiritual—state of Soldiers [Active, Reserve, Guard, retirees, veterans], civilians, and their families that contributes to their preparedness to perform the Army’s mission.” The spiritual state of wellbeing, according to the Army Well-Being Plan, “centers on a person’s religious/philosophical needs and but he does say further categories are open to scientific study.

Likewise, but from a different perspective, research in the relationship between spirituality and healing has increased dramatically in the past 10 years. The National Institute for Healthcare Research in Rockville, Maryland, has accumulated more than 200 studies from researchers at such prestigious institutions as Harvard, Duke, Yale, Michigan, Berkeley, Rutgers, and the University of Texas at Galveston religious. Levin and Maslow agreed, after 60 years of study between them, that while everyone has a range of needs, not everyone reaches an awareness of either innate or acquired spiritual needs even though Maslow believed that all human beings are potentially motivated by metaneeds to some degree.

What can be demonstrated, and what may be of most import for the Army leadership and Army professionalism, is the American culture, from which the military services draw support, puts a high premium

Chaplain (CPT) Dowun Suh, with the Special Troops Battalion, Task Force Resolute prays with the TF-Resolute primary security detail before they depart on mission at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, May 19. (Photo by SSG Alexander Burnett, U.S. Army)
on spirituality, organized religion, religious freedom, and the Constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, a right which both Congress and the federal courts have applied to military as well as to civilian communities. The “Journal of Family Psychology” reported in 1999 that in the U.S., many individuals report that religion and spirituality are integral parts of their lives. As many as 95 percent of American adults express a belief in God, 84 percent believe God can be reached through prayer, and 86 percent state religion is important or very important to them. Surveys also suggest religion may play a significant role in many marriages. Religiousness, as reflected by church affiliation or attendance, emerged as a correlate of higher marital satisfaction in early, classic studies on marital adjustment. In “Marriage and the Spiritual Realm: The Role of Proximal and Distal Religious Constructs in Marital Functioning,” Annette Mahoney et al., state more recently, greater religiousness has been tied to higher marital satisfaction and adjustment in large, nationally representative samples.

Mahoney also states the rate of attendance at religious services at least once a month among a national random sample of 1,000 families, as reported by the “Journal of Family Psychology,” was 37 percent, with 25 percent of the same sample reporting attendance at religious services weekly or more than once a week.

The data obtained by Bradfield also stated that among Soldiers in 2001, the rate of identification with one of the seven larger religious faith groups in the Army—Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu—was 64 percent, one percentage point higher than the national average. Although chapel attendance figures for Soldiers and family members of all faiths in the Army worldwide were not available, the U.S. Army Forces Command reported 10,563 field and chapel worship services conducted in FY 2000 for active duty Soldiers.

In addition, FORSCOM documented among chapel-supported functions 821 weddings, 611 funerals, 334 memorial services, 2,644 family skill/enhancement classes, and 1,304 separate suicide prevention classes which reached a total population of 89,979 Soldiers, retirees, and family members.

Dr. Bruce Bell, with the Army research Institute, stated in a volunteer Army with 65 percent of its active force of all ranks married and with 52,000 physically handicapped members included in their families, these services/classes were indispensable to Soldier welfare and readiness.

Since church attendance by the retiree population has not been separately tabulated, the estimated church attendance figures for active duty Soldiers and family members cannot be accurately determined. However, a 1995 survey conducted by the Army Personnel Survey Offices indicated that of 12,561 waiting spouses during lengthy separations due to deployments, 30.6 percent (3,844) reported use of worship programs and services provided by Army chaplains.

Although all relevant inputs have not been considered (e.g., religious activities in the reserve components), it seems reasonable to conclude the active duty Army population is a microcosm of American society and culture. The majority of citizens and Soldiers profess to be religious. Moreover, many more people have an interest in spirituality and religion than attend religious services, at least on a regular basis. James A. Martin, of the Army Research Institute states, during periods of prolonged stress to both individuals and families as exemplified by deployment to a combat zone, most Soldiers and spouses indicate that religion is an important support for their pre-deployment readiness, their morale, the well-being of their deploying units, the durability of their marriages, and the welfare of families back home.

“Leveraging the human dimension to build Soldier confidence, cohesion, and courage.

“You must speak to the soul in order to electrify the man,” stated Napoleon Bonaparte.

On June 15, 1941, GEN George C. Marshall addressed the faculty and students of Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, a college linked to the Episcopal Church, on the subject of morale in modern war, “I
know that this association with you here this morning is good for my soul. If I were back in my office I would not have referred to my soul. Instead I should have used the word ‘morale’ and said that this occasion increased my ‘morale’ — in other words was of spiritual benefit to me. One of the most interesting and important phenomena of the last war was the emergence of that French word from comparative obscurity to widespread usage in all the armies of the world.

