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Very respectfully,

s/ H. P. McCain
The Adjutant General.

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COLONEL BRECKINRIDGE A. DAY
Editor

TIMES ARE CHANGING

The objects of the Association shall be the promotion of the efficiency of the Field Artillery by maintaining its best traditions; the publishing of a Journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information as to the field artillery's progress, development and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms, a common understanding of the powers and limitations of each; to foster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and of hearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between the regular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects are worthy and contribute to the good of our country.

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- Cover: A 105mm howitzer M-7 changes position on a snow-covered highway in Belgium.
- Frontispiece: "D of the 5th's" special guidon.

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From Morocco to Berlin

An Armored Artillery Battalion in Action

By Lt. Col. Hugh M. Exton, FA

Part I

INTRODUCTION

The guttural tones of the German voice rent the dark, "Was ist das?" Suddenly the night was lit by the flashes of machine guns, rifles, pistols, and "burp guns." Soon the "wham" of 105mm howitzers was heard, followed by the noise of exploding ammunition and the crackle of burning vehicles. Shells from German 75mm tank guns crashed through the trees. Screams of wounded men mixed with shouted orders of excited officers.

It was 0200, 30 July 1944, and the last gasp of the German forces, trapped to the north by the rapid advance of Combat Command B of the 2nd Armored Division, was about to end in disaster. A column of tanks and infantry of the German 2d SS "Das Reich" Panzer Division, in attempting to escape the trap, had run into the position of the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion of the 2d Armored Division. By daylight this German force had been destroyed, the St. Lo breakthrough was complete, and units of the Third Army began to surge forward toward Brittany and the east.

This was one of the highlights of the wartime tour of the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion which had begun on the coast of North Africa on 8 November, 1942, and which ended when it marched into Berlin in July 1945 as part of the United States contingent of the first Allied occupation forces in the German capital.

This article will review some of the experiences of this artillery battalion and, in so doing, attempt to illustrate the employment of armored artillery. However, before we start this saga, let us examine the characteristics of armored artillery and compare it with infantry division artillery.

ARMORED ARTILLERY

1. General characteristics. — a. Armored artillery is essentially what the name implies. Except for cargo trucks and the ever-present jeeps, the vehicles of the armored artillery battalion are either the self-propelled 105mm howitzers or the armored halftracks and personnel carriers. Practically every vehicle has mounted on it a machine gun, either .50 or .30 caliber. Hence, one of the first characteristics which stands out is the heavy fire power.

b. Because of the armor on the howitzer carriages and other vehicles, another obvious characteristic is protection of personnel from enemy small-arms fire and shell fragments.

c. The fact that the howitzers are self-propelled gives armored artillery one of its outstanding characteristics—mobility. This mobility is demonstrated in the rapidity with which positions can be occupied, in the quick movements to meet deflection shifts beyond the range of the traversing mechanism, in the ease of debarking from landing craft in amphibious assaults, in the continuous support which can be rendered to fast-moving units, and in the ability to meet, with direct fire, attacks of enemy tanks. It is admitted that, at times, this mobility may be limited, owing to the heavy weight and large fuel consumption of the howitzer carriages.

d. A final characteristic is flexibility. This is due, to a certain extent, to the fact that the howitzers are self-propelled, but principally it is due to the fact that the greatest amount of communication within the armored artillery battalion is by radio. This facilitates the movement of forward observers, facilitates changes in missions or orders, and reduces the work required to maintain the communications.

2. Employment. — a. Because armored division operations are generally deployed and rapid in nature, armored artillery battalions march well forward in the advancing columns and occupy positions very close to the line of contact with the enemy. In the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, Major General Ernest N. Harmon, commanding the 1st Armored Division, ordered his artillery battalions to occupy positions 500 yards from the front line. This was to take advantage of the range of the weapons to ensure continuous full support to the advancing combat commands during the critical breakthrough stage. This is not unusual but is typical of armored artillery operations.

b. The employment of armored artillery batteries well forward requires them to be prepared for sudden close engagements with the enemy in every position. Consequently, these positions are organized for all-around defense in such a fashion that the fire of the howitzers and of the machine guns on the halftracks can be used to meet an enemy attack from any direction.

c. The fluid nature of armored operations necessitates the use of a large number of forward observers. It is not uncommon for one armored artillery battalion to have out as many as 12 observers with different units. These observers, whether mounted in tanks, jeeps, or halftracks, usually will have one radio receiver on the supported unit commander's channel and the other receiver on one of the artillery fire-direction channels. In this way an observer can easily talk to the supported unit commander and to the battalion fire-direction center. In some armored divisions a common radio channel was installed in every radio set in the division. One set at each artillery battalion fire-direction center continuously monitored this channel. This arrangement permitted anyone in the division with a radio to call for artillery fire regardless of whether or not an artillery observer was present.

3. Comparison with infantry division artillery.—a. During the war, one of the greatest differences between armored artillery and infantry division artillery was in the fact that the armored artillery battery had six howitzers, whereas the battery in the infantry division had only four. These six howitzers generally...
occupied positions in hexagonal or circular formations about 150 yards in diameter. This greatly facilitated firing for effect as there was no need of changing ranges in order to cover a zone. The observer would make his adjustment depending on which numbered piece was firing. The spread of the battery, together with the normal dispersion, would effectively cover a target over 200 yards in depth. A battalion fire for effect would effectively cover a target 300 yards in depth. This was a considerable advantage over the four-gun battery, which normally has to change ranges during fire for effect to properly cover a target of any depth. The latest reorganization of the infantry division now places six howitzers in each artillery battery, so that this difference is no longer present.

b. The next difference results from the fact that the howitzers in armored artillery are self-propelled, whereas those in the infantry division artillery are still towed. There has been much discussion concerning towed versus self-propelled artillery. The author firmly believes that self-propelled artillery has a great advantage in mobility. This results in more ease in moving crosscountry or in rough terrain, more speed in occupying and displacing from positions, and better ability to meet enemy tank attacks. There is a further advantage in the armor protection afforded the crew of the self-propelled howitzer.

c. A final difference lies in the communication facilities of the two types of artillery. Communication in infantry division artillery is primarily by wire. It is true that wire communication is possibly more dependable than radio and affords more security. However, radio communication provides for greater flexibility, an advantage considered to outweigh those given for wire communication.

**EARLY DAYS**

In the summer of 1940 the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions were formed, the 1st at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the 2d at Fort Benning, Georgia. The nuclei of these divisions came from the 7th Cavalry Brigade Mechanized and the several infantry tank battalions stationed at Fort Benning and at other posts. The 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, inactive since World War I, was reactivated as part of the 2d Armored Division with personnel from the armored field artillery of the 7th Cavalry Brigade.

Under the initial tutelage of Major General Charles L. Scott, and then under the late General George S. Patton, the 2d Armored Division roamed the hills and woods of Tennessee, Louisiana, Georgia, and the Carolinas during maneuvers and gradually developed into an effective fighting machine. In addition to its fighting ability, General Patton instilled into the division an *esprit de corps* second to none. This spirit was to last throughout the war and was one of the primary reasons for the outstanding combat record of the division.

Then came 7 December 1941. Immediately the rumors began to fly. The division was to leave immediately for this place. Then it was somewhere else. In early 1942 the division became part of II Corps and it looked as though it was to participate in an operation very shortly. It was not known by the rank and file at the time, but the operation in which the division was slated to participate was operation SLEDGEHAMMER, an assault landing on the French Coast, later cancelled. In late spring, the rumors were to the effect that the division was going to Africa. However, in spite of these rumors, the division left for maneuvers in the Carolinas in early July. It was definitely known that something was going to happen before long, as the division was ordered to Fort Bragg for permanent change of station upon completion of maneuvers. Even the maneuvers didn't start without an alert. Immediately after his unit had closed in the area, the battalion commander of the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion reported to the combat-command command post for orders. While he was there word came down from division headquarters not to do anything in preparation for the maneuvers as the division would probably move without delay to Fort Bragg to prepare to go overseas. However, this alert was short-lived and the division went through the maneuvers, assembling at Fort Bragg upon their completion in middle August.

It then became apparent that this time the rumors had real foundation. Three landing teams were formed, each consisting of a light tank battalion, an infantry company, an artillery battery, and detachments of other supporting arms and services. The 78th was selected as the unit to furnish the batteries for these landing teams. Landing exercises were held in the vicinity of Virginia Beach, Virginia, and officers were sent to naval gunfire schools and to observe the firing of naval guns on land targets in the Chesapeake Bay.

The location and time of the impending operation was unknown to the artillerymen until, in late September, the battalion commander was notified that he was to be artillery officer for a task force commanded by General Harmon, the 2d Armored Division Commander, which was to land on the coast of North Africa at Safi, French Morocco, on 8 November. Then the entire picture of Operation TORCH was learned. The Western Task Force, commanded by General Patton, was to land at three points, Safi, Fedahla, and Port Lyautey. A sub-task force, consisting of units of the 3rd or 9th Infantry Divisions and one of the 2d Armored Division landing teams, was to land at each of these points.

On 16 October the three landing teams combat-loaded their ships at Newport News and sailed up the Chesapeake Bay for final landing exercises and last-minute arrangements. On 23 October the invasion fleet sailed down the bay and out into the ocean toward the first offensive action of American troops against the Axis. Back at Fort Bragg remained the 2d Armored Division less the landing teams, a reinforced medium tank battalion to be landed at Safi, and General Harmon's Task Force Headquarters. When the two parts of the division would be rejoined was unknown.

**AFRICA**

Shortly before midnight 7-8 November the three sub-task forces of the Western Task Force hove to off the coast of French Morocco. (See Map No. 1.) Here it was—the first combat! Each man wondered how he would react. The assault waves shortly proceeded to debark from the transports into
the landing craft. At Safi the first waves of troops from the 47 Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division hit the beaches at 0400. The 2d Armored Division landing team, including Battery C 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Captain Robert Livesay, commenced landing after daylight and moving inland. As soon as the town was secured and a sizeable beachhead was held, the Navy transports moved into the port to unload the heavier equipment and supplies. On the 9th, the seatrain Lakehurst docked and unloaded the medium tanks of the 3d Battalion 67th Armored Regiment, and the M-7 howitzers of Battery B 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. The batteries of the 78th were all equipped with the T-19's, 105mm howitzers mounted in halftracks, because the landing craft in use during that period of the war could not carry the heavy M-7 carriages.

At noon 9 November word was received that a sizeable French force was marching toward Safi from Marrakech. The landing team, with the reinforced medium tank battalion, was ordered to intercept this force. On the afternoon of the 9th, Battery C occupied position to support a tank attack against the French and commenced firing on the enemy, who was deployed in the hills to the east. Soon the French artillery, using old World War I 75s, let Battery C know that the action was not to be a pushover. The first practical application in occupying alternate positions, which had so often seemed boring and useless in training, suddenly became very important.

General Harmon shortly realized that the French forces were not a great threat and decided to disengage and march toward his main objective—Casablanca. Therefore, on the evening of 10 November the 2d Armored Division elements disengaged and started marching north. The 47th Infantry remained to garrison Safi. At dawn on the 11th the armored column coiled up on the outskirts of Magazan. Battery C of the 78th and Battery B 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion went into positions prepared to support the attack on the town, which was planned for soon after daylight. The batteries were almost at the point of firing the first registration rounds when down the road, full speed, came a jeep in which could be seen a figure wildly waving his arms. As he came abreast of the positions he was seen to be Captain Rooney, General Harmon's aide, yelling "Cease firing, the war is over!" and other variations of the same theme. Word had just been received that the French had agreed to an armistice and Captain Rooney was frantically trying to stop the imminent attack. He was successful and so ended the "Battle of Mazagan."

At Fedahla, because of heavy surf, losses in landing craft, and naval action, the 2d Armored Division landing team, including Battery A of the 78th, commanded by Captain George Bain, did not start landing until late 9 November. On the 10th the landing team started an envelopment of the city of Casablanca and was all set to launch its attack on the morning of the 11th when it, too, received word of the armistice.

Further north, at Port Lyautey, only seven tanks of the landing team were ashore by 0800 on the 8th when the French launched an attack with thirty-two Renault tanks in an effort to overrun the American beachhead. The seven tanks moved out to meet the French and, in a sharp engagement, repulsed the attack and drove the French back three miles. It so happened that Captain C. W. Walter, commanding Battery B 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and Lieutenant Richard
Moses, the forward observer, had landed with the seven American tanks. Suddenly they found themselves very much in action, though not exactly as they had envisioned that artillerymen should fight. The remainder of the landing team, including Battery B, landed the next day. It moved into position to ward off further counterattacks by the French and was thus occupied until the armistice.

On 13 November, the three landing teams started assembling in the Forêt de Mamora, a cork forest north of Rabat. The division was given the mission of guarding the French-Spanish Moroccan frontier, as the intentions of the Spanish at this time were uncertain.

The remainder of the 2d Armored Division arrived from the United States on Christmas Eve and was immediately treated to an air raid on Casablanca by German planes. Shortly after New Year's Day the entire division was assembled in the cork forest and training began in earnest for the battles to come. During this period the method of firing time fire over tanks was developed.

A rather amusing incident occurred on December 1942, when General Devers, commanding the Armored Force,General Brooks, the Armored Force Artillery Officer, and General Barnes, the Armored Force Ordnance Officer, visited the division. General Patton was also present. He had indicated that he favored the 105mm howitzer mounted in the halftrack over the M-7 (the 105 mounted on a medium-tank chassis) because of the lighter weight and lower fuel consumption rate of the halftrack. So, at a meeting of the unit commanders with the visiting generals, he walked up to the battalion commander, of the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, who was acting Division Artillery Officer at the time, and said, "Come on, you tell these people how much better the T-19 is than the M-7; you've had experience with both." That was a rather large order inasmuch as the three visiting generals were probably the three men most responsible for the development of the M-7. However, there wasn't much for the poor battalion commander to do but start talking, which he did in what must have been an unconvincing tone. The three generals politely listened, said "thank you," and changed the subject.

In May 1943 the division moved to the vicinity of Arzew, Algeria, and began landing exercises in preparation for the next operation, the invasion of Sicily. Because of a shortage in shipping, the 2d Armored Division units participating in the invasion were cut to the bare essentials and several units were to be left in Africa. However, the 78th was again selected as one of the units to go. It became part of Combat Command B, which in turn was a part of the invasion force floating reserve, Task Force Kool, consisting of the 18th Regimental Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division in addition to Combat Command B, and commanded by Major General Hugh Gaffey, who had become commander of the 2d Armored Division. This time, the 78th was going as a complete battalion, although reduced in strength. Also it would use M-7s this time and would land directly from LSTs and LCTs instead of employing the unwieldy procedure of lowering vehicles from transports into small LCMs as had been done in the Moroccan landings.

On 23 June, the assault elements of Task Force Kool were loaded aboard LSTs, LCTs and LCIs at Arzew and the flotilla sailed for Tunis. From there it would sail at the proper time to join other ships of the invasion fleet standing out from Oran and other ports. The greatest portion of the vehicles of the 78th were loaded on one LST, but there were battalion elements aboard other landing craft and transports, so it was clear that there would be the problem of assembling these various elements after the landing in Sicily. On 8 July the landing-craft flotilla sailed from the Bay of Tunis and the next step in the road to Germany was about to begin.

**SICILY**

"Wowomp, whoomp." "Pom, pom, pom." "Rat-tat-tat-tat." "There he is off the starboard bow." The men of the 78th aboard the LST tumbled out of their bunks. It was hardly light yet. An Italian bomber had just straddled the LST with its bombs and the ship's gunners were trying to hit it with the 40mm and 20mm antiaircraft guns and with the .50-caliber machine guns. However, it disappeared into the gloom, evidently undamaged.

Off to one flank the British monitor *Abercrombie* could be seen throwing shells toward the land. The U. S. cruiser *Boise* passed by, also firing toward the shore. On the shore and inland could be seen plumes of smoke rising from the bursting shells. LSTs, LCTs, and LCIs could be seen at the shore line. Thus started the invasion of Sicily as far as the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was concerned. (See Map No. 2.)

Troops of the 1st Infantry Division and the Rangers had hit the beaches early that morning and were now moving inland to consolidate the beachhead and capture the town of Gela. The 2d Armored Division troops were being held in reserve aboard their ships until the situation was clarified.

The next morning came the cry, "Send the tanks in." The Herman Goering Panzer Division was counterattacking the American beachhead with a strong tank force. The previously arranged landing schedules were discarded and every effort was bent toward getting the 2d Armored Division tanks ashore as soon as possible to repulse the attack. By noon, elements of the 3d Battalion 67th Armored Regiment, together with 1st Division troops and naval gunfire, had stopped the Germans, knocking out 14 tanks. The Germans had reached within 1,000 yards of the beach before they were finally stopped.

The 78th started landing in the afternoon. The gradient of the shore line was such that the LST could not approach close enough to the beach to land the vehicles directly on the shore, so they were first debarked into an LCT from which they then landed on the beach.

The invasion fleet had been subjected to almost continuous bombing attacks from German planes and there is no more lonesome feeling than to be on a ship being attacked by enemy bombers. There are no slit trenches—there is no place to go. A person just stands and hopes the enemy bombardiers are not very good. Thus, it was with a feeling of relief that the 78th went ashore, even though ME-109s were strafing the beaches quite regularly. At least there were some holes to get into.

The greatest portion of Combat Command B was either being held in
rescue or had been parcelled out to support units of the 1st Infantry Division. The 78th was directed to reinforce the fires of the artillery supporting the 18th Infantry, and occupied positions about 500 yards inland from the beach. One of the first requirements after landing was to move quickly to the inland side of a ridge paralleling the beach. The navy antiaircraft gunners were a bit too conscientious in their efforts to hit the low-flying ME-109s, so that the beach and ridge were suffering not only from German shells but also from American ones.

During this landing it was observed that the vehicles which moved across the beaches with the greatest ease were the DUKWs and the M-7s. Many other vehicles of all types bogged down in the sand and had to be assisted out. The one danger involved in the passage of a full-track vehicle across sand is that of throwing a track. This can be avoided by making gradual instead of sharp turns.

Just at dusk on the evening of the 11th, several German JU-88s appeared, flying very low. This was unfortunate as the navy gunners, and also some army antiaircraft units on shore, having become excited over the attacks by the German planes, did not recognize these new planes as being American and opened fire on them also. Fortunately all personnel of the 78th had been forewarned that the paratroopers would land in the vicinity, so when these figures came floating down right into the battery positions, there was no firing and the paratroopers were guided to their assembly points. However, other units nearby evidently had not been sufficiently warned and some lives were unnecessarily lost as a result.

The battalion maintained the same position the next day until it was ordered to support 1st Division units on the east flank. The road to the new battalion position passed through part of a draw which the Germans had been shelling all day. As the battalion was turning off this road into its positions about 2000 that night, there was a tremendous flash and explosion about 500 yards up the road. In a few minutes some doughboys appeared, running as fast as they could. They paused long enough to say that a German shell had struck an ammunition dump, their entire company had been destroyed, and the Germans were on their way. The men were obviously hysterical, so the 78th decided to take a chance and go ahead into position. Later, it developed that there had been some casualties due to the explosion of the ammunition dump, but not quite to the extent envisioned by the running men.

The batteries of the 78th had no sooner gone into positions, finished the survey, and settled down for the night when there was a commotion in the area of Battery C. One of the sentries had come running to the battery commander crying "There's a gas attack!" The battery commander wisely did not sound any alarm and told the man to quiet down while he went to investigate. Sure enough, there was a peculiar odor in the air. It was discovered that it seemed to be coming up out of the ground. Then he remembered. Sicily has a large amount of sulphur and these were sulphur fumes from some deposits evidently under the battery position. The presence of mind of this officer undoubtedly prevented a panic such as occurred within certain divisions just prior to the breakthrough attack at St. Lo. Nor-, mandy, in July 1944, when irresponsible individuals thought they smelled gas and sounded the alarm without properly investigating the cause, which turned out to be fumes from the explosions of German shells.

The next day, Lieutenant Middleton, while on his way to the 1st Division to act as forward observer, was passing over a small hill when suddenly there loomed up in front of him the ugly snout of an 88mm gun sticking out from what was the biggest tank he had ever seen. He skidded to a stop, while saying every prayer he knew as fast as he could, and started to jump into a ditch. Then he noticed that there appeared to be an unusual stillness about the tank. Looking closer he saw a neat hole in the side of the tank and he realized that what he was looking at was a knocked-out Tiger tank. So, volubly thanking God, he climbed back into his vehicle with much relief and proceeded on his way, vowing that he would never intentionally tangle with a live Tiger tank.

On July 13th, the 78th was ordered to support the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions in their attack on a small mountain town of Butera. So the battalion moved from the east flank and matched
over to new positions to accomplish this new mission. Observing from a high hill, the scene looked very peaceful. One officer thought it would be a good idea to unload the 78th's ammunition halftracks, load up the Rangers, and dash right up the road into the town. Luckily, Colonel W. O. Darby, commanding the Rangers, returned from a meeting at that moment and talked the officer out of this scheme. They attacked that night and, under cover of supporting fires of the 78th, captured the town by early morning. However, it was discovered that the road had been extensively mined and was effectively protected by antitank guns. Thus, had the halftracks of the 78th gone baring up the road the day before, the results would have been quite uncomfortable, if not disastrous. This shows that aggressiveness must be tempered with judgment.

