Army Target Production CentersBuilding a multi-domain operations enabled Army

By John A. Scotto, Capt. Tiago Camilo and Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jordan Kness

As this goes to press, senior Army leaders are grappling with how to build a force capable of facing and prevailing over a peer or near-peer adversary. This is likely an adversary who can field large forces, probably numerically superior to U.S. forces in the land domain, against whom the U.S. may have no advantage in those areas where we have become accustomed to operating with near impunity – the air and maritime domains - and who seeks to leverage the space, and cyberspace domains against U.S. forces. The Army's response is to move toward multi-domain operations which envisions employing capabilities from all domains in concert to develop windows of advantage as needed to enable freedom of action. Fortunately, there is an existing system for integrating all types of capabilities, regardless of domain or service of origin, to produce a desired effect upon the adversary in order to achieve the commander's desired end state - it is the Joint Targeting Process.1 Unfortunately, the Army lags in understanding and employing this system which could prove detrimental in largescale combat operations against a peer adversary unless corrected.

In truth, Army leaders have recognized this problem for some time now. In 2014, the Army tasked Training and Doctrine Command to conduct a study examining the service's operational-level targeting -- joint targeting-- capability, in response to an Army Lessons Learned Forum – general officer steering committee identified shortfall. That study found that the Army had significant leadership education, operator training and overall doctrinal gaps regard-

ing joint targeting, the very process that harnesses capabilities from all domains to achieve the desired end-state, a key enabling capability for true multi-domain operations.

Following the release of the study findings, the Fires Center of Excellence moved to establish a targeting center, ultimately approved by the chief of staff of the Army as the Army Multi-Domain Targeting Center (AMTC), to act as a focal point for targeting doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy (DOTMLPF-P) integration within the Army, and as an entry point for the Army to the wider joint targeting enterprise. The good thing is there is now an Army's "hub" for targeting, promoting discussion and thought, particularly in the area of joint targeting. The bad thing is the Army still largely does not organize, man, train (this is being addressed as we will explain shortly), or equip to execute the joint targeting process. The ugly thing is there still is no agreed-upon roadmap for the Army to achieve a state in which it can as easily employ the joint targeting methodology to access joint capabilities as it does its own more familiar decide-detect-deliver-assess² methodology to employ Army organic capabilities. The goal of this short article is to start, not dictate the end of, a conversation that describes how the Army could organize to employ joint targeting. The authors also hope to reach out beyond the Fires and Intelligence communities, both institutional and operational, to gain perspectives and build a consensus on the best way to establish a sustained Army capability for joint targeting, a key enabler of multi-domain operations. This outreach is absolutely necessary since targeting, by its nature, is interdisciplinary and reaches across MOS, warfighting function, service and domain and requires input from a very broad spectrum of capability owners, planners and integrators in order to be successful.

Because engaging the joint targeting enterprise is still a relatively new and not very well understood activity within the Army, in this article we will limit our discussion to a limited subset of DOT-MLPF-P concerns. We will also, for simplicity's sake, avoid extensive discussion of the Department of Defense regulatory structure that governs joint targeting - let it suffice to say that wherever we discuss accreditation or certification in this article we mean to joint standards that would allow Army headquarters to create, edit and submit targets to joint target databases, such as the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB), for inclusion on joint target lists. Instead, we will detail specific actions the AMTC has taken in regard to joint targeting training and then propose a framework for the operational force to capitalize on those by organizing to create a more joint targeting/multi-domain operations capable force. The ultimate goal is that operational force commanders gain capability while the AMTC ensures that the overall Army targeting program meets existing and future regulatory requirements in a manner that is largely transparent to the operational force.

The AMTC has taken action to address the gap in targeting training by establishing Army-taught

¹ JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 28 Sep 2018 2 ATP 3-60, Targeting, May 2015

joint targeting courses. This was necessary because joint force and sister services training pipelines were unable to support a sustained Army need in addition to their own requirements. The Army now has its own (Defense Intelligence Agency accredited) Joint Intermediate Target Development (JITD) Course. The Army has also added a Target Material Production (TMP) Course and established a service TMP Program (anticipating National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency accreditation in late FY19) enabling the accreditation of TMP work centers and certification of TMP analysts across the Army. Together with the previously existing Weaponeering and Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) courses, the Army now has the capability to train the skills for intermediate and advanced target development. Mid-grade staff and leader education of joint Fires integration and joint targeting is addressed through the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC), with a shorter JOFEC Executive Session for colonels and above under consideration as well.

