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For the Order & Discipline

A publication for the Soldiers, Army Civilians and Families at Fort Sill, Oklahoma

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Inspector General Mission

The Office of the Inspector General provides assistance, teaches and trains and conducts inspections and investigations as directed by the Commanding General for and throughout the United States Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill in order to assist commanders in achieving disciplined and combat-ready units and to maintain the operational effectiveness of the command.

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For the Order and Discipline, a professional bulletin, is published quarterly by the Office of the Inspector General at the Fires Center of Excellence, 1613 Randolph Rd., Ft. Sill, OK 73503.

Purpose:
Originally distributed as the FCoE IG Bulletin, a monthly publication, this format features a wider variety of topics that affect the Fort Sill population. The contents exemplify a component of our Teaching and Training function to improve command readiness and warfighting capability for units across the installation.

COMMAND CORNER

Toxic Leadership

By LTC Timothy J. Diley, Command Inspector General

Subordinates often use the term "toxic leadership" trying to define leaders who are malicious or who create a climate that does not promote good order. Historically, Soldiers loosely using the term described the very leaders who are detrimental to the Army Profession and the Army Ethic. The Army recently revised AR 600-100, Army *Profession and Leadership Policy* (dated 5 April 2017) to define clearly counterproductive leadership such as toxic leadership and the five destructive leadership styles. The regulation encompasses leaders at all levels including officers, non-commissioned officers, Soldiers and Army Civilians. If leaders possess or continue to display these leadership styles, then the regulation is clear that actions such as removal from position, punitive action, and removal from the Army Profession will occur.

AR 600-100 describes toxic leadership "as a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance. To be classified as toxic, the counterproductive behaviors must be recurrent and have a deleterious impact on the organization's performance or the welfare of subordinates." It further states, "Counterproductive leadership behaviors prevent the establishment of a positive organizational climate, preclude other leaders from fulfilling their requirements, and may prevent the unit from achieving its mission" (para 1-11.d.). A positive command climate is a direct reflection of the quality of its leaders. Leaders establish the climate by enforcing standards, developing subordinates and leaders, and taking care for the welfare of everyone in the organization including families.

The *Army Profession and Leadership Policy* breaks down destructive leadership styles into the following five categories (AR 600-100, para 1-11.e.):

1) **Incompetent managers** - They possess inadequate cognitive or emotional fitness or have inadequate prior experience to function at their level. They cannot move from the tactical to the strategic level when so required. They cannot make sound decisions on time.
2) **Affable non-participant** - These leaders are interpersonally skilled, and intellectually sound, but incapable of taking charge, making decisions, providing timely guidance, and holding subordinates accountable. They provide minimal guidance, avoid decisions, are fond of committees, meetings, visitors, and often lack passion or creativity.

3) **Insensitive driven achiever** - These leaders are usually bright and energetic and consumed by need for unit accomplishment and its attendant recognition. They often provide impressive short term results, but create a frenzied, micro-managed climate. They are frequently inattentive to the morale of their organization.

4) **Toxic self-centered abuser** - These leaders are also usually bright and energetic, as well as goal-oriented and boss-focused. Capable of producing spectacular short term results, but are arrogant, abusive, intemperate, distrusting, and irascible. They are typically distrusting micro-managers never burdened by introspection.

5) **Criminal** - These individuals may be energetic, bright, and sometimes charismatic. However, they cheat, lie, steal, defraud, and assault.

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NCO BUSINESS

The Army People Strategy

By MSG Salvador Valle, Inspector General NCOIC

The Army People Strategy is foundational to the readiness, modernization, and reform efforts described in the Army Strategy. People are the Army. Individually and collectively, people are the most important weapon systems and they are the most vital assets. With the right people, in the right place, at the right time, the Total Army will successfully deploy, fight, and win in multi-domain operations (MDO) and excel in support of the Joint Force. It is the people that provide us with an enduring advantage to remain the world's most ready, lethal, and capable land combat force.

This strategy is a starting point. It provides the guidance, framework, and conceptual basis for follow-on military and civilian implementation plans. These plans, which will be time and data driven, and will allow for gap identification, solution implementation to close those gaps, and metrics by which to assess our progressive improvement, as we build upon these in thoughtful and effective ways.

The Army People Strategy describes how the Army will shift from simply "distributing personnel" to more deliberately managing the talents of the Soldiers and civilians. This means creating a 21st century talent management system with policies, programs, and processes that recognize and capitalize upon the unique **knowledge, skills**, and **behavior**, allowing the units to employ each to maximum effect. Recognizing that our Soldiers and Civilians should have the best quality of life possible, Army Senior Leaders are also prioritizing improvements in our housing, healthcare, childcare, spouse employment, and permanent change of station (PCS) moves.

Within Fort Sill, we have seen implementations of this strategy. An example is Army Directive 2019-18, which "establishes policy for the authorized reimbursement for State licensure and certification costs for a spouse pursuant to the PCS or permanent change of assignment of a Soldier sponsor to another State." Additionally, upcoming inspections on Fort Sill support the Army People Strategy: Medical Resources, Barracks Maintenance Program, and Army Enlistment.

The Army will proceed along all four lines of efforts (LOEs) simultaneously, (See Figure 1) but the implementation priority and main effort through 2028 is LOE 1, Acquire Talent, with an emphasis upon innovative new marketing, recruiting, and onboarding of our multiple cohorts (Total Army officers, enlisted, and civilians). This directly supports the Army Strategy's priority, Build Readiness, through 2022, which calls for Total Army and strength growth, reductions in non-deployable rates, improvements in talent alignment, and improved training outcomes.

As non-commissioned officers, leaders, and mentors, you may be asking yourself, "How do I support the people strategy?" We can focus on supporting three of the Critical Enablers, essential components of the Vision of this strategy: talent management, quality of life, and Army culture.

Talent Management: Place people in positions to foster their strengths and improve their weaknesses within our organizations. Another critical aspect of talent management are evaluations. We must take the time and expend the energy to conduct viable evaluations, which will provide leaders an accurate assessment.

Quality of Life: Quality of life encompasses housing, healthcare, childcare, spouse employment, and PCS moves. The Army tasks leaders to identify gaps rapidly, make improvements, and report deficiencies.

Army Culture: Our values, **Loyalty**, **Duty**, **Respect**, **Selfless Service**, **Honor**,

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DEPUTY CORNER

Corrective Training

By Lloyd E. Dixon, Deputy Inspector General

Self-discipline, respect for properly constituted authority, and embracing the professional Army ethic with its supporting individual values form the basis for all military discipline. Well-intentioned and well-crafted individual and group training develop military discipline to create a mental attitude resulting in proper conduct and prompt obedience to lawful military authority. Leaders must exemplify and subordinates must honor military authority promptly, firmly, courteously and fairly. Commanders should consider administrative corrective measures before deciding to impose non-judicial punishment.

Competent non-commissioned officers (NCO) are important to maintaining discipline in the Army. As enlisted leaders of Soldiers, NCOs are essential to furthering unit efficiency. This function includes preventing incidents that make it necessary to resort to trial by courts-martial or to impose non-judicial punishment. Thus, NCOs must assist commanders in administering minor non-punitive corrective actions as found in AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, AR 27–10, *Military Justice* and the *Manual for Courts-Martial* (MCM).

One of the most effective administrative corrective measures is non-punitive extra training or instruction (including on-the-spot correction). "Article 15 and Part V of [the MCM] do not apply to, include, or limit use of administrative corrective measures that promote efficiency and good order and discipline such as counseling, admonitions, reprimands, exhortations, disapprovals, criticisms, censures, reproofs, rebukes, extra military instruction, and administrative withholding of privileges" (MCM, Part V, para 1.g.). For example, if Soldiers appear in an improper uniform, they are required to correct it immediately; if they do not maintain their housing area properly, they must correct the deficiency in a timely manner. If Soldiers have training deficiencies, leaders will require them to undergo extra training or instruction in subjects directly related to the shortcoming. Having Soldiers report five to ten minutes early for formations is a reasonable corrective measure for Soldiers who display an inability to report to formations.