The next day the battalion displaced to new positions to support the consolidation of the gains made by the Rangers. In the afternoon General Gaffey came into the command post of the 78th and told the battalion commander that he had received word that the Germans had launched a strong counterattack against elements of the 1st Division about six miles to the north and effective antitank measures were needed right away. He ordered the battalion commander to immediately take all his M-7s to the danger area and prepare to engage the German tanks by direct fire. So, without further ado, the M-7s moved out of their positions and went tearing up the winding mountain road. Upon arrival in the 1st Division area, it was learned that the German attack had been repulsed, so the 78th howitzers turned around and returned to their positions. This illustrates a possible use of self-propelled artillery. Many artillerymen frown on the use of artillery in direct fire, but there often will be occasions, particularly in mountainous terrain, when direct fire will have to be used. This is even outside of direct-fire combat forced by sudden enemy penetrations.

The 78th remained in its positions for two more days and then marched west to the vicinity of Campobello. There the entire 2d Armored Division was assembled and preparations were made for the move around the enemy west flank to capture Palermo.

On 18 July the advance started with Combat Command A leading, Combat Command B following. The 78th was given the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion supporting Combat Command A. The march was extremely difficult as it had to be made along one winding road. Battery positions of which Ft. Sill would approve were few and far between. Here was demonstrated the mobility of the M-7s in their ability to move off the road and go into position in areas that, at first glance, seemed almost impossible of passage by vehicles of any kind.

At Camporeale, Combat Command B was ordered to move via a western route toward Palermo while Combat Command A continued straight for the division objective. The 78th, therefore, ordered to support Combat Command B. The advance continued all during the night of 22-23 July and by late morning the combat command reached the outskirts of Palermo, which had been entered the night before by elements of Combat Command A.

The participation of the 2d Armored Division in the Sicilian campaign was now finished, as there was no more opportunity for the employment of large armored units. The division now assumed the role of patrolling portions of the island, setting up military government offices and holding intact a reserve to counter any enemy attempt to recapture the island. The 78th became the artillery element of this reserve. In addition, it was ordered to man some ancient Italian 152mm coast-defense guns. No firing tables could be found for these guns, so some test firing was staged to try to obtain some data for engaging targets at various ranges. The conclusion reached by the officers and men of the 78th, after engaging in this test firing for a few days, was that it was no wonder the Italians were losing the war, if their other weapons fired as poorly and as inaccurately as those 152mm guns. Some data were obtained but it is doubtful whether any targets could have ever been hit except by chance, as there never seemed to be any certainty as to where a shell would land. Training was conducted during the remaining days in Sicily until 7 November, when the division embarked for the voyage to England and the preparations for the landings on the French coast.

**NORMANDY**

Advance detachments of the 2d Armored Division commenced landing on the Normandy beaches on 7 June 1944, and most of the combat elements were ashore by 12 June. The 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion made the trip from England in LCTs. In contrast to what it was just preceding D-Day, the weather at that time was fair and clear, so that the voyage was enjoyed by all and there was ample opportunity to observe the goings and comings of the vast number of ships involved in the invasion. The battalion landed on 11 July. The only serious incident connected with the landing occurred when the truck carrying the officers’ baggage ran off an LCT into a deep bomb crater and disappeared under the water. Several days later the truck was retrieved at low tide but, for some reason, after having been immered in salt water, the clothes which had been in the baggage didn't seem to fit very well.

The 2d Armored Division assembled as V. Corps reserve. The 78th was placed under the control of Combat Command B, Brigadier General I. D. White, commanding, which went into assembly area just north of the Forêt de Cerisy. The remainder of the month was spent in the reconnaissance of routes over which to launch counterattacks, fighting off German air attacks, and enduring spasmodic enemy artillery firing.

On 1 July the division relieved the 7th British Armored Division in the left sector of the First U. S. Army, adjacent to the 1st U. S. Infantry Division near Caumont. The 41st Armored Infantry Regiment occupied the front-line positions, the three battalions in the line, with an armoded artillery battalion in support of each. The sector was divided between Combat Command B on the right, and Combat Command A, Brigadier General Maurice Rose, commanding, on the left. Both of the armored regiments were in reserve and certain
tank units were designated to occupy positions from which to fire indirect fire to reinforce the artillery battalions. This illustrates the manner in which an armored division should occupy a defensive sector. The defense is not an appropriate armored division operation. However, it may often have to be undertaken by armored divisions in situations where there are insufficient infantry divisions to do so. In such case, however, the armored division should not be assigned a sector larger than that which can be defended by its infantry elements. The tank units are not suited to position defense and should be held in reserve for use in counterattacks.

Evidently the Germans knew where the boundary between the U. S. First Army and the British Second Army was and, probably considering that this would be a weak point in the line, they frequently counterattacked in the 2d Armored Division sector and subjected the area to continuous artillery fire. Thus, the 78th was well occupied in counterbattery missions and in helping to repulse these counterattacks.

The Germans were employing an annoying but rather ingenious way of firing into the division area. They used a number of self-propelled guns which would fire down the front lines from positions to the flanks in the sectors of adjacent divisions. These guns moved continuously from position to position and so were extremely difficult to locate. It was discovered that one of the best ways of locating these guns was for air observers to be concentrated in the air at dusk, at which time the flashes of the German guns could be seen and often fire could be brought to bear before they could displace to new positions.

One of the disadvantages of the M-7 carriage, as it was built at that time, made itself very evident during this period. The positions of the 41st Infantry were along a ridge in front of which there was a rather deep draw. Furthermore, the ridge was intermittently covered with tall trees. Because of the limit in the elevation which could be obtained on the M-7, areas were discovered into which the 78th could not fire. This problem was soon effectively solved, however. In the adjacent sector of the 1st Infantry Division was the 33d Field Artillery Battalion. The two battalion commanders were West Point classmates and friends of many years. Thus, it was no trouble at all to establish complete communications, liaison, and understanding between the two battalions. Under this arrangement, the 33d, using its ability to fire high-angle fire, took over the targets which the 78th could not reach and both battalions fired into each other’s sector when the situation deemed it advisable or when such fire was requested. Even though the technical term is not generally used, the mission of each battalion, in practical terms, was direct support, reinforcing the fires of the other battalion. This cooperation worked exceedingly well until both divisions were withdrawn for Operation COBRA, the St. Lo breakthrough.

The Germans followed the practice of often using high-burst adjustments for their artillery firing. Thus, whenever a burst would appear over a certain area, it was known that the area would shortly be covered by fire for effect. On 15 July, during lunch, which seemed to be one of the Germans’ favorite times for firing, several high air bursts appeared over the command post of the 78th. Immediately, an air observer ran over to the cub airfield and took off to try to locate the enemy battery. No sooner had he risen into the air when the entire horizon seemed to be a mass of flashes from enemy guns. Then he saw below him the bursts all over the 78th area. He quickly located one of the positions and called for the fire of all the division artillery. In very short order, the air was filled with American shells flying toward the German guns. The observer, knowing he was right in the middle of all these shells going both ways, soon was sure he could feel and hear them passing by his plane. However, he proceeded to shift the fire to each German position he had located and it was not long before they were all silenced. The main point of this episode, however, is not how the observer felt, but the fact that the batteries of the 78th, in spite of being under heavy and steady enemy fire, returned the fire without a flinch. This illustrates the effectiveness of the armor protection of the M-7s and the fact that the crews can man their pieces even while under counterbattery fire. This was demonstrated many times after this and the personnel learned that they were safer in the carriages than in slit trenches and that by remaining in the vehicles, they could get in their licks at the enemy before he was ready for a reaction.

On 17 July, the 2d Armored Division was relieved by the 50th British Brigade and it moved to an assembly area north of the Foret de Cerisy to prepare for the St. Lo breakthrough.

(To be continued)
The war was over in Germany and Capt. Smithers, Battalion S-2, relaxed with the rest of the command. "Our present mission is to maintain law and order in our area," the Battalion Commander had said. It sounded easy. No more shell reports at three o'clock in the morning, no more squinting from observation posts. Capt. Smithers slept well that night.

It was well he did. He slept little in the next few weeks when the hunger-sharpened hatreds of conglomerate peoples flared violently in an area whose normal police forces had been disrupted by war. Day and night, Capt. Smithers and his patrols scurried over the area to investigate sporadic shootings, attacks on isolated farms, and occasional riots. The patrols always seemed to arrive after the responsible "persons unknown" had departed.

Groggy from frustration and lack of sleep, the S-2 stopped chasing shadows and sat down to think. He was a good combat S-2; his war record had proved that. But it was obvious that the direct methods successful in battle were not working now. The enemy he sought was not conveniently located on the next hill to the front. For all he knew, the innocent-looking peasant working in the field across the street from Headquarters could be the burglar who had rifled Battery A's storeroom last night.

Wearily, Capt. Smithers catalogued mentally the possible trouble spots in an area he now knew well from constant patrolling. That refugee camp—it contained varied racial groups. Did they get along with each other, or did they nurse ancient hates that could send them, on slight pretext, at each other's throats? What had caused the rumpus yesterday in the town square—a black market? The fast-learning officer knew by now that bootlegged food and clothing invariably led to trouble.

The captain pulled out his notebook and wrote down places and groups that could bear watching. Then he listed the items of information concerning these subjects that he needed. The procedure seemed familiar. After a while he realized he had drawn up a rough set of essential elements of information—but a set different from the one he had used during the war.

The next question followed logically: "What sources could he utilize to get the information he needed?" He could think of dozens. The Military Government Detachment had already established scores of contacts among the local inhabitants. There were intelligence specialists working in the area. Refugee leaders in the camps might be persuaded to talk. Every village had a burgemeister who could furnish leads on local people, and who kept his ear to the ground. German police offices maintained files on known law-breakers in the locality. The list of potential information sources was limited only by his imagination and initiative—and the number of qualified men he could obtain to help him tap these sources. Life in the ET appeared a shade less rough to the S-2 as he pondered next the composition of his section to implement the plan.

Within a week Capt. Smithers had forgotten his previously voiced regret that the war was over. He had an organization of twenty men, some of them linguists, which covered regularly the "sensitive" spots in the area. One man visited the Military Government office daily. Foremost among his questions was: "How is the food and fuel supply coming along?" Another haunted the German police station. The "Pennsylvania Dutch" which he spoke was helpful. Through some information he picked up, Capt. Smithers arranged a very successful raid, in cooperation with German police, on a warehouse used by clothing black-market operators. On the tip of a refugee informant, a group of illegal border-crossers was apprehended.

Analyzing the reasons for the resultant abrupt decrease in disorders, the S-2 reached two important conclusions. His men were uncovering potential sources of trouble before they could spawn overt disorders; and the very existence of his alert section was making prospective law-breakers more chary.

But Capt. Smithers was not yet ready for that leave to the Riviera.

One night a German civilian truck driver talked his way past one of his section's men at a roadblock. It was embarrassing to learn from the Military Government the next morning that the truck contained stolen American rations. That afternoon the battalion intelligence section started interrogation training.

First, Capt. Smithers prepared a set of cards. Each card contained the name and partial history of an invented interrogatee. For example, one card might describe Hans Muller, recently released prisoner-of-war who was returning home. Half the training group were named interrogates and studied the cards. They were then questioned thoroughly by the other half, who attempted to gain from them the information on the cards.

The captain found also that most of his men were weak in investigative technique. To correct this deficiency he drew up an investigation problem which required a man to obtain information from several agencies and individuals and piece it together to solve the exercise. The agencies and individuals thus queried were represented by himself or other members of the intelligence section.

The S-2 trade had changed radically since the days of combat, but the innovations paid off. And Capt. Smithers found time for sleep again.

It's been Mr. Smithers for some time now. He is a newspaper reporter who continually delights his city editor with his ability to anticipate news before it breaks. But he frequently gets a letter from his replacement that he trained before he left Germany. The last one read, "... so it makes it a lot easier on us all over here now, the way we've been heading off these disorders before they ever get started."
Vieques—We Were There Too

BY 1ST LT. L. B. MATTINGLY, FA

The annual Caribbean maneuvers of the Atlantic Fleet Marine Force took place during February on Vieques Island, a narrow, 20-mile strip off the eastern coast of Puerto Rico, with the veteran 2d Marine Division and the 65th Regimental Combat Team of the United States Army Forces Antilles operating jointly in a full-scale landing attack on the island. On 17 February two battalions of Marine Infantry splashed ashore on Vieques’ sandy beaches, where they were joined by the 2d Battalion of the 65th Infantry, which simulated the landing, for a four-day assault on umpire-controlled enemy defenses. The three assault battalions and the Division Reserve were supported by the fires of the Marines' three 105mm six-gun batteries and one 155mm howitzer battery, plus the 504th Field Artillery Battalion, U. S. Army, with a Marine rocket battery attached.

Only a month earlier the 504th Field Artillery Battalion, the only Puerto Rican field artillery unit in the Army, had celebrated its first anniversary, at Losey Field, Puerto Rico. It had been formed in January 1947 to serve as the artillery arm of the 65th RCT, in support of the regiment's two Puerto Rican infantry battalions and the 531st Engineer (Combat) Company, also Puerto Rican. In the Vieques operation the Combat Team was put together in the field for the second time, the first having been for a three-day exercise in January at the Salinas Training Area on the island of Puerto Rico.

Marking the first participation in the Fleet Marine Force Caribbean maneuver by troops of the United States Army Forces Antilles, the 65th RCT landed on Vieques during the week prior to D-Day. The island, they found, was like dozens of others in the West Indies—bordered by many small, sandy beaches with backdrops of palm groves and dense vegetation. Inland the ground rises in rough, erratic contour. Eight miles across the channel to the west is located Fort Bundy and the naval base of Roosevelt Roads, on the eastern tip of Puerto Rico.

The eastern part of the island was acquired by the Navy from private owners for use in armed-forces training operations such as the one just concluded.

The first waves of attacking Marines came ashore on Vieques from landing craft that nosed into Red Beach II and Black Beach at 0930 17 February. On Red Beach I, in the left sector of the beachhead, the 65th RCT was in position, and the 2d Battalion joined the attack as the Marines hit the shore. The Artillery Regiment of the 2d Division, the 10th Marines, gave the signal for the 504th Field Artillery Battalion to make its simulated landing at 1520 on the afternoon of D-Day, almost six hours after the initial waves of infantry came ashore. The Marine six-gun batteries struck the shore from landing craft, and all artillery units went into position in palm groves along the shore. The attached rocket battery took position near the Puerto Rican battalion, ready to deliver its fires through the 504th FDC.

Field artillery liaison officers, naval gunfire officers, and air officers were with commanders of the assault battalions to call for support at critical moments, and the three arms worked together effectively in breaking enemy strongpoints throughout the problem.

Following a half-day hold-up on D- plus-2, for neutralization of strong enemy defenses, troops of the reinforced division pushed forward to the Force Beachhead Line the next morning to end the maneuver on 20 February.

Service practice for the 504th Field Artillery Battalion and Marine Corps batteries began 23 February and continued through the next five days. The Puerto Rican battalion fired 1,000 rounds on the Vieques combat range.

The 20-day operation ended for the 504th Field Artillery Battalion on 2 March, when the unit rolled through the gates of Losey Field, following the channel crossing to Fort Bundy and the 80-mile road march along the coast to the home station. Vehicles and howitzers crossed from Vieques to the mainland on barges, while troops boarded the Sgt. Curtis F. Shoup, Antilles transport, for the voyage.

The period at Vieques with the 2d Marine Division had done the work of twice that time in garrison. It had been the most valuable training session through which the young 504th Field Artillery Battalion had moved in its year of existence. Officers and men of the unit had gained wide experience from their contact with the Marines. Firing at service practice had been provocatively different from that done before on the limited range at the Salinas Training Area. Forward observers, liaison officers, and their companions of the 65th Infantry and the 531st Engineer (Combat) Company knew each other's problems and capabilities better than ever before. The Puerto Rican soldiers of the 504th had heard their much-studied English at work in communication nets with the Marines.

Long-range planning in the battalion looked ahead to 1949. The 504th Field Artillery Battalion eyed its second birthday and a second trip with the Marines to Vieques Island.

Service practice on Vieques Island—a section of Btry B. 504th FA Bn. The camera caught a projectile in flight (upper left).
Red-Legged Doughboys

By Capt. Henry P. Walker, FA

TRAINING IS ALWAYS the primary mission of an army in peacetime, and it is in peacetime that the policies and practices are worked out on which the speeded-up Mobilization Training Programs are based. During World War II, training was highly specialized and compartmented. In order to provide the trained individuals that units could whip into teams in the shortest possible time, this specialization was necessary.

There is one wall, between two of these compartments, that must be lowered if not torn out entirely, and that is the wall that separates the infantryman from his chief supporter, the artilleryman. There have been many reams of paper expended on the subject of the Infantry-Artillery Team, but there is still, even after the war, too much misunderstanding on both sides. There are too many infantrymen who don't know or understand either the limitations or capabilities of the artillery. Too many doughboys will work for days to do a job, with infantry weapons, which a good artillery concentration could handle in a few minutes. In reading the report of the action of the 27th Division on Tanapag Plain on Saipan, the scanty artillery support is striking to an artilleryman. Where the artillery was from his chief supporter, the artilleryman. Where the artillery was.

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The ignorance on the other side of the wall is even more profound and more personally vital. In the first place, if an artilleryman is to support the infantry intelligently, he must have a detailed knowledge of how the infantry is apt to act under any given set of circumstances. He must know the capabilities of the infantry weapons if he is to intelligently plan his supporting fires. During the war, most forward observers and liaison officers had to learn all of this by being there and doing it.

There is a phase of this ignorance that is much more personal to the artilleryman, a phase bearing directly on his continued health and happiness, and that is his lack of knowledge of what to do with himself under small-arms fire. There is the case of one captain of artillery who, investigating a Filipino house in which a Jap had been reported, walked across the clearing and right up to the front door. Luckily the Nip was asleep during the approach march and was chopped down with a Tommy-gun when he woke up. After it was all over, it dawned on our captain what a damphool he'd been and he nearly had nervous prostration.

The author went a-wandering through the hills of Italy one day, with a couple of radio operators, in search of lucrative targets. He was able to borrow three French riflemen for local support but didn't know what to do with them from then on, but had to let them take up the positions they thought best to cover the temporary observation post.

The outright use of artillery units as infantry is not unknown in our history. During the Mexican War, a battalion of "red-legged" infantry took part in the battle of Palo-Alto, and during the Indian Wars much of our artillery served as infantry. Col. O. L. Spaulding in "The United States Army in War and Peace" says, "... for it has always been the pride of the American heavy artilleryman that he can, in an emergency, rival the infantryman on his own ground." Why should not all artillerymen be trained to take care of themselves in an emergency?

In every artillery battalion there are a number of men whose normal duty keeps them with the infantry: the FO and LnO parties of the divisional battalions and the OP parties of the Corps battalions. In addition, the almost universal custom of rotating the personnel of these parties means that the majority of artillerymen will spend some time with the infantry. It is not the job of the artilleryman with the doughs to support them with the fire of his carbine, but he may easily get entangled in a fire fight. The OP party of the 178th FA Bn got caught in a nasty tangle one night on Monte Battaglia and had a rough time getting out — not getting out for the purpose of running but because he couldn't direct fire properly with Zipper Pistol slugs bouncing off his helmet. More than one party of artillerymen had to engage in fire fights to hold positions of advantage or to move from one to another. This was especially true in the Pacific. Again, it was SOP in the Pacific for all artillery units to throw up perimeter defenses every night to hold off infiltrating Jap raiders, and to comb the area in the morning for any raiders that managed to get through the screen during the night. In many cases, battery positions had to be swept before the artillery could move in and occupy position. In Europe, small arms engagements were almost daily affairs for the artillery of the armored divisions.

There have been cases reported from all major theaters in which an artilleryman found himself the only officer left with an infantry unit. Undoubtedly, in most cases, such competent non-commissioned officers as were left actually made the plans and dispositions, but that didn't relieve the artilleryman of his responsibility as the only officer present. It seems clear that an artillery officer finding himself in such a situation would be easier in his mind and could turn in a better performance in his stand-in role of doughboy if he had a good grounding in the fundamentals of infantry operations.

Looking at present lines of thought and trying to project them into the future, the demand for self-sufficiency and self-protection of the artillery will be greater than ever. Increased speed of armored columns will mean even less thorough mopping-up as they move, leaving more and more enemy in fighting condition to cause trouble for the following artillery. As armies take more and more to the air, the unheralded arrival of enemy paratroops in the rear means more close-in fighting for the artilleryman in order to protect his positions and to move both units and supply
trains through the infested areas. In future warfare no section of the globe can be considered safe as a rear area. It is the author's recollection that reports of the invasion of Crete stated that one British artillery unit was doing an excellent job of smashing German gliders and transports attempting to use an airfield until German paratroops were dropped between the infantry defending the field and the artillery supporting them. The gunners, having no small arms with which to protect themselves, were soon put out of action and the airport was opened to reinforcements which soon overcame the unsupported infantry.