“Today as we strive to create a great new defensive force, we are investing the word ‘morale’ with deeper and wider meaning,” Marshall went on to say. “Underlying all the effort back of this essentially material and industrial effort is the realization that the primary instrument of warfare is the fighting man. We think of food in terms of morale—of clothing, of shelter, of medical care, of amusement and recreation in terms of morale. We want all of these to be available in such quantity and quality that they will be sustaining factors when it comes to a consideration of the Soldier’s spirit. The Soldier’s heart, the Soldier’s spirit, the Soldier’s soul are everything. Unless the Soldier’s soul sustains him, he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end.”

GEN Marshall gave a good deal of his personal attention to supporting the Soldier’s morale, moral behavior, and spiritual strength, authorizing more than 550 cantonment chapels and 9,111 chaplains—one for every 1,200 Soldiers—to the Army and Army Air Corps.

However, he also recognized that the Soldier’s morale—or spirit—included much more and demanded much more than religious support alone. Morale is a disciplined state of mind which embraces confidence in the self and confidence in the unit. It encompasses courage, zeal, loyalty, hope, and at times grim determination to endure to the end. Morale, élan, esprit de corps, the will to fight, and the will to win are the human dimension’s most important intangible assets. John Keegan, author of “The Face of Battle,” along with FM 22-100 state, strong morale is an emotional bonding of purpose, common values, good leadership, shared hardship, and mutual respect.

“Sun Tzu: The Art of War,” states, of all of the factors which produce strong morale in a unit — of whatever size — leadership by example and unit cohesion are frequently mentioned first.

- Sun Tzu

Of all of the factors which produce strong morale in a unit — of whatever size — leadership by example and unit cohesion are frequently mentioned first.

Morale in extended combat. However, the morale of the Soldier and the esprit de corps of the unit may have a short shelf life in extended combat. Like courage, morale is an expendable commodity and needs replenishment and support to withstand prolonged combat stress. John Keegan reflected on the experiences of British and American doctors during World War II in his book, “The Face of Battle.” Keegan writes, of all British battle casualties during the active phase of the Battle of France in 1940, “10-to-15 percent were psychiatric, 10-to-20 percent during the first 10 days of the Normandy battle, and twenty percent during the two latter months, seven-to-10 percent in the Middle East in the middle of 1942, and eleven percent in the first two months of the Italian campaign.”

The official American report on combat exhaustion during the same period stated, “There is no such thing as ‘getting used to combat.’ Each moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the intensity and duration of their exposure [thus] psychiatric casualties are as inevitable as gunshot and shrapnel wounds in warfare. Most men were ineffective after 180 or even 140 days. The general consensus was that a man reached his peak of effectiveness in the first 90 days of combat, after that his efficiency began to fall off, and he became steadily less valuable thereafter until he was completely useless. Keegan also says the number of men on duty after 200 to 240 days of combat was small and their value to their units negligible.

Not only individuals but also whole units became ineffective as a result of fatigue, stress, high casualties, poor leadership, and a loss of hope. In the Tunisian campaign of 1942, veteran American combat troops joined newer recruits in ‘going to ground,’ ‘burning out,’ and breaking down. One 1944 report referenced by Gabriel, pointed out in the North African theater nearly all men in rifle battalions not otherwise disabled ultimately became psychiatric casualties even though some of them made it as far as Cassino and Anzio. John Brinsfield, in “Encouraging Faith, Supporting Soldiers: A History of the United States Army,” said other examples of whole units becoming combat ineffective may be gleaned from the experience of some German units on the Eastern Front, American units during the Korean War, and Iraqi units during the Gulf War.

What types of support did Soldiers find helpful in enduring and coping with the stresses of combat for as long as they did? John Keegan identifies four critical elements in British armies: (1) moral purpose—believing in the “rightness” of the war; (2) unit cohesion—formed in hard training, sports competitions, and rewards for being the “best”; (3) selfless leadership from first-line officers; and (4) spiritual or religious fortification before battle.


“You had to know that your whole generation was in this together, that no strings were being pulled for anybody,” Manchester wrote. “You also needed nationalism, the absolute conviction that the United States was the envy of all other nations. Today the ascent of Sugar Loaf [on Okinawa] takes a few minutes. In 1945, it took 10 days and cost 7,547 Marine casualties. And beneath my feet, where mud had been deeply veined with human blood, the healing mantle of turf, I murmured a prayer: God—take away
this murdering hate and give us thine own eternal love. And then, in one of those great thundering jolts in which a man’s real motives are revealed to him, I understood why I jumped hospital and, in violation of orders, returned to the front and almost certain death. It was an act of love. Those men on the line were my family, my home. They were closer to me than I can say, closer than any friends had been or ever would be. They had never let me down, and I couldn’t do it to them. I had to be with them, rather than let them die and me live in the knowledge that I might have saved them. Men, I now know, do not fight for flag or country, for the Marine Corps or glory or any other abstraction. They fight for one another.”

