A fundamental gap exists in current doctrine on how to integrate and synchronize Fires with maneuver in multi-domain operations. Maj. Gen. Wilson A. Shoffner, commanding general, the Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, argued that the integration of fire and maneuver is essential to the success in future large-scale combat and that we will not dominate our adversaries if we can only do one and not the other. He argued that the “role of Fires is to enable freedom of maneuver, while maneuver forces compel the enemy to concentrate when they place something of value at risk.”

Fires creates this window of opportunity for maneuver. Surface Fires is the most critical requirement to achieve this effect because it directly counters the enemy’s strength, integrated air defense (IADS) and long-range Fires. Without effective surface Fires, joint Fires and attack aviation cannot be employed and maneuver risks unacceptable losses to massed enemy artillery. The need for synchronized ground-based Fires is...
intensified due to the qualitative and quantitative advantage of peer competitors’ surface Fires. Therefore, success in this effort is centered on a contest for time. The challenge is to make the right decisions, arrange tactical actions and resources to achieve a decisive effect before the enemy can do the same. Material developers strive to close this gap by developing weapons that can move faster and fire further to create additional time. However, the joint force cannot wait for modernization efforts to implement multi-domain operations, it must rely on current capabilities that already exist within the Army. Therefore, in the absence of a technological overmatch, the current force must develop a process to synchronize and integrate Fires with maneuver across domains to dominate our adversaries in large-scale combat operations (LSCO).

Within the Army division, the processes that synchronize Fires center on the division fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) and the DIVARTY staff. In particular, the role of commanding surface Fires functions as the foundation for the entire Fires enterprise because it creates opportunities to employ joint Fires and attack aviation. The DIVARTY, as the force field artillery headquarters (HQ), optimizes Fires beyond the range of brigade combat teams’ (BCTs) cannons in order to destroy, defeat or disrupt enemy IADs and long-range artillery in depth. In order to shape these enemy capabilities, it requires a seamless integration and synchronization of cross-domain Fires. The cross-domain capabilities exist within a division now, but most HQs lack a unifying process with the requisite authorities to achieve synchronization. The DIVARTY commander brings together surface and joint Fires collection, airspace management and cyber and electronic warfare into one coherent effort through the targeting process. As the foundation for this collaboration, surface Fires enabled division targeting through its understanding of enemy artillery locations and organic delivery capability. In addition, the DIVARTY staff must understand how the DIVARTY supports the division across all warfighting functions (WFF). This interconnected effort moves at the cadence of the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. Therefore, the division Fires enterprise needs an integrated process aligned to an ATO cycle to coordinate and synchronize Fires across multiple domains.

The current methods for integrating and synchronizing Fires are insufficient for the intensity and complicated character of large-scale operations against peer threats. Success in modern warfare consists of two requirements: the ability to mass high volumes of lethal attacks in a short period of time and ability to sustain those attacks over time. The DIVARTY commander, division and the DIVARTY staffs have two principle mechanisms to solve these divergent aims: the military decision-making process (MDMP) and targeting. The operational tempo during recent Army Warfighters moves at such a rapid pace that deliberate MDMP becomes too inflexible and not an economical use of time. This process does not allow the division Fires enterprise to manage the competing interests for resources and priorities. The combination of a full battle rhythm and constantly changing conditions leads to divisions relying on targeting rather than MDMP to synchronize Fires. The DIVARTY’s principle doctrine ATP 3-09.90, Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division adequately describes how to conduct division-level targeting through the dedication of an entire chapter. However, only two sentences within this manual reference the requirement to conduct the DIVARTY targeting working group (TWG) and it does not detail any roles, responsibilities, or inputs/outputs. ATP 3-60 Targeting describes a TWG, but it is written for a brigade combat team. In addition, this manual does not adequately list DIVARTY inputs to division targeting and omits the key warfighting functions. Specifically, the logistical requirements needed to synchronize the DIVARTY and expedite Fires through the use of airspace control measures are noticeably absent. As a result of this doctrinal gap and operational tempo in LSCO, a new method to enable division targeting and synchronize surface Fires was needed. The 1st Armored Division Artillery synthesized a method to facilitate division targeting and synchronize surface Fires through a daily execution of the rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP) aligned to the ATO cycle.

The DIVARTY daily synchronization meeting

In order to describe 1st AD’s method, this article will detail the function, process, and shortfalls (see Figure 1).