At the other end, the delivery end rather than the receiving end, of this air transportability business, it is easy to foresee that artillery units may find themselves deposited, by parachute, glider, or transport, in the wrong places, and have to fight their way to the main body through active hostile opposition.

Some small efforts were made to fill this lack of infantry-artillery training but they seem insufficient to meet the needs. During the 13-weeks training program at the FARTC at Ft. Bragg after VE Day, some half-dozen hours were devoted, mostly in the form of demonstrations, to actions of the rifle squad. When the program was cut to eight weeks basic, all that sort of thing went out of the window. The wartime Basic Officers Course at Ft. Sill devoted a few hours to the infantry, consisting of lectures, demonstrations of the firing of infantry weapons, and demonstrations of the infantry battalion in the attack and on the defense. But there was no time to give the students actual practice in the principles of fire and movement.

If the artilleryman is apt to be exposed more and more to the need for engaging in small-arms actions, it would appear that more attention should be paid to infantry training in anticipation of this need. There would probably be no need for elaborate higher-unit training, though there is the case of at least one artillery battalion that is reported to have gone into the line as doughboys during an ammunition shortage in Europe, and there is the well-established use of one AA brigade in Italy to hold a section of line north of the Arno River. In both cases, no doubt, both officers and men would have given a good deal to have had a good grounding in infantry tactics up to the battalion level. The greatest proportion of the artillery's problems could be met by training up to and including the platoon level. There are a number of points on which the Army and Marine Corps do not see eye to eye, but there is one point in Marine training that the Army might do well to emulate and that is that every Marine, including the Marine Air Corps, is basically an infantryman. He is trained to fight on foot with a rifle before he goes on to further training in some specialty. Proficiency in such operations might well be added to the list of subjects for the Knox Trophy competition. It certainly was the sense of the Infantry Conference that all soldiers be trained initially as riflemen, for their own protection.

To achieve this training, two programs could be set up: one a detailed plan for peacetime, and the other cut to fit the need for speeded-up training in wartime. The peacetime schedule would include a Platoon Leader's Course at the Infantry School for all artillery officers, to cover all the basic infantry subjects: weapons, scouting and patrolling, small-unit operations, etc. Training schedules of all artillery units would include a set number of hours devoted to this same sort of training. Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul, Director of Personnel and Administration, recently stated that the principal goal of peacetime training is the production of soldiers capable of holding down several jobs. This is another form of the old Battery Commander's dream of a battery of men all of whom were 100% interchangeable, from the highest-numbered cannoneer to the 1st Sergeant. Gen. Paul's thought apparently is that peacetime training should be essentially designed not to design efficient units, per se, but units composed of efficient soldiers capable of being cadred to bigger and better jobs. These are the men who would, as chiefs of section, chiefs of detail, etc., have the jobs of squad leader or platoon sergeant when their artillery unit had to engage in close combat. These are the men who would have to handle the bulk of the training of the men of any new unit. If these men are thoroughly trained in peacetime, they can pass on their training and won't have to learn all their infantry fighting the hard way.

The great problem under the pressure of wartime training would be to find time for this training without extending the MTP. One place where some of this time might be found is in the time set aside for Physical Training. To the artilleryman, much of whose instruction is relatively inactive, it would be real exercise to get out and run, or crawl, through a series of small-unit infantry problems. Many artillerymen can no doubt recall the great enthusiasm and great ineptitude shown in the few hours devoted to "snooping and peeping." If nothing else it was variety.

The curriculum of the Ground General School may provide such training for new officers, but it will be years before the evolutions of the rifle squad are anything but a mystery to the majority of artillerymen.

To recapitulate: the advantages of a fair degree of infantry training for all artillerymen would be:

a) More intelligent support to the infantry through better knowledge of their ways of doing things.

b) Better and more constant support to the infantry because of the artillery's ability to change position or stay put at will in the face of close hostile activity.

c) Fewer casualties among the artillerymen because of their increased knowledge of how to take care of themselves in the front line with the doughboy or back on the battery or battalion perimeter.

As operations can seldom be separated from equipment, the question logically arises, "Is the present secondary armament of the field artillery battalion adequate?" Considering the secondary and close-quarters nature of fire fighting by artillery units, some form of the present carbine would appear to be the proper weapon for the individual. Use of the .50-caliber machine gun in a dual role is rather like swatting a fly with a baseball bat. In the Pacific, light machine guns were issued on the authorization of the theater commander, but
Something We Should Know

By Lt. Col. R. C. Williams, Inf.

Now that the shooting is over, those of us who have chosen to make the army our career had better make up our minds that we will spend a large portion of our future in instructing our subordinates in one subject or another. Every officer and non-commissioned officer will be exposed to this duty, whether he be in a combat outfit, a service unit, or with some headquarters. Schools will be a frequent part of the drill schedule. It might be well for us, therefore, to look into this business of instructing, analyze it, and try to prepare ourselves properly.

There are four main prerequisites of a competent instructor. First, he must have a comprehensive, exact, up-to-date knowledge of his subject. Next, he should have the initiative and ability to organize his subject matter clearly. Third, he must have the enthusiasm and ability to project his subject vividly, forcefully, and effectively, into the minds of his men. Lastly, he must be capable of dealing effectively with the questions asked him by his men.

Let's return for a moment to the first point—that of knowing your subject. Let us assume that perhaps you are to lecture on the tactical employment of the 81mm mortar. Or possibly you've been assigned the task of telling your officers something about Staff Planning. The subject may be anything—the point is that the Army puts out reams of printed material on any subject you might be assigned, and if you have the necessary determination you can find that material, study it, and secure a comprehensive, exact, up-to-date knowledge of your subject.

Next there is the matter of properly organizing the material which you have obtained for your instruction. You should seek to divide this material into not more than five major points, as that is about the maximum number which you can use and still maintain clarity. Put these five subject subheadings in chronological order. Be logical when you begin to develop each point. Remember that your organizing should also utilize psychology in its finished product. By that I mean simply this—in logical organizing you will first build up to a point, let us say to prepare your audience for a certain point, then you will present that point and follow it by some good examples. To further clarify the logical type of organization let me quote an example. You are talking to your platoon about the care of the M-1 Rifle. You begin by telling how accurate the M-1 Rifle is, how much fire power you can get from a platoon firing the M-1 Rifle, how respected it was by our recent enemies. Then, you say that this power, this accuracy, these good qualities will be present only if proper care is taken of the weapon. Finally, you describe, as an example, an instance where a soldier had a chance at such-and-such a place to clean out a whole German patrol as they passed by his concealed position within 150 yards of him in a bunched-up formation. However, his rifle failed to function because he had not taken the proper care of the weapon and so he lost his opportunity.

The psychological method is simply first to give an example, perhaps several examples, and then state your point, showing how it was present in each of the examples. By way of illustration let us assume that you have been assigned the task of talking to your men about "Fire and Movement," or "Fire and Maneuver" as some prefer to call it. You wish to show how it can be done and has been done in the past. Your research has revealed some splendid squad actions which were in "Combat Lessons," an Army publication, and you use them. First you tell about a squad in Guadalcanal and describe how they cleaned out a Jap machine gun by employing the proper tactics that you wish to emphasize. Then you cover another example, wherein a platoon took a small hill in Tunisia. You might even describe in detail a third action which might have occurred in France or Okinawa. After you have explained these actions, clearly showing each of the steps involved, you suddenly state "these examples illustrate the proper method of employing fire and maneuver," or some such words. You refer back to each example in turn and mention how it illustrates your points. You might even cement your talk by an example of how improper employment proved disastrous.

In appraising the material which you intend to use in your talk I first stated that you should arrange it chronologically. Then you should be logical in developing each step. Thirdly, you should employ psychological organization. There is yet another consideration for you to bear in mind and that
is that you should, whenever possible, employ the problem-solution pattern. Now what do I mean by problem-solution pattern? Simply this. First, you should state to yourself, and eventually in writing on paper, just what your problem will be and clarify it. If you are to talk about firing machine guns in battery, for example, put that down. Next, analyze the problem in your own mind. Are you going to discuss machine-gun fire against aircraft or ground troops? Are you going to discuss the light or heavy machine gun? Next, you should have several possible solutions for your problem. Then you should have a recommended solution and, if possible, try it out.

You should understand clearly what your ultimate and immediate objectives are in your instruction. It is realized, of course, that the object of any instruction is to persuade someone of something, to get the desired human behavior. But do you wish to inform your soldiers, that is, provide them with some certain knowledge? Do you intend to explain the working parts of some weapon, the pistol for example, so that they clearly understand your talk? Do you wish to describe an action so that your students receive a clear picture? Do you wish to convince them of something and intend to secure their agreement to your proposals? Do you want to activate your soldiers, obtain performance from them? Do you want to entertain and insure that your students receive a clear meal and feel like having a siesta. Next, you should analyze the class, the situation, and the occasion. In analyzing the class, you should ascertain whether or not your students know anything about your subject. If, for instance, you are to talk about Map Reading to the officers of your battalion you would use a different approach than if you were to explain the recoil mechanism of an infantry cannon to a bunch of new recruits. You should undertake to find out something about their background and experience. By proper analysis of the situation I mean that you should look to the comfort of your class. If you have your men outside and the sun is beating down unmercifully, it is best to have your class seated in some shade, if possible. If, on the other hand, you are instructing in a classroom, it is advantageous to inspect that classroom before the class assemblies and assure yourself that any unnecessary things, such as scribbling on the blackboard, or articles of equipment or training aids not necessary to your talk, are removed. By analysis of the occasion I mean simply that you should provide for circumstances which might arise because of the time of your talk. For example, giving a lecture to some soldiers at 0800 does not create some of the problems which arise at a talk given at 1300 after each soldier has had a big meal and feels like having a siesta.

The third essential step is to limit and adapt the subject to your class. Uncommon words, abbreviations, technical phrases, all must be explained or, better yet, deleted if at all possible. You know what you will talk about, you know your order of coverage, you are aware of what you wish to say about each point, and you have some good examples to illustrate these points. You are then ready for the fourth essential, that of making a tentative outline.

You will find after you have made your tentative outline that in most cases you need more reference material or training aids. You should get your reference material yourself as it will aid you immeasurably in becoming fully acquainted with your subject. Your sources are many: your own mind, your unit, any reference rooms at your post or camp, the training film library, previous training aids which might be stored in the Training Aids section of your school or post (if there is such a section in your locality), the library—these are just some of the places where you can secure material that will be of value.

After you have your tentative outline and the necessary reference material the next step is in writing down your talk. Remember, however, that it is to be a talk, not an essay. Also, do not take your written manuscript with you when you give your talk, as it will harm rather than improve your talk. The written lecture or talk will enable you to make the final outline, which will be your guide for your talk.

Finally, you should practice your talk a time or two before you give it to your class. If possible practice it at the same location or in the same classroom where you will present it to your class. And, if possible, get someone to listen to you, so that you can make yourself feel as though your class is present.

So much, then, for the preparation. You now are confronted, let us assume, with the task of presenting your prepared talk to your men. You certainly aren't one of those "impromptu speakers” who has to speak but does not
necessarily have something to say, for you were given a subject and have properly prepared it. Sometimes you may be able to give a good talk because your war experiences have provided you with a good general background, but remember that proper organization is the mainstay of a well-prepared talk. In giving your talk you don't want to be one of those “readers” who don't glance at their class but simply drone on—reading from the manuscript. Reading is excusable only for reasons of accuracy when you wish to present quotations or statistics. The only reason for reading acceptable in the interests of good instruction is when you have had insufficient time to prepare your talk. It is a poor method and you should avoid it whenever possible. Another type of speaker is the officer who reads from memory. He's the chap who memorizes his talk, by his delivery makes it very evident to the class that he has memorized his lecture, and so fails to do his job well. You want to be an extemporaneous speaker, knowing your outline, and putting your talk across in your own words.

Well, what is a good talk? By definition it is a code consisting of audible symbols and visible signs used to satisfy our wants. It may be given in any language. It consists of four things. First, in its content it includes what the instructor talks about and what he says concerning what he talks about. Second, in its organization it includes the arrangement of the points the instructor wishes to cover with the material arranged chronologically. Third, in its phraseology it has the correct words put together properly. Fourth, in its projection it has the necessary stimuli to obtain the desired result from the class. An effective talk is purposeful, is easily understood, and wins the desired response. By easily understood I mean that it is audible or easily seen; it is distinct, which in most cases will eliminate the necessity for loudness; it is intelligible; and it is relatively free from distractions.

Now what about you as an instructor? You should be relatively free from mannerisms. Pacing to and fro, body swaying and shifting, rising on your toes, all of these are bad mannerisms. You don't want purposeless movement when you talk; you should strive for purposeful movement. Slouching on a desk or side of a truck, leaning on a pointer, trying to hide your hands, having “flying” hands, keeping your hands on your hips throughout your talk, these harm rather than benefit you in your task. Many officers have what is known as “vocalized pauses.” When they are stumped for a word they put in an “uh.” You should avoid these or you'll find some GI in your audience counting them to pass away the time. You have heard the speaker who gives his talk in a dull monotone—a more effective lullaby than any set to music. You have listened to instructors who are "throat-clearers." You have undoubtedly had to listen to an instructor who looked out of the window, across the field, or any place but at his class. You've had to sweat out these officers who continually fumble with their tie or collar or belt. You've had to be patient while some instructor took "time out" to hide his instructional material. Then you certainly can look back on the chap who played with his instructional aids, or who shook chalk in his hand, or twirled his pointer, or threw erasers in the air while he talked. All these are minor points, it is true, but if you ask yourself fairly as to whether or not you are guilty of any of these mannerisms, you will have made a great stride in the direction of good instructing.

In preparing your talk, remember that you are going to talk to soldiers and guide yourself accordingly. You probably will never have to use the debate technique, wherein your purpose is to make a systematic attempt to get your men to believe as you'd want them to believe. By the debate system I refer to a subject that involves competition, your class having the other side of the problem. You have therefore to spiritedly advocate your ideas and try to resolve the issue. No, more than likely you will have to employ the discussion type in putting your points across. Strictly speaking, a discussion is a cooperative attempt by a group of individuals through short talks to solve a problem. First, it is necessary to recognize and state the problem, then to analyze it and break it down, then to search for possible solutions, next to arrive at a tentative solution, and finally to try it out, if possible.

So much then for the preparing and delivering of a talk to your men. There is a final phase of any instruction which is at least equally as important as the talk itself, and that phase is the question period. It might be advantageous to look into this phase for some lessons applicable to you as an instructor.

The men who ask you questions after your talk is over usually fall into one of four groups. There is the chap who asks a question with the intention of embarrassing you as an instructor. If you are patient, if you keep your head and self-control, and if you by your words and actions keep the class with you, you will always be able to take care of this type of individual. Then there is the lad who will ask a question to show off his own knowledge. It is up to you to "take the ball away" from him, so to speak, and as you get to recognize this type, don't give him your attention, if you can avoid doing so in a smooth way. There is also the soldier who will ask you a question because he really wants to know the answer. You should repeat his question, explain or clarify it, and then answer it so that everyone can hear. If you don't know the answer, say so, and go it as soon as you can for the group. Finally, there is the man who asks the instructor a question so as to aid the instructor in making an important point. You should deal effectively with this man, show him that you appreciate his intention. Always respect your audience. Don't involve yourself in any debate or discussion with one member of the class. Keep the class under control during the question period and then you will accomplish your desired task. Never let the discussion degenerate into an argument.

Remember that the Army of today is one of the greatest schools in the world and that you are expected to spend a great deal of your time as one of its instructors. As an instructor you should know how to prepare your talk. You should be conversant with orderly teaching procedures. You should know how soldiers learn. Finally, you should have the ability to select and to use the correct instructional methods.
"D of the 5th"

On 1 March 1948, in Erlangen, Germany, the 172d anniversary of the organization of Battery D, 5th Field Artillery Battalion, called the "Daddy of the Army," was observed with appropriate ceremonies. Brig. Gen. Ralph J. Canine, 1st Infantry Division Artillery Commander, and Lt. Col. Reuben N. Salada, Battalion Commander, addressed the men, and the Battery's history was read.

Battery D is the oldest outfit in the United States Army, and is the only Battery D in the U. S. Field Artillery. Some highlights from its history follow:

On 1 March 1776, Alexander Hamilton was given permission to recruit and organize a battery of artillery, to be known as "The Provincial Company of Artillery of the Colony of New York." This "company" was the direct ancestor of "D of the 5th." Its first shots were fired, at two British ships in the harbor, from the southern tip of Manhattan, in a position in the area now known as "The Battery." Its first participation in an actual battle was in August 1776, in the battle of Long Island. Subsequently it participated in numerous battles of the war, its last firing being a salute to the raising of the Stars and Stripes over New York Harbor at the end of hostilities.

Immediately after the Revolutionary War, the Army was reduced to this one battery, stationed at West Point, plus a detachment at Fort Pitt (now Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania.

The battery's next action was in 1791, in the war with the Miami Indians, at Vincennes, Indiana. In this tragic battle the battery lost all its officers, all its horses, all its guns, and two-thirds of its men. The battery's coat of arms has five arrows on it (standing for the five Indian campaigns in which it fought), one of which is broken, to commemorate Vincennes.

The battery participated in the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War, seeing action in many of the famous battles. There followed service in Alaska and then duty in the Indian Wars after Custer's annihilation. From 1821 to 1901 the unit was designated Battery F, 4th Artillery Regiment.

The nearest the battery came to seeing action in the Spanish-American War was at Santiago, Cuba, where it had just gone into position when the Spanish commander surrendered. From 1899 to 1902 the battery saw action against the Moros during the Philippine Insurrection. It was redesignated 8th Battery, Field Artillery, in February 1901. It became Battery D, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, when the latter was organized in May 1907 under War Department General Orders 118.

In World War I the Fifth Field Artillery saw plenty of action as the 155mm howitzer regiment of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade of the famous First Division.

In World War II the battery saw action, as part of the 1st Infantry Division, in North Africa, Sicily, France, Belgium, and Germany. In North Africa the battery again "lost its guns": on 21 March 1943 the breakthrough of the German 10th Panzer Division near El Guettar forced the battalion to abandon its 155mm (Schneider) howitzers and equipment. This time, however, the battery was back in action within 24 hours, rearmed with new 155mm howitzers M-1, and thirsting for revenge. The end of the war found the battery in the vicinity of Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia, and it is still on duty in Germany. Its present BC is Capt. Charles K. Branton.

Battery D shares battle credit for all the campaigns commemorated by streamers on the Battalion's standard; it also shares in all the unit decorations of the Battalion. Battalion streamers are the following:

**Civil War**
- Manassas
- Antietam
- Chancellorsville
- Gettysburg

**Philippine Insurrection**
- Without inscription

**World War I**
- Montdidier-Noyon
- Aisne-Marne
- St. Mihiel
- Meuse-Argonne
- Lorraine
- Picardy

**World War II**
- Algeria-French Morocco
- Sicily
- Tunisia
- Normandy
- Northern France
- Ardenes-Alsace
- Central Europe
- Rhineland

Streamers in the colors of the French Croix de Guerre embroidered as follows: Lorraine; Picardy, Aisne-Marne; and Meuse-Argonne (World War I).

Streamers in the colors of the French Croix de Guerre, with palm, embroidered as follows: Kasserine.

Streamers in the colors of the French Croix de Guerre, with palm, embroidered as follows: Normandy.

French Fourragere in the colors of the Medaille Militaire (French Decision No. 282, 27 July 1946).

Streamers in the colors of the Belgian Croix de Guerre embroidered as follows: Mons.

Streamers in the colors of the Belgian Croix de Guerre embroidered as follows: Eupen-Malmredy.

Belgian Fourragere in the colors of the Croix de Guerre (Belgian Decree No. 1395, 20 November 1945).
Battery D is also entitled to silver bands for the following campaigns:

**Revolutionary War**
- Long Island
- New York
- Trenton
- Princeton
- Brandywine
- Germantown
- Monmouth
- New Jersey
- Yorktown

**War of 1812**
- Louisiana 1815

**Mexican War**
- Vera Cruz
- Cerro Gordo
- Contreras
- Chapultepec

**Civil War**
- Valley
- Virginia 1861, 1862

**Indian Wars**
- Miami
- Creeks
- Seminoles
- Little Big Horn
- Pine Ridge

**War with Spain**
- Santiago

**Philippine Insurrection**
- Luzon 1899
- Samar 1899, 1901

In 1882 the heirs of Alexander Hamilton presented the battery with a special guidon, which, when worn out, was replaced by the Chamber of Commerce of Watertown, New York.

The following is the correspondence that culminated in Mr. Hamilton’s letter of presentation, reproduced in the facsimile from the original. The actual presentation took place on Governor’s Island on 19 May, 1882, when Maj. Gen. Hancock, Department Commander, with a few appropriate remarks, handed the guidon to the Battery Commander, 1st Lieut. William F. Stewart, in the presence of Mr. Hamilton and a galaxy of high-ranking officers and other notables. A copy of this correspondence, of the original of the frontispiece letter, and of a newspaper description of the ceremony, were obtained through the courtesy of the National Archives.—Ed.