Leaders must provide Soldiers training, instruction, or correction that directly relates to the deficiency in question. Leaders must orient the correction to improving the Soldier's performance in his or her problem area. Leaders may impose corrective measures after normal duty hours. Such measures assume the nature of training or instruction, not punishment. Corrective training should continue only until the training deficiency is overcome. Corrective training should not be oppressive in nature, humiliate the Soldier or present the appearance of punishment. Leaders must ensure at all levels of command that training and instruction are not oppressive. Furthermore, leaders must root out any intentions to evade the procedural safeguards when attempting to impose non-judicial punishment.

"Leaders must provide Soldiers training, instruction, or correction that directly relates to the deficiency in question."

Figure 1: Strategic Approach through 2028



Lloyd Dixon entered Civilian Service as an Assistant Inspector General, in 2008. He has been serving as the Deputy Command Inspector General at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since April 2010.

The Inspector General Action Process

CPT Jedidiah Z. Schlissel, Chief of Assistance & Investigations

Last quarter we discussed Assistance as one of the four functions of that oft-overlooked and misunderstood Army organ, the Inspector General (IG). (Refresher: the other three functions are Investigations, Inspections and Teaching and Training.) Now armed with a better understanding of the IG and its Assistance function, we will examine the seven steps of the Inspector General Action Process (IGAP) to provide readers some behind-the-scenes insight. General George Casey Jr., the 36th Chief of Staff of the Army, once said, "Clarity and simplicity are the antidotes to complexity and uncertainty." The seven-step IGAP (graphically depicted in Figure 2) provides the IG simple steps that clarify the seemingly complex and uncertain problems that people bring to us for resolution.

Figure 2: The IGAP



The process begins when complainants reach out to our office, initiating our first step, **Receive the IG Action Request (IGAR)**. Complainants may submit requests for assistance in a variety of ways, to include in-person, phone, email; our office even has a Facebook page that inquirers may utilize to initiate contact. Whatever the method used for introductory contact, this office will always reach out, establish lines of communication, and gather as much pertinent information as possible. The most important product that comes out of this first step is the completion of DA Form 1559 (an Inspector General Action Request form), the IG's base-control document, signed and replete with contact information, requested action, and consent / denial of release of identity and documents. While not necessary, you may come to the office with one filled out (found online). If unable to come in person, this office can gather any necessary initial information over the phone to begin action for a request. If you elect to contact the office via email, sending a filled-out, signed form will expedite the intake process. The IG will address all complaints, including those made anonymously and those with personal information withheld. Understand, that depending on the nature of the issue, withholding identity will often significantly impair the IG's ability to pursue resolution to the initiator's satisfaction. Additionally, third-party initiators may not receive status of a complaint unless the concerned party consents by signing a DA Form 7433, a Privacy Act Information Release Statement.

For the sake of complainant expectation management, it is important to understand that IGs will not immediately provide them a selected course of action or likely outcome. The second IGAP step, **Preliminary Analysis**, is separate and distinct from the first. However, IGs may provide possible courses of action, depending on familiarity with the issue. Familiar as you are with non-commissioned officers and their tendency to solve problems (and that immediately upon identification), understand that the separation of these two steps is not only necessary, but also a counterintuitive restraint on a service member's natural impulse to right wrongdoing. The proper identification of issues and / or allegations that arise based on the provided narrative is arguably the most important component

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The Inspector General Action Process

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of preliminary analysis. Doing so allows the IG to determine appropriateness of the request for IG or another agency. Directly related to this is the proper identification of the pertinent standard(s) (i.e. regulations or policies), potentially requiring extensive research. Generally, the two primary classifications, issues and allegations, have correlative course selections, Assistance Inquiry and Command Referral, respectively.

Once IGs identify issues and / or allegations, relevant standards and the correlating avenues for redress, our office will begin the third step, **Initiate Referrals; Make Initial Notifications**. For matters that are not IG-appropriate, this office will find the correct agency (e.g. Veterans Affairs, Criminal Investigations Division, or Civilian Personnel Advisory Center), refer it, and close the case. Sometimes this office will receive an issue that another IG office must action (often dependent on echelon, Army Command, or Soldier's component). This office will inform the complainant in writing of this change. The majority of referred cases go to the appropriate level chain of command. Once we deliver allegations or issues, our office will monitor the case until the command addresses the issue, after which this office will close the case.

For IG-appropriate Assistance Inquiries, our fourth step, **IG Fact-Finding**, involves devising a plan for resolution, for which we gather pertinent information through various means. This step is often the most time consuming in the process. Recalling what we discussed in last quarter's issue, the IG does not conduct investigations, except under very specific circumstances. For our command-referred cases (i.e. allegations), please refer above to our third step.

At this point, our office will have effected a resolution, according to the relevant regulations and policies, which may not always coincide with the complainant's preconceptions of justice. Our office will **Make Notification of Results**, our fifth step. We will provide to the complainant information only what pertains directly to that person. Remember, third-party and Privacy Act regulations apply.

In the penultimate step, our office will **Follow-Up** with the complainant. Here, the IG will contact the complainant to ensure the IG has both thoroughly addressed all the issues and fulfilled all IG responsibilities. If the complainant is not satisfied, our office will reexamine the inquiry or we will refer it to the next higher IG (i.e. TRADOC) if we are unable to reach an agreed resolution.

Our office will then **Close the IGAR** as our final step. The office will send the complainant a written final reply. This letter does not contain the identity of sources or techniques, results of disciplinary action or information that violates the privacy of others. The IG will close the case in our system. Anonymous complainants and those who withheld the release of their personal information have waived their right to this final notification. For complaints submitted on another's behalf, third-party individuals have no right to know results if the issues do not directly pertain to that person. The IG must have a DA Form 7433 signed by the person in question before releasing inquiry results to a third party. If you want information released regarding an IG case, this office will not release any records. You may submit a Freedom of Information Act request at this website: http://www.daig.pentagon.mil/foia.aspx.

I trust this examination of the IGAP gave you some insight into the inner workings of our addressing an issue or allegation. Please, if you have any inquires, and do not know how to address them, do not hesitate: reach out to our office! "The world is a dangerous place, not because of those who do evil, but because of those who look on and do nothing." – Albert Einstein

IGs will not immediately provide a selected course of action or likely outcome upon initial complainant contact.

Command Referral: An Evolution

CPT Jedidiah Z. Schlissel, Chief of Assistance & Investigations

The purpose of the Inspector General (IG) is to enhance "the command's readiness and warfighting capability" (AR 20-1, *IG Activities and Procedures*, para 1-6.d.(1)). This is our guiding philosophy as passed down from our founder MG Frederic von Steuben. When exercising our Assistance function, specifically with regard to command referrals of allegations or issues, our derivative goal is to help our directing authority and the subordinate commanders make the best decisions on behalf of the Army. For many years, the IG procedure governing command-referred allegations (CRA) and issues in many ways worked in opposition to the idea that a unit's readiness and discipline is the command's responsibility. For all IG-originating CRAs, IG had to capture command investigation products in which IGs would produce modified reports, and enter into the IG database their determination ("Substantiated" or "Not Substantiated") for the subject.