If morale is the human dimension’s most important tangible asset, cohesion must be the most important single asset for a unit. Jonathan Shay, author of “Trust: Touchstone for a Practical Military Ethos, in Spirit, Blood, and treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century,” states cohesion consists psychologically of recognition, stability, and safety. Yet the coping strategies Keegan and Manchester identified, which included maintaining cohesion, did not exist as separate elements. For Manchester, combat was a spiritual exercise, a willingness to sacrifice for a greater cause (moral purpose) but mostly for his fellow Marines (brotherhood). Moral purpose, selflessness, courage, and spiritual strength as prescribed by Keegan and Manchester all contributed holistically to unit cohesion and survivability.

American surveys of other World War II combat survivors tended to center on similar coping mechanisms and their relative order of importance for survival of the individual. Although the methodologies involved in these surveys may be questioned, the general conclusions that spiritual strength and ‘not letting others down’ were two of the most important motivations underlying endurance seem to be validated by other observers, not the least of whom were senior officers.

Samuel A. Stouffer et al., author of “The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath,” wrote in November 1945, the Research Branch in the Information and Education Division of the War Department queried a representative group of enlisted men who had returned from combat zones about their experiences in the U.S. Army during World War II. There were few aspects of their experience that elicited positive responses. Most of the Soldiers said they were ‘fed up’ with the Army. When asked how they coped in combat, however, many responded loyalty to one another and prayers for strength were important supports.

Stouffer goes on to say, in a survey of 1,433 enlisted infantrymen taken in Italy in April of 1945, 84 percent of the privates, and 88 percent of the noncommissioned officers said prayer helped them more ‘when the going got tough’ than unit cohesion, the cause they were fighting for, thoughts of finishing the job to get home again, or thoughts of hatred for the enemy. Among company grade infantry officers questioned in the European and Pacific theaters in the spring of 1944, approximately 60 percent said prayer helped them significantly in tough circumstances. Thus, in both Italy and in the Pacific, at different times, prayer as an aid to combat adjustment generally ranked higher among enlisted men than did the other personal coping mechanisms listed in the questionnaires.

Among very senior officers who expressed religious faith, prayer seemed to be important to remind themselves and their Soldiers of their dependence upon a ‘Higher Power,’ to help senior leaders make decisions calmly, and to help them bear the burdens of their immense responsibilities. LTG George Patton recognized the power of spiritual petition when he circulated 250,000 copies of a weather prayer, one for every Soldier in the Third Army, during his efforts to relieve Bastogne in December of 1944. President Dwight Eisenhower, in recalling his prayerful
decision to launch the Normandy invasion in 1944, reflected that, “prayer gives you the courage to make the decisions you must make in a crisis and then the confidence to leave the result to a Higher Power.”

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur told the cadets at West Point in his, “Duty, Honor, Country” address of May 1962, stated “The Soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training—sacrifice. In battle, and, in the face of danger and death, he discloses those divine attributes which his Maker gave when He created man in His own image.”

In World War II surveys of combat veterans, prayer was not of itself a sufficient indicator of religious faith; it may have been adopted as an instrument of psychological self-defense. There were no data that could prove a relationship specifically between prayer in battle and formal religion. However, Kellet writes, the experience of combat did seem to have an effect on spiritual attitudes, for 79 percent of combat veterans surveyed in both theaters believed that their Army experience had increased their faith in God.

As LTG A.A. Vandegrift, commandant of the United States Marine Corps, reflected on his experiences at Guadalcanal, he stated, “The percentage of men who devoted much time to religion might not make a very impressive showing. The average Marine, or Soldier, or sailor, is not demonstrative about his religion, any more than he is about his patriotism. But I do sincerely believe one thing; every man on Guadalcanal came to sense a ‘Power’ above himself. There was a reality there greater than any human force. It is literally true—there are no atheists in foxholes — religion is precious under fire.”

Morale versus religious views. Thus, from the commander’s point of view, the Soldier’s spirit, his or her morale, is not exactly coterminous with the Soldier’s personal views on, or experience with, religion. The fighting spirit of the Soldier may be motivated by any emotion, idea, or complex of ideas that will inspire the Soldier to accomplish the mission. These compelling drives may include personal confidence, competence, and pride in self, faith in leaders, unit bonding and cohesion, a belief in the moral necessity and rightness of the cause, a consonance between personal values and national purpose, and a belief that others are depending upon the Soldier for success. As the reality of danger increases, however, and as casualties pile up, religion seems to provide many Soldiers a strong buttress for the spirit and will to endure.