However, training alone does not produce increased capability for the operational force. Of primary concern is the absence of Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) codified work centers for the Army's trained targeting experts to reside. This creates two problems. First, newly trained Soldiers are returning to their units and quickly absorbed back into work sections that are not dedicated to, or even significantly involved in, target development and ill-positioned to maintain the currency requirements necessary to maintain proficiency. Second, proper, detailed and well-researched characterization of enemy target systems and entities is only achievable when analysts are unhindered with competing tasks and dedicated to regional target familiarization. A Target Production Center (TPC) could be a solution to these issues that will enable an organic,




Figure 1. (Top) An example of a TPC-T. (Courtesy illustration) Figure 2. (Bottom) An example of a TPC-C. (Courtesy illustration)

sustained capability to produce and submit targets to be serviced as required by the full range of joint/multi-domain capabilities available.

This article proposes that TPCs be created at the geographic Army Service Component Commands (TPC-Theatre or simply TPC-T) and the Corps (TPC-C). Note - Division TPCs (TPC-D) and Functional/ Global Army service component commands (ASCCs) are beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed separately at a later date.

Target Production Centers are: All-domain. The TPCs will be comprised of Soldiers with expertise in all domains and the information environment. Target development and targeting solutions require analysts to characterize targets and think creatively with regards to the peculiarities in air, land, sea, space, cyberspace and the information environment.

Multi-disciplined. Personnel from across the intelligence disciplines will contribute to a holistic target development approach; avoiding stovepipe views of systems and entities.

Regionally focused. TPCs will be focused on gaining mastery of enemy target systems and entities within combatant commands area




Figure 3. An example of corps transition to JTF with TPC-T augmentation. (Courtesy illustration)

of responsibilities. TPC-T will be regionally focused. TPC-C will be capable of sharing target development workload from the TPC-T. Depending on corps mission and focus, TPC-C may have a dedicated target production responsibility to a COCOM AOR. This will enable the TPCs to be viable producers of intelligence support to joint targeting. As a best practice, it is recommended that analysts serving in a TPC have longevity within the organization to obtain and maintain the level of expertise required for systems and entity mastery.

Integrated. TPCs establish and maintain continuity with the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (IIOCs), battlefield coordination detachment, multi-echelon integrated brigade training, and joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners with regards to target development and federated target development workload. (MIB-T will play a vital role in target development either in function or in personnel. A TPC-T may reside within a MIB-T vice an ASCC G2. This is currently being examined.) These tasks are primarily for the TPC-T, but TPC-C will contribute via established relationships, tasking or agreement.

Tailorable. TPCs will allow for quick augmentation from other TPCs. For example, a TPC-C could

be augmented from a TPC-T during the formation of a joint task force. Based on the scope of the mission, size of the joint operations area and duration of the mission, TPCs could be augmented to provide additional target development capacity. The TPC concept can also be readily adapted for emerging formations such as the multi-domain task force. A codified TPC will ensure all gaining commands are equipped with all workstations, equipment and software packages necessary to complete entity-level target development. We assess that with relatively modest organizational changes to capitalize on already existing training, the operational force can make significant strides toward building an organic capability to access and employ the Joint Targeting Process, the entryway to the full array of joint/ multi-domain capabilities.

We do not assume or maintain that targeting training or even targeting training in conjunction with organizational changes, such as establishing TPCs, will by itself address the Army's challenges against a peer or near-peer adversary. However, absent these or other changes to address systemic capability gaps related to engaging the Joint Targeting Process, the Army will not be postured to access the full range of joint and multi-domain capabilities that

are available, and that will need to be employed in concert in order to succeed against a sophisticated, capable adversary determined to challenge U.S. military might. Organizing for joint targeting is not "the solution" but it lays a necessary foundation upon which to build a credible Army response to the much more dangerous foes that we face moving forward.

John A. Scotto is a retired United States Air Force officer and current Department of the Army civilian employee. He previously served as the deputy director of the Fires Center of Excellence's Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate and is currently the deputy director, Army Multi-Domain Targeting Center at Fort Sill, Okla.

Capt. Tiago Camilo is a Signals Intelligence / Electronic Warfare intelligence officer and intelligence planner for the Army Multi-Domain Targeting Center. He is a former enlisted SIGINT analyst and field artillery officer. Camilo has served as a light, composite and MLRS field artillery battalion S2 and in various targeting roles at national level, division and below.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jordan Kness is a targeting officer with the Army Multi-Domain Targeting Center and the program manager for the Army's Joint Intermediate Target Development Course at the Fires Center of Excellence.