This practice for CRA cases often resulted in a double, albeit delayed, punishment to service members (SM). Our system tethered a record to SMs' profiles, often with derogatory information, for a matter already addressed by command, up to thirty years – longer than the duration of most Army careers. SMs experienced the effects of this double retribution, which adversely and unduly affected their careers, e.g., during background reviews at centralized promotion boards. In capturing command investigative product results along with the violators' information, this policy acted in countervailence to the responsibility commanders have for adverse-information accounting by the IG's being a duplicated repository of derogatory information.

Recognizing these systemic flaws, the Secretary of the Army released Army Directive (AD) 2018-01 (IG Investigations), effective 26 January 2018, which sought to resolve this double jeopardy. The directive aimed simply to ensure that the command addressed IG-referred allegations. By eliminating IG's capturing of command investigative products, the directive sought to provide greater equity to tracking derogatory information.

This directive restricted IGs chiefly in three ways: First, it prohibited the IG from investigating "complaints ... when the command elects to resolve those matters" (para 2.a.). Second, it stopped the practice of recording allegations' determinations. IG would merely "review the investigation only to ensure that the command answered all the issues or allegations the IG referred" (para 2.b.). Third, it directed a procedure in the case IG identified a command's failure to address appropriately the IG-referred allegations or issues: If after allowing the commander to "resolve the unanswered issues or allegations" with no resolution met, "the IG would present the matter to the next higher commander for action." Only in cases of escalation to the Commanding General (CG), our directing authority, might the CG direct our office to conduct the investigation. Only in this rare case, would our system reflect the allegations' determinations (para 2.c.). A concurrent procedural change stated, "Inspectors general cannot disagree with the findings of a command product" (Policy Change 3 to AR 20-1, para 4.b.).

This directive undoubtedly moved the needle in the right direction toward returning control of adverse-information accounting to command, but, without further development, the directive laid the ground for other latent weaknesses in the system, which over time came into stark relief – particularly in two areas. First: The directive's stipulations allowed command products to have inconsistencies and discrepancies; many times command ignored or mishandled IG-referred

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Command Referral: An Evolution

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allegations. Unqualified, this directive prohibited IGs from challenging in any way the command's findings or conclusions. Second: AD 2018-01 significantly hampered IG's ability to provide specificity in allegations' determinations for IG trend analysis. With this prohibition in effect, trends simply showed that persons made allegations without indicating verdicts. Our role as the IG charges us with "the responsibility...to share...—but without direct attribution—any observations, findings, trends, and assistance requests with subordinate commanders to whom the observations or findings apply" (AR 20-1, para 1-6.f.). Furthermore, we are extensions of the CG's "eyes, ears, voice, and conscience responsible for advising...commanders on the state of their commands and for enhancing the command's readiness and warfighting capability" (AR 20-1, para 1-6.e.(1)).

In spite of movement in the direction towards greater equity, the necessity for IG quality control became increasingly clear without reverting to the prior flawed practices. To that end, The Inspector General (TIG) of the Army, LTG Leslie Smith, published "TIG Note 2019-01: Army Directive (AD) 2018-01 Guidance," addressing these very issues. Implemented 01 August 2019 with all Department of Defense (DoD) IG-initiated Hotline Cases, the following change is effective for IG command-referral procedures: "Once the command completes the investigation, the IG will review the final command product to ensure that the command addressed the allegations and any related issues referred by the IG in a thorough and complete manner with *findings supported by the evidence*" (emphasis added; TIG Note 2019-01). Otherwise stated, IGs have authority to request revision of the command products to ensure the evidence directly supports the findings for Hotline Cases. IG command-referral procedures now fully support the provisions of "DoD Instruction 7050.01: DoD Hotline Program" concerning thoroughness and legal sufficiency for investigations. Upon the publishing of the forthcoming AR 20-1 update, *this procedure will be effective for all IG-referred allegation cases* (update to AR 20-1, para 7-1.i.).

The other important alteration addresses IG tracking of allegations' determinations. Already effective with entry into the Fiscal Year 2020, TIG Note 2019-01 authorizes the IG's recording "Substantiated" or "Non-substantiated" in connection with the CRAs, but prevents capturing any associated personal data. Once command reaches its resolution and IG records it, cases cannot close until the IG case manager sanitizes subjects' personal data. This capability facilitates IGs' provision of specificity in trends for commanders to make informed decisions. IGs are now able to provide, e.g., "for all X number of Dignity and Respect allegations, Y number were substantiated." Furthermore, specificity is possible without capturing and tying allegation determinations to personally identifiable data of subjects / suspects.

These measures allow IGs to help commanders see their units, protect SMs from double jeopardy and facilitate better alignment with both the intent of AD 2018-01 and IG core principles and goals in AR 20-1. They "reinforce the Army Senior Leaders' view that the readiness and discipline of a unit is a command responsibility. [IG's] role in this process is to help our Directing Authorities [and] their subordinate commanders...make the best decisions on behalf of the Army" (TIG Note 2019-01).

> ***"The IG will review the final command product to ensure ... findings supported by the evidence" (TIG Note 2019-01).***

Captain Jedidiah Schlissel entered active duty as a 13A, Field Artillery Officer, in 2011. He has served in various positions including Basic Combat Training Battery Commander, Fire Support Officer and Multiple Launcher Rocket System Platoon Leader. CPT Schlissel has been serving as Chief of Assistance and Investigations at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since May 2019.

Hazing and Bullying

By MSG David M. Qutaishat, Assistant Inspector General

Frequent among the issues brought to the Fort Sill Inspector General (IG) office, matters of treatment of persons are among the most common which complainants bring us. Our office refers these as allegations to the appropriate command team for their investigation. It is important that leaders and subordinates alike are aware of what constitutes improper treatment of persons, both to prevent it and to identify and report its commission.

Our Army has experienced significant cultural changes over the last twenty years. Currently, the Army considers both hazing and bullying two behaviors whose culpability could span echelons. The presence of either displays a series of failures to treat Soldiers with dignity and respect. These behaviors are in direct violation of AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*, para 4-19. The Army understands that the practice of either hazing or bullying fundamentally undermines the obligatory dignity and respect inherent in our Profession of Arms and is in flagrant violation of the Army's core values. Soldiers found guilty of allegations that fall under either of these categories are highly likely to fall subject to punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

> ***"The Army considers both hazing and bullying two behaviors whose culpability could span echelons."***

Hazing was at one time normal behavior; it may ostensibly present itself as having intentions to correct deficiency or instill discipline, other times with more nefarious motivations. Service members of all ranks, often, considered hazing activities a "rite of passage," even a congratulatory obligation, e.g. the reception of "blood wings" upon promotion. A majority of leaders overlooked bullying until relatively recently. Before being rooted out, this particular practice was singularly difficult to prove culpability.

The Army Command Policy defines hazing as "any conduct whereby a [Service member (SM)] or members regardless of service, rank, or position, and without proper authority, recklessly or intentionally causes a [SM] to suffer or be exposed to any activity that is cruel, abusive, humiliating, oppressive, demeaning, or harmful" (AR 600-20 para 4-19.a.(1)). Examples of hazing can vary widely, including physical contact, and verbal or psychological abusive behavior. Hazing can take the form of requests to participate in certain activities, often with implicit pressuring or threats for failure to comply, whether subtle or overt. Exchanges conducted over text messages, voice messages, social-media platforms, or through email messages may help to substantiate investigations alleging hazing. Hazing often occurs in military settings (though not exclusively), for example, in small organizations, to start or "welcome" another service member to the unit or team. A hazing example, cited above, would be a Platoon Sergeant punching a Soldier in the chest during a promotion ceremony. (para 4-19.a.(1)).