Historically, therefore, religious support for the Soldier’s spirit has been an important source of strength for many in coping with
difficult and dangerous situations, especially over prolonged periods of time. Religious services before battle and the presence of chaplains in the lines, at aid stations, and even in prisoner of war camps have helped thousands of Soldiers face the uncertainties of war.

For example, during Operation Desert Shield, from August through December 1990, 18,474 Soldiers from the XVIII Airborne Corps attended voluntary religious services. The U.S. Army Central Command sponsored 7,946 religious meetings with an attendance of 341,344 Soldiers. MG Barry McCaffrey remarked, “We had the most religious Army since the Army of Northern Virginia during the Civil War.” Moskos in his study on Operation Iraqi Freedom found that 33 percent of active component and more than 50 percent of reserve component Soldiers attended a religious service conducted by a chaplain.

At midnight on Jan. 17, 1991, GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf held a staff meeting with 30 generals and colonels in his war room in Riyadh to read his announcement of the beginning of combat operations. In his message Schwarzkopf reminded his staff of their purpose, their just cause, and his total confidence in them. He then asked his chaplain to offer a prayer. Moskos writes the chaplain reflected later that even though it was not discussed as such, the prayer for a quick and decisive victory with few casualties had a unifying, cohesive effect on the staff as they set about the business of war.

In the discussion of spiritual fitness for Soldiers in the Army’s Health Promotion Program, the term from DA Pamphlet 600-63-12, *Fit to Win: Spiritual Fitness,* is defined as “the development of those personal qualities needed to sustain a person in times of stress, hardship, and tragedy.” No matter how pluralistic the sources for spiritual fitness may be, in the estimation of many senior leaders the ability of the Soldier to draw on his or her own spiritual or philosophical resources in times of stress is an undeniable component of readiness.

GEN Gordon Sullivan, former chief of staff of the Army, noted a relationship between courage and the spiritual fitness of Soldiers in Field Manual 100-1, *The Army,* published in December 1991. “Courage is the ability to overcome fear and carry on with the mission. Courage makes it possible for Soldiers to fight and win. Courage, however, transcends the physical dimension. Moral and spiritual courage are equally important. There is an aspect of courage which comes from a deep spiritual faith which, when prevalent in an Army unit, can result in uncommon toughness and tenacity in combat.”

GEN John Hendrix, a veteran of Operation Desert Storm and former commanding general of U.S. Army Forces Command, stated at a Memorial Day prayer breakfast at Fort McPherson, Ga., May 22, 2001, “Spirituality is an individual matter. We must not cross the line between church and state. But in general spiritual fitness is important to any organization. Spiritual fitness helps shape and mold our character. Spiritual fitness provides each of us with the personal qualities which enable us to withstand difficulties and hardship. When properly exercised, spiritual fitness enhances individual pride in our unit.”

Training considerations: preparing Soldiers for future combat. FM 22-100 states there are two essential ingredients for success in combat — that is, for creating high morale, unit cohesion, bonding among Soldiers, increased personal courage, spiritual strength, and determination to succeed — are inspirational leadership and tough, realistic training. The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study states the combat training centers must “recapitalize, modernize, staff, and resource to provide multi-echelon, combined arms operational and leader development experience in all types of environments, across the full
Battlefield visualization and Soldier skills. Army literature on battlefields of the future is complex and copious. For several years at the U.S. Army War College and at the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, among other institutions, numerous subject-matter experts prepared briefings, training models, and articles on the Army ‘After Next,’ on the digitized battlefield, and on Army transformation into a true 21st century fighting force. The purpose of these studies was to prepare the military for future wars and to tailor the reduced forces available to meet changing, possibly asymmetric, threats with a multi-dimensional national military strategy.

As a former deputy commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, LTG John Miller, had a specific vision of what future battlefields would look like.

“Battle-space—the use of the entire battlefield and the space around it to apply combat power to overwhelm the enemy—includes not only the physical volume of breadth, depth, and height, but also the operational dimensions of time, tempo, depth, and synchronization,” Miller stated. “Commanders must integrate other service, nation, and agency assets with their own to apply their effects toward a common purpose. The digitized battle staff—a deputy commander and three planning and operations teams—is one concept to help the commander handle the current battle, the future battle, and sequels to the future battle with an information exchange system that produces virtual collocation between staff and external elements. Emerging technology includes interactive graphics, enemy and friendly force tracking, scalable map displays, three-dimensional terrain visualization, course-of-action analysis, and video-teleconferencing capabilities among other assets.”