Function

In order to continuously execute Fires in support of the division with surface Fires and enable division targeting, 1st AD DIVARTY conducted a daily synchronization meeting. This meeting termed the ‘Daily Sync’ had two distinct goals: facilitate division targeting through informing the FSCOORD’s and targeting team’s estimate and synchronization of the DIVARTY staff. The meeting informed division targeting through providing an accurate estimate on the enemy

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6 Department of the Army, ATP 3-09.90 Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), 3-1.
8 Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2017), 10.
9 Center of Army Lessons Learned, Deep Operations Handbook (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Center of Army Lessons Learned, 2018), 1.
10 ATP 3-09.90 Division Artillery Operations and Fire Support for the Division, 3-2.
surface fire picture and friendly surface Fires capability (positioning and ammunition). Simultaneously, the DIVARTY staff would be able to forecast requirements such as logistics and airspace control measures. As a rule, this meeting forecasted resources at 72 hours, coordinated the movement of resources at 48 hours and synchronized assets at 24 hours. This meeting occurred after the morning update brief to the commanding general and prior to the division (TWG). This timing is critical to the function because it started the meeting with an accurate estimate, drove the division targeting with recommendations based on facts, and provided outputs to the staff to execute in concert with the targeting process. In particular, the staff placed a heavy emphasis of utilizing this meeting to publish airspace control measures to the airspace control order (ACO) in order to allow more responsive Fires. These outputs are codified in a daily field artillery support plan (FASP) and validated in the evening DIVARTY commander update brief. An illustration of the ‘how’ will describe by what method this meeting closed the doctrinal gap needed to be successful in large-scale combat operations.

A concise description of the meeting, attendees and agenda will clarify why a daily RDSP event was vital to provide inputs to targeting and drive DIVARTY operations. The sync was conducted in four steps: the current assessment, next 24 hours (ATO), next 48 hours (ATO), and review of the due outs for the upcoming daily fragmentary order for the FASP. This meeting was chaired by either the executive officer (XO) or S3 dependent on current operational tempo.

The setup for this event is critical and requires each staff member to come prepared with their running estimate. Before the meeting the targeting officer collated an analog map with the enemy (from the S2) and friendly (from the plans officer) situation for the current state, next 24 and 48 hours. In addition, the targeting officer created a sketch (see Figure 2) that outlines the targeting focus. This sketch contains the current enemy assessment by named unit that outlines type and number of tubes. This sketch is copied and handed out prior to the meeting and is used by the participants to record requirements aligned to enemy formations. For example, the enemy named area of interest (NAI) that is identified as a battalion of multiple rocket launchers will have a battalion 3 of Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, call-for-fire zone, and air space control measure allocated against it. This allows the staff to stay enemy focused, streamlines the meeting and simplifies the transition to FASP production.

The first action for the meeting

Figure 1. The sync flow process detailed in the 1st Armored Division Artillery plans standard operating procedures. (Rick Paape/Courtesy information)
is the S2 assessment of the enemy artillery and IADs composition and disposition, which included pertinent details of terrain and weather. This is an abbreviation of MDMP, therefore it is critical that the S2 distilled the essential facts through continuous mission analysis. The sketch in Figure 3 captured these essential facts in a manner that brought the clarity and focus needed for a short and efficient analysis. A special emphasis must be placed on the division’s area of influence because enemy long-range artillery will exploit adjacent boundaries to make friendly Fires less responsive.11 After the S2’s assessment, the S3 or XO outlined the scheme of maneuver for the division. The scheme of maneuver covered both the corps and division to create a baseline understanding needed to transition to COA development.

Second, the targeting officer outlines the current fire support tasks requirements from the previous division targeting board in order to account for resources that are allocated against enemy artillery or IADs such as strike coordination and reconnaissance, air interdiction, close air support, corps artillery, or attack aviation. With this starting point established, the S3 or XO leads the staff through each enemy formation and determines a course of action. This includes movement to new position areas for artillery (PAAs), changes to radar positioning, and the fire control officer (FCO) recommended a fire order based on current and projected ammunition. This must be a succinct collaboration based on a shared understanding. This deliberation is an artillery-centric method that analyzed relative combat power, generated options, arrayed initial forces, developed a scheme of maneuver and assigned the HQs to fire support tasks.12 Within the approved course of action, the S3 directed the inputs to the FASP that focused on the positioning of the artillery battalions. This method also expedited Fires by hav-
ing the air defense and airspace management cell create airspace coordination areas (ACAs) from the PAAs to the enemy locations (NAIs) for more permissive geometries. These ACAs are submitted through Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to division in order to be placed on the ACO. The counter-fire officer records critical friendly zones or call-for-fire zones based off the COA. The S4 records the predicted ammunition consumption to request ammunition 72 hours out. The collaboration with the S3 and FCO enabled the S4 to recommend the coordination of ammunition into the division area or recommended movement of a supporting brigade support area. At 24 hours, the S4 provides locations and timings for class V resupply. In essence, this method provided the staff an understanding of time and space needed to conduct battlefield calculus. These requirements are annotated on the sync sketch by each staff officer for review at the completion, which allowed an efficient transition to orders production.