Although bullying and hazing bear similarities, they differ slightly, though importantly. While hazing might parade itself as good-natured, bullying is characterized by harsh or cruel treatment, intended to "exclude or reject another [SM] through cruel, abusive, humiliating, oppressive, demeaning, or harmful behavior, which results in diminishing the other [SM's] dignity, position, or status" (para 4-19.a.(2)). Bullying tactics include, but are not limited to, making threats, spreading rumors, social isolation, and attacking someone physically, verbally, or with electronic media such as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, etc. Bullying also may include abuses of authority or forms of excessive corrective measures that cause physical or psychological pain. Bullying may likewise happen in all

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Pass and Leave Policy

By SFC Eric J. Ballheimer, Assistant Inspector General

Every year Human Resources Command issues new or updated guidance on taking leave in conjunction with pass, and permanent change of station (PCS) leave. This year is no exception. The new policy comes from Military Person (MILPER) Message numbers 19-290 and 19-329.

This recent message continues to allow a regular or special pass in conjunction with ordinary leave without a duty day in between. This, however, only allows one leave period in conjunction with pass (pass-leave or leave-pass); additionally, only one leave period in conjunction with two passes (pass-leave-pass). Leadership may NOT grant two periods of ordinary leave without a duty day in between (leave-pass-leave and pass-leave-pass-leave are not authorized). If inadvertently granted, finance will charge the entire absence as leave.

This year's policy also confirms that pass periods normally include the weekends, for Soldiers working Monday through Friday. Furthermore, leadership will not grant two consecutive passes without a duty day or a leave day in between (e.g., unauthorized succession: pass, Saturday thru Monday, followed by pass, Tuesday thru Thursday). In addition, regulations prescribe as unauthorized passes that exceed four days. Soldiers must be physically present on post, at duty location, or local residence area (defined as where the Soldier commutes daily to and from work), to start and end a pass. Soldiers may depart on pass after duty on the day before the "FROM" date on their DA Form 31 (Request and Authority for Leave form), and return before start of duty on the day after the "TO" date (e.g., for a Thursday to Sunday 4-day special pass, the Soldier may depart after duty on Wednesday and must return before duty on Monday).

For a leave period, Soldiers must be physically present on post, at duty location, or local residence area (defined as where the Soldier commutes daily to and from work), to start and end leave. Soldiers may not depart the local area on leave until after 0001 hours on the "FROM" date on their DA Form 31, and must return before 2400 hours on the "TO" date (e.g., for a Thursday to Sunday leave, the Soldier may depart after 0001 hours on Thursday and must return before 2400 hours on Sunday).

Regulations dictate charge of ordinary leave to Soldiers outside of the areas defined above at the beginning or end of any leave, or pass period for their entire absence, or the charge of absence without leave. When requesting a leave and pass together, do not include them on the same DA Form 31. If a Soldier remains in vicinity of his or her normal duty station, he or she does not have to submit a DA Form 31, by regulation. However, in order to exempt the Soldier for duty during the pass period, Soldiers should submit one.

> ***"Leadership may NOT grant two periods of ordinary leave without a duty day in between (leave-pass-leave and pass-leave-pass-leave are not authorized)."***

For PCS leave, commanders must ensure the "TO DATE" in Block 10b of the DA Form 31 is the same day as the Reporting Date in the Soldier's PCS orders. "Losing Commander will release Soldiers in time to permit authorized leave, travel, and TDY, if applicable, so Soldiers reach new station by reporting date" (AR 600-8-10, *Leaves and Passes*, 7-3.g.). Leaders must take care to prevent periods of absence that exceed leave, travel, or TDY before reporting dates.

Unless PCS orders state, "Early report not authorized," Soldiers may report early to new permanent duty stations (PDS). Soldiers may ensure successful accomplishment of early reporting by signing in at the gaining PDS before the "TO DATE" on the DA Form 31 (e.g., use less

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ACFT: Profiles and Alternate Events

By SFC Regan L. Davis, Assistant Inspector General

When the Army first published plans to launch its pilot combat fitness test, the accompanying guidance stated a "no alternate event" policy. I can recall panic from leaders and subordinates at the policy's implications. However, the test developers received this feedback with consideration and began planning to incorporate and approve alternate events for Soldiers with permanent profiles. While the alternate events still prove challenging, in keeping with the goal of the Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT) itself, the alternate assessment events demonstrate their design to provide commanders with enough information to determine whether Soldiers can meet mission requirements.

The prescription of alternate events requires Soldiers taking as many ACFT events as possible within the scope of their profile. Before receiving approval to take any modified version of the ACFT or alternate assessments, Soldiers must undergo specific screening and clearing by their medical provider. Once the provider determines the Soldier's limitations, the provider will specifically inform them which events they are able to do. The Soldier's medical provider will list on their permanent profile the specific events a Soldier can and cannot perform. Soldiers having received a permanent profile must successfully complete at a minimum the alternate assessment. Soldiers with a temporary profile must complete a reconditioning program to rehabilitate, within a given, specified timeframe, and afterwards take the six-event ACFT.

These are the three mandatory ACFT events, regardless of permanent profiles, i.e. everyone must complete these: 1) the three-repetition maximum deadlift, 2) the sprint-drag-carry, and 3) an aerobic event, either the 2-mile run or an alternate aerobic event. A Soldier's ability to pass these three events is imperative. The purpose of this fitness test is to measure ability of those tasks' completion most likely encountered in a combat situation. The ability to successfully complete these events will prove Soldiers can perform combat related tasks.

These are currently the three approved alternate aerobic events: the 15,000-meter bike, 5,000-meter row, and 1,000-meter swim. The standard for a passing score with all alternate aerobic events is 25 minutes or less. The Army has not yet released score tables for the alternate aerobic events. However, Soldiers with permanent profiles must achieve the GOLD standard for the 3-Repetition Maximum Deadlift, the Sprint-Drag-Carry and the aerobic event. ACFT developers will publish the policy regarding physical profiles and alternate events no later than 01 October 2020.

Soldiers may find the physical demand category standards for the ACFT broken down by each military occupational specialty (MOS) in Figure 10-2-1 "Enlisted OPAT Physical Demand Categories" from the Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21. The minimum standards are labeled Moderate (Gold), Significant (Grey), or Heavy (Black), or minimum unit requirements. A common question is whether respective MOS requirements or unit-based physical demand standards determine a Soldiers' minimum score. For example, would a support-MOS Soldier assigned to an infantry battalion be required to achieve the Black standard or their individual MOS standard? As of right now, the Army has not yet released clear guidance. The Army has locked the ACFT's currently published standards for this initial year of force-wide implementation. Soldiers and leaders can view these standards as living documents. Information pertaining to the ACFT is subject to change during this implementation period. Visit https://www.army.mil/acft/ for more updates.

Continued on Page 21

> ***"Before receiving approval to take any modified version of the ACFT or alternate assessments, Soldiers must undergo specific screening and clearing by their medical provider."***

Hazing and Bullying (Continued)

By MSG David M. Qutaishat

(From page 10)

settings, however, it regularly shows itself as excessive redress of, or discipline for perceived performance inadequacies. Examples of bullying include a leader pushing a subordinate without apparent provocation, and SMs spreading malicious rumors over social media of other SMs.

The Army strictly forbids bullying and hazing in all cases, whether on or off post, at unit functions or over the Internet. Neither bullying nor hazing is limited to superior-subordinate relationships. These behaviors often present themselves among peers, and even in coordinated activities towards senior staff by those lesser in rank, grade, or position to them. Service members should report incidents of bullying and hazing to the suitable level chain of command. If uncomfortable going that route, or for inquiry on what might constitute hazing or bullying, contact the IG office. In that case, the IG may refer the allegation to the requisite level chain of command providing them the opportunity to address the allegation. The IG does not conduct investigations unless specifically under directive by our directing authority, the post Commanding General. Circumstances may not always present clear-cut examples of either hazing or bullying. Call the IG if you have any questions.