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**D OF THE 5TH**

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**1st ENDORSEMENT**

Fort Adams, R. I.
February 3rd, 1882

I have the honor to respectfully forward to the Regimental Commander of the 4th Artillery, a personal letter received by me from the grandson of the first Captain of Battery "F," 4th Artillery, which I’ve always understood is the oldest military organization in the service of the U. S., and I respectfully request, if the Regimental Commander sees fit, that this letter be forwarded to the Adjutant General.

(Sgd.) A. B. Dyer
Adjutant, 4th Artillery

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**2nd ENDORSEMENT**

Fort Warren, Mass.
February 5th, 1882

The enclosed special request of Mr. A. Hamilton, of Irvington, New York, is respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant General of the Army, — through the Commanding General of the Department of the East—for the consideration and action of the War Department.

(Sgd.) C. L. Best
Lieut. Colonel, 4th Artillery
Commanding the Regiment.

---

**3rd Endorsement**

Hdqrs: Department of the East
Governor's Island, N. Y.
February 8, 1882.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant General of the Army.

(Sgd.) Wm. D. Whipple
Asst. Adjutant General,
In absence of the Department Commander.

---

Headquarters of the Army,
Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, Feby. 18, 1882.

The Commanding Officer
Fourth Artillery
(Thru' Headquarters Dept. of the East)

Sir:

Referring to your endorsement of the 5th instant, forwarding a letter addressed by Mr. Alexander Hamilton to the Adjutant of your regiment, requesting permission to present to Battery "F," 4th Artillery, a guidon bearing the name "Alexander Hamilton" and the date "1776" as a memento of his origin and long career of honor.

This circumstance has of late attracted much attention, and in a country like ours, where changes are so continual, the fact that a military organization is 106 years old seems very extraordinary.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
(Sgd.) A. Hamilton

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NOTES FROM FA-CMG

SCHOOLS

THERE appears below a tabulation of the principal Military Schools open to qualified Field Artillery officers. Officers interested in one or more of these schools can obtain information thereon by writing a personal letter direct to:


It is not desired however, that officers inquire concerning the Army Schools listed in Column I, since attendance is automatic. Attendance at the Arms Basic and Advanced courses is mandatory. Attendance at the Command and General Staff College and higher Army schools is selective. All officers eligible for attendance at one of the schools in Column I are carried on appropriate lists in the Field Artillery Branch, CMG, and come under consideration for nomination each time a class is formed.

Time of attendance is governed, except for the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, by age and availability.

Officers desiring to attend one of the schools in Columns II and III may write to the FA Branch, giving their reasons and special qualifications. Nominations will be made, as openings become available, from among those officers with outstanding records who volunteer and who are specially qualified.

There are several limiting factors governing nominations:

(a) Officers should be fully qualified in artillery before requesting consideration for schools listed in Columns II and III. Officers volunteering for civilian schooling may have Basic credit only, but should consider how their selection will affect matriculation at the Officers' Advanced Course at TAS by the time they reach 30 years of age. While attendance at TAS will be open to officers up to age 42, credit equivalent to attendance at the Advanced Course is a prerequisite for C&GSC: C&GSC is a prerequisite for AFSC; and so on.

(b) Officers will not normally attend two successive schools unless they become critical for age and have outstanding records.

(c) Officers assigned to key activities will be considered for attendance at the Officers Advanced Course only as they complete a normal three-year tour.

(d) Assignment to foreign schools will be normally made from officers vulnerable or volunteering for overseas service, and will require:

1. Fluency in the foreign language.
2. Previous attainment of at least the same level of schooling, either by attendance at US Army schools or by equivalent credit.

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<td>Armored Basic Course</td>
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<td>BI Basic Course, Ground General School</td>
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New President for AFF Bd 1. Colonel Louis J. Compton, FA, replaces Colonel Guy O. Kurtz, FA, in July as President of Army Field Forces Board No. 1. Colonel Kurtz's new station will be in Canada.

RA General Officers Started in NG. Thirty of the present permanent general officers on the active list of the Regular Army started their military careers as National Guardsmen, in various ranks from private to captain. Twenty-one states are represented.

Coming Events. The Department of the Army has announced the following summary of maneuvers and field exercises planned for the remainder of 1948. MAY-JUNE: Joint Airborne "Exercise Assembly," at Fort Bragg, N.C., and Camp Campbell, Ky.; Army-Air participation. JULY-AUGUST: U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, Little Creek, Va.; joint amphibious exercise. SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER: Student Service Schools, Air Indocination, Fort Benning, Ga.; Army-Air participation. OCTOBER (tentative): Third Army, V Corps, CPX, Camp Campbell, Ky. OCTOBER-DECEMBER: Arctic-Air Transport, Mt. Ranier and Alaska; Army-Air participation.

Another New Name. The Army War College has been renamed "Fort Lesley J. McNair." Previous names: Washington Arsenal, 1803-1881; Washington Barracks, 1881-1927; Army War College, 1927-1935; Fort Humphreys, 1935-1939; again Army War College, 1939-1948. It is the site of the National War College and the Army War College, 1939-1948. It is the site of the National War College and the War College, 1939-1948. It is the site of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Training of Army Liaison-Plane Mechanics. Army liaison-plane mechanics will hereafter be trained at a special Air Force school at Keesler AF Base, Biloxi, Miss. The 12-week course for the enlisted personnel will include first-hand experience on L-4, L-5, L-16, and L-17 aircraft. Graduate students will be assigned to Army units which use liaison planes.

R & D for ORC. A Committee of outstanding scientists and engineers who hold commissions in the ORC has unanimously approved the Army's contemplated research and development reserve program, and recommended optimum utilization of the technological skills of all reserve officers professionally engaged in the Medical, Biological, Physical, and Engineering Sciences. The first of the R & D Reserve groups formed under the program was established in Wilmington, Delaware. It is anticipated that similar groups will be established in localities where there are sufficient eligible Reserve Officers.

Instruction of AF Pilots in FA Adjustment. A program has been inaugurated at TAC for the training of Air Force pilots in adjustment of artillery fire. Twelve AF pilots, the first of approximately 100, started their two-weeks' course in April. The initial phase of instruction will be with a battery on the ground, to see how fire control works and learn what information is needed from the air observer. The first air adjustments will be from liaison-type planes, followed by adjustments from "jets" (P-80s, stationed at Tinker Air Base, Oklahoma City). The ultimate object is the adjustment of long-range fire from far behind enemy lines, where the liaison planes cannot work satisfactorily. A test of the practicability of such long-range adjustment was described in the November-December 1947 JOURNAL.

Post Field an Airport. On 16 April, a Continental Air Lines plane "City of Santa Fe" landed on the new Post Field air strip to inaugurate the long-awaited commercial air service for Lawton and Ft. Sill. Appropriate ceremonies followed the landing, climaxied by the presentation by Mr. Simpkins, Continental Air Lines representative, of boxes of fresh Colorado trout to General Andrus and leading Lawton officials.

Organization Changes at TAC. The 53rd Infantry Battalion is to be redesignated as the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment. When the battalion is brought up to strength, which is expected in the near future, the battalion will consist of 33 officers and 746 enlisted men. It is the only infantry unit assigned to Fort Sill. . . . The 2nd Field Artillery Battalion will become the 2nd Rocket Field Artillery Battalion, and Battery A 87th Field Artillery Battalion will be known as Battery "A" 2nd Rocket Field Artillery Battalion. All enlisted men of what was the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion will be redistributed among other units in the 5th Field Artillery Group. The location of 2nd Rocket FABn, minus Battery "A," will be at Fort Bliss, Texas. Therefore the change makes little difference in the manpower of the 5th FA Gp but does make it a more compact organization. . . . The 17th Field Artillery Battalion will be known as the 17th Field Artillery Battalion (Composite) and personnel from the 81st Field Artillery Battalion will be assigned to the 17th. The 17th will turn in its 105mm howitzers and take over the battery of self-propelled 8-inch howitzers and the battery of tractor-drawn 240mm howitzers from the 81st. . . . A new battalion, the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, has been activated with a strength of 24 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 396 enlisted men. The officers are being assigned from the Second Field Artillery Battalion. The 96th will be entitled to colors and battle honors of the 349th Field Artillery Battalion, which was deactivated here a year ago. This change will make a total of 1,150 Negro troops at the Artillery Center. . . . The several changes are expected to make units easier to control and improve training efficiency, it was explained.

Staff and Faculty Changes at TAC. Lt. Col. H. R. L. Hodges, RA, has replaced Lt. Col. Philip T. Tower as British Liaison Officer at TAC. . . . Major Richard L. Duckwall, CAC, former acting G-2, has been assigned to the GSC and named G-2. . . . Col. Walter C. Lattimore, FA (on his fourth tour at Sill), has been named IG, replacing Col. Raymond G. Miller, FA, whose new assignment is in the SW Pacific. . . . Col. Frederic H. Chaffee, FA, has been appointed Director of the General Subjects Dept., TAS. . . . Col. Everett C. Williams, FA, has been shifted from Chief of Staff to Deputy Commander TAC, replacing Brig. Gen. John Millikin upon the latter's retirement. Col. Julius E. Andrus, FA, formerly G-1, replaced Col. Williams as Chief of Staff, and Major Peter J. O'Rourke, FA, was moved up from Asst G-1 to G-1. . . . Col. Richard A. Gordon, FA, has been named G-3, replacing Lt. Col. Morris Schonholz, FA.
The German Paris Gun of World War I

The Journal recently received a letter from Colonel S. Y. McGiffert, FA, which stated, in part:

"In November 1947 I had business with the British Krupp Control regarding reparations of one of their Krupp-owned properties in Bavaria. A Mr. Talbot came from Essen to see me in Munich and in the course of the conversation I discovered that he was also interested in Artillery, having been on the British Board of Munitions during the war. He told me he had at last discovered photographs of the Paris gun. I told him I was interested and would like to get them in order to send them to Fort Sill. A Colonel Ayers has written a book about the gun, but it contained no illustrations, as I recall. The Book of Honor of German heavy artillery contains only a small snapshot of the cannon firing at a distance and I think a pencil sketch also. I know of no other photographs.

"The nine photographs and accompanying letter (copy inclosed) were finally received by me from Captain Slocum here in the Pentagon a few days ago. Mr. Talbot had sent the photographs to 'Secretary of State for War,' and Captain Slocum got them from the State Department. He told me he had had other copies made."

The letter he enclosed reads as follows:

14th January, 1948

To: The Secretary of State,
   U. S. Department of War,
   WASHINGTON
   U. S. A.

Dear Sir,

I recently met a Colonel S. Y. McGiffert of the U. S. Army. He was Chief of the Industry Branch of American Mil. Gov. in Munich, and I understand that he has returned to America to rejoin his unit, which, I believe, is the Artillery.

During my visit I told him that we had discovered in the Krupp archives a series of photographs of the Paris gun of the war 1914/18.

Colonel McGiffert expressed great interest in these and asked me if it would be possible to obtain a set for the American Artillery Museum in Washington.

These photographs are unique, and I am told by the Director General of the Imperial War Museum in London that they had been endeavouring to obtain such copies for 20 years without success until these were unearthed here in Essen.

I, therefore, have great pleasure in sending you these prints direct, as I do not know where Colonel McGiffert is now living. I hope these photographs will be of interest to your Department.

Yours sincerely,

s/ G. A. Talbot

(G. A. TALBOT)

for CONTROLLER OF FRIED KRUPP

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The best of the pictures are here reproduced.
Close-up taken on the proof range

Erected on the proof range

Firing on the proof range
Small Unit Action . . .

Crossing the Meuse

By Capt. Tattnall R. Pritchard, Jr., FA

"The successful crossing of the Meuse . . . in the face of strong opposition, was one of the most difficult tasks of this war. Despite heavy losses, [the 3d Battalion] held a bridgehead against spirited German counter-attacks . . . and routed the enemy, who fled to the east."

— Letter of Commendation, from the Commanding General, VII Corps

On the afternoon of 3d September 1944, the "finger" of First Army in the person of a lead scout of Company K, 60th Infantry, entered that portion of the town of Hastiere, Belgium, lying along the west bank of the Meuse. The Germans were still in rapid retreat to the borders of the Third Reich, and resistance during the day had therefore been sporadic and disorganized; but here the omniscient High Command had decreed a forceful rearguard action, and it was late that afternoon before the western bank was secure. The river became the MLR.

The following morning an attempt was made to force the river over the only available means, a narrow one-lane bridge joining the two sections of the town. The failure of the attempt was due to a combination of factors: the bridge was heavily mined and guarded, and under constant harassing fire; supporting artillery and the battalion heavy weapons could not—because of the difficult terrain—be brought to bear on the approaches to the eastern end. Late on the afternoon of the 4th the bridge was blown by the jerries, and this forced Col. Jesse Gibney, commanding the 60th Infantry Regiment, to seek other means of effecting a river crossing. After a necessarily hasty reconnaissance, a night crossing, at a more favorable point to the south, was agreed upon.

Artillery had spent the day having fun, in a way only the artillery knows. An observation post had been established in a house atop a hill overlooking the town, the river, and the terrain beyond; the only point we were unable to cover was the eastern end of the bridge and its approaches. My forward observer was 1st Lt. (later Captain) Eugene Welch of Charlie Battery, 60th F. A., and the two of us had a merry time of it. The hills and open fields beyond the river presented almost every type of target ever dreamed of by forward observers—our only difficulty was in picking the next one.

Had we known then what we knew later we would have redoubled our efforts to clear missions through the fire-direction center. We learned several days later that the Germans were scrambling pellmell down the river—moving openly, in full view—to resist a crossing made the night before by the 2d Battalion. The poor 2d met the fiercest kind of resistance; by that afternoon they had lost 14 officers and 319 men, killed, wounded or missing. A radioed strength report placed their effectives at 69 men by nightfall. Had we known of their troubles we would not have been quite so carefree.

It was not all egg-in-the-beer, however. A few minutes after I left the OP to answer a call from Lt. Col. Keene N. ("Slick") Wilson, commanding the 3d Battalion, a German tank picked up the position and sent an 88 through the window. The shell burst in the next room, but the concussion and shock were enough to daze Lt. Welch and his radio operator for several minutes. As it was late in the afternoon anyway, the OP closed down for supper.

Col. Wilson was in the cellar of an abandoned warehouse, holding a conference. "Slick" briefed me by explaining that his rifle companies would cross in Engineer assault boats in three waves, and once on the other side would attempt to link up with the remnants of the 2d, make a wide sweep from the south, and take Hastiere through the back door.

The crossing was to be made at a point opposite the village of Blaimont, without artillery preparation. H-hour was 0300. Slick suggested that I put my detail to bed, and then added that he thought Lt. Welch should go with L Company, since they would hit the beach first.

At this I demurred. I pointed out that because of the extremely hilly terrain I would need a relay station on the west bank, and that Gene's radio was the only one available since my normal relay point, Major Glenn Elliott's command car, was with Col. Gibney in the valley behind us. I added that an observer was of no possible value to anyone at night, especially when his observation was limited to straight up (the east bank was a high bluff). I proposed as an alternative that I cross with the second wave, sticking close to the CP group until daylight, after which I would take over the duties of forward observer as well as liaison. Lt Welch would remain on the west bank to act as a relay station, joining us later when the battalion had secured the high ground to the east and had thus obviated the necessity of a radio relay. This suggestion was approved, and we stretched out on the floor for a nap.

The S-2 awakened us about 1100, and we moved downriver about two miles, arriving well before H-hour. The embarkation point appeared in the darkness to be the lawn of a private home, which sloped smoothly down to the river and a two-foot high flood-wall of concrete. The initial wave apparently cleared the river without incident, although the surface was liberally spattered with staccato bursts of harassing MG fire and an occasional mortar; the assault boats returned in surprisingly short order to pick up the second wave, which included the CP party. This movement lost a man overboard and three wounded when a searching burst swept one of the boats. These were the only casualties for the actual crossing.

When we debarked we were met by Col. Wilson and L Company's CO, both in something of a rage; the Engineers had made a miscalculation in the darkness and had landed the first wave on a small island in the river about three-fifths of the way across. There
was still a hundred yards of deep water between them and the east bank. By the time this error had been corrected, and the initial wave re-embarked and placed where it was supposed to be, considerable time had been lost. When the CP party reached the east bank it was almost dawn.

The bluff at this point, heavily wooded, towered almost straight above us about a hundred yards. We moved up it in single file, each man with a hand on the belt of the man in front. About half way up the incline a terrific fire fight broke out ahead—MG's, BAR's, and MI's — and suddenly stopped as quickly as it had flared up. The column halted, and I got the disturbing impression that someone in the line ahead of me had lost contact. So, telling my radio detail to stay in column, I pulled out and went ahead to reconnoitre.

I found Col. Wilson and the forward CP group standing on a trail which encircled the hill just short of the crest. Nearby was a machine-gun nest, now silent, its late occupants sprawled about on the trail and in the bushes. Slick decided to move the rifle companies up on the crest, dig in, and wait for daylight before attempting to link up with the remnants of the ill-fated 2nd, somewhere downriver to our right. Accordingly the CP party, after passing on the necessary orders, crawled into the MG nest and went to sleep.

I located my radio, contacted Gene Welch on the west bank, and relayed my position and the situation to my battalion; then I shut down and told the operators to get some sleep. Except for the sentry and me, idly talking on the trail, all was quiet.

Suddenly a voice behind me spoke, in German: "Was ist das?" Having been, in childhood, an ardent Western fan, I reacted instinctively, going into approved fighting crouch and clawing madly at the .45 on my hip as I turned. Facing me was a Feldwebel and perhaps five privates; we were so close—and the light was just strong enough—that I could easily distinguish the SS insignia on the collar. The Feldwebel and I fired together—and both missed. The entire party, obviously a relief for the dead machine-gun crew, turned and streaked down the trail. The Feldwebel ducked into the}

bushes and— we found out later—calmly sat down.

The two pistol shots had awakened the CP detail, and a perfect fury of small-arms fire burst from the bunker, directed down the trail. In the midst of this confusion Dr. Clem Carruthers, the battalion surgeon, arrived with his medical party and asked Col. Wilson for suggestions on setting up an aid station. Slick told him to take it easy until daylight, when we would move into Blaimont, just to our left at the top of the hill, and then Doc could have a house in which to work. The doctor nodded, and told his medics to make themselves comfortable along the trail.

One of the aid men sat down with his back against the bank, put his head on the shoulder of the Feldwebel—thinking, of course, that here was a convenient buddy—and went to sleep. It was by now considerably lighter and rapidly approaching full daylight; the Feldwebel shortly decided the odds were against him in daylight and determined to make a break for it. He stood up in full view of us all, spilling the medic rudely to the ground, and took to his heels. We were so surprised not one of us thought to shoot; he disappeared forever down a bend in the trail.

Since it was now quite light, K Company swung over and occupied Blaimont. The movement was accomplished without incident, and the CP detail and the medics took over a house on the river side of the town. During our stay in the village we saw less than a handful of civilians; they had all ducked into backyard bomb shelters at the first sign of trouble and refused to come out.

L and I Companies remained on the crest of the hill, and L sent a patrol downriver to contact the 2nd Battalion. The patrol ran into trouble almost immediately, walking into a fire fight about a half-mile out, apparently between a strong Jerry force and what remained of the 2nd. The patrol was able to break off after great difficulty and return to report.

Coincident with the patrol's return we were attacked frontally by a determined band of SS of possibly regimental strength, accompanied by a great many tanks and one flame thrower. They came in all along the line, with the bulk of the assault thrown against Blaimont. Our right was anchored to the top of the hill, and the left to the river bluff behind the town. We drew first blood when a bazookaman knocked out a medium tank, but a following medium severely wounded him, and his mates were forced to leave him just inside the door of the village church when they withdrew.

When the fight started I succeeded in by-passing my relay and contacting my battalion direct, calling for fire. The first full salvo played havoc with the incoming infantry, and effectively discouraged the tanks; they wouldn't move forward without rifle support. The flame thrower, however, was the greater menace: after setting several houses in the village afire, he veered off to our right and escorted the wave assaulting L Company, in the center of the line.

The raging helplessness of men fighting against an armored flamethrower with rifles can well be imagined. At one point Col. Wilson was trying to pick off the driver with a carbine, through slits in the front armor, and almost crying at the futility of the gesture. My artillery shells forced the jerrys to keep their heads down, but left the 'thrower undaunted.

At this critical moment my battalion "grasshopper" arrived, and 1st Lt. Harry Link, the air observer, took over and succeeded in crippling the flamethrower, driving it off. L Company mopped up the remaining infantry and settled back to lick their wounds, and we all took a deep breath and counted noses. The defense had been successful, except that the OPLR had been pushed back across the village square.

I went down to K Company's CP in hopes of finding a better place for an OP, and while I was there one of the platoon leaders — a tough young sergeant cradling a well-polished Tommy-gun—asked me to accompany him in an attempt to rescue the wounded bazookaman, lying just inside the church across the square. I agreed somewhat half-heartedly, and we started out with two riflemen and two aid men. When we reached the edge of the square the riflemen covered us while the sergeant and I dashed across and took up positions on either side of the church. The two aid men followed us and went into
the church with their stretcher.