At the operational and tactical levels, this means Soldiers will have to be proficient not only with their weapon systems, but also with emerging technologies which would function in all shades of weather, terrain, and illumination. Moreover, dispersal of units, to prevent detection by an enemy with over-the-horizon targeting capabilities, will produce a force with mobile combat power and logistical support as opposed to the iron mountains of stockpiled equipment familiar on Vietnam-era firebases or on forward-deployed Desert Storm logistical bases.

The specific geography for future engagements is, of course, speculative. In the 20th century American Soldiers have fought in foreign areas on snow-bound tundra and sandy beaches, and in forests, mountains, deserts, jungles, and urban areas. For the future, all of these settings must be considered along with the special problems of homeland defense amidst one’s own citizens.

Responding to current after action reviews of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as at the post-11 Sept. ethos, the Department of Defense and the Army in particular have reevaluated their doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities with a view toward accelerating the transformation to a new Army. This transformation is rooted in an understanding that the contemporary operational environment is not static and predictable, but in fact fluid, unpredictable, nonlinear and asymmetrical. We are an Army at war, and the very culture must change. “We must be prepared to question everything. Development of a culture of innovation will not be advanced by panels or studies. Cultural change begins with behavior and the leaders who shape it. We have the mindset and culture that will sustain the Army as ready and relevant, now and into the future,” BG David A. Fastabend wrote in “Army Magazine.”

What, then, are the special skills Soldiers of the future must possess? In the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s strategy for dealing with change, readiness, and the human dimension, some of these qualities are described. First, the leveraging of the human dimension is all about leading change with quality people, grounded on Army values, and inspired by an American warrior ethos. Adaptive leadership remains an essential aspect. Quality people will need to have the character and interpersonal skills to rapidly integrate individuals and groups of individuals into tailored organizations. They will need to adapt quickly to new situations, and form cohesive teams, and demonstrate competence and confidence operating in complex and ambiguous environments.

In short, the Army will need not just Soldiers but Soldier-leaders who are committed to the professional ethic, who are talented in small-group facilitation, who are flexible and mentally agile, and who can integrate technological and interpersonal skills in the midst of uncertain and possibly chaotic combat conditions. The metacompentencies of self-awareness and adaptability are being channeled to change the Army culture into what has been coined a “Culture of Innovation.” As GEN Kevin Byrnes wrote, “We need to create a culture of thinkers and innovators who look at a challenge and input a set of ways of doing it, not just apply band-aids and bailing wire to fix old ways of doing business. If something needs to be changed and it makes sense to me, let’s figure out the best way to do it.”

GEN George Casey in his opening statement to the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee stated, “The Army’s training programs have also been, and will continue to be, the cultural drivers for the future. Leaders will not learn what to think, but instead how to think — jointly, strategically and within the context of an expeditionary mindset.” This paradigm shift is major in the transformation of how and what the Army will train. It influences not only the officer education system but also basic combat training and all NCO Schools. In consonance with the lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, every Soldier must know how to make decisions independently, if necessary, to accomplish the mission.

Clearly, then, with the current rate of deployments and missions, the Army’s recruiting and leadership challenges are daunting. We no longer have the leisure to complete complex and lengthy training before units find themselves engaged in combat operations. In the long history of the Army, however, this has often been the case.

The Millennials: what Soldiers for the future? Drawing upon approximately 210 national surveys, interviews, and studies of American young people, Neil Howe and William Strauss have formed a description of a group they call, ‘Millennials.’ These are American young people born in 1982 or later; in other words, they were 18 or younger in the year 2000. Some of the characteristics of these young people will be of interest to Army recruiters.

Neil Howe and William Strauss, authors of “Millennials Rising: The Next Great
Generation,” write that first, they are a large group of approximately 76 million, with 90 percent native born and about 10 percent who immigrated to the United States. By the year 2002 they will outnumber the surviving Baby Boomers. They are the most diverse group ethnically in American history, with 36 percent nonwhite or Latinos in the 1999 youth population. At least one Millennial in five has one immigrant parent, making the Millennials potentially the largest second-generation immigrant group in U.S. history. As the authors point out, their presence will contribute to the irreversible diversification of America.

For many Millennials there is no separation of church and state in their primary education. Two million attend Catholic elementary schools and another two million attend Catholic high schools. Nine in 10 private schools in the United States by 2000 had at least a nominal religious affiliation, many with their own mandatory chapel programs. Within the public schools there were no prayer clubs or circles in 1990; now, with the 1995 Federal court ruling that students had a right to organized prayer gatherings as long as they were not official school programs, there are more than 10,000 of them.