Master Sergeant David Qutaishat entered active duty as a 13J, Senior Fire Control Sergeant, in 2001. He has served in various positions including DIVARTY Fire Control Sergeant, Battalion Fire Control Sergeant and Operations Sergeant. MSG Qutaishat has been serving as Assistant Inspector General at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since July 2018.

Pass and Leave Policy (Continued)

By SFC Eric J. Ballheimer

(From page 11)

leave than authorized). Soldiers reporting early are responsible for executing locally established PCS sign-in procedures at the gaining installation to ensure properly terminated leave.

The authorization of "early reporting" on a Soldier's PCS orders does not guarantee Solders can use their desired early report date as the "TO DATE" on the DA Form 31. Losing Commanders may, or may not, grant sufficient leave for a Soldier to sign in at a new PDS more than 30 days before the Reporting Date on the PCS orders. Finally, if a Soldier has TDY-en-route travel scheduled for 30 days or longer, Soldiers may use two DA Forms 31, dependent on unit policies. The first DA Form 31 will cover from final out at the losing PDS to the reporting date for TDY. The second DA Form 31 will cover from the completion of TDY (e.g., graduation date) to the Reporting Date on the PCS orders.

Whether you decide to take leave, pass, or both, make it stress free and ensure you follow the policy. For clarification of this guidance, contact your unit personnel / S-1 offices.

Sergeant First Class Eric Ballheimer entered active duty as a 13M, Multiple Launcher Rocket System Crewmember, in 1992. After a break in service, he reentered active service in 2001 as a 42A, Human Resources Specialist. He has served in various positions including NCOIC at Human Resources Directorate and Defense Threat Reduction Agency. SFC Ballheimer has been serving as an Assistant Inspector General, in the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since July 2019.

TEACH & TRAIN

Fort Sill Inspector General Outreach

MSG Qutaishat with incoming Drill Sergeants at the Drill Sergeant Orientation Course at 434th Field Artillery Brigade

SFC Young with brand new 14 Series Initial Entry Trainees at 30th Air Defense Artillery Advance Individual Training in-brief

The Fort Sill Inspector General Office puts a lot of energy into our Teach and Train function. This office takes a preemptive, preventative and proactive approach to arming the Soldiers and workers on Fort Sill with the knowledge they need to stay out of trouble. Knowing is half the battle and the Fort Sill IG does their best to direct people to that knowledge.

SFC Ballheimer with fresh 94M Initial Entry Trainees at the Ordnance Training Detachment

TEACH & TRAIN

Fort Sill Inspector General Outreach

SFC Castillo briefing 434th Field Artillery Brigade command teams at a brigade leader professional development session.

This office has been able to become part of a number of the introductory briefs across the installation, including 434th FA Cadre Training Course, Drill Sergeant Orientation Course, a number of Advanced Individual Training (AIT) Courses, Ordnance Training Detachment, NCO Academy and Ft. Sill Commander First Sergeant Course.

MSG Qutaishat briefing an incoming group at the Fort Sill TRADOC Cadre Training Course, hosted by 95th Adjutant General Battalion

We provide attendees an overview brief of the Office of the Inspector General, explain the core IG roles, functions and operating guidelines of Army regulations, identify issues, inspections and investigations internal to the USAFCoEFS. Briefers discuss who can request IG Assistance, IG Appropriateness, IG trends, Whistleblower Reprisal, IG Scope and Confidentiality; they also highlight aspects of the IG which pertain to Soldiers now and in the future.

TRENDS

Trends for Fort Sill

Assistance and Investigations

Fort Sill Inspector General Office Cases: Last 4 Quarters



Top Two Major Categories

1. **Command / Leadership Issues (173 / 35%)**
   - Nonsupport of Family (49%)
   - Dignity and Respect (15%)
   - Commander's Decisions (9%)
2. **Personnel Management – Military (81 / 16%)**
   - Flagging Actions (17%)
   - DEERS (11%)
   - Assignment Orders (7%)
   - Contest Separation (7%)

FCoE Trends

Issues & Allegations: 499
- Assistance: 407 / 82%
- Command Referred: 92 / 18%

Command Referred Allegations: 13*
- Command Substantiated (15%)
- Command Not Substantiated (85%)

*Determination tracking begun 01OCT2020
(For an explanation read "Command Referral: An Evolution," page 8.)

TRENDS

Trends for Fort Sill

Assistance and Investigations

Fort Sill Inspector General Office Cases: 1st Quarter 2020

Why Soldiers Seek Out Inspectors General:

- Command Referred Issues (13 / 9%)
- Requests for Assistance (128 / 91%) **"I Have a Problem"**

141 Issues brought to IGs

"What Walks Through the Door"

(Top Five Trending Categories Only)

1. **Command / Leadership Issues (56/ 40%)**
   Nonsupport of Family (41%)
   Failure to Treat Individuals w/ Dignity & Respect (14%)
   Failure to Promote Positive CMD Climate (11%)
2. **Personnel Management – Military (20 / 15%)**
   Assignment Orders (15%)
   Enlisted Promotions (15%)
   Flagging Actions (10%)
   REFRAD (10%)
3. **Personal Misconduct (11 / 8%)**
   False Statement or Writing (27%)
   Electronic Harassment (18%)
4. **Healthcare (8 / 6%)**
   Medical Profiles (38%)
   HIPAA (25%)
5. **Sexual Misconduct (9 / 6%)**
   Adultery (67%)
   Intimate (22%)

*Legend: Issue Type (Number of cases/relative percentage of caseload)
Sub-Issue (Percentage relative to Issue Type)

What's going on throughout the installation?

Bottom Line: Most Inspectors General spend most of their day solving problems brought to them by Soldiers, Army Civilians and Family Members… it's what we do!

(1st Quarter data as of 18 December 2019)

Resource for Inspections and Training

By CPT Aaron K. King, Chief of Inspections

Memorizing every regulation is a seemingly impossible task, even impractical given the frequency at which proponents publish updates. Simply relying on Google for the most current regulation is a bad practice and can cause issues in some cases. The resource of choice in the realm of the Inspector General (IG) is the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) website, https://armypubs.army.mil. The APD website provides the most updated versions of Army regulations, as well as access to Department of Defense Directives, Instructions, Manuals and more. All in all, it is another beneficial tool for Soldiers and leaders.

So why write an article discussing APD? The short answer is simply to bring awareness to relevant constituents. Now, the long answer: During an IG inspection, we analyze data and classify deficiencies into three root causes: Don't Know, Can't Comply, and Won't Comply. (See Figure 3.) AR 20-1, *Inspector General Activities and Procedures*, states, "All IG inspections...will identify patterns of noncompliance, determine the magnitude of the deficiencies, and seek the root causes of problem areas" (para 5-1.f.(1)). The majority of deficiencies found in our inspections on Fort Sill primarily falls under "Don't Know" and "Can't Comply." However, these root causes are not exclusive to inspections.

Consider the following scenario: While on post, you notice two moving vehicles whose drivers are both texting. Both vehicles pull into the PX parking lot just as you are about leave. Both drivers exit the vehicles; one is a parent of a trainee, the other a captain. After you

Continued on Page 19

> ***"Contrary to popular belief, the role of the IG is not to patrol the installation and play regulation police; however, one of our four functions is to teach and train."***

Root Cause: The underlying reason something happens or does not happen.



Figure 3:
IGs use Root-Cause Analysis for systemic non-compliance to determine recommendations for addressing their reversal.