While I was peering up the street around the edge of the building, an SS trooper—probably a scout—came walking down the middle of the street carrying a Schmeisser against his leg. He walked with supreme disdain, looking neither to right nor left, not even idly curious of the still-burning tank he passed. Acting the fool we all do at times, I stepped into view, brandished my pistol, and ordered him to "Kommen sie hier." He lifted his lip at me in a magnificent sneer and stepped calmly out of sight behind the church.

I ran quickly around to the left to warn the sergeant, and as I arrived the SS trooper appeared at his corner and fired a burst from the Schmeisser. Most of the burst took the sergeant in the forearms, inflicting painful wounds, and spattering me with blood and a dusting of plaster from the church wall. I instinctively lifted my pistol and shot the German between the eyes.

This immediately earned me notoriety of a sort. For a long time afterward I was pointed out as the only man in the 9th Division—some said First Army—who ever killed a German with a pistol. Shortly after this episode I threw away the .45 and liberated a "greasegun" from a tanker. The pistol was too erratic.

By the time we got the wounded back the jerries were attacking again, and we were forced out of the village. We re-formed in the woods bordering the river, under constant pressure. The air observer, Lt. Link, was forced to return to his base when heavy rainclouds settled over us, and we were left with just rifles and what I could do in the driving rain. In addition, supplies were running short; the river crossing behind us was well-nigh unusable since it was under direct fire from cannon and mortars emplaced on either side of the beachhead.

By the end of the day Blaimont had changed hands four times, finally winding up in our possession for good, although we paid a terrible price. Throughout the day the medics, under direction of Doc Carruthers, had performed the Herculean task of getting our wounded back across the river, utilizing an almost-collapsed bridge used for carrying power lines. This structure, affording a most shaky and tenuous footing at best, was under constant fire and threatened to fall into the river at any moment. For this devotion to duty the 3d Battalion Medical Detachment was afterwards awarded a Unit Citation.

After dark we received orders from Regiment, over the battalion 300, to make a night movement to Hastiere, the original objective, and prepare ourselves for a dawn assault from the land side. This looked impossible: each of the companies was down to about thirty men, bone-tired, wet and miserable, and the heavy and almost impassable woods between Blaimont and Hastiere were thick with Germans. Food there was none, and ammunition was dangerously low. We had three thousand yards of incredibly rugged terrain to fight over, defended by bloodthirsty fanatics. It could not be done.

But the battalion did it. Leaving K Company as a holding force in Blaimont, I and L fought their way through those terrible woods, arriving before Hastiere shortly after midnight. We threw up a thinly manned defense perimeter and sat down, too keyed-up to rest, and waited for dawn. The rest of that night was punctuated by frequent clashes with patrols, "alarums and excursions."

During the night Col. Wilson and I, moving along the line in the darkness, came upon four men sitting down in the trail, squarely between I and L. Thinking they were ours, Slick said "Pardon me," and stepped around them. He was abreast of the third man before mutual recognition broke over us simultaneously. Moving calmly and methodically, Slick reached down, wrested the man's rifle from his grasp and beat him unconscious with it. The second man of the group unlimbered his machine pistol and began spraying the bushes wildly in all directions; the trigger-happy outposts from I and L cut loose at the sound; and we got the hell out of there in a hurry.

As soon as it was light enough to see, we spotted the battalion Exec, Major Al Bruchac, riding along the river road in a jeep and making frantic gestures with his 300 "mike." The battalion 300's were shot, but I managed to contact Gene Welch on the 610; he chased Al down, who reported that from his side of the river Hastiere looked deserted.

We forwarded word to Col. Gibney that we would move in an hour, and asked him to have the 1st Battalion try a crossing from his side.

Everything was very quiet; we had no contact. Slick sent a patrol into town, and he and I and one of my radio operators followed a hundred yards behind. We watched them until they arrived at the first house; they went inside and did not come out.

The house was a mansion of three stories, white stone, with formal gardens through which we approached, and a boathouse on the river bank. We waited in the garden near the boathouse for the better part of an hour, but no report; Slick decided to investigate.

We moved by bounds, and as luck would have it—it was pure chance—I arrived at the back door of the house in the lead, with Slick and the radio operator covering me. I heard voices behind the door; indicating by hand signals what I intended to do, I threw open the door, pistol in hand.

It was truly the epitome of all domestic scenes: around the kitchen table sat the patrol, eating ham and fried eggs. A young girl and an older couple were waiting on them; before each man was a tall glass of scotch-and-soda, sparkling with ice. I found out later one of the men was upstairs taking a bath. No wonder they hadn't bothered to report.

"Good morning," said the matron pleasantly, without a trace of accent. "Will you join us at breakfast, or would you prefer a drink? The Germans left hurriedly last night, and the town is yours."

I settled for a drink and a hot bath.

"On the morning and throughout the day of 5th September 1944, the 3d Battalion effected the river crossing, secured a bridgehead in the vicinity of Blaimont, Belgium, captured that town, and without pausing went on to force the enemy from Hastiere, Belgium, fighting fierce, fanatical resistance through the entire route."

—After Action Report, 60th Infantry Regiment
It Happened on the Fourth of July!
By James Aldredge

5. On July 4, 1802 the first service academy established in the United States opened with an enrollment of ten students.
   (a) U.S. Military Academy
   (b) U.S. Coast Guard Academy
   (c) U.S. Naval Academy

6. On July 4, 1863 the news of the surrender of a great Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi led Abraham Lincoln to throw his arm around his Secretary of the Navy and exclaim, "It is great, Mr. Welles, it is great!"
   (a) New Orleans
   (b) Port Hudson
   (c) Vicksburg

7. On July 4, 1872 the twenty-ninth President of the United States was born in a small country town where his father conducted a farm and a general grocery store.
   (a) Warren G. Harding
   (b) Calvin Coolidge
   (c) Herbert C. Hoover

8. On July 4, 1898 a U.S. Navy officer spoke up as the burning Spanish ship Viscaya swept past the Texas during the battle of Santiago, "Don't cheer, boys. The poor fellows are dying."
   (a) Captain John W. Philip
   (b) Rear Admiral William T. Sampson
   (c) Captain Robley D. Evans

9. On July 4, 1826 America's favorite composer of sentimental songs, who scored one "tin-pan alley" hit after another, was born at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
   (a) Irving Berlin
   (b) Victor Herbert
   (c) Stephen Collins Foster

Integration Finale
By Lt. Col. George I. Forsythe

Republished (slightly condensed) by courtesy of the Army Information Digest

After two hectic years, desks have been cleared and calculating machines have clicked out the final statistics on the largest Regular officer integration program in Army history.

A grand total of 25,667 wartime officers were integrated into the Regular Army and Air Force in six increments, from June 1946 to December 1947. Of these, 11,322 were Army and 14,345 were Air Force. More than 140,000 officers applied. Nearly 2,000 officers declined commissions after they were nominated, and 259 were rejected, after nomination, for physical reasons—including 13 deaths. Of those appointed, 165 have been separated, most resigning for their own convenience.

The Regular Army and Air Force officer strength on 1 January 1948 was 21,102 Army and 18,021 Air Force—total 39,123. Since the authorized officer strength of the two services is 50,000, this leaves approximately 11,000 vacancies, of which about 9,000 are allotted to the Army and about 2,000 to the Air Force. These vacancies will be filled during the next ten years by appointments in the basic grades. Allowing for attrition throughout the Regular establishment, this will provide nearly 1,800 appointments a year. It is estimated that these will be filled annually from the following sources: United States Military Academy, 350; Senior Division ROTC distinguished
graduates, 600; Reserve and National Guard officers serving on competitive
tours of active duty, Officer Candidate School outstanding graduates, and
Reguar Army enlisted men by direct appointment, 600; persons qualified for
appointment in the professional services of the Army, 250. Of this annual
procurement objective, it is estimated that 830 will be appointed in the ground
arms, 390 in the professional services (Medical, Dental, Veterinary, Chaplain,
and Judge Advocate General), and 580 in the other administrative and technical
services.

Of the January strength of 21,102
Regular Army officers, 11,322 were
integrated officers, distributed as follows:

- Infantry: 2,417
- Cavalry: 478
- Coast Artillery: 564
- Field Artillery: 1,102
- Total Ground Arms: 4,561
- Corps of Military Police: 421
- Ordnance Department: 593
- Transportation Corps: 1,027
- Quartermaster Corps: 749
- Signal Corps: 605
- Corps of Engineers: 474
- Chemical Corps: 239
- Adjutant General's Department: 421
- Finance Department: 274
- Judge Advocate General's Department: 246
- Medical Corps: 374
- Dental Corps: 234
- Veterinary Corps: 118
- Medical Service Corps: 728
- Total Administrative & Technical Services: 6,761

Permanent grades of officers appointed in the ground arms:
- Second Lieutenant: 435
- First Lieutenant: 3,015
- Captain: 911
- Major: 200
- Total: 4,561

Highest temporary grades ranged from
second lieutenant to general officer
(one). The second lieutenant became
permanent second lieutenant, while the
general officer received the permanent
grade of major. Most of the other
appointees had been temporary captains,
majors, or lieutenant colonels, although
more than 200 had been colonels, and
some 500 had been first lieutenants.
Ages ranged from 21 to 48, the limits set
by law, with the great majority between
26 and 35.

Permanent grades of officers appointed in the services:

- Second Lieutenant: 308
- First Lieutenant: 2,779
- Captain: 2,716
- Major: 958
- Total: 6,761

Again, temporary grades ranged from
second lieutenant to one general officer.
More than 6,000 had been captains,
majors, or lieutenant colonels; more than
400 had been colonels; and about 700
had been first lieutenants. Ages were
from 21 to 48, except for chaplains and
medical officers, where 45 is the
authorized limit. Average age was
somewhat higher than in the ground arms.

Air Force appointments, by permanent
grade:

- Second Lieutenant: 1,469
- First Lieutenant: 11,574
- Captain: 1,048
- Major: 254
- Total: 14,345

Approximately 350 had been second
lieutenants; 3,300 first lieutenants; 5,300
captains; 3,500 majors; 2,100 lieutenant
colonels; 400 colonels; and two had
been general officers. More than two-
thirds were within the ages of 25 and 31,
inclusive.

One hundred and thirty-one
specialists, with no basic arm or service
background, were appointed in various
branches—officers with high
qualifications in military intelligence,
public information, troop information
and education, special services, military
government, General Staff Corps, and
the Inspector General's Department.

Educational levels of appointees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College Graduate Per cent</th>
<th>College Non-Grad. Per cent</th>
<th>Other Per cent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army:</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force:</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Integrated:</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total officer strength at wartime peak:</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
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Geographical distribution of the new
Regular Army and Air Force officers
presented interesting comparisons. New
York, third from the top in the number
integrated, with 1839, was among the
lowest ten states percentage-wise (ratio
of men integrated to state population).
Nevada, the lowest state numerically,
with 38 officers integrated, was among
the top ten percentage-wise. The western
states generally rank high in percentage
figures. California and Texas were easily
first and second numerically, with 2,475
and 2,344, and were among the first ten
in percentage. Utah was the highest in
percentage, and Maine, Michigan, and
West Virginia were tied for lowest.

Ninety appointees gave addresses
outside the continental United States,
including 35 in Hawaii, 30 in Puerto Rico or the Canal Zone, 11 in Alaska, 5
in Mexico or South America, and one
in China.

Out of 140,000 applicants, only 4,000
failed the General Survey Test; 6,400
were physically unqualified; 7,500 were
over age or under age; and 5,900
abandoned or withdrew their applications. Of the total integrated, 97
were Negroes—approximately the same
ratio of appointments to applications as
for white officers. More than 60 per cent
of all integrated officers were former
enlisted men. Total cost of the program
has been estimated at $9,376,254, an
average of $67.06 for each applicant, or
$365.30 for each appointee.

All integrated officers will be fitted
into the promotion lists on the same
basis, regardless of date on which each
increment was appointed. As in the case
of all newly appointed Regular Army
officers, integrated officers are placed on
a three-year probationary basis, their
commissions being subject to revocation
during that period.

Answers to
"IT HAPPENED ON THE FOURTH OF JULY!"

1. (b) George Rogers Clark
2. (a) John Hancock
3. (c) Colonel C. E. Stanton
4. (c) Charles Carroll of Carrollton
5. (a) U.S. Military Academy
6. (b) Vicksburg
7. (b) Calvin Coolidge
8. (c) John Adams
9. (a) Captain John W. Philip
10. (b) Stephen Collins Foster
The USSR and the democracies stand in the way of fulfilling imperialistic plans for world domination and for crushing democratic movements, a campaign against the Soviet Union and countries of the new democracy was undertaken, which campaign was also fed by threat of a new war from most sanguine imperialistic politicians of the United States and England.

"In this way two camps arose—the camp of imperialism and anti-democratic forces whose mission is to establish a world-wide American imperialist hegemony and crush democracy; and the democratic anti-imperialist camp whose mission is to eliminate imperialism, strengthen democracy, and liquidate remnants of fascism."

Approaching war called for new preparations. The Polit Bureau judged that Russia's enemies were not ready; neither was Russia. The general situation was therefore similar to 1934.

It is well to look at the record as to how Russia prepared for World War II, and compare the measures then taken with what is being done toward a possible World War III.

RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II

These included: Increase of the military forces; making Russia self-sufficient for food and supplies; suppression of a 5th Column at home; and diplomatic measures. The Polit Bureau's executive was Marshal Stalin, with Molotov as second in command.

Military forces at first increased at a rapid rate, and were promptly deployed in line. On 15 January, 1936, the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Tukhachevsky, reported that during the past year their strength had increased from 940,000 to 1,300,000. Divisions on the west frontier were, and would remain, at war strength. The same precaution had been taken in East Siberia, as it was believed that in case of war Japan might join Germany.

Really extraordinary improvements were made in production of food and industrial supplies. Russia became self-supporting as to food, but production of munitions had not become sufficient when war arrived. The deficiency was made good by American and British Lend-Lease.

There were many in Russia who refused to approve of Communism. The Polit Bureau realized that if this condition continued a powerful 5th Column might form to aid an invader. To avoid that possibility purges were ordered. They were directed against military and political officials and persons in public life, such as movie stars, writers, scientists, etc., who the secret police reported were hostile, lukewarm, or even neutral to Communism.

The purge best known in this country was that in the army. An example: On 11 June, 1937, the C-in-C and 7 other senior generals were arrested, charged with treason. That evening they were secretly tried by GCM, found guilty, and executed that night. Specifications to the charge have never been published. Similar measures were taken against thousands, who, removed by execution from their posts, were replaced by Communists. The Polit Bureau sought to make sure that there was absolutely no 5th Column within Russia.

In 1939 Russia was still not ready for war. Her diplomats made a treaty with Germany which postponed war for two years, besides obtaining advantageous territorial gains. In April 1941, a non-aggression 5-year treaty was signed with
Japan. Russian diplomacy delayed the war, although not for as long as had been desired. It did succeed in confining war to a single front at a time.

RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS AT PRESENT

The Polit Bureau's Executive is Marshal Stalin, with Molotov as second in command; same situation as in 1934. They appear to be following the same plan, modified by the experience of war.

In 1948 Russian divisions are again being strengthened on the west frontier. Strong forces have appeared in Northeast Siberia across Bering Strait from Alaska. There is great activity in increasing and improving military forces and weapons.

A renewed effort is making progress in growing more food and in producing more goods. Russia realizes that in another war there will be no Lease-Lend. To counteract that loss, industries in satellite states are being integrated into the Russian economy. This is a substantial gain. Additional satellites (industrial) would be desirable.

Purges are again in progress, for World War II developed a large dissatisfied class. Recently the world has heard of a purge of composers charged with writing unpatriotic music. These composers had an international reputation. Some of their works had been performed and admired in this country. This led to correspondence and some appearance of friendliness to Americans, all in violation of the communiqué denouncing the United States as the enemy of the "democratic" nations.

A major reason why Germany lost the war against Russia was the absence of some 50 divisions in other theaters of operation. It would be to the advantage of Russia to have something like that happen again. This is a mission of its diplomatic service. If chaos can be brought about in Palestine, it might suit Russia to have the United States furnish the divisions (estimated as a minimum of 6) to keep Jews and Arabs apart. The press has assumed that Russia would also want to send troops to Palestine. She has expressed no such desire.

Disturbances in Greece, near Panama, or elsewhere which might cause the United States to divert troops would be welcome. Best for Russia would be to induce the United States to rescue China. That would require a large number of divisions for a considerable time, and in an area whence they could not easily be withdrawn.

The employment of 5th Columns to distract attention, and if possible, eventually require military intervention, is being pushed. (See section on 5th Columns in the Americas.)

The present policy of the Polit Bureau is following the same pattern as that undertaken in preparation for World War II: Avoid war until everything is completed, but in the meantime keep military forces well in hand, prepared to strike in case some favorable opportunity presents itself, or to parry an attack, which it is alleged the Western Powers intend to launch.

5TH COLUMNS IN THE AMERICAS

The fact that during World War II 5th Columns in the Americas accomplished just about nothing should not lead to a belief that in another war they will be equally harmless. New organizations and techniques have been developed. New types of weapons may be issued. The 5th Column may hereafter become an important military factor.

EARLY RUSSIAN EFFORTS

Plans for an armed 5th Column within the United States were under way as early as 1929. On 6 May of that year, Josef (now Marshall) Stalin addressed the 3rd International Communist Congress in Moscow in part as follows:

"Many now think that the general crisis will not affect America. That of course is entirely untrue, Comrades. Three million now unemployed in America are the first swallows indicating the opening of the economic crisis in America. I think the moment is not far off when the revolutionary crisis will develop in America.

"This will be the beginning of the end of world capitalism. It is necessary that the American Communist Party should be able to meet this historic moment fully armed and take the lead in the coming class battle in America."

In the 10 years that followed there was an economic crisis within the United States. Russia's hopes that that would lead to a revolution did not materialize. But she kept the idea alive by organizing a number of communist headquarters in this country. These were literally supplied with Training Regulations for 5th Columns, covering the securing of arms, drills, sabotage, etc., written in excellent English and forwarded from Moscow by 1st class registered mail. Some of it fell into the hands of this writer and other American officials. Efforts to supply arms centered on thefts from armories and other sources. A small number of weapons was secured but not enough to be dangerous. This effort was a complete failure. Moscow so recognized it. Despite the fact that World War II was keeping its military forces fully occupied, the Kremlin decided not to lose sight of the ultimate objective of destroying the United States.
section was to be armed in part, and charged with sabotage. To direct the activities of both sections suitable CPs were to be established.

The foregoing recommendations were duly approved in Moscow, and the first Russian CP for 5th Columns in the Americas opened at Montevideo on 6 October, 1942. Recent reports are that it is still there. It now has branch CPs in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and possibly elsewhere.

In the autumn of 1945, soon after the conclusion of World War II, Russia, still with the same objective in mind, detailed intelligence officers to visit the United States, ascertain why German sabotage had failed, and determine what need be done to avoid failure again if there should be a new war. It was not illegal for these officers to travel throughout the United States, and although two of them were discovered, they were not disturbed. There may have been others who were not discovered. After about a year's reconnaissance and study these officers filed their report in Moscow in December, 1946.

It was easy to determine why German sabotage had failed. A few German agents had landed in this country, but they were captured before they accomplished anything. Their trials were extensively reported in the press, and the reasons for their lack of success publicly established. These included:

- a. Agents landed at unsuitable places.
- b. There was no organized 5th Column to receive and aid agents.
- c. Consequently agents had great difficulty getting started.
- d. It had been impracticable to land, over guarded coasts, munitions and demolition outfits sufficient for any worthwhile sabotage.

The Russian investigators recommended that it should be necessary to land agents, care be taken to select beaches or locations with a view to evading observation by guards. Agents so landed were to report without delay to a shelter agent previously appointed from the secret section of the 5th Column. Shelter agents were to appear as citizens engaged in regular work and have no direct connection with other communists except their immediate superior and such properly identified communists as required secret shelter. Similarly transportation agents were to be planted prior to hostilities. Their duty was to find, or furnish, transportation when properly directed to do so. It would seem that the shelter and transportation system was to be used principally by members of the 5th Column already within the country, and only incidentally for agents secretly landed.

The Russian investigators recommended that places for sabotage be selected in advance of war, and that arms and explosives for demolition be provided prior to hostilities and cached near the places where they would be needed.

Reports relating to unauthorized landing of arms and munitions within the Americas come from press despatches from Argentina and Chile which indicate that this has been in progress since December 1947. The method of landing is presumed to have been from unidentified submarines observed near the coasts. A British report states that this really commenced in July 1947. Unidentified submarines have also been observed off North America during this year, but no reliable information as to what they were about has been noted.

A Canadian report of April of this year states that a communist cache of machine guns and ammunition has been discovered in Quebec, and that it is suspected other caches exist.

**OPERATION FALKLAND**

This has been controlled from the Montevideo communist CP already mentioned. The desire was to create an incident over the ownership of the Falkland Islands and adjacent dependencies. Propaganda was circulated alleging that British control of the Falklands was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine and an outrage against Argentina and Chile, to which these islands should belong.