Howe and Strauss also state that among the Millennials who are over 14, some 65 percent plan on attending college, while 55 percent go to church regularly as opposed to 45 percent of Americans as a whole. The ones in high school are bright. They have scored well in science and reading as compared with students from other industrialized countries.

Significantly, the war in Kosovo is the only U.S. military action most Millennials remember. The oldest young people in this sample were only eight to nine years old during the Gulf War, and a report that aired on Channel 3 Television News in Atlanta, Ga. said the events surrounding the subsequent Oklahoma City Federal building bombing and the Columbine school shootings made greater impressions.

Other sources, outside the studies surveyed by Howe and Strauss, paint a somewhat different picture. The State School Superintendent’s Office for the state of Georgia reported on May 5, 2001 that of the 116,000 high school freshmen who were enrolled in 1997, only 72,000 graduated in June of 2000. This reflected a high school dropout rate of 38 percent. The Atlanta Journal Constitution reported 47 percent of Georgia’s high school seniors who graduated in the class of 1999 were unable to keep their scholarships as college sophomores because they could not maintain a B average. Finally, a 2001 United Way report, stated there were 230,000 troubled children under some form of care in the state of Georgia — all Millennials under the age of 18. If one assumes that Georgia, with half of its eight million people living in Atlanta, is not too different from many other states, one suspects that the rosy reports by Howe and Strauss were based on the most privileged of the Millennials.

One trait that has not been questioned, however, is the growing interest among older young adults in discovering their own interests, vocations, and, in some cases, spiritual insights. Many college students and young business people want to be part of an organization or movement which transcends the ordinary.

The Campus Crusade for Christ, for example, has experienced an amazing growth in the past five years among college students looking for meaning in their lives. Campus Crusade has 1,000 college chapters—including one at Harvard—comprising a total of roughly 40,000 students. Donations to Campus Crusade, as reported by the Chronicle of Higher Education, exceeded $450 million.
in the year 2000. “They’re bombarded and blasted with all kinds of atheistic teaching from the classroom and they need help,” according to William Bright, the lay founder of the movement.

In his recent book, “Capturing the Heart of Leadership,” Professor Gilbert Fairholm of Hampden-Sydney College describes a similar kind of restlessness among young workers. “Whatever we like it or not, work is becoming or has become a prime source of values in our society and our personal lives. American workers are uncomfortable, uncommitted, and adrift. They are searching for new organizational patterns and new paradigms. Integrating the many components of one’s work and personal life into a comprehensive system for managing the workplace defines the holistic or spiritual approach. It provides the platform for leadership that recognizes this spiritual element in people and in all of their behavior.”

Fairholm argues that young people expect leadership to be a relationship, not just a skill or personal attribute. Leaders are leaders only so far as they develop relationships with their followers, relationships that help all concerned to achieve their spiritual as well as economic and social fulfillment. This concept is not far from the Army’s definition of the transformational leadership style and may be a constructive bridge in thinking about what “leadership” might mean to the next generation of American Soldiers.

Implications for combat training. “War, the most dramatically physical of all human works, does indeed become the vehicle for the most spiritual of achievements. And the morale springing from such philosophy may be counted on to win the wars.” – William E. Hocking

Two events that occurred during Operation Iraqi Freedom provide important implications for training in combat. They underscore the belief that the metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability should be fully integrated not only with the warrior ethos, but also at all levels of leadership training.

After two days of heavy combat operations on the outskirts of Najaf, the Division Commander of the 101st, then MG David Petraeus, told his staff, “It is time to stop dipping around the edges and jump in the pool. Tomorrow the 2-327th Battalion and its sister units will push deeper into the city and possibly determine once and for all who owns it.”

On April 3, 2003 the Soldiers of the 2-237 Infantry moved into the city, the home of one of Iraq’s leading holy men, the Grand Ayatollah Ali Hussein Sistani, in order to gain his crucial support for their mission in An Najaf. Turning the corner, a group of men blocked their way shouting in Arabic, “God is Great.” The crowd grew into the hundreds, many of whom mistakenly thought the Americans were trying to capture the Grand Ayatollah and attack the Imam Ali Mosque, a holy site revered by Shiite Muslims around the world. Someone in the crowd lobbed a rock at the troops, then another. LTC Christopher Hughes, the battalion commander, was hit on the head, chest and the rim of his sunglasses with rocks.