Resource for Inspections and Training

(Continued)

(From page 18)

identify yourself, you explain the violation in which the parent said she did not know. The simple explanation can easily justify her response with little analytical effort; therefore, the root cause is "Don't Know." The captain on the other hand, said he knew better, but texts and drives all the time. This is a cognizant violation of the regulation and falls into the "Won't Comply" root cause. (Compare this scenario to the analytic process depicted in Figure 4.)

Over the last several months, our office published a weekly information post on our Facebook page titled, "DID YOU KNOW?" which we have begun consolidating in this publication. The object of each post is to share excerpts from various regulations based on trends from our cases or just from observations by IGs. Some of the topics include online misconduct, authorized locations for government vehicles, fraternization, authorized locations for the wear of physical fitness uniforms, and so forth.

Contrary to popular belief, the role of the IG is not to patrol the installation and play regulation police; however, one of our four functions is to teach and train. The most effective method of teaching and training is to engage directly with Soldiers and leaders. We do this in classroom settings, while buying coffee at the shoppette, during inspections, and many other platforms - including this publication. The most predominant observation is that some individuals become apprehensive to correct violations, whether to avoid a potential confrontation, or just simple lack of knowledge. In either case, forgoing an opportunity to address a deficiency creates a new standard.

As leaders, we should never miss the opportunity to educate Soldiers and other leaders on the standards. No one is perfect, and as a previously mentioned, memorizing every regulation is essentially impossible. Fortunately, an asset like the IG or APD can assist finding the correct answer and mitigate the "Don't Know" across the leadership domain.

Root Cause Analysis as a Flow Chart



Figure 4:
Root-Cause Analysis demonstrated by Flow Chart

Captain Aaron King entered active duty as a 35D, All-Source Intelligence Officer, in 2009. He served in various positions including Battalion Intelligence Officer, Brigade Plans Officer and Intelligence Collection Platoon Leader. CPT King has been serving as Chief of Inspections at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since August 2016.

Did You Know?

COYOTE BROWN FLEECE CAP AUTHORIZED FOR OPTIONAL WEAR WITH THE ARMY COMBAT UNIFORM. From Army G-1 Uniform Policy: The Chief of Staff of the Army has authorized the Coyote Brown Fleece Cap for optional wear with the Army Combat Uniform *at the discretion of commanders*, effective 01 Oct 19. This change will be reflected in AR/DA Pam 670-1 in 2020. https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-702659

According to AR 670-1 (Dated May 2017), **physical fitness uniforms are NOT authorized for wear in off-post establishments.** For example, going inside Chick-Fil-A or similar establishments following PT in the morning or after work.

AR 670-1, Chapter 10, para 10-3.(c)(2) (page 27) states, "Personnel may not wear the physical fitness uniform in off-post establishments, unless for purchase of *essential items* (for example, gas)."

If the BDE/BN/BTRY/CO commander authorizes the **wear of the *fleece cap*,** that authorization is ONLY good *for that unit footprint*. You *are NOT authorized* to wear the fleece cap to places such as the PX, RAHC, shoppette, while pumping gas, off post, or any other place outside that footprint *unless* the Installation commander (CG) authorizes.

The micro fleece cap that is worn with the APFU or combat uniform in field environments when the ACH is not worn, work details, or in other environments where wearing the patrol cap is impractical, as determined by the commander. Installation Commander (CG) will determine warranting wear of the cap in non-field, non-deployed environments based on temperature, wind chill, and extended duty time. For any questions, refer to the Fort Sill Blue Book (June 2019) and AR 670-1 Chapter 3, para. 3-7.(d), and DA Pam 670-1, Chapter 4, para 4-10.(c).

Upcoming Inspections

Date	Agency	Units Affected	Topic
JAN/FEB (dates TBD)	DoD IG	FCoE HQ, MEDCOM, USAG, 434th FA BDE	Evaluation of Medical Protocol and Deaths of Recruits in the DoD
06-10APR2020	IMCOM IG	All Fort Sill Units	Barracks Maintenance Program
04-08MAY2020	DA IG	FCoE HQ, USAG, 434th FA BDE	Army Enlistment
3rd QTR (dates TBD)	FCoE IG	All Fort Sill Units	Army Voting Assistance Program
4th QTR (dates TBD)	FCoE IG	All Fort Sill Units	Organizational Inspection Program
4th QTR (dates TBD)	FCoE IG	FCoE HQ., 428th FA BDE, 434th FA BDE, 30th ADA BDE	Special Conditioning

The Army People Strategy (Continued)

By MSG Salvador Valle

(From page 4)
Integrity, and **Personal Courage** form the basis of our Army culture. These values are time-tested and provide our culture with a rock-solid foundation (see Figure 5). As an American institution, however, we face many of the same cultural challenges as the rest of our nation: sexual assault, sexual harassment, discrimination, extremism, and suicide. If allowed to persist, these behaviors can break trust within Army teams. They affect team cohesion and it is our responsibility to create a positive culture within our formations.

Master Sergeant Salvador Valle entered active duty as a 13M, Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember, in 2000. He has served in various positions including First Sergeant, Master Gunner and Observer Controller/Trainer. MSG Valle has been serving as the NCOIC at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since July 2018.



Figure 5: Building Cohesive Teams

ACFT: Profiles and Alternate Events (Continued)

By SFC Regan L. Davis

(From page 12)
Sergeant First Class Regan Davis entered active duty as a 92Y, Unit Supply Specialists, in 2008. Currently representing our office on the installation Fitness Advisory Board, she has served in various positions including Battalion Logistics NCO, Operations NCO and Senior Supply Sergeant. SFC Davis has been serving as Assistant Inspector General at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since August 2019.

Initial Command Inspections

By SFC Scott E. Young, Assistant Inspector General

The Army designed Initial Command Inspections (ICI) to identify a unit's strengths and weaknesses in comparison to its higher headquarters' goals. ICIs (which fall under Command Inspections, see Figure 6) are essential for every commander by providing a baseline status of the unit's systems. Generally, inspections have one purpose: "provide feedback to commanders… so they can make decisions that will improve the Army" (AR 1-201, para 2-3.). This critical feedback will enable them to make educated decisions that will improve the Army. AR 1-201, *Army Inspection Policy*, defines an inspection as "an evaluation that measures performance against a standard and that should identify the cause of any deviation" (pg. 31), and provides elements by which to organize effectively these formal evaluations (para 2 -3.).

The purpose of an ICI is to ensure that the new commander understands the unit's strengths and weaknesses in relation to higher headquarters' goals. The incoming commander should receive a clear picture of the goals, standards, and priorities for the unit. The inspecting commander establishes the scope and scale of all ICIs based on readiness requirements and from higher headquarters' guidance. "A new company[-level] commander…will receive an ICI from his or her commander, who is also the inspected commander's rater" (AR 1-201, para 3-3.c.1.). The *Army Inspection Policy* requires conducting ICIs for all battery-level commanders within 90 or 180 days of assumption for Active or Reserve Components, respectively (para 3-3.c.).

The ICI does not evaluate the commander's performance since assuming command. Only the inspected commander and that commander's rater will receive the specific results of the initial inspection. The ICI will appear on the training schedule and, once completed, will serve to evaluate the condition of the unit.

The inspection results will serve as the basis for a goal-setting session between the incoming commander and his or her rater that will establish realistic goals to improve unit readiness. The ICI results (and subsequent command inspection results, if available) will be included as part of the inspected unit's deployment records if that unit deploys separately, so that the gaining commander is aware of the unit's strengths and weaknesses. At a minimum, upon completion of any command inspection, the inspecting commander must attend the in-briefings, out-briefings, actively conduct part of the inspection, and provide the inspected commander with an assessment of strengths and weaknesses.