Lastly and most important, the plans officer identified all due outs and updates to the DIVARTY Field Artillery Support Matrix (FASM). The DIVARTY sync contains the critical tasks, facts and assumptions needed to inform the DIVARTY S3 at the division targeting meeting and enable the production of a FASM by ATO cycle. The sketch contained the predictive ammunition consumption, movement of PAAs, fire support coordination measures, logistical requirements or critical shortfalls to request from division. These sketches provided a concise reality of the DIVARTY for the next three days. This allowed the DIVARTY XO and S3 to make decisions and provide recommendations to the DIVARTY commander prior to the division TWG. Upon completion of the sync, the DIVARTY S3 attends the division TWG and provided the surface Fires recommendation to the commander. Simultaneously, the DIVARTY XO oversaw the inputs of the staff into the digital mission command systems (CPOF, AFATDS, Tactical Airspace Integration System, Distributed Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A) and division processes (logistics synchronization and operations synchronization). At the DIVARTY commanders update that afternoon, the XO validated the status of the staff inputs and the S3 incorporated the commander’s guidance from the TWG through two minute drills, operations and intelligence (O&I) and updates to the FASM.

The DIVARTY sync achieved the intent to enable division targeting and DIVARTY operations, but the tempo of LSCO presented a serious challenge that must be discussed. The speed of combat relative to the enemy provided a remarkable challenge to keep pace with the battle. The outputs of the DIVARTY sync stayed current for an average of six to eight hours. Enemy forces moved to unexpected locations, friendly units sustained significant losses, ammunition resupplies are de-

Figure 3. An example of a division artillery (DIVARTY) sync. (Courtesy illustration)
 Soldiers with the 1st Cavalry Division report the opposing forces movement from an observation point during exercise Combined Resolve XI, Dec. 4 at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany. CBRXI exercise gives the U.S. Army's regionally allocated combat forces in Europe the opportunity to execute a combat training center rotation with a joint, multinational environment demonstrating their integration into U.S. Army Europe operations. (Sgt. John Onuoha/U.S. Army)

layed and a whole litany of friction overturned the outputs of the sync. The 1st AD DIVARTY staff struggled with incorporating changes in conditions within real time into the FASM with simultaneous understanding at battalions, BCT's, FA and division. Command Post of the Future (CPoF) was the primary mechanism to share the estimate and FASM, but other brigades and division often did not fight off the DIVARTY estimate and common operational picture. The process still allowed for effective DIVARTY operations and targeting. The incorporation of regular two-minute drills and O&Is utilizing the sync method would allow the staff to keep with the pace of the battle. The XO or S3 must regularly bring the staff in to update the FASM if the fundamental conditions have changed. In addition, the DIVARTY staff must strive to keep the FASM simple in order to ensure ease of change. Despite this friction, the process did allow the field-grade officers to manage critical transitions with resources already forecasted or coordinated for. Without the staff sync or a similar process, the DIVARTY would be reactive to the enemy or conditions on the battlefield. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's dictum could not have been truer, "The plan is nothing, but planning is everything." The overreaching aim must always be to anticipate enemy actions and place overwhelming combat power against enemy artillery and the integrated air defense network.

It is important to understand that the combination RDSP aligned with the ATO cycle enabled division targeting and synchronized the DIVARTY's focus on Fires across all WfF. This method served as only "a way" to bridge the gap of capabilities and doctrine. Each division is unique, but this process can be applied across the force as an effective means of integrating Fires with maneuver. Large-scale operations are inherently complicated and require training and repetition to be successful. With processes such as the DIVARTY sync, the Army and joint force will bring multi-domain operations to life. With current threats there is no time to wait for a new 'whiz-bang' technology that will bring about victory. The most powerful changes of warfare come from organizational ideas or methods rather than technological innovations. In order to deter adversaries and prevent conflict, we must hone our ability to synchronize and integrate Fires and maneuver or be prepared to spend needless blood and treasure to learn these lessons at war.

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