Hughes subscribed to the philosophy of Sun Tzu, “A great commander is one who does not wield a weapon.” It followed that the best way to defuse the impending confrontation was to demonstrate peaceful intent. Hughes ordered his troops to, “Take a knee and point your weapons to the ground, smile, and show no hostilities.” Some of the Iraqis then backed off and sat down, which enabled Hughes to look for the troublemakers in the crowd. He identified eight. Wanting it to be clear who started the shooting if it erupted, he told his Soldiers, “We’re going to withdraw out of this situation and let them defuse it themselves.”

Hughes had trained his troops previously in understanding cultural differences and in the meaning and value of restraint. With his own rifle pointed toward the ground, he bowed to the crowd and turned away. Hughes and his infantry marched back to their compound in silence. When tempers had calmed, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa (decree) calling on the people of Najaf to welcome Hughes’s Soldiers.

The second event occurred on August 20, 2003 when LTC Allen B. West, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 20th Field Artillery Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, took a prisoner out of the detention center near the Taji air base and threatened to kill him. The prisoner was an Iraqi policeman who, according to informants, was involved in the attack of 16 August at Saba al Boor near Tikrit.

West commented in an email interview with the Washington Times that he had, “asked for Soldiers to accompany him and told them we had to gather information and that it could get ugly,” for some Soldiers had already assaulted the prisoner. After other interrogation techniques failed to secure the prisoner’s cooperation, West brandished his pistol. “I did use my 9 mm weapon to threaten him and fired it twice. Once I fired it into the weapons clearing barrel outside the facility alone, and the next time I did it with his head close to the barrel. I fired away from him. I stood between the pistol and his person. I admit that what I did was not right, but it was done with the concern of the safety of my Soldiers and myself.” After the shots were fired, the Iraqi policeman provided the information West wanted on a planned ambush near Saba. The Army, however, subsequently charged West with criminal assault for improper coercion of a prisoner.

Both commanders had the well being of their Soldiers as a paramount concern. However, their actions were different. Hughes stated in his interview, “That but for the psychological operations and civil affairs personnel, the chaplain and the translators who taught me the cultural and religious implications; I would not have been as successful.” Facing a different but no less difficult problem, West was equally successful, but according to a story in the Washington Times, his coercive methods ended his career.

In war and in combat the metacompetencies of self-awareness and adaptability are critical. The Army Training and Leadership Development Panel Officer Study define these metacompetencies in the following manner, “Self-awareness is the ability to understand how to assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses in the operational environment, and learn how to correct those weaknesses. Adaptability is the ability to recognize changes to the environment; assess that environment to determine what is new and what must be learned to be effective, all to standard and with feedback.” It is important to note there is no warrant for doing anything that is illegal.
or morally or ethically unsound in either FM 22-100 or in the ATLDP Officer Study.

**Preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom.** During the preparation for OIF there were many chaplains involved in both the ethical and spiritual training of units. Twenty of the Army’s training centers had chaplain instructors who were charged explicitly not to preach in the classroom, but to discuss professional values, ethics, and leadership.

In field units, chaplains focused on “spiritual fitness training, or battle proofing,” a command program to address, among other topics, the full spectrum of moral concerns involving the profession of arms, the conduct of war, and personal spiritual care. Chaplains were their commanders’ staff officers of choice to be responsible for conducting these programs.

Spiritual fitness training by chaplains is part of unit preparation for deployment to combat zones. The chaplains could answer questions about morals and morale, they had connections to family support systems back home, they enjoyed legal confidentiality so Soldiers could report to them suspected violations of the law of war without fear of retribution, and they could address the Soldier’s personal spiritual needs and ethical questions. Although not all chaplains were fully trained in the ethics of war, they helped religious Soldiers find the bridge between their spiritual and professional values in a way no other staff officer could be expected to do.

The question that must be asked regarding our innovative Army is how to develop leaders who know how to think, who have internalized the Army values and the warrior ethos, and who are flexible, adaptive, confident, competent and self-aware. This task is an ambitious one, for it requires leaders who can control their emotions and be able to analyze situations on the fly in order to make the right decision at the right time.

The focal shift in the Army’s leadership development with all the complexities of the post-Sept. 11 environment will continue to be a challenge. The implication of confronting enemies whose numbers include stateless terrorists with preemptive strikes and covert operations may tempt leaders, and therefore their subordinates, to disregard the Law of Land Warfare and the Geneva Conventions as outdated and irrelevant.

A philosophy of ends justifying means can become the modus operandi for cruel and unusual interrogation techniques, not to mention questionable strategic operations and plans. However, if Soldiers truly embrace and live the current Army Values and the Warrior Ethos, they will be fully equipped with the moral and the ethical decision matrices that will prevent them from succumbing to bestial acts of war. Leaders of all ranks must remember their actions reflect not only upon them, but also upon the nation they have sworn to defend.