Any effective inspection must incorporate the **five basic elements** of an inspection (AR 1-201, para 2-3.). First, inspections must measure **the performance against a standard**. Inspectors should determine compliance against a standard (i.e. a regulation) and should prepare ways to determine why the unit or organization failed to meet the standard. During an inspection, inspectors should avoid the strict use of checklists. Second, inspectors must determine **the magnitude of the problem(s)**. Focus should be on high-payoff issues that affect unit or organizational readiness. Focus on issues that count and that truly affect the health and function of the organization. Trivial issues must not sidetrack inspectors. Third, inspectors must **seek the root cause(s) of the problem(s)**. Use the Root Cause Analysis Model from the OIP Guide (see Figure 3) to determine reasons for the noncompliance. This model provides inspectors three helpful factors by which to determine the

Continued on Page 23

"The Army Inspection Policy requires conducting ICIs for all battery-level commanders within 90 or 180 days of assumption for Active or Reserve Components, respectively (para 3-3.c.)."

Initial Command Inspections

(Continued)

(From page 22)

basis of noncompliance: *Don't Know; Can't Comply; Won't Comply*. Fourth, inspectors must **determine a solution**. Examine the root causes and use them to articulate an effective and meaningful solution. Finally, inspectors must assign **responsibility to the appropriate individuals or agencies**. The commander must receive a copy of the inspection report with the inspector's findings and recommendations in order to task the appropriate individuals or agencies with fixing the problems. The inspector must name those individuals or agencies in each recommendation.

Army inspections that incorporate all five elements of inspections can be extremely effective tools for commanders. While ICIs identify a unit's strengths and weaknesses, the feedback that commanders receive will afford them the opportunity to improve their unit and the Army as a whole. If your unit is preparing for ICIs and wish to have your unit inspectors receive training, call our office. We are eager to work with you!

Sergeant First Class Scott Young entered active duty as a 13B, Cannon Crewmember, in 2002. He has served in various positions including Battalion Master Gunner, Platoon Sergeant and Gunnery Sergeant. SFC Young has been serving as an Assistant Inspector General in the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since January 2019.

Figure 6:
Visual depiction of the OIP Integration; ICIs fall under Command Inspections, which make up only one category of the three.

The Total Army Sponsorship Program

By MSG Kent W. Scobey, Assistant Inspector General

In light of Fort Sill's completed Inspection by Department of the Army Inspector General of the Total Army Sponsorship Program (TASP), what follows is a helpful description of the TASP. Changing duty stations, or Permanent Change of Station (PCS) move can be a daunting task. The Army utilizes Levy Briefs to alleviate some of the stressors involved with a PCS move, as well as the utilization of the TASP, governed by AR 600-8-8. The TASP covers a slew of responsibilities from commanders and military organizations down to the sponsors and tier level Soldiers who PCS. The TASP "prescribes a system to help commanders exercise their basic responsibility for the successful reception and integration of Soldiers and Families into their unit, installation, facility, and community...It provides principles of support, standards of service, policies, functions, and tasks governing the program" (para 1-1.).

Oversight of the TASP lies with a hierarchy of government officials and military leadership who appoint TASP managers to monitor the sponsorship program at the command level to establish and provides command emphasis and support for the TASP. Leadership, at all levels, provides guidance and oversight as to how the TASP should operate, though at the lowest level, commanders will maintain full responsibility over the sponsorship program, and must publish standing operating procedures (SOPs) to meet sponsorship requirements. Battalion commanders delegate authority to a primary and secondary Unit Sponsorship Coordinator (USC), usually residing in the S1 shop. The USC maintains the sponsorship program and works with battery / company commanders in the assignment of sponsors.

Though the TASP is of extreme importance to Soldiers and family members who undergo a PCS move, a tiered approach places priority on first-term and junior enlisted Soldiers. Tiers I thru III help differentiate the respective assignment procedures for sponsors. Tier I Soldiers consist of AIT and Officer Basic Course graduates. Tier I sponsor assignment occurs prior to the publication of that Soldier's assignment orders. Tier II rank requirements are Private to Staff Sergeant, Second Lieutenant to Captain, and Warrant Officer One, to Chief Warrant Officer Two. Assignment of sponsors for Tier II Soldiers occurs before a PCS move. Tier III Soldiers are in the grades of Sergeant First Class to Sergeant Major, Chief Warrant Officer Three to Chief Warrant Officer Five, and Major to Colonel. Tier III Soldiers may request sponsorship but these may opt not to have a sponsor before, during, or after a PCS move. Though Tier III Soldiers may not require a sponsor due to their rank, various duty assignments, such as senior commanders, may require sponsorship regardless of the Soldier's rank. Some examples: A PCS move to Korea and Japan mandatorily requires all Soldiers receive sponsorship due to the uniqueness or complexity of the area of assignment. If a Soldier, regardless of tier, travels TDY -en-route to a long-term military school (20 weeks or more), the receiving facility must provide a welcome letter and a sponsorship packet to the incoming Soldier though the TASP does not require gaining units to assign a sponsor. Army Civilians who PCS have the opportunity to participate in the TASP though there is no requirement for them to do so (para 3-1.e.).

Command must focus on three types of sponsorship: 1) advanced arrival sponsorship, 2) out-sponsorship, and 3) reactionary sponsorship. **Advanced sponsorship** is the most common of the three. This type of sponsorship, occurring roughly 120 days

Continued on Page 25

> ***"Commanders at all levels are responsible to ensure processes and SOPs are in place to achieve minimum stress during times of uncertainty in order to provide the best possible integration of Soldiers into their units."***

The Total Army Sponsorship Program

(Continued)

(From page 24)

before the PCS move, aides the unit in acquiring the needs of the inbound Soldier and family. Advanced arrival sponsorship also allows the gaining unit to send information to the inbound Soldier, such as maps, packing lists, location of schools or daycare, SOPs, etc. **Out-sponsorship** involves helping a Soldier prepare for a PCS move from their current duty station, though it does not take from a Soldier certain responsibilities that a Soldier must perform for self and family on a daily basis. Least preferred, **reactionary sponsorship** becomes necessary with the production of unforeseen arrivals, when the time between assignment and reporting date is too short, or due to other factors which prevent advanced arrival sponsorship. In this case the gaining command must provide this least effective form of sponsorship, though as a last resort.

After a Soldier receives notification of an impending duty assignment, the outbound Soldier must log into the Army Career Tracker (ACT) website (www.actnow.army.mil), go to the sponsorship tab on the left side of the page, and fill out sections 1, 2, 4, and 5 of DA Form 5434. Soldiers must ensure that they have all applicable information on hand before filling out this form, such as current First Sergeant and Unit TASP Coordinator phone numbers and email addresses. Even incomplete, the ACT website allows an applicant to save the DA Form 5434 and log back in to complete it at a later time. Once receiving the ACT sponsorship notification of assignment, sponsors have three business days to complete "Section 3" of DA Form 5434. Upon completion, sponsors must contact the inbound Soldier, either by email or phone. At this point, both parties will exchange vital details to identify the needs of the inbound Soldier.

Before assigning a sponsor, command must focus on the makeup of the incoming Soldier and family in order to assign the best possible candidate as sponsor. "To the greatest extent possible, sponsors will be leaders [that] are: (1) Equal in grade or higher than the incoming or departing Soldier," and "(2) of the same gender, marital status, and military career field or occupational series as the inbound Soldier. Commanders and supervisors will make every attempt possible to assign sponsors who are the same gender as the inbound Soldier—especially first-term Soldiers" (AR 600-8-8, par. 3-4.f.). All Initial Military Training Soldiers will have a sponsor in the rank of Sergeant or above. Once command determines the makeup of the inbound Soldier, the USC will have 120 days before the report date of the inbound Soldier to assign a sponsor. If the inbound Soldier receives assignment orders less than 120 days before the PCS, the USC must assign a sponsor as soon as possible but within five duty days of realization of the inbound assignment.