The communist 1st Section worked vigorously and succeeded in inducing the two South American states to make naval demonstrations and diplomatic claims between December 1947 and February 1948. This led to a British counter naval demonstration. The British offered to arbitrate the dispute, but both Argentina and Chile declined to do so.

The real mission of Operation Falkland is to weaken the United States. If the United States approves British occupation of the Falklands the communists hope that this will alienate two important Latin American states from the list of possible American allies. But if the United States disapproves the British occupation, that might lead to alienation of Great Britain as an ally. Either way Russia stands to gain, and has nothing to lose.

Up to date of writing, the United States Government has dodged the foregoing dilemma by refusing to express an opinion on the merits of this controversy.

**Historical Note.** The first colony in the Falkland Islands was established by France in 1764. One year later the British arrived but on a different island. In 1766 Spain bought the French colony. The Spaniards ejected the British during 1770, but this action was disapproved by the home government during the following year and the British returned. The Spaniards voluntarily abandoned the Falklands as a result of, and during, the Napoleonic Wars.

In 1823 the British established a regular government in the Falkland Islands and have maintained it ever since. In 1828, Argentina, then become independent from Spain, granted the islands as a concession to one of their citizens—Louis Vernet. Vernet established a fishing industry, including a small shore settlement. Vernet, on the ground that he owned the islands, interfered with whaling and fishing vessels of other countries. On complaint from United States ships, the US Navy in 1831 sent a naval vessel, under Commander Silas Duncan, to the Falkland Islands. Duncan opened fire on the Argentine settlement and completely destroyed it. Vernet and his Argentinians then left the islands. Since that date the British have been in undisputed possession of the Falkland Islands. The inhabitants are British, mostly of Scotch descent.

**Strategical Note.** The Falkland Islands afford locations for both naval and air bases. They played an important part in naval operations during
World War I, and a lesser part during World War II. It is the only base owned by the Anglo-Saxon Powers off the south end of South America and would be a serious loss if it passed to possession of an unfriendly nation.

**OPERATION PANAMA**

The communist CP controlling this operation has not been identified. It is presumed, but not known, to be in the Caribbean area.

On 10 December 1947, the United States completed negotiation of a treaty with Panama providing for further temporary occupation of certain defense bases covering the Panama Canal. These were mostly air fields located on islands. All had been built exclusively by American funds and were at the time garrisoned by American troops. No difficulty was expected in securing ratification of the treaty. The Panama government officially expressed the opinion that ratification would be passed by a large majority.

On 12 December, crowds of students instigated by communists made noisy and riotous demonstrations against ratification. For reasons not ascertained, the Foreign Minister who had negotiated the treaty now unexpectedly advised against its ratification. It was alleged that the treaty was an instrument for American imperialism and derogatory to the independence of a free state. Under this pressure the Panama Legislature rejected the treaty.

In view of this action the United States on 22 December announced that it would not further argue the matter, but would withdraw from the bases in question. The necessary orders were issued to abandon them and turn them over to Panama.

In this case the communist objective was to establish a strong 5th Column close to the Canal from which future operations can be conducted.

Operation Panama must be rated as a communist success. Reason—surprise and rapid action.

*Comment.* An election is due in Panama during the month of May. The communists are making special efforts to make important gains on this occasion. Reports have been received, but not proved, that Russian arms and munitions have arrived in Panama for use of the 5th Column. Because of the strategic importance of the Panama Canal, Panama and adjacent states are likely to be very particular objectives for communist activities. The entire Caribbean area deserves close attention.

**OPERATION BELIZE**

The same communist CP which maneuvered Operation Panama last December appears to have directed the next operation during late February and early March 1948.

A communist-armed organization, reported by British sources as having a strength of about a thousand men, has been formed in Central America. Each member is supposed to be a citizen of some Latin American state. There is reason to believe that that is far from being the truth. Members of this organization have participated in local revolutions, and have had combat experience.

In February 1948, this force was concentrated in Guatemala. At the same time an agitation was started by propaganda against further British occupation of British Honduras. This was on the same lines as propaganda in Operation Falkland—alleged violation of the Monroe doctrine and of the rights of Guatemala. The armed force advanced from central Guatemala towards Belize under the guise of being patriots seeking to liberate their enslaved brothers of British Honduras.

The excellent British Intelligence Service discovered this operation in time. It was therefore possible to bring in by 28 February two battalions of infantry and marines, who arrived on the frontier in advance of the attacking communists. In view of this action the communists withdrew without fighting, notwithstanding that Guatemala, also on 28 February, had officially applied to the United States for support in its desire to annex British Honduras.

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The communist objective in Operation Belize was the same as in Operation Falkland — to draw the United States into a position where it would have to favor a possible ally at the expense of losing another. The United States again dodged the issue by declining to express an opinion upon the dispute.

**OPERATION COLOMBIA**

The communist CP for the Caribbean Area did not plan the uprising which occurred in Bogota on 9 April, 1948. From despatches from US agents in Colombia, later submitted to a Congressional Committee, the communists on 16 March had appointed a committee to prepare to sabotage the Inter-American Conference shortly to convene in Bogota. This was to be by agitation against delegates from the United States, described as an imperialist, capitalistic country (same language as is used by Moscow), and against
The Communist Party in Colombia is small. Its leaders had no hopes of being able to stage a major operation.

On 9 April, during the Inter-American Conference, Senor Gaitan, one of the Ministers of Colombia, was assassinated at Bogota at about 1:30 PM. The assassin was promptly lynched. Investigation has established that he never had been a communist. His reasons for committing murder are unknown.

According to a report by an American (Puerto Rican) communist who reported for duty to the Bogota communist CP on 8 April, a communist meeting was held that evening. It was there decided that an uprising would take place which would include robbing stores for rations and supplies for distribution to the poor. This was for a distant date, to be determined later. No orders were issued for 9 April, nor was any operation planned for that day.

The communist CP was functioning on 9 April; its leader was active and intelligent. He heard about the murder of Senor Gaitan within a few minutes after it happened. He at once sent some communist university students to seize a local radio station. That mission was accomplished by 2:00 PM, when a stream of communist orders inciting the people to rise, seize arms from hardware stores, and prepare to overthrow the government, began. Poorer people responded with surprising enthusiasm. By 2:30 PM mobs appeared, and by 3:00 PM looting was in progress. The police were caught unprepared. There was a deficiency of troops immediately available. The mobs, constantly growing, had the business section soon at their mercy. Initial objectives were arms and liquor. Then came burning of undefended buildings, general sabotage of cars, etc.

The communist CP sought to direct the mobs, who were by no means communists, to concentrate and attack the Presidential Palace. This had a guard of soldiers, before whose fire the mob vanished. They were not interested in fighting as long as good looting could be indulged in. All efforts to make a coherent unit out of the mob, and to control it with a view of overthrowing the Colombia Government and the Inter-American Conference, failed. Looting and murder went on until around 9:00 PM. A large part of the mobs were by then drunk. Heavy rain began to fall. The mob was not concerned about communism. Thoughts turned to getting home with as much loot as possible. So ended an improvised communist operation. It had caused some 1,500 deaths, and a property loss estimated at over $100,000,000.

Comment. Communism attracts impoverished people. An opportunity to get something for nothing seems attractive, and at Bogota the chance was seized with surprising rapidity. Within two hours a temporary first-class local rebellion had been successfully staged by prompt action by a local communist CP.

The lesson is never to allow communists to set up CPs where subversive operations can be plotted at leisure to be sprung upon an unsuspecting people at an unexpected moment. In case of subversive activities, radio stations must be protected promptly against capture and unauthorized use.

THE BOGOTA CONFERENCE

The ninth Conference of American States, consisting of the United States and 20 Latin American states, met at Bogota on 30 March. Notwithstanding that its place of assembly was destroyed on 9 April by an unexpected communist attack, the Conference, with some haste, completed a program.

The United States considered this Conference highly important, and was represented by Secretary of State Marshall. As it was known that the Latin American states desired financial aid from the United States, on the ground that if we gave billions to Europe, they ought to get something substantial, President Truman on 8 April recommended to Congress the grant to them of $500,000,000 through the Export-Import Bank. This brought not a word of appreciation from Latin America. The sum was too small to please them.

The Conference adopted resolutions against subversive communist activities. But the most controversial subject was presented on 6 April by Venezuela. It desired that foreign possessions in the Americas be transferred to "a flag of the Americas" or be erected into new states. Without mentioning names it was made clear that Venezuela was willing to take over British Guiana and the British West Indies. This project was seconded by Argentina and Chile, who desired to annex the Falkland Islands and dependencies, and by Guatemala, which wanted British Honduras.

Thereupon, on 30 April, a Commission was appointed to investigate, report upon, and submit recommendations separately for each foreign possession within the Americas, with a view to abolishing all foreign legal ties in a peaceful manner. The United States declined to vote on this, as did Brazil and Santo Domingo.

The Conference then adjourned.

Comments. 1. There is general agreement that something needs to be done to prevent subversive communist activities. However, action, not resolutions, is required.

2. The problem of suppressing foreign possessions in the Americas is not simple. Their inhabitants are English, French, or Dutch — none Spanish or Portuguese. They have no wish to be annexed to a Latin-American state. In general they have a more stable government than many Latin-American states, which are subject to revolutions and violent overthrow of their governments.

The highest political freedom among foreign possessions is found in the French West Indies. They form a department of France, roughly equivalent to a state in the US, with full representation in the French Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Their people have all the rights of a citizen of France. Just now the French Council of the Republic in Paris, which advises and acts on most important matters, has for its
President the representative of French Guiana, who is a colored man. These French possessions are politically ahead of our Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Relations with the United States. On 3 March, the Secretaries of State and of Defense, testifying before a Congressional Committee, agreed that there would be little economic recovery in China, regardless of the volume of American aid, as long as communist armies remained unsuppressed. Lieut. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, testifying before the same committee, stated:

"Two years ago conditions in the Far East would have reacted favorably to purely economic assistance. But in the past two years the force in opposition to the legal government has become stronger militarily, and today economic aid would not suffice. Then $200,000,000 would have helped, if properly applied and supervised. Today I don't think I would have helped, if properly applied to military aid to protect that."

Gen. MacArthur wired:

"Underlying all issues in China is now the military problem. Until it is resolved little progress can be expected toward internal rehabilitation, regardless of the extent of outside aid."

Notwithstanding the foregoing testimony, the Congress, on 3 April, in the Foreign Aid Act allotted $463,000,000 to China, which amount included $125,000,000 for military equipment. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized to advance an additional $100,000,000.

On 11 March, President Truman at his press conference stated that the United States did not want a communist government in China, or anywhere else, if we can help it. Broadening the base of China's government (previously recommended by the United States) did not mean including communists in the Government. This statement is a reversal of the American position which for a long time demanded a joint Kuomintang and Communist National Government, and which Secretary of State Marshall spent over a year in China seeking to accomplish. It is presumed that from now on, the communists in China are considered as an enemy.

Internal Chinese Conditions. The first National Assembly under the new Constitution opened at Nanking on 29 March. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, long-time Dictator of the National Government, declined to run for President, but was nevertheless elected on 4 April. On 18 April, the President was authorized to assume dictatorial powers as he considered advisable until 25 December, 1950. As previously discussed in this column, Oriental nations dislike constitutions or having fixed laws. They prefer a dictatorship.

According to Chinese Treasury reports, since 15 August, 1945, and up to 1 April, 1948, the United States had given China in cash and in supplies the amount of $2,200,819,163. Of that sum $96,500,000 remained unexpended. The expenditure at the expense of the United States is at the rate of about $900,000 per annum. The new credit of 3 April can therefore be expected to last about 6 months. As predicted by high military officers, it will probably be nearly useless. The problem is to defeat the enemy, not restore the national economy. If the enemy is defeated the national economy can be expected to improve. In the contrary case it will deteriorate. There is now a large deativest element in China who believe that the communists can not, or will not, be stopped. In view of this belief, thefts of government moneys and supplies, disguised as graft, are common. Shanghai reports are that the major part of American aid is corruptly disposed of.** This includes a certain amount of military equipment sold, directly or indirectly, to the enemy.

Note. The vast majority of Chinese live a primitive life under extreme poverty. They are completely incapable of understanding constitutions, communism, democracy, and similar subjects. What they want is to live in peace, and to be taxed justly and not too much.

There is now considerable agreement that under Japanese occupation life was safer, communication quicker, business better than at any time since the fall of the Empire in 1912. Just now everything seems to be steadily growing worse.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

The General Situation. The communists have made substantial gains. They have the initiative and are using it. Their main offensive, based on their radio reports, is to be launched in May and is intended to sweep south across the Yangtze River.

On 9 April, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced a change of strategy. He stated:

"In past the Government has been handicapped by its concern for the people. To protect towns from enemy ravage everywhere, troops have been spread thin, thus giving the enemy opportunities to concentrate against particular targets. There are about 2,000 counties and if one regiment is stationed in each county, the Government will have to increase its present combat strength four fold, which is impossible. Consequently the Government has revamped its strategy."

"It has now been decided to fight the communists at times and places chosen by the Government. In this way the area south of the Yellow River will be cleared of the enemy within six months.

"Cities of strategic value [to be held] in order of importance are Chinhien, Mukden, Changchun, Harbin, Kalgan, and Chefoo. Less Harbin, all are now in Government hands."

**Testimony given before a US Senate Committee showed, as an illustrative example, that the US had given to China a considerable quantity of blood plasma. The plasma had been donated by patriotic Americans during the war. The Chinese were charged on paper 3c a dose. It was thereupon sold in China in the Black Market for SUS 25.00 a dose. The testimony indicated that troops got none of this plasma.
Up to the end of April the Government evacuated a number of areas under the new policy. However, no special operation against the enemy had been reported.

The Manchuria Theater. Communist GHQ and its temporary capital is stated to be at Kiamusz in northeast Manchuria and about 90 miles from the Siberian border. The capital of Manchuria is at Tsitsihar. Total communist force is unknown but is reported by the Kuomintang as exceeding 200,000.

On 1 March, the Kuomintang held 4 cities: Changchun, Kirin, Szepingtai, and Mukden. All were blocked and had connection with each other and the remainder of China by air only. Total Kuomintang force was stated as 300,000 exclusive of a relief expedition of 200,000. The relief expedition was advancing overland from the Tientsin area, reinforced by troops brought in by sea through Chinchow and Hulluao, ports then free from ice. The leading elements were at Tahushan, covering the main body at Chinhsien, listed by the Generalissimo as the most important strategic point in all of China. The leading elements were only 30 miles from the Liao River along which was the outer defense of Mukden. That 30-mile gap was never closed during the period of this account, and there is no report that any effort was made to close it. Mukden reported that they had no way to supply 200,000 troops if they should arrive.

The main communist force of 10 divisions was west of the line Kaiyuan—Szepingtai. Two communist divisions were at Simmin between Mukden and the relief force, and 3 divisions were south of Mukden. The communist commander was General Lin Piao, an energetic officer, with CP at Liayuan, 45 miles northwest from Szepingtai. On 7 March General Piao attacked Szepingtai, and captured it with its garrison on the 13th. The Kuomintang thereupon ordered the evacuation of Kirin on the 13th. Troops left the same day, so hastily that there was left untouched a large amount of ordnance, stores, and supplies for the 3 divisions which had formed the garrison. Capture of Kirin gave the communists a major hydroelectric plant unharmed. The communists cut the power to Mukden and Changchun, only cities remaining to the Kuomintang in Manchuria. No further operations of importance occurred during April.

American correspondents visited Mukden at the beginning of April. They report no real defenses; practically no barbed wire. Pill boxes are made of mud and not very useful. Troops spend much time in barracks. The general appearance was one of disorder and inefficiency. General Wei Liwong was in command; the general opinion was that he had no intention to fight, but was likely to surrender on the ground that the central Government had failed to fill his requisitions as to funds and supplies, thereby seeking to place the blame on the government. All hands were seeking to leave. General Chennault was operating 3 private planes a day to take out refugees, also some Government planes. About 80 were leaving daily, including some wounded. The waiting list for departure had 60,000 names, with priority to the military.

North Theater. On 7 March a communist force moving west from Taichung, Shansi, defeated the 29th Kuomintang Army near Ichwan. This Army (really a corps of 3 divisions) had a strength of 30,000 men. Kuomintang reports are that only 2,000 infantry and a battery escaped, casualties amounting to over 20,000 against a loss of 7,000 for the communists. Truth appears to be that the Kuomintang troops, with minor exceptions, deserted to the enemy. After that success the communists moved onwards and entered Yenan, their former capital, on 31 March.

At Peiping the Kuomintang commander since October 1947 has been General Fu Tsu-ji. The official designation of his command is North China Communist Rebellion Suppression Command. He hasn't succeeded in suppressing the Rebellion. Yet he is an energetic officer and one of the very few efficient generals on the Kuomintang side. The lack of success against the communists has led General Fu to adopt some of their principles. He has announced free distribution of lands where owners had collaborated with the enemy. The enemy follows the same principle. As areas are constantly changing sides, lands are constantly being forfeited. In view of this situation and a common observance that the communists are advancing, owners of all kinds of property in north China are liquidating their estates. Where possible they are leaving the country. Favorite havens are Hon Kong, which is British-owned territory where law and order prevails, and Formosa, supposed to be safe from communists as long as the US Navy rules the seas. General Fu has gone right after communists invading his area around Kalgan. He has prevented them from making a permanent settlement, but has not been able to prevent raids.

At the end of April a strong communist force had assembled north of Sian, apparently with a view to forcing a crossing over the Yellow River during May.

Central Theater. The communist 8th Army, General Li Mi commanding, had the initiative in Shantung. In accordance with the new general policy to reduce the number of garrisoned places, the Kuomintang on 31 March abandoned the ports of Lungkow, Penglai, and Weihaiwei. Islets off Lungkow and Weihaiwei were retained with coast artillery garrisons. It was believed that with the help of the American-trained navy this would suffice to deny those ports to the communists. At the end of April the communists captured Weihaiwei, but failed to take Tsingtao, which was ably defended. Outside of that town, throughout Shantung, the Kuomintang now holds only Chefoo, and Tsingtao, which is an American naval base.

At the other end of the theater a communist raid captured Loyang on 12 March, together with its garrison—the 206th Division and its commander. The communists withdrew on 17 March but came back again on 5 April. On this occasion the new Kuomintang garrison failed to fight and fled.

The Kuomintang is concentrating troops in this theater with a view to making the Yellow River line the Main Line of Resistance. They have undertaken, up to 1 May, no important offensive.
South Theater. Some communist troops have crossed the Yangtze River in spite of a naval patrol. At mid-March they were raiding the Shanghai & Nanking RR. A communist force consisting of their 1st, 2nd, 10th, and 11th Divisions, en route to cross the Yangtze, was stopped by Kuomintang troops between 6 and 10 April in the vicinity of Fowyang along the Yellow River line. There is considerable communist 5th Column activity in this theater.

Comment. If the communists continue to gain, the announcement of the establishment of a Soviet state in Manchuria may occur. Also the communists may set up an entirely new Chinese state in the territory controlled by them, declaring their complete independence. Should either, or both, of these measures be taken, application for recognition by Moscow is to be expected. This might lead to Russia's denouncing so much of the Yalta Agreement as required her to recognize and support the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Russia has held to that agreement, but might hold that it did not apply to portions of China which had set up new states. This complication should be watched for.

WEST EUROPE

On 22 January, 1948, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, in his speech before the House of Commons, suggested that West Europe organize for mutual defense against Russia, for he stated:

"There is no doubt that, as it has evolved, it has revealed the policy of the Soviet Union to use every means in their power to get communist control in Eastern Europe and, as it now appears, in the West as well."

A conference thereupon convened at Brussels, Belgium, on 4 March. On the 17th the participating states of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a treaty providing that if any of them be attacked, the others would immediately afford all military and other aid in their power. On 17 April a joint military headquarters in London was provided for.

On 28 April Secretary of State Marshall said that the United States had under consideration some form of military Lend-Lease to the West European nations. What political commitment the United States should make was under study.

Comment. Nations go to war when they believe themselves to be in danger, or to obtain, or retain, some economic benefit. A war in fulfillment of an abstract promise to some one else and which offers no benefit to the nation concerned is unusual.

An illustrative example is the Pact of Locarno of 1 December, 1925. Five West European nations—Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and Italy—promised to keep the peace among themselves and to act at once against any one of them who attacked, or even concentrated troops against, another. Wildly acclaimed at the time, the Pact was useless to prevent World War II.

The reason was that no economic benefits were provided for in the Locarno Pact. The economic interests of the participating nations thereafter advanced on divergent lines and eventually brought about a situation which resulted in war.

GREECE

THE GENERAL SITUATION

Since time immemorial Greece has been a battle ground between the east and the west. The Greek historian Herodotus referred to this as the eternal question. Before the Christian era there was a long series of wars against the Persians on the east, and the Romans on the west. The latter won, and Greece remained a part of the Roman Empire (west) for several centuries. It then fell to the Roman Empire at Constantinople (east) after which it became part of the Turkish Empire (east). It is again a battle ground between Russian communism (east) and American democracy (west). The general situation is the same as it was 2,000 years ago. Only the combatants have changed.