The American people are eager to praise principled leaders, but will not tolerate military actions that violate their own values. The challenge we face in the Army is to find the means to help Soldiers make the right moral and ethical decisions in the presence of their enemies even when they are isolated from fellow Soldiers.

**Soldiers’ human and spiritual needs.**

All Soldiers have human needs and most have spiritual needs broadly defined, seems to be supported from a wide variety of sources in a number of fields. As Karl von Clausewitz tellingly observed in his treatise “On War,” “All effects in the sphere of mind and spirit have been proven by experience: they recur constantly and must receive their due as objective factors. What value would any theory of war have that ignored them.”

There also seems no question whether the Army profession should continue to try to address these needs in the future as part of its leadership doctrine. Indeed, the unique aspects of the profession of arms in requiring the total commitment and unlimited liability of Soldiers deployed often in difficult
and dangerous situations would seem to mandate such care and concern. Moreover, the Constitution, Congress, and the American people expect and demand it.

A corollary question is to what extent the profession of arms should try to meet the spiritual needs of a military population becoming ever more ethnically, morally, and religiously diverse. At the present time, the Army seems to have struck an appropriate balance between facilitating the free exercise of religion and in protecting the freedom of individual conscience for Soldiers and their family members. Most religious services and ceremonies are voluntary. The Army Chaplain Corps, in implementing commanders’ religious support programs, currently represents more than 140 different denominations and faith groups in its own ranks. There is no prospect the Army will institutionalize a single religion, nor should it. There is a concern, however, as a shortage of young ordained clergy grows in both the Roman Catholic and Protestant communities nationally, that there will be a corresponding shortage of chaplains for the Army. Part of a solution could lie in the way the Millennial generation chooses to respond to its own spiritual challenges in the 21st century.

The preparation of Soldiers for future combat seems to involve more knowledge, more technological skill, and perhaps more maturity on the part of junior leaders than has been the case in the past. Yet the basic principles involved in building relationships, unit cohesion, confidence, and courage have not changed very much over the years and will likely not change markedly in the near future.

There are valid, practical considerations for commanders, staff officers, senior noncommissioned officers, chaplains, surgeons, psychiatrists, and other leaders in preparing Soldiers for combat. Some of the more important of these, based on historical experience and analysis, may be summed up as follows: Soldiers need to have time to get their personal affairs in order. This may include time for family, and legal as well as physical, mental, and spiritual preparation.

Soldiers and family members need to have the most accurate and most current information possible on what they may expect. The importance, necessity, and moral justification of the mission are essential elements of information for the Soldiers, their families, and communities if the unqualified support of all affected parties is to be forthcoming.

Soldiers must be briefed on the cultures they will encounter in the area of operations and be thoroughly familiar with Army values, the Rules of Engagement, the Law of Land Warfare, and the Geneva Conventions.

Commanders and other leaders need to spend some personal time with Soldiers in their primary units to reinforce relationships, cohesion, confidence, and courage. Soldiers must know the commander’s intent and their specific jobs to include how they fit into the total effort of the unit.

Soldiers must be challenged by tough, realistic training and have confidence in their leaders, training, equipment, battle plans, teamwork, and ultimate chance for success. They must know and trust one another.

Rituals before deployment and before battle based on unit history, esprit de corps, and spiritual preparation are important. These should include voluntary opportunities for religious sacraments, services, or meditation. Soldiers need to know that their commanders, senior NCOs, chaplains, and other key personnel are present at every stage during combat operations. The Soldiers’ morale is strengthened if the total team is demonstrably present and involved.

One caveat. Hocking said, War is not a thing which can be seen; it must be thought. No one has ever seen war in all of its dimensions—physical, moral, and spiritual—because each participant sees the event from his or her own narrow, partial perspective.

In the distant future, war and the professional skills needed to survive and prevail may be very different with the advent of robotics, information warfare, and even space technologies. Therefore the combat training strategies developed for the first decades of the 21st century may be of short duration, but they will also surely be important for their insights and wisdom in the evolution of future training doctrine and for appreciating the human dimension in Army professionalism.

Chaplain (LTC) Peter Baktis serves as the deputy command chaplain, U.S. Army, Europe, Seventh Army in Heidelberg, Germany. He has published more than 17 articles and book reviews in theological journals worldwide.

Dr. John Wesley Brinsfield, served as the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps historian at the U.S. Army Chaplain School, Fort Jackson, S.C. from 1969 to 2002. He also served as a chaplain in the Army, retiring with the rank of colonel.

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CPT Edwin Churchill calls for indirect fire following an enemy attack on his company’s position near the Pakistan border in Afghanistan, May 18, 2011. (Photo by Karen Parmish, Department of Defense)