The Army designed sponsorship to help alleviate some of the stressors involved with a change of duty station. The responsibility of smooth transitioning from one station to another rests not only with the inbound Soldier, but with commanders at all levels to ensure that processes and SOPs are in place to achieve minimum stress during times of uncertainty in order to provide the best possible integration of Soldiers and Families into their unit, installation, facility, and community.

Master Sergeant Kent Scobey entered active duty as a 43E, Parachute Rigger, in 1988; after a 14-year break in service, in 2007 he reentered as a 14T, Patriot Missile Launcher Operator/ Maintainer. He has served in various positions including the Headquarter Platoon NCOIC, Air Defense Battalion Master Gunner. MSG Scobey has been serving as an Assistant Inspector General at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since June 2017.

Inspector General Events

Rigor Inspection

This office conducted an inspection looking into the elements of rigor in Basic Combat Training here on Fort Sill. Although it occurred last fiscal year, we are using this opportunity to show the diversity of Inspector General Inspections. Also we very much enjoyed the interactions with Trainees and Cadre.



MSG Qutaishat captures his observations

Inspector General Events

Guest Speaking and Esprit de Corps

Cadre from 2nd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery invited CPT King to perform the duties of Guest Speaker at a recent Advanced Individual Training graduation for 14E and 14T. It is always an honor to participate in the life events of Soldiers and cadre on the installation.



SSG Braxton presents CPT King a Certificate of Appreciation for his words of advice to the graduates.

Always an advocate for Fort Sill, this office was eager to participate in the Post Run executed this past November. Leading from the front, Inspectors General called cadence with great aplomb, eager to enhance the already high morale of the formation.

Post Run photos used courtesy of the Fort Sill Tribune

Inspector General Events

Veteran Appreciation Day

CPT King speaking to a throng of raptured students and faculty

In concert with Veterans Day, CPT King participated in a day of appreciation sponsored by his son's school, St. Mary's Catholic School, at which he provided a picture into life as a Soldier, replete with Army gear in tow. Crowd volunteers got a chance to try on and feel what it is like to use some of the most commonly utilized Army paraphernalia.

Gear tryouts by staff and students alike

Inspector General Events

External Classes and Inspections

A number of Inspectors General attended a class at the Army Wellness Center teaching and certifying students in proper and current methods measuring Height and Weight. (Photo courtesy Fort Sill Army Wellness Center.)

Department of the Army sent Fort Sill a team of 14 Inspectors General and Subject Matter Experts to conduct an inspection on the Total Army Sponsorship Program. Successfully completed, they posed for this photo in front of the post headquarters building.

Fort Sill Housing: Corvias' Commitment

By SFC Eric P. Castillo, Assistant Inspector General

All of Fort Sill Housing is involved with Corvias Property Management. As of February 2019, Corvias implemented The Corvias Commitment in order to better serve the residents and provide an overall improvement to the resident experience. The Corvias Commitment is entirely resident focused, dedicated to providing hassle-free communication, timely responses, and overall satisfaction. When relocating to Fort Sill, personnel can find information on their website at http://sill.corviasmilitaryliving.com/.

Hassle-free communication between Residents and the company needed improvement. Corvias ensured the new process is easy and provided multiple means to suit the residents' needs. The most efficient way for a resident to voice concerns or address issues is to visit their community office at Old Calvary Post, Southern Plains, or Buffalo Soldier Acres. Residents can openly address their needs with staff and work towards a solution. Residents can also call their community office or reach them by email. If residents choose to contact Corvias by phone or email, The Corvias Commitment is to provide a response within 24 hours.

"The Corvias Commitment is entirely resident focused, dedicated to providing hassle-free communication, timely responses, and overall satisfaction."

The most common interaction between residents and Corvias is requesting a work order / service request. Residents have the option to visit their community office, call 844-947-4412, visit the new resident portal website, or download the Resident Portal app from the Google Play Store or the App Store. From the main screen on the Resident Portal app, personnel will touch the "Maintenance" tile located at the bottom of the screen. The next screen gives residents the option to call maintenance or touch the "Request Maintenance" tile located in the middle of the screen to continue on. When residents fill out the request, they must answer numerous questions in order to assist Corvias with identifying what and where the problem is located. Residents will select from one of the following categories: Appliance, Deployment Assistance, Electrical, Extermination, General, Health/Safety, HVAC, Key/Lock, Plumbing, Rental Furnishings, Structural-Exterior, Structural-Interior, or Window. After selecting one category, each category has further options to help pinpoint the area needing attention. For example, when selecting the Appliance category, residents must select which appliance has the issue. The menu then asks residents to provide a detailed description of what the problem is, such as, "The dishwasher leaks from the bottom of the unit and doesn't drain properly." To help assist the maintenance crew, residents can add pictures to their request. Providing images is extremely helpful, but not required. The last two options ask permission to enter the home and a good contact phone number.

Within 24 hours, a maintenance representative will make contact with the resident to confirm any details and set up a time to visit the home. When workers require entrance to the home, a maintenance representative will ask some generic questions such as whether someone will be home, whom the workers might meet upon arrival, if the home has pets, and, if so, whether you have locked up the pets. On the day of the scheduled visit, a technician will call the resident ahead of their arrival. Whether working indoors or outdoors, the technician will meet with the resident to confirm the details of the service request.

After completion, the technician will inform the resident what was wrong and how the technician had fixed it. If the technician could not fix the issue, the technician will provide information to the resident about what remains and how

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Fort Sill Housing: Corvias' Commitment

(Continued)

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the job will be finished. Once the job is complete, Corvias will send an email to the resident with a survey requesting feedback. The email provides all the information about the work order / service request and a link to the survey. The survey is a means for residents to provide Corvias valuable feedback about the work completed and professionalism of the technician.

The Corvias Commitment ensures they fully and satisfactorily meet the residents' expectations. Corvias will not consider a job complete until the resident is 100% satisfied. In the event Corvias does not meet a resident's expectations, the resident has the right to contact the Community Managers, Operations Directors, Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) office, Housing Management Officer, or the Corporate Office. Visit https://www.corvias.com/node/304 for more information on the Corvias Commitment.

Sergeant First Class Eric Castillo entered active duty as a 14T, Patriot Launching Station Enhanced Operator/Maintainer, in 2002. He has served in various positions including Team Chief, Squad Leader, Platoon Sergeant and First Sergeant. SFC Castillo has been serving as an Assistant Inspector General at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since July 2016.

Toxic Leadership (Continued)

By LTC Timothy J. Diley

(From page 3)

I recommend that all leaders review the revised AR 600-100 (dated 05 April 2017) and understand the counterproductive leadership behaviors and their definitions according to regulation. The Army expects its leaders to exhibit appropriate behavior in order to optimize organization effectiveness and climate, develop mutual trust, and facilitate mission accomplishment. Army leaders can also address these issues through mandatory performance and professional growth counseling and utilize self-awareness programs such as the Commander 360 (CDR360), Leader 360 (formerly MSAF360) and Unit 360 (commander-directed organizational event). Teaching and training our Soldiers, leaders and Army Civilians to identify and resolve counterproductive leadership issues are paramount components for maintaining our status as the greatest Army in the world.

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Diley entered active duty as a 13A, Field Artillery Officer, in 1997. He has served in various positions including Chief of Cannons with TRADOC Capabilities Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires, Senior FSCOORD for Ministry of Interior Ministerial Advisor Group and Brigade Operations Officer for 214th Fires Brigade. LTC Diley has been serving as the Command Inspector General at the Office of the Inspector General, USAFCoEFS since June 2017.

"Droit-et-Avant"

"Right, then Forward"

Office of the Inspector General

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