CURRENT MILITARY OPERATIONS

The Greek Army has three corps with a strength of about 120,000 men. The troops are now well supplied with American equipment, and the men receive American rations. The II Corps faces Albania with its CP at Larissa; the III Corps, with CP at Salonika, faces Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The I Corps, with CP at Athens, supports the other corps and protects the lines of communications. A detached, force operates in the Peloponnesus.

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The communists have about 25,000 troops. The main body operates out of Albania; a secondary force out of
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. When hard pressed, or in need of rest, reorganization, or supplies, they withdraw across the frontier. The Greeks have respected the frontier and have not followed. The communists therefore have a sure haven, with the option of invading Greece at such time and place as they select.

An important element of communist strength is the 5th Column. This is estimated as 150,000 strong scattered all through Greece. It furnishes information, aids in military operations in its vicinity, undertakes acts of terrorism and sabotage. The 5th Column is dangerous. During April, incensed MPs killed 25 5th Column POWs while they were in confinement. This was officially denounced by the government as completely illegal and unauthorized. Yet the local population, harassed by 5th Column activities, expressed the hope that the same treatment would be carried out against other traitors discovered. There is a growing desire among Greeks to end the current war by vigorous action, regardless of whether this complies with ordinary rules of warfare.

On 11 March, the US Aid Mission to Greece in its report severely criticized the Greek Army for failure to take the offensive against the communists, designated as the "bandits." It stated: "It is an indisputable fact, proved in every engagement, that the firepower of the Greek Army has been overwhelmingly superior to that of the bandits. The comparative casualties of every major engagement has been striking proof of the inferior fire power of the bandits. . . . It is an unfortunate fact that during the past summer, fall, and winter, the army did not resume the offensive and the bandits were thereby enabled not only to increase their marauding activities, but also to increase their strength through forcible recruiting."

Communist operations have been on a minor scale, limited to raids. Some penetrated inland into Salonika and as far south as the Gulf of Corinth. A new feature of the raids was the kidnapping of children, who were taken into Albania and Yugoslavia. The alleged reason is that important operations are scheduled for the coming summer, and that it was desired to remove children to a zone of safety. Raids also included forcible recruiting of young men, brutal assassinations of anti-communists, and seizure of animals and supplies.

Partial confirmation of a communist offensive this summer came on 14 April when Yugoslavia declared the south part of her territory, within 50 miles of Greece, as off limits for foreigners. Representatives of the US Embassy at Belgrade were turned back from this area. Greek Intelligence reports state that Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian are massing troops along their south boundaries. A communist International Brigade, composed largely of displaced Spanish communists, after training in Yugoslavia under a Russian general, is reported as having taken station in Albania. No part of this brigade has been identified in line.

Early in April, the Greek Army commenced an offensive to clear out numerous small bands of communists throughout the north section. Plans for this offensive were drawn, and are being supervised, by American officers. Instead of divisions deployed on a wide front, numerous combat groups have been formed. They did not all start on the same day and hour, but operated independently. The aim is to subject the communists to attack from any and all directions, and allow them no rest day or night. The main effort is to clear the Albanian border and the lines of communication south to the Gulf of Corinth. Up to the end of the month this offensive appears to have yielded substantial results. Many communists are stated to have been killed or captured; others were glad to surrender; and certain areas became reasonably safe for circulation. This seems to be the first fruits of American training.

During April, about 50,000 NG troops have been organized and are operational for defense of their home towns. This relieves Regular troops for field duty, and keeps the 5th Column under close watch.

A small communist force has appeared raiding in the Peloponnessus. It is supposed to be supplied by sea. It seems more probable that it is supported by the 5th Column.

Comment. American intervention in Greece, to support the Government at Athens, which had been freely elected, against an armed communist insurrection, was announced in March 1947. During 1947 the United States furnished Greece some $300,000,000 of supplies, and considerable military operational advice. Notwithstanding, the communist force was not overcome. On the contrary it increased in strength.

During 1948, the United States expects to furnish much more supplies, and this year is giving military operational direction in the campaign against the communists.

If the 1948 campaign is not successful, it will produce a severe reaction against the United States. The Greeks are beginning to think that American intervention is prolonging, rather than shortening, the general chaos in Greece. They are likely to think that after all it might be better to give the communists a chance. It is most important that the current campaign be conclusively won.

Palesine

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The situation revolves around the United Nation's decision of 29 November, 1947, to partition Palestine into:

A Jewish state—5600 sq. miles (54.37%), with 498,000 Jews and 327,000 Arabs, forming together 50.305% of the total population.

An Arab state—4700 sq. miles (45.63%), with 10,000 Jews and 805,000 Arabs, forming together 49.695% of the total population.

A neutral state—Jerusalem and suburbs under UN rule.

The Jewish state contains the richest farms and the best ports—Haifa and Akaba. The Arab state has farms in the north, pastures in the south, and the inferior port of Jaffa, which is an enclave wholly encircled by Jewish territory.

The Arabs have refused to accept partition. To them this is not a problem
of providing for a minority alleged to be unjustly treated; it is a proposition to oust the Arabs from their homeland in order to make place for outside Jews who are not citizens. Presumably to make room for incoming Jews, the UN decision has allotted the Jews a proportionately larger area than present numbers warrant, under an assumption that Arabs now there would move out.

On 6 February the Palestine Arabs declared war against any nation seeking to enforce partition. The declaration was filed with the United Nations. This alleged that the UN decision for partition had been secured by undue pressure from the United States amounting to "political blackmail", and was null and void anyway as unauthorized under the UN Charter.

On 19 March, in view of increased fighting between Jews and Arabs, the United States requested the UN to reconvene the General Assembly with a view of establishing a trusteeship over Palestine. This was agreed to and the General Assembly was convened for 20 April.

On 25 March, President Truman expressed the views of the American Government as follows:

"It has become clear that the partition plan can not be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not undertake to impose this solution on the people of Palestine by the use of American troops, both on Charter grounds and as a matter of national policy.

"The United Kingdom has announced its firm intention to abandon its mandate in Palestine on May 15... The United States has proposed to the Security Council a temporary UN Trusteeship for Palestine... I am instructing Ambassador Austin to urge upon the Security Council in the strongest terms that representatives of the Arabs and Jews be called at once to the council table to arrange a truce... With such a truce and such a trusteeship, a peaceful settlement is yet possible."

The Arabs and Jews, having been to the council table to arrange a truce, refused to do so, unless it was agreed in advance:

For the Arabs—that the partition plan would not be made effective.

For the Jews—that the partition plan would not be made effective.

The conditions for a truce being mutually incompatible, there hasn't been any.

On 20 April, the UN General Assembly met as ordered. They proceeded to consider the Palestine problem. Up to the end of the month no decision had been arrived at. The viewpoints of the contending factions as submitted were:

By the Jews—that partition practically already exists. The UN has no authority to revoke or amend its decision as to partition. Its single duty is to protect the Jewish state from attacks by Arabs in violation of the UN's just decision.

By the Arabs—that partition is unauthorized by the UN's Charter, and also by the League of Nations Covenant, which prescribes that when a mandate expires, an independent state shall be set up. Ousting citizens from their own country to make room for foreign Jews is contrary to all international law.

Comments: 1. The UN Charter is silent as to partitioning an existing state into two or more new states. It is presumed that such a right is authorized under Charter provisions for preserving the peace. If that view is upheld, there is nothing to prevent the UN from partitioning other states—for example, China and Greece into communist and non-communist states.

2. League of Nation's Covenant Article 26 relates to former Turk areas which became mandates (of Great Britain and France). This prescribes that upon the end of a mandate the various areas become independent states. This procedure has been regularly followed for Syria, Lebanon, and all the former Turk areas except Palestine, sole remaining mandate.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

A minor war is in progress. Prior to partition, operations were limited to terroristic attacks by Jewish gangs against the British. This has practically ceased and has been replaced by fighting between Jews and Arabs on an expanding scale.

The main Jewish force is between Haifa, Jerusalem, and Jaffa, which is the heart of the proposed new Jewish state. The strength is secret, but exceeds 20,000 men, well armed, trained, and equipped. They are efficiently led. Munitions, supplies, and funds come almost entirely from the United States. Direct shipment of arms and munitions is prohibited, but it is not illegal to ship them to an intermediate port from which there is no prohibition against shipment to Palestine.

The Jews occupy a central position with interior lines of communication and good ports. There are good roads to all parts of the frontiers. The Arabs occupy an exterior position beyond the Jewish lines on the north, east, and south, with as many different commands. Lines of supply and communication are lengthy, circuitous, and in some places poor.

Inside of Palestine only provisional forces of Arabs have been operating. These are natives reinforced by outside volunteers. Some of the latter are trained officers and men on leave. Organizations are provisional, and these are imperfectly trained and poorly supplied. They have not been a match for the Jews. During the period of this report no regular Arab troops have crossed into Palestine.

North Force: Probably about 5,000 men based on Syria, where some training was given. Commenced to cross into Palestine by infiltration during the first week in March. Has a few armored vehicles and considerable motor transportation. Commander is Sheik Hassan Salamen. This individual was a leader in the Palestine revolt between 1936 and 1939 and is rated an expert guerrilla.

Mediterranean Force: Probably not over 2,000 men in southwest Palestine. Very poorly equipped and almost no training. Commander is Sheikh Hassan Salamen. He also was a leader in the 1936-1939 revolt, and later in the 1941 Irak rebellion. After that was crushed, Salamen escaped to Germany. There he received some training and was appointed a major. The German Air Force dropped him in Palestine in 1944. Mission of his force is to hold Jaffa.

South Force: Probably some 4,000 men covering lines of communication around the south end of the Dead Sea. Commander was Abdul Kadr el Husseini, a graduate of the British-established
The Mediterranean Force has not intervened to force the Jews to withdraw. It is scheduled to withdraw on 15 May when the British Mandate is to expire. What will then occur is unknown.

Miscellaneous Notes. Best information of the regular Arab troops is that Syria and Lebanon can jointly furnish 1 weak division; Trans-Jordan a good division reinforced by an Iraq Brigade; and Egypt not over 1 division. Egypt could furnish at least 2 divisions. She is, however, confronted by a strong 5th Column in home territory. This 5th Column just failed to overthrow the government in extensive rioting in March. Consequently sending away any considerable part of the Regular Army which quelled the 5th Column is not favorably considered.

Identification

By Lt. Col. Arnold M. Anderson FA-Res.

MOVING from Metz into the Bulge area on the night of December 26, 1944, our column was turned to the right, or east, by a route marker a few miles north of Mersch, Luxembourg. After moving a few miles in the new direction, my vehicle, which was in the lead, was overtaken by a jeep and the driver shouted up information that we had been turned at the wrong corner and that the column should turn around and resume the march to the north.

On a narrow road, on a dark night and with armored vehicles, that was easier said than done, so we moved slowly ahead to find a clear space off the road that would permit our vehicles to circle and turn back.

Just as a clear space was sighted in the gloom, a voice shouted, "Halt," and there in the middle of a small bridge, hardly more than a culvert, stood an American sentry. Holding his carbine at port, the sentry advanced to my half-track and demanded the password. Since we had been moving all day, we hadn't been provided with the current magic word and we couldn't supply it. Since it was necessary to cross the bridge to reach the open field, I tried to prevail on the guard to permit us to cross his bridge but he was adamant. His instructions were to permit no one to cross the bridge without the password. In case of trouble, he was to blow the bridge, which was mined. That we were approaching the bridge from the friendly side did not influence his decision that we could not cross nor did the fact, which I pointed out to him, that we were 500 strong with tanks, machine guns, grenades, rifles and what have you.

As I thought the problem over, trying to decide whether to drive on anyway and hope that his aim was poor or to have several men restrain him while we made the crossing and turn-about, the sentry came up with the answer. "What is the capital of Illinois?" he demanded unexpectedly. "Springfield," I replied, blessing the fact that I had once worked in Illinois. "What is the capital of Wisconsin?" he next asked. "Madison," I answered. "Pass on," said the sentry as he moved to the side of the road.
"The true University of these days is a Collection of books."

THOMAS CARLYLE

Diplomacy and War

By Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker

At the meeting of the War Council at the White House on November 25, 1941, Secretary Hull reviewed our relations with Japan and concluded: "The Japanese are likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force. The question of safeguarding our national security lies in the hands of the Army and Navy." (p. 1080) For this reason alone The Memoirs of Cordell Hull deserve the attention of the armed services. These volumes demonstrate clearly to what extent power, especially military power, is an essential ingredient of foreign policy.

Civilians are often inclined to underrate this aspect of our foreign relations; the military frequently fails to understand the difficulties which confront our policy makers—political and economic shibboleths dividing our nation, traditional rivalries and narrow self-interest among foreign nations. In order to discharge properly their responsibility for the security of the nation, the armed forces must not only be experts within their profession but also be familiar with the many problems which make up the ultimate objective of our national policy. To those who feel the urgency to study these problems and have the time to read 1804 pages of frequently difficult text, Cordell Hull's memoirs are strongly recommended.

Most of us know that the policymaking process is a complex one, but the extent of the difficulties is only too often not realized. Secretary Hull's narrative furnishes this education. It can be criticized for its style, for its self-righteousness, for its overemphasis of the importance of many of the actions taken; still it gives the reader an understanding of the many factors which complicate our foreign policy. National policy should be feasible as well as right.

Public opinion must constantly be taken into consideration. "In our policy toward Europe, as in our policy toward Japan, we sought to keep reasonably ahead of public opinion, even while seeking to educate public opinion to the importance of our position in the world and to the fatal fallacy of isolating ourselves. But we could not get too far ahead. To do so brought an inevitable reaction and made the situation worse than before because it caused the aggressor governments to believe that our people would not follow us in any strong action in the foreign field." (p. 575)

The support of the Legislative Branch must be carefully wooed, as the Senate's treaty-making power and the House's control of the purse can upset the most intelligent of foreign policies. An unfriendly Chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, like Senator Pittman during much of Hull's tenure of office, can cause innumerable difficulties and stymie State Department policy.

Within the Executive Branch much depends on the personal relations between the President and his associates. A President strongly interested in foreign policy may run his own State Department in the White House, as Franklin Roosevelt frequently did. Other Cabinet officers, the future Morgenthau and Wallaces, may expand their activities into the foreign field. Under these circumstances much of the time available will be spent in efforts to "put out fires" and to coordinate diverging policies. Even within the State Department itself, animosities like the one between Mr. Hull and Mr. Welles may impede the proper execution of policy.

In addition, other nations usually experience similar difficulties. They too have their isolationists and interventionists. They too are more often inclined to follow narrow self-interest rather than far-sighted international policies. Moreover, they are generally more haunted by traditional rivalries and national ambitions than the United States.

These factors will remain and will continue to influence foreign relations. There will probably never be another Cordell Hull — honest, stubborn, with implicit faith in Wilsonian ideals; his type and generation are passing from the national scene. We can only hope that the men called to meet similar challenges in the future will be as able and at the same time more successful in their efforts to avoid the settlement of differences between nations on the battlefield. For the latter, a much closer cooperation between the State Department and the National Defense Establishment than that indicated in Mr. Hull's memoirs appears essential.

What Ike Is Like

EISENHOWER SPEAKS, Edited by Rudolph L. Treuenfels. 299 pp. Farrar, Straus & Company. $3.00.
By Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley

This book is a collection of General Eisenhower's public statements between V-E Day and the end of his tour as Chief of Staff. It begins with his Victory Order of the Day, May 8, 1945, and ends with his final report as Chief of Staff, February 7, 1948. Its pages include formal addresses, statements,
messages and transcripts of press conferences and Congressional hearings. The addresses, particularly in the periods when General Eisenhower was making several in a day, were presumably staff written—at least to some extent. Then too, speeches made in acknowledgment of the receipt of honors of various sorts, foreign and domestic, can hardly fail to contain some platitudes. In contrast, the press conference reports, more personal and in some cases off the record at the time, come alive and make interesting reading.

The editor, in a foreword, says that this book grew out of a discussion among friends who wondered why a General of the Army should have followed the example of Robert E. Lee in accepting the call to the presidency of an educational institution. One cannot help suspecting that the publishers wish that General Eisenhower has accepted a call to another presidential office. This book would have made an excellent campaign reference book. There is no question but that the editor made a good choice of items to bring out a rounded picture of Eisenhower’s beliefs. Unfortunately, there is some evidence of haste in the publication of the book. There are three pages of biographical data which are neither well selected nor without errors, and there are some typographical errors in the body of the book (George S. Patton becomes George F. Patton, for example).

Communism at Work
I SAW POLAND BETRAYED. By Arthur Bliss Lane. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1948. $3.50.

By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza

The author had been a member of the American embassy at Warsaw following World War I. He returned as ambassador at the end of World War II. The earlier occasion had been a happy celebration; the latter was a sorrowful reunion over a devastated country occupied by powerful Russian forces.

The first third of the book is a study of President Roosevelt’s decisions respecting Poland. Documents are quoted indicating that Mr. Roosevelt felt that a break with Russia during the war might result in Stalin’s once again joining Hitler. He considered that possibility to be such a menace that he felt it necessary to appease Russia, at least until Germany had been defeated.

Mr. Lane reports that during his ambassadorship the Polish people were very friendly and appreciative of what the United States did for them. The Polish Government accepted American gifts and loans, but it was not friendly. Russia, from behind the scenes, arranged to plant trusted Communists in key positions. They forced a strongly anti-Communist country into the narrow path prescribed by Moscow.

"Elections" were held. Voting was fair, but the counting of ballots was not. A law had been passed that blank ballots should be counted for the Government’s single ticket. Enough blanks were usually found to give a thumping majority for Communism.

Early in 1947 Mr. Lane came to the conclusion that a new World War was being planned. He believed that he could accomplish nothing useful by staying in Warsaw, therefore resigned and then wrote this book. Its purpose is to acquaint Americans with how Russia establishes a police state upon an unwilling people, through unscrupulous and tyrannical means. His account is well documented, entertaining, and instructive.

Satanic Saga

By Dr Louis Morton

When the Russian Army moved into Berlin in 1945 and went through the German official archives, it discarded many of the documents in favor of the filing cabinets, which were sent back to Russia. Among the mass of papers discarded in the courtyard of the Propaganda Ministry was the diary of Paul Joseph Goebbels. The papers were carted away to be sold as junk, but because the diary had been typed on expensive water-marked paper it escaped destruction. Eventually the charred and soiled pages of the diary—evidently an attempt had been made to burn it—fell into the hands of Mr. Frank E. Mason, once a military attaché at the American Embassy in Berlin and later a correspondent. He recognized the value of the papers and after Louis P. Lochner,
"A document of unique and sinister interest . . . In terms of military power Goebbels was worth several armies."

N. Y. Times
Book Review

This is the most important volume on your bookshelf of World War II . . . revealing the full extent of Hitler's hatred for his generals . . . the impact of our attacks on Germany . . . the day-to-day development of the strategy of terror . . . the inner workings of the Nazi hierarchy and Goebbels' own comments on other high Nazis whom, one-by-one, he managed to murder in the eyes of Adolf Hitler.

THE
GOEBBELS
DIARIES
Edited, Translated, and with an Introduction
by LOUIS P. LOCHNER
BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB SELECTION FOR MAY

$4.00

U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASS'N.
1218 Conn. Avenue
Washington 6, D. C.

an experienced journalist and for twenty years head of the Associated Press bureau in the German capital, had established the authenticity of the diary, the decision was made to publish it. Mr. Lochner was selected for the task of translating and editing the diary. The result is an admirable and authentic picture of wartime Germany, but more than that it is a document with a unique and sinister interest.

The period covered in Goebbels' diary extends from January 1942 to December 1943. There are gaps which Mr. Lochner has filled in with editorial comment. Many of the pages of the diary will not be of great interest, but on the whole it is filled with exciting and fascinating passages which throw much light on the way Goebbels operated, what he thought of other people, and his views on propaganda. Goebbels' comments on many of the military leaders as well as civilian officials with whom he disagreed are vitriolic and illuminating. His attitude toward Hitler is revealing also, for he seems always to have regarded his leader as an inspired figure.

Goebbels believed in anything, it was Hitler's greatness.

With his brilliant and distorted mind, Goebbels was reputed to be the most intellectual of the top Nazi leaders. The diary does not bear out this reputation for intellect. He is revealed in his day-by-day entries as a petty man, vain, revengeful, and mean — a man who scorned the enemy and crowed over his defeats. Such an attitude might be justified in a propaganda document intended for the German people, but not in a personal diary written by a man who should know better. He knew little or nothing about America and totally misjudged and ridiculed our war effort; he sneered at British ability and their reverses confirmed his opinion. He seems to have been convinced that the Axis would win on the Eastern front. In his diary Goebbels shows himself as a vicious and cynical man whose influence lay in his ability to control German thought.

As a propagandist—and he must be judged finally from this point of view—Goebbels was an immense success. With him propaganda techniques became a fine art and he led the German people like sheep. He appealed to the worst instincts, the lowest common denominator in his people — hatred and envy. The diary shows him as the motivating force behind the vicious anti-Semitism of the Nazi regime. In guiding the masses and confusing the enemy he had no equal, and his success was greatly aided by American and British propaganda which called for a harsh peace and unconditional surrender.

Lochner, who knew Goebbels well, has done an excellent job of translating and annotating the diary. He has given us a book that will answer many questions about Germany during the war and the methods used by the Nazi leaders. It is a book which will reward the persevering reader with insights into the character of one of the most evil and sinister personalities of our time.

Fun on the Air
SOMETHING'S GOT TO GIVE. By Marion Hargrove. 312 pages. William Sloane Associates. $3.00.

By Allen L. Otten

See Here, Private Hargrove was a slick, pleasant, entertaining and often profound book about the early days of our draft army. In his second book, Something's Got to Give, Marion Hargrove has written a slick, pleasant, entertaining and not quite so profound book about the radio and advertising "games."

The story tells of two suburban couples, the husbands refugees from high-paid promotion jobs, busily using up the family savings while they freelance and grind out who-dunits. To give the families "security," the females get the idea of a daily radio program—Airing Our Children—in which they discuss the problems of bringing up infants, based on personal experience with their own four precocious toddlers. The husbands are dragged in as unwilling coworkers, the program is a fabulous success, and its very success forces the marriages toward the rocks. There is the usual deus ex machina in the form of a foundling left on the doorstep of one of the couples, and the usual happy ending. On this very gaunt skeleton of plot, Hargrove has draped some lovely dialogue, tailor-made for Hollywood, and his own comments on modern art, fashionable cocktail parties, radio sponsors, advertising agencies, soap operas,
gossip columnists, and the world of radio and advertising in general. Not quite so bitter as The Hucksters, Aurora Dawn, Please Send Me Absolutely, and other precursors, Something's Got to Give should still provoke many giggles and one or two snorts on Radio Row.

Marion Hargrove has not written a modern classic, but he has written a good book by current standards, one that will enhance his reputation a little and his bank account a lot, and one that he has obviously enjoyed writing. You'll enjoy reading it, too.

**American Keystone**

**THE GREAT REHEARSAL.** By Carl Van Doren. Viking Press. $3.75.

By George C. Groce

The basic assumptions of this book are that man can learn from the experiences of the past and that there is a certain broad parallel between the establishment of a Constitution for the thirteen American States and the establishment of harmonious international relationships between the component members of the United Nations.

In this framework, Mr. Van Doren presents those essential facts the general reader may want to know about the actual framing and ratification of the "Supreme Law" of our land.

This is no book for pedants. It reads too smoothly, unencumbered as it is by unwieldy documentation. For special students, he reprints as appendices the major documents from which the Constitution was derived.

Here is a capital piece of writing by one whose many years of labor in the vineyards of early American life have been abundantly productive. The austere majesty of Washington, the mellow wisdom of Franklin, the learning and industry of James Madison, as well as a score and more of other characterizations, vitalize these momentous hours and give life to the pages as they pass in review.

Those who have faith in the United Nations will find profit in the early arguments for and against major clauses in the Constitution, as well as in the later debates on its adoption. This is a fascinating and a timely book which, if given an opportunity, will set in motion long trains of thought on historical parallels and their value.

In this connection the reviewer is reminded of a dictum of Mr. Van Doren's former colleague, Professor Charles Downer Hazen, "Of this one thing we can be quite certain: that history never repeats itself—exactly."

**Strategic Area**

**THE MEDITERRANEAN.** By Andre Siegfried. 221 pages. Diagrams and maps. Duell, Sloan and Pearce. $3.00.

By Richard Cordon McCloskey

This book represents popular history at its best — exceptionally well written and translated, easy to read, and packing kernels of information in an easily opened nut.

As Siegfried emphasizes throughout, the Mediterranean is primarily a highway between east and west, "but it is also a civilization within which it has clung to its own conception across the years." The evidence to justify this assertion is expertly gathered, and furthermore it is neatly placed in relation to the various civilizations which the area has affected and which have affected it. Geographically the Mediterranean is a crossroads, historically it is a source, an economic and political center of gravity. Through the ages its importance has varied, from extreme importance in the days of the great Greek civilization, to a stagnant period when the Turks conquered Constantinople in 1453 and when the route around Cape Horn was discovered, to a new importance when the Suez canal was opened in 1869. This second flowering lasted until 1914 when the Panama Canal was opened, and then the pursestrings controlling trade shifted from Europe to America. Will it flower again as a center of world economy and civilization? Siegfried discusses and weighs at considerable length the pros and cons of its second rebirth.

As a handbook to the Mediterranean, Siegfried's book is no tourist's guide, but it does provide an eminently convenient reference. The excellent diagrams sum up its historical, economic and geographic changes, and the various chapters discuss enough of its facets to satisfy anyone but a student of the area. Siegfried has written a thoroughly useful book.
THE PRICE OF POWER
by the noted military analyst
Hanson W. Baldwin

If war comes, it will be total war. The atom bomb, the biological germ, warhead planes and missiles remotely controlled make that inevitable.

How can America mobilize her national economy now, in peacetime—her commodities, weapons, industry, transport and communication systems; her government and personnel; her scientific research; her intelligence services—to be ready in event of war with immediate striking power?

In THE PRICE OF POWER, product of two years’ study with a group of specialists brought together by the Council on Foreign Relations, Hanson W. Baldwin supplies the answers and points to the course we must follow if we are to survive without becoming either a garrison or a bankrupt state. $3.75

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War or Peace
THE STEEP PLACES. By Norman Angell. 247 pp. Harper and Bros. $3.00.
By Meyer H Fishbein

The author of The Great Illusion again concerns himself with the task of exploding popular misconceptions on matters relating to war and peace. Security cannot be maintained by remaining neutral in the face of aggressor nations. Education, in the sense of further dissemination of knowledge, will not prevent war. Only by more effective and realistic use of the knowledge we already have can peace be preserved. If the Voice of the People is the Voice of God, how are we to explain the excesses of the German and Japanese people as well as the terrors of the religious war in India?

Sir Norman Angell is not pessimistic about the chances of avoiding another war. He does not believe in the theory of the “irrepressible” conflict between socialist and capitalist nations just as he does not believe that differences between worker and employer cannot be adjusted. War will come only if there is continued disunity among the Western nations and indifference to democratic principles by their people in the face of Soviet aggression and fanaticism. The path of Russian expansion can be blocked by a firm Anglo-American alliance that will make clear our determination to fight if our security is threatened. Just terms can then be made with the Russian rulers based on mutual security. The prerequisite to this rapprochement is the understanding of our own motives and purposes in trying to contain Russian expansion.

The author’s oft repeated defense of British monarchy and empire is a minor weakness in a book that is written with clarity and insight. Norman Angell’s analysis of democratic and communistic motivations in war and peace should be read by all.

Blood and Thunder
THE GOLDEN HAWK. By Frank Yerby. 346 pages. The Dial Press. $3.00.
By Robert F. Cocklin

Frank Yerby’s The Golden Hawk falls into the category of modern writing loosely referred to as the historical novel. Just why it should be termed an historical novel is not quite clear. There certainly is nothing historical about it and very little that is novel. However, it does fit into the pattern of adventurous debauchery for which much of the reading public has evidenced an almost insatiable desire.

Mr. Yerby apparently has attempted to out-do all of his contemporaries in this field. That is to say, he has crammed into 346 pages an unbelievable series of events all of which will have a familiar ring to regular addicts of this type of reading.

Ostensibly, the story is built around Kit Gerardo, the bastard son of a Spanish peer and his search for revenge on his father and his tortuous courtship of Rouge, an English gentlewoman turned pirate by an early wronging at the hands of Kit’s father. If the preceding sentence seems incredulous, bear in mind that it is just the central theme of the book.

The story opens on the deck of the Seaflower, a privateer commanded by a leper (of all things). However, the leper soon gives way to our hero, who assumes command, averts a mutiny, and starts on a series of adventures that would shatter the equanimity of Superman. Kit is a sea-fighter without peer and displays a dexterity in seduction that would wring reluctant praise from the now-famous Amber. There are sea battles galore, prison escapes, and tortures. Blood, wine, and money flow freely, intermingling with the perspiration of the long-suffering reader. Both Kit and Rouge escape certain death at least a dozen times and therein lies the weakness of the story. Mr. Yerby would not have made nearly so much money but would have performed a far greater public service if he had failed to extricate them from their very first dilemma.

Prairie War
FORTS AND FORAYS. By James A. Bennett. 85 pages, illustrations, map, index. University of New Mexico Press. $1.75.

Here is a minor gem of American military literature, which greatly enriches the story of our Indian Fighting Army. Unpretentious, with considerable
 humour, and with stark brevity, it tells the story of a dragoon sergeant in New Mexico during the tumultuous 1850's. Indian fighting, gambling den brawls, fandangos, tough Army discipline and worse Army food are reported factually and without rancor.

Bennett enlisted because he was told "that soldiers received good board, clothing, medical attention; had nothing to do but play the gentleman." That was on November 22, 1849. On November 23 he wrote, "Today come my sober thoughts. Regret the step taken yesterday but 'tis too late." The first Christmas he wrote, "we were informed we would not drill and that we would have an extra dinner. Of what did it consist? Boiled beef, cabbage and potatoes, but what we had not had before, plenty of it." A typical Indian fight runs like this: "11 o'clock at night, a dozen rifles cracked and a score of arrows came flying into our camp. The dry grass was set on fire around us ... at daybreak appeared about 100 warriors. We saddled our horses, took no breakfast, mounted in pursuit. A running fight was kept up until 4 o'clock."

More books like this on early Army days are needed.

Reckless Mountain Boys

THE HATFIELDS AND THE McCOYS.

By Virgil C. Jones. 293 pages. Illustrations, notes, index. University of North Carolina. $3.75.

By Richard Cordon McCloskey

Here is a fine slice of America in the raw—dripping blood, sex, intrigue, and suspense. The cracks of the feud ing rifles of the Hatfields and McCoys have left echoes that are heard to this day. The feud developed during the 1870's over a series of incidents, some as trivial as a razorback hog, some as desperate as murder. It flared into sharp violence, and subsided into uneasy peace for some 70 years, and now seems to be settled. Mr. Jones has written a deft and definitive account of this famous argument.

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS

(If not listed, unsigned illustrations are from authors, by the Journal staff, or from special sources. Reference numbers are pages.)

U. S. Sig. Corps: Cover, 114, 116.

Neighbors to the South

LANDS OF THE DAWNING MORROW.


MY PARADISE IS HELL. By Albert Balink. 331 pages, appendices, index. Vista. $3.00.

By Richard Cordon McCloskey

These are two excellent books on the Latin American scene, and on the countries of the Caribbean.

Carleton Beals, a travel-hardened analyzer of the Latin American scene, here reports on his last trip through the southern countries. His belief is that "Latin America is awakening. It is on the march: its people, its industries, its governments, its culture. ... Problems and difficulties are often staggering ... there is a real danger that the fight against Communism will not promote democracy but will serve dictatorial and fascist forces to resort to reaction, militarism, dictatorship and a destruction of democracy and human rights ... as elsewhere a race is on between the forces of growth and freedom and the forces of disaster. ..."

His survey of the many facets of Latin American progress is quick but thorough enough for the casual reader. He hews pretty closely to the middle of the road in his analyses, putting himself under no obligation to the right or the left, giving the facts as he sees them, not as he is shown them or as he is requested to see them.

The title and the jacket of My Paradise Is Hell would honor any of the trashy, sexy novels of hot love in the hot countries—but they do a tremendous disservice to Balink's very fine story of the Caribbean. Sober, reasonably well documented, critical in its evaluation of the past, and Catholic in its interests, this is one of the best introductions to the tortured regions of the Caribbean I have ever read. Sympathetic to the people and the background, and yet appreciative of America's position, Balink paints a broad canvas that has everything pretty well in perspective. Don't let the title and the jacket fool you. This is a sound and fascinating book.
Texas Saga

THE ALAMO. By John Myers Myers,
240 pages, illustrations, maps,
bibliography. E. P. Dutton and
Company. $3.00
By Charles C. Cumberland

To the average reader who knows
little concerning the Alamo, the book
under review will be both interesting and
enlightening: to the serious student of
Texas or Mexican history it will be
neither since it adds nothing in either
information or interpretation. A vein of
humor, usually misplaced and never
scintillating, permeates the atmosphere
of the pages, but neither the subject nor
the men engaged in the deadly serious
task of molding a new nation lends itself
to the style chosen.

The battle for possession of the Alamo
was not only an important episode in
the Texas Revolution and in Texas history,
but it was also important in the
development of the Mexican nation. Any
test attempt to evaluate the siege should
therefore be accompanied by an analysis
and interpretation of the Mexican
political scene. In presenting the
background for the development of his
principal theme, the siege of the Alamo,
Mr. Myers has given some rather
questionable interpretations and has
made some errors in fact which serve to
distort the true picture and fail to give
the proper perspective to the
independence movement. A notable
failure is the absence of a clear picture
of the basic and fundamental cleavage
between the psychologies, philosophies,
and traditions of the opposing forces.

With all its weaknesses—and it has
many—The Alamo will be appreciated
by those readers who want their history
in easily read and easily digested form,
with plenty of drama and black-and-white
characterizations. The feverish
excitement among the Anglo-Saxons in
Texas in the late 1835 and early 1836,
the difficulties encountered in
organizing an army, the siege and the
capture of the Alamo by the Mexicans,
and the magnificent but vain defense of
the citadel will all appeal to many
readers. Although Mr. Myers has not
made full use of the dramatic character
inherent in the situation, the story has
sufficient color, pathos, and vicious
fighting to be an engrossing tale.
BOOKS IN COLUMN

By Major Nelson L. Drummond, Jr.

In these days of cold war there continues a hotly contested series of battles against one of man's most ruthless, malevolent enemies—fire. Within our great forests, this deadly agent finds a grandeur of scene, a vulnerability of isolation and a heavy advantage of logistics in contests which form a close parallel to battlefield struggle. In FIRE (Random House—$3.00) George R. Stewart presents a closely-woven, powerful narrative of one forest fire, from its almost amusingly small, smoldering start, through its raging uncontrollable peak, to its final death through human maneuvering—with a moving panorama of the men and women who gradually closed in to fight it. The story could easily have degenerated to melodrama or episodic fragments; instead, its soundly selected detail and carefully gathered impact bring the reader a share in a typical campaign of one of our most dramatic peaceetime fighting services. The fire becomes an almost human opponent, exploiting every advantage of wind and terrain against the strength and weaknesses of the men who range themselves against it. Here, in an unusual and dramatic setting, are the old military problems of early and uncertain intelligence, low and high level planning, meeting engagement, retreat, rout, communication difficulties, airborne counterstroke, staggering logistics, human heroism, and fatal failure; then finally the change in command which creates a master-stroke to bring victory. No military man ever embroiled in battle, whether his role had been planning or fighting, could fail to find this forest campaign an engrossing account.

For occupying a summer guest or profitably enjoying odd snatches of reading, Anthony Abbott's These Are Strange Tales (Winston—$2.50) is highly recommended. This master of magic and mystery has culled a fine selection of short, fast-moving stories to illustrate that actual records of human experience often pass beyond the wildest imaginings of fiction writers. There is less of the eerie than one would suspect; the author tells a deft tale but has little power to create mood or atmosphere. With acceptance of this limitation, and the fact that most of the collection has appeared before in various publications, devotees as well as skeptics of mystery tales will certainly enjoy the book.

Ridge Runner, by Gerald Averill (Lippincott—$2.75) is the "story of a Maine woodsman" which should appeal to anyone with a bit of liking for outdoors life. Told with Yankee sparseness, which conveys a fine blending of simplicity, salty humor, and poetic imagery, the author's narrative of his hunting boyhood, work in lumber camps, and later experiences as game warden seems worthy of far more attention than it has won. The book bears a mark of heavy editing and slides somewhat disconcertingly from personal chronology to anecdote to a final area of message, but it is always unlabored. The writing has charm with touches of shrewd characterization and for sheer story-telling appeal it would be hard to beat the anecdotes of grandfather vs. the white shark, the punchy exploit of lumber-hellion, Jamie McGaskill, in Bangor town and court, or the weird fate which gathered around the name of Esau Kant and hounded him through the Maine northwoods.

How well do most of us handle our heaviest investments? Not impressively, according to the authors of three recent books which deal respectively with your car, your life insurance and the taxes which you pay in remarkably heavy doses whether you recognize them or not. Walter Altschuler, automotive engineer, presents a well-organized, graphic booklet, CAR OWNER'S GUIDE TO CARE AND REPAIR (Tudor—$1.50), which tells in simple language how to keep a vehicle running smoothly, how to spot trouble, how to save money on monthly maintenance and repair bills, and an expert's opinion of various garage and gas station "rackets." Of the last there should be more, but the book will prove of high value to anyone who owns, or is desperately hoping to own, a car. INSURANCE AND YOUR SECURITY (Rinehart—$3.00) by E. A. Gilbert, noted insurance consultant and author of LIFE INSURANCE: A LEGALIZED RACKET, clearly and interestingly discusses the average person's needs in life insurance, with stress on policies for sickness, old age, accidents, etc. He deftly uncovers many of the popular insurance fallacies which are inflicted on us of the unsuspecting public and his special section covering veterans' G.I. policies can save servicemen millions of dollars. In SLASH THOSE TAXES (Duell, Sloan & Peace—$2.00) Daniel E. Casey lucidly traces the complex structure of taxes which absorbs from everyone an alarming slice of his income. Without question each of us makes his largest single investment in local or national government and probably spends little constructive time overseeing it. This compact, highly readable book is not for the expert but for all who work and vote during these years of increasingly costly government bureaucracy.

For all who came in contact with ships of the navy during the past war, NOW HEAR THIS by J. J. Motley and P. R. Kelley (Infantry Journal Press—$4.00) will have real, though limited, appeal. The authors have organized by types of ship a taut compendium of the action stories covering most of the Navy's noteworthy combat vessels. No cohesive picture of naval warfare emerges but the action is terse and exciting, incidents seem well chosen considering the tremendous coverage attempted, and one gains a good conception of the extreme diversity of battle contribution from men and ships which won the war on the waters.

The mounting tide of books concerning deviationists recently escaped from the Communists has a minor addition in ILL NEVER GO BACK (Dutton—$3.00) by Mikhail Korjakov, Red Army correspondent and captain during World War II. Since totalitarian repression, Soviet army and espionage tactics, and the current clash of ideologies has much importance today, this book has some value — particularly to military men; in general, however, it is characterized by easy journalese and a rather overdone aura of religious conversion.

For a very non-Pearl Buck view of Chinese life prior to and during World War II, Felix C. Forrest's somewhat melodramatic novel CAROLA (Duell, Sloan & Peace—$3.00) packs quite a few punches. Damaged by some overworked material on the introspective qualities of its heroine, the story moves well when its rapid flashbacks reach China, where a strong unlovely picture of provincial feudalism emerges. The main theme graphically carries racial and ideological conflict between old-East and new-West, when the young, radical, American girl marries a Chinese university student and both go back to communize his family's feudal sector of China. A quite remarkable murder, flight to America via Japan's wartime espionage, and final enthusiastic reconversion to the good and bad of American capitalism round out this unprofound but spark-stirring tale.

A first novel by Arthur Baker, THE SHORT TERM (Duell, Sloan & Peace—$2.75) displays sharp insight and a sly simplicity which bode well for the author's future. This book keenly treats the cosmic elements and the little people which center around a small town's murder trial: Art Greene, who is confident that fellow humanity will not hang him; World Blaise, 300-pound mystic imbiber who flounders to his defense; an overambitious district attorney and a judge
Horses Past and Present


The true American horse is the Spanish horse that came first with Columbus and the following Spanish explorers. It is the descendants of these horses that have the only economic function in today's economy, for they still play a basic part in the cattie industry of the Americas.

In addition to an excellent historical account, Mr. Denhardt discusses breeds, types, strains and colors, the evolution of the Western saddle, brands, the rodeo, and the American quarter running horse. To anyone interested casually in horses, this makes absorbing reading. To a horse lover, it is as necessary as a saddle.

Marine Air War

DEVILBIRDS. By John A. DeChant. 265 pages; illustrated; glossary; index. Harper & Brothers, $4.00.

By John R. Cuneo

Within its scope this is a good history of Marine aviation in World War II. It is a laudatory account done in a reportorial manner with little time lost on the weighing of events. It is true that after a while the flood of names and air combat reports dulls the reader's interest. Yet of its class this is a better book than the usual air narratives.

The subject of air support receives considerable attention — as it should since the primary purpose of Marine aviation lay in this field. While the Marines may not have had quite so much to do with originating the tactics of such operations as the author claims, they certainly played a role in its development and employment. This discussion was to me one of the most interesting parts of the book.

Of course any book on one section of this nation's air power presents an illproportioned picture which sometimes leads to unfortunate distortions. But only an over-all critical history could hope to give a balanced view. This book does not pretend to do this and criticism of it on this score seems unfair. Accept its limitations and you have a good report of Marine air operations in the amphibious war of the Pacific.

"It makes the reader proud to be an American and proud to belong to the human race."

—STRINGFELLOW BARR, Saturday Review

CARL VAN DOREN'S

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The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the Constitution of the